BUK SAM system Thread

Stealthflanker wrote:Well apparently BUK M2E didn't perform good in Syria.

Just wondering what the hell was wrong with Syrian IADS ? Gratz to Pantsyr anyway.

Viktor wrote:

We are just not able to analize anything because all we have is a few photos from lucky camerman who took few shots and placed them on the net.

Stealthflanker wrote:Yes. that's true, Nonetheless just saw some ppl "celebrating" It in social media..calling Buk perform worse.. etc.. Without any further criticism on what happened.

Stealthflanker wrote:Well apparently BUK M2E didn't perform good in Syria.

Just wondering what the hell was wrong with Syrian IADS ? Gratz to Pantsyr anyway.

TheArmenian wrote:
How do you know it was BUK?

How do you know whatever missile actually hit or missed the Israeli Popeye?

How can you make conclusion based on almost zero information?

TR1 wrote:Poor mans S-350 at this point.

TR1 wrote:How is an S-350 THAT much more bulky than Buk? The tracked footprint is large by itself. Buk also does not have a single multipurpose Radar unit unlike S-350E, so in terms of total vehicles you might have an even bigger footprint.
Yes, there are mobility differences between wheels and tracks, but actual system components are not much larger. Hell, the 9M96 is a smaller missile.

Most export operators take wheeled units in any case, so in that case the Buks tracks work against it. In any case, you can put Buk on a wheeled MZKT chassis.

S-350E is sold with 60km range, Buk was, what, 70km last I checked? Of course we all know S-350 range can be extended to 120km+ with ease, unlike Buk which is already at the limit of its envelope.

Their up time form march is probably identical- old S-300 could do it in 5 minutes.
Reload time? S-350 has 12 rounds PER VEHICLE, Buk has only 6.
Buk-m3 is supposed to have active-seeker missiles...just like S-350. If bought without them....seems an awful lot like a poor-mans S-350.....

Obviously there are differences, but the two overlap massively as well.

If I am an export buyer, both would be considered, since they roughly have the same range and footprint size. Buk has worse characteristics almost across the board, from radar to missiles.
Yes, it has the advantage of radar on every TEL vehicle....but that makes each battery very expensive....might end up costing as much as the conceptually much newer S-350E.

Yes yes I am well aware of the Russian military reqs these vehicles came from (though this is yet another symptom of Russian inability to standardize anything), but if you are looking for a Russian SAM bellow the S-400....it would be these two. I personally would be more interested in putting S-350E on tracks and calling it a day.

TR1 wrote:If S-300V can be put on tracks, you can bet S-350E can. They might need to shave down on missile number per TEL, but I would bet they can stuff 12 on each one.

Buk-M3 should be able to fire just using its TEL but keep in mind the radar is fairly limited on its own, as it is meant to have battery level early warning and tracking sets.

If it was up to me, I would dump Buk altogether. Instead, integrate S-300V4 with 9M96 missiles, and buy tracked Pantsir-S1 for close in defense and attach it to S-300V4 units.

sepheronx wrote:Any reason why they didn't make it a vertical launch system?

"Alexander G. Luzan - Doctor of Technical Sciences, State Prize of the Russian Federation in the field of science and technology, Lieutenant General in retirement, from 1982 to 1992 - deputy commander (chief) of the Air Defense Forces Land Forces for armaments - chief engineer troops CB defense"

Research and experiments, including the conduct of experimental firings show that quite effectively and with minimal financial and time-consuming to solve this problem is possible by using modern multi-channel anti-aircraft missile system of medium-range (AAMS DM) "Buk-M2", and short term - "Buk-M3."

AAMS firing system "Buk-M2" as part of a multi-channel radar illumination and guidance (RPN) and puskozaryazhayuschih units (ROM) provides for the passage of fire zones 8-12, and with the self-propelled fire installation (SDA), a member other than RPN and ROM in the antiaircraft missile batteries - 12-18 cruise missiles at the height of their flight 10 m or more. A total of S "Buk-M2" (anti-aircraft missile battalion) provides 24 target channel, ie it can simultaneously bombard 24 air targets, and for the passage of the affected area - 32-46 aerial targets.

