Russian Navy: Status & News #2

Navy Day Rehearsal in Sevastopol

The creation of the regular Russian Navy dates back to the reign of Peter the Great. During the Second Azov Campaign against Turkey in 1696, Russia used 2 warships, 4 fireships, 23 galleys and 1,300 longboats built at river shipyard in Voronezh. After the seizure of the Azov fortress the Boyar Duma issued a decree on commencing the construction of the navy on October 20, 1696.

This date is considered the official birthday of the regular Russian Navy.

In keeping with President Vladimir Putin’s decree, Navy Day is annually marked in Russia on July 31.

Russian Navy will not reduce program of warship construction — media

Izvestiya daily wrote that main efforts of the Navy are currently focused on constructing the Leader nuclear-powered destroyer, Storm aircraft carrier, Lavina large helicopter carriers

MOSCOW, August 1. /TASS/. Russia’s Navy does not plan to reduce the program of constructing warships, Navy’s Deputy Commander for Weapons, Vice Admiral Viktor Bursuk told Izvestiya daily on Monday.

"There are several options of implementing the promising program, but no decision has been made yet by the Supreme Commander on the new program of fleet construction," Bursuk said.

Izvestiya wrote that main efforts of the Navy are currently focused on constructing the Leader nuclear-powered destroyer, Storm aircraft carrier, Lavina large helicopter carriers.

The new nuclear-powered destroyer Leader will be constructed in the framework of the "Stealth" concept. The power capacity of the reactor will also allow to install new types of weapons on the ship - laser or electromagnetic guns.

Designers say the Storm project is ready. However, it requires some adjustment due to long-term construction. Designing a new large helicopter carrier will start next year, Bursuk added.


More:
http://tass.ru/en/defense/891783

George1 wrote:Russian Navy will not reduce program of warship construction — media

Izvestiya daily wrote that main efforts of the Navy are currently focused on constructing the Leader nuclear-powered destroyer, Storm aircraft carrier, Lavina large helicopter carriers

MOSCOW, August 1. /TASS/. Russia’s Navy does not plan to reduce the program of constructing warships, Navy’s Deputy Commander for Weapons, Vice Admiral Viktor Bursuk told Izvestiya daily on Monday.

"There are several options of implementing the promising program, but no decision has been made yet by the Supreme Commander on the new program of fleet construction," Bursuk said.

Izvestiya wrote that main efforts of the Navy are currently focused on constructing the Leader nuclear-powered destroyer, Storm aircraft carrier, Lavina large helicopter carriers.

The new nuclear-powered destroyer Leader will be constructed in the framework of the "Stealth" concept. The power capacity of the reactor will also allow to install new types of weapons on the ship - laser or electromagnetic guns.

Designers say the Storm project is ready. However, it requires some adjustment due to long-term construction. Designing a new large helicopter carrier will start next year, Bursuk added.


More:
http://tass.ru/en/defense/891783

Very logical to me. I expect Russia opens as fast as possible new production lines for the Project 23560 destroyer/cruiser and the Project 23000E aircraft Carrier.

While we see early decommissions the Russian fleet is still in reduction mode, but they need to open production lines for modern ships of every type to keep the fleet modern, and these (destroyer, cruiser and aircraft carriers) were the last types of ships without a modern model in production.

They money recovered from the failed purchase of the Mistral ships will likely be used in the impulse of the opening of these new lines of production. In my view this can be better still for Russia than to have the two Mistrals in service today.

JohninMK wrote:MOSCOW (Sputnik) — Russia's St. Petersburg-based Malakhit design bureau said Monday it had signed a contract with the Defense Ministry to design a fifth-generation multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarine with construction to start sometime after 2020.

"A contract has been signed with the Defense Ministry on the development of a new-generation [nuclear] vessel. It is realistic to say that the construction may start after 2020," Malakhit's General Director Vladimir Dorofeev said in an interview with the Echo Moskvy radio.

This still leaves room for several Yasen class subs to be built before new ones are laid down.

JohninMK wrote:MOSCOW (Sputnik) — Russia's St. Petersburg-based Malakhit design bureau said Monday it had signed a contract with the Defense Ministry to design a fifth-generation multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarine with construction to start sometime after 2020.

"A contract has been signed with the Defense Ministry on the development of a new-generation [nuclear] vessel. It is realistic to say that the construction may start after 2020," Malakhit's General Director Vladimir Dorofeev said in an interview with the Echo Moskvy radio.

The design cycle in Russia is impressive. From ICBMs to nuclear submarines there is evolution on a less than 10 year time scale.
Yet more evidence that the NATO prattle about "Russia doesn't make anything" is retarded spew by insecure inadequates.

Russian warship Yaroslav Mudry starts anti-piracy mission in Gulf of Aden

More:
http://tass.com/defense/894901

It seems that there are some problems in the navy

---

Weak Light at the End of the Tunnel

In recognition of Navy Day several weeks back, Mikhail Khodarenok examined the current state of the Russian Navy for Gazeta.ru.

Khodarenok offers a pessimistic assessment of the navy’s shipbuilding program.  He notes there is still significant disagreement over what to build.  The navy, he argues, has also lost some of its bureaucratic heft when it comes to planning for shipbuilding as well as for the operational employment of naval forces.


