Novorossiya Armed Forces (NAF)

Milkavkaz's view on the NAF or VSN;

http://www.milkavkaz.net/2016/07/vooruzhennye-sily-dnr-i-lnr-boevoj-i-chislennyj-sostav.html

T-72's in use with the "Diesel" separate Tank BTG of the Donetsk Militia;

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2141978.html

List of equipment with vehicle numbers from the NAF Motor Rifle brigades and regiments;

http://mishaxaxa.livejournal.com/15244.html

eehnie wrote:

franco wrote:List of equipment with vehicle numbers from the NAF Motor Rifle brigades and regiments;

http://mishaxaxa.livejournal.com/15244.html

It is very interesting.

In some cases, like the BMP-2, BTR-70 and 2S9, the number is exactly the expected after the analisys of the data offered by lostarmour.info.
In the case of the 2S1, T-72, BTR-80, MT-LB, BMP-1 and T-64 is higher, but it is necessary to take into account also the material captured in Crimea before to talk about supplies of different origin.
Also there are some types of weapons that are not listed, like the GMZ-3, 2S19, 2S5, MT-T, BM-27, 2S3, BRDM-2, BMD-1, BTR-60 and T-55 (engineering variant), but Novorussia should have some unit captured from Ukraine (less than 10 in every case except the BRDM-2).

There are two artillery brigades not listed which hold all the heavy artillery and MRLS along with 2 reconnaissance battalions also not listed.

A small remark on a possible new aggravation in the Donbass

On the fact of the campaign of 2014, the Debalce campaign of the winter of 2015, many expected the offensive of the VSN to the north and west, with the aim of destroying the APU. With rear support from Russia. That is, the application of the strategy of contrition (based on the classic division of the strategy) with rather large human sacrifices and resource costs.

It was from this understanding of the situation that a private initiative of the head of one of the departments of the young DNR, approved by the leadership of the republic, was associated with the unsuccessful attack of Maryinka in June 2015. Shares, poorly coordinated and prepared, and therefore turned into great victims.

However, over time, the fighting subsided, resulting in positional duels and the activities of the DRG (sabotage and reconnaissance groups) along the front line (and also in the depths of the young republics of the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Germany - in connection with the creation of Ukraine's own centralized special operations forces, which was legally formalized on July 26, 2016 of the year). Little by little, there were fewer forecasts for the intensification of hostilities - in connection with the reduction of the bloodshed of the conflict. The true format of the confrontation has become obvious: a war of attrition or a war of decay (the exact opposite of contrition - according to all the same I understand strategies in the classical sense).

"Window of Opportunity" ("Overton window") then opened, then closed in the minds of the politically active part of the population. That is because of the election of the US president, because of the season change in Ukraine (winter, spring mudslide and so on). The next "Overton window" will open in May or in the summer of this year, which does not mean, however, the intensification of hostilities for that period.

Brief assessment of prospects:

As of December 30, 2016, LDNR (or the young republics of Donbass - which is the better term?) Gave the following estimates for MAT:

1. DNR: personnel - 32 thousand 438 people, tanks - 213 units, artillery installations with caliber 152 and 122 mm - 351 units, mortars with a caliber of 82 and 120 mm - 198 units, MLRS - 84 units, armored combat vehicles - 1154.

2. LLR: personnel - 19,464 thousand people, tanks - 186 units, artillery installations caliber 152 and 122 mm - 235 units.

Apparently, this was considered against each of the republics and the figures needed to be summarized. Thus, the AFU grouping "in the ATU zone" for the finals of 2016 very strongly "sank" in the autumn (52 thousand in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, a certain number of "departmental" and in the national formations - in the amount of 60-65 thousand bayonets). Approximately 20 thousand bayonets.

At the same time, part of the forces (the same 128th Mountain Infantry Brigade, known by Debaltsevo) received an order for rotation under the New Year and met New Year's Eve in echelons near Kiev. Those. "Subsidence" was associated with the elementary sending of personnel to homes: January 17-18, the 128th Brigade is already full "shines" under Stanitsa Luganskaya.

Part of the personnel of the 55th artillery brigade is celebrated in celebrations in Zaporozhye, the 57th is on vacation in Kherson, 92nd is under steam in Kharkov. In general, parts were taken.

For comparison, here's how the founders of the unfriendly resource Milkavkaz (which means the need to evaluate this resource with a certain amount of skepticism) were assessed by the VSN (admittedly, as of summer 2016):

True, according to these data, the VSN has at least 50-60 thousand bayonets in its staff, at least 320 tanks (apparently, the figure is understated - according to the resulted OLS is obtained much more, not less than 400 machines), hundreds of artillery systems. All this - including departmental structures, which gives a difference from the generally accepted estimates of 32-35 thousand military personnel (the latter, perhaps, only the Corps). However, in fact, apparently, staffing has never been.