By American standards, worked out as a result of combat use of cruise missiles "Tomahawk" and spent the estimates "... to defeat the object of the" medium-sized enterprise "or" airport "is required from 8-10 to 15-20 cruise missiles with the possibility of opposing forces and air defense systems. Consumption needs of these weapons to destroy target area of ​​the "terrorist camp" with the destruction of up to 70% situated therein personnel may be from 4-5 to 10-11 rockets. "

Thus, the AAMS "Buk-M2" certainly capable to reflect the expected raid outfit KR operating at extremely low altitudes. In this case, the probability of hitting one of the KR-Zour in the system "Buk-M2" is higher than that of S family of S-300P, due to the implementation in the tap changer (SDA) mode recognition target type and adaptation of military equipment under the recognized type of missiles hitting targets. The same mode reduces the average consumption per missiles hit by a goal. In addition, AAMS SAM "Buk-M2" cheaper than the main rocket family of S-300P, which is important.

BET Russian producers

Compare the capabilities of S "Buk-M2" and the family of S-300P With anti-cruise missile makes sense because only these vehicles have special devices to raise a considerable height (20-30 m) antenna systems-fire radar systems to extend the range line of sight, and thus enhancing the far boundaries of the affected area of ​​cruise missiles operating at extremely low altitudes.

According to the maximum range of the defeat of these goals possible commensurate systems (AAMS "Buk-M2" only 6% loses S-300PM2 by hitting range). However, the deployment of towers to lift the antenna systems in S-300PM2 almost 20 times, and its cost - 7.8 times higher than that of the telescopic tilt-up devices AAMS "Buk-M2". In addition, the tower, which is equipped with S-300PM2 commercially manufactures and supplies from abroad (Kramatorsk, Ukraine), and tilt-telescopic device AAMS "Buk-M2" produced in Russia.

AAMS "Buk-M2" also provides an effective fight against tactical ballistic missiles and tactical classes and a high probability of their defeat, again due to the implementation of the system mode type detection purposes and adaptation of military equipment SAM. The studies were conducted by experienced combat shooting at targets not only imitating these ballistic missiles, but even on a relatively small-sized rockets MLRS "Smerch".

Of adopting the new generation of SD AAMS "Buk-M3" has even higher performance. In our country and abroad anti-aircraft missile systems "Buk-M2" and "Buk-M3" counterparts do not have. Has not yet passed the test of S-350 "Vityaz" in the fight against the above objectives, as shown by analysis of a priori will have a lower combat capabilities due to the peculiarities inherent in her technical solutions.

The application of the system of protection of critical facilities of S-range C-300PM2 "Favorite" and S-400 "Triumph" as unpromising and unjustified, since such systems are expensive, redundant on a number of non-critical characteristics Parry BSU and as a result essentially lose protection systems based air defense missile systems "Buk-M2 - M3" in terms of "cost-effectiveness".

In this regard, it is necessary to consider the AAMS CD "Buk-M2" basic building block for high performance CVD critical facilities (areas) and it is advisable to consider extending the series production of S DM "Buk-M2" and equipping them as the Air Defense Forces Land Forces (in modification "Buk-M2") and troops EKO (a modification of "Buk-M2-1"). In the short term, these functions must be performed AAMS "Buk-M3" various modifications. On the same system must be in the future and to assign functions to combat future space-planning system and other hypersonic means.

Combat stability SPECIAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS

The system of protection of critical facilities (districts) should be not only highly efficient but also have a high combat stability when subjected to special means of combating it appointed to its defeat in the initial period of operations (for example, a special tier suppression of air defense of the "Wild Weasel" ). Saving combat performance ("survival") must provide reliable protection system recognition of further major shocks SVKN and WTO covers the object. This is clearly confirmed the war in Yugoslavia.

Research and practical experiments have shown that achieve high survivability homogeneous grouping of air defense and its efficiency is not possible. The creation of so-called mixed groups in the classic sense, when dissimilar air defense assets are used with different positions (position areas) and controls each with their command post, fundamentally does not solve the problem.

Solution to the problem of survival of air defense and defense systems based on them have been found by the joint use of these funds in a specific combination, that is based on the creation of homogeneous (monogamous) SAM and SAM systems combined (polygamous) reconnaissance and fire fighting equipment (modules).

Polygamous combat modules allow defense at times to increase resistance against shocks anti-radar missiles (PRR) and the WTO, to maintain the system's ability to protect securely covered up to defend the object of subsequent major strokes SVKN and generally increase the efficiency of their defeat in typical raids (such as Iraq, Yugoslavia , Lebanon) to 0.9 or more.

Naturally, air defense systems that are part of a polygamous defense system should function in a unified information-management space, created as part of the same automated reconnaissance and fire defense groups and managed from a single command center.