Late of Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer, Mr. Khodarenok — you’ll recall — is an ex-General Staff officer and serious military journalist.  He shares interesting and credible opinions from several well-placed former naval officers in his article.

According to him, all observers agree that the start of serial construction of ships after more than 20 years is “one of the most important vectors of the fleet’s current development.”  This might seem obvious, but it’s not widely appreciated.

Khodarenok walks quickly through the current construction program:

• four proyekt 20380 corvettes in the fleet with eight on the buildingways;
  

• three proyekt 11356 frigates delivered, others uncertain;
  

• proyekt 22350 frigates under construction;
  

• six proyekt 636.3 diesel-electric submarines complete, six more for the Pacific Fleet to be built in 2017-2020;
  

• proyekt 955 Borey-class SSBN is a success with three delivered;
  

• a single proyekt 885 Yasen-class SSN has reached the fleet, others will likely not arrive until after 2020.
  

One can quibble with his points.  For example, it’s premature to declare Borey a success when its Bulava SLBM still hasn’t been accepted into the navy’s inventory (NVO made this point flatly on 12 August).  Perhaps Borey is a success, but only in comparison to Yasen.

Khodarenok doesn’t dwell on these points, and his general themes are of greater interest.

He quotes former deputy chief of the Navy Main Staff, Vice-Admiral Vladimir Pepelyayev:

“Serial production is generally a very big deal.  It has big pluses in the deployment plan, lowering costs of subsequent ships in the series compared with the lead unit, and simplification of training personnel for new ships.”

According to Khodarenok, Pepelyayev feels there is light at the end of the tunnel for the navy, but it’s dim and flickering because navy ship construction “fully reflects the realities and condition of the Russian shipbuilding industry,” and not just shipbuilding.

Pepelyayev continues:

“A ship is a visible and material reflection of practically all the technological capabilities of the state.  In a word, we build that which we can build.”

Khodarenok adds:

“Specialists believe that another fifteen years are still needed to recover after many types of restructuring, the 1990s, and the hiatus in fleet construction at the beginning of the 2000s.”

Turning to the sore point of gas turbine engines, Khodarenok writes that Rybinsk may well be able to make them for the Russian Navy by 2017-2018, but someone still needs to replace the reduction gears also once made for navy ships in Ukraine.  This is a more difficult task.  The Zvezda plant in St. Petersburg has gotten the job.

Ex-deputy CINC of the Navy for Armaments Vice-Admiral Nikolay Borisov says:

“This is a highly complex task — highly complex and modern equipment, particularly gear cutters, are needed to work with high-alloy steel.  Whether this task will be completed at Zvezda is an open question.  Many specialists doubt the enterprise’s capability to handle the task in the established timeframe.”

Khodarenok turns to the proposed nuclear-powered destroyer Lider (proyekt 23560), concluding there isn’t agreement among specialists whether the fleet even needs this ship. An unnamed highly-placed source tells him the fleet needs 20 frigates more than 15 frigates and five Lider destroyers.  The source continues:

“Lider will be a ship of the second half of the 21st century.  However, there are no new weapons which correspond to the second half of the 21st century for it.  There’s just no sense in building a hull and power plant.”

Retired Rear-Admiral Yuriy Gorev, who was involved in ship acquisition, tells Khodarenok that the navy should continue building corvettes and frigates while continuing development of Lider. But the new destroyer shouldn’t be a goal of the fleet’s near-term plans.

Next, the always-pregnant question of aircraft carriers…

An unnamed Navy Main Staff source says:

“Today there are no conditions for the construction of a ship of such a design.  No buildingway, no drydock.  There is simply nowhere to build an aircraft carrier.”

“The construction of such ships should be realized for concrete tasks, but today the Russian Navy simply doesn’t have such missions.”

“And with further development of aviation, aircraft carriers could even die out altogether as a class.”

Recall that MOD armaments tsar Yuriy Borisov said an aircraft carrier contract won’t be signed until late 2025, and there are three existing “not bad” designs for it.

Former chief of the naval “direction” (department, i.e. not a major bureaucratic entity) of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate (GOU), Rear-Admiral Arkadiy Syroyezhko believes there are no insurmountable obstacles to the construction of a nuclear-powered strike carrier in Russia.  He thinks Sevmash could handle the job since it was originally conceived as a yard for major surface combatants and later concentrated on submarines.

But Syroyezhko admits, without preparation to support carriers, Russia could end up with extremely expensive, sporadically constructed carriers. Today, he concludes, Russia is able to fulfill combat missions typically placed on carriers by other means.

Changing gears, Khodarenok covers the state of play in the Russian Navy’s Main Staff.

According to him, specialists unanimously report that the operational-strategic component has disappeared from the Main Staff’s work.  It no longer plans for the fleet’s employment — for strategic operations in oceanic theaters of military operations.  The naval planning job has gone to Russia’s operational-strategic commands (military districts) and the four geographic fleets (as the operational-strategic large formations of those MDs).  

A Main Staff source tells Khodarenok that the MD commanders have come up with disparate rules for directing the