In addition, the LDPR have a prepared reserve (the number of which alone for the summer of 2016 was at least 30-40 thousand infantry), which, together with detachments of volunteers from Russia with full mobilization, can give more than 100 thousand people in the ranks of the VSN, which will be resisted Comparable or (maybe) even a slightly smaller number of APU - whose command still holds a part of the forces on Perekop and near Odessa (where the exercises take place).

All this - for 426 kilometers of the front, most of which relies on a highly urbanized area (dense urban development) and the Kalmius River and Seversky Donets. Accordingly, there is as yet no talk of an operation analogous to Operation Storm conducted in the Serbian Krajina in 1995 by Croats.

There are estimates for February 11: "The total number of up to 89 950 people, battalions and BTG - 75 tanks to 432, MLRS to 206, BBM to 2085."

Those. For the month (from early January to early February), the strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces increased by about one and a half times, from 60 to 90 thousand bayonets, while the amount of equipment increased insignificantly - the same tanks by 30-35 units (just pulled from the rear, drawn and Sent on vacation for New Year's staff).

However, the justification of this figure - "90 thousand" bayonets - raises certain doubts. No, of course, the main trend of the Russian mass media today (with reference to the situation in the Donbass) is "we are weak, they are strong." However, there are legitimate reasons to believe that the named number of "90 thousand" exists today only on paper.

A hundred years ago, surviving the internal systemic crisis, the Russian Empire was defeated in the First World War. The Provisional Government that came to power, the legislative acts it adopted, and the actual establishment of a dual power in the country led to the collapse of the front. Hundreds of thousands and millions of soldiers moved home from the war zone, taking with them rifles and other government material.

Something similar with the New Year began to happen in Ukraine. At the beginning of January 2017, President Poroshenko, guided by not entirely understandable convictions, signed a law (earlier, in early December 2016, adopted by the Rada of Ukraine) "On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Improving the Procedure for Military Service."

Among other measures in this legislative act, servicemen of Ukraine serving under the contract were given the right to early termination of the contract (subject to a service life of up to 2 years, true). Moreover, such a measure was preceded by a general set-up for the contract service of persons sent to the "ATU zone" in 2016, with the replacement of "departmental officers" and those who served there on an urgent basis. That is, the combatant was given a legitimate right to leave the risk area without any recognition of his desertion and criminal prosecution under the laws of Ukraine.

The consequences that this leads to can be seen in the examples below. The APU today is about four dozen different brigades (tank, mechanized, airmobile and artillery), without taking into account others and taking into account the newly revived units. Numerically, this should be very much (approximately 5,000 bayonets on average per brigade), but in fact much less.

So, more than a quarter of the staff of the Nicholas 79th Airmobile Brigade filed an application for dismissal in April because of a systematic non-payment of salaries. Today the brigade has 1700 people (according to the state of war time - 5400 bayonets). Taking into account the April "exodus" (482 troops) and the subsequent May (800 more soldiers) by the summer, the brigade will represent a consolidated battalion level unit (400-500 bayonets), which is not capable of solving the tasks assigned to it.

There are other data. So, in February, the 72nd mechanized brigade of the APU was actually withdrawn from the line of contact in connection with the scale of dismissals and desertions. 128th Brigade is also present in the Luhansk direction only partly (recently its units were again noted at the family site in Transcarpathia).

This is somewhat more than the expected "10% of those who left" out of the number of 70,000 contractors, whom on January 11, 2017, the deputy head of the Main Directorate of Staff of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Colonel Mark Andrusyak, pathetically stated.

As a result, the maximum outflow of personnel from the ranks of the APU is expected by the summer. Information that is silently hushed up in the media (however, the first alarming bells, as seen above, are). This period coincides with the time of the most optimal season for an offensive in Ukraine ("when the earth dries").

While that while the APU is decreasing - VSN is getting stronger, replaying in the positional struggle. Estimations of the potential of the operational command forces of Donetsk and Lugansk for today are the ultimate reason for confusion (some spreads "from 300 to 700 tanks" and "from 30 to 70 thousand" personnel, without their layout, what they cost). Moreover, the transition from a winning strategy to a no less victorious strategy of contrition (the transition from defense to offensive - what Napoleon Bonaparte called "the most complicated operation") - is always possible after reaching a certain level.

The new "Window Overton" will open with the onset of heat - May and summer. It is necessary to wait this season.