Research, natural-digital simulation and a number of experimental firings showed that almost create a polygamous defense system most appropriate by the introduction of the AAMS CD "Buk-M2" combat vehicles short-range air defense missile systems "Tor-M2" (two MB SAM "trafficking in M2 "rather than two SDA and two ROM AAMS" Buk-M2 ") and completion of S KP" Buk-M2 "for combat operation" Tor-M2 "in a single information-management space. This can significantly increase the chances of a polygamous system of self-defense in the fight against the RDP type "Harm" to maintain its fighting capacity and combat potential.

Calculations and fragments of field tests show that polygamous (joint) use of non-upgraded even AAMS "Buk-M1-2" and "Tor-M1" in a single information space control improves the efficiency of groups of more than 2.5 times, and the stability of the defeat anti-radar missiles (PRR) of the "Harm" - 8-12 times. Joint combat use SAM AAMS and new modifications "Buk-M2" and "Tor-M2" will achieve even better results and save for such means polygamous status of modern weapons to the level of 30-35-ies.

By the way, this question back in 1998 to report to the Chief of the General Staff, was it approved, planned for implementation, but later "successfully swing" military officials.

A further increase in the combat capabilities of systems to protect critical facilities-based air defense missile systems "Buk-M2" + "Tor-M2" is possible by introducing a missile seeker AAMS "Buk-M2" ("Buk-M3"), a special regime of passive DF producer of active interference and homing in on him. This offer is for a long time and is considering offers for sale here, but was virtually done by Chinese specialists in imported from Russia S-300PMU (Chinese name of S - FM-2000). The introduction of such a regime in the AAMS "Buk-M2 - M3" will dramatically change the balance of combat potentials in favor of air defense and make problematic use of active interference with the offensive boards manned and unmanned aircraft, as itself an obstacle becomes a source of information.

The structure of "Tor-M2" (in the SAM), the introduction of a functional means of destruction (explosion generators). This will ensure effective control of such specific purposes as midget and small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), acting directly on critical facilities in the immediate operational and tactical depth.

It should be emphasized that this study, natural-digital simulation and experimental firings, which were mentioned above, showed that significantly improve survival systems protect critical objects in a massive impact on them PRR type "Harm" and other WTO was only when introduced into the composition of these groups BM "Tor - M2".

Multifunctional system

As part of a polygamous CVD critical facilities-based air defense missile systems (SAM) "Buk-M2" + "Tor-M2" is supposed to create a multi-site reconnaissance and targeting (URC). System of communication and data exchange URC and the GCC as a whole to have an open, envisaging it as a "gateway" means of obtaining information from early warning systems, regional formations and units of EKR and air defense military commands.

The structure of the GCC PSBs should also include means for creating interference and reduce the effectiveness of space-based navigation systems such as GPS and avionics manned and unmanned SVKN (EW equipment). Previously, units and parts EW, although included in the Air Defense Forces, are fairly autonomously, and from the Air Defense Forces Land Forces have been withdrawn, are included in the Ground Forces as an independent branch of service and also used virtually autonomously. This has led not only to improve the efficiency of air defense groups, as to the need to address additional problems encountered by agreement of hostilities.

However, the possibility of EW on the joint fight against SVKN, especially when coordinated action together with the AAMS (SAM) for CVD in a single information space control appreciated enough, major integrated research on this subject has been conducted, although the contribution of EW in improving the efficiency of security systems expect.

However, information on the composition and construction of EW subsystems, including SVKN using these systems GPS, enough is confidential and may be viewed and discussed the formation of the tactical and technical specifications for concrete protection system.

The same applies to the subsystem protection of critical facilities from terrorist attacks and attacks enemy ground. But not because of confidentiality, but rather a feature of the construction of a security subsystem depending on the dislocation of the object cover in a particular region or a country. However, such a subsystem in the protection of the PSB should be and function in a single information space with the control by other means.

SOME RESULTS

In conclusion, we must again emphasize the fact that in modern conditions the creation and deployment of highly specialized systems for the protection of critical (critical) sites is extremely important.

This approach is precisely focused on countering asymmetric development and deployment of expensive high-precision weapons systems, cruise missiles, including long-range, and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones fighting) in most advanced countries, and the possibility of applying a material (unacceptable) impact on our strategic nuclear forces and other critical facilities.

Proposals for the establishment of special protection systems are based on the use of commercially available weapons and actually do not require significant additional financial and material costs.

It is hoped that the need for special protection systems particularly important (critical) sites (areas) will be evaluated, offers them demanded and accepted for implementation in our armed forces, and interested foreign customers, and build the structure, the basics of combat employment and functioning as part of the GCC troops EKR and defense in the theater - be the subject of discussion in the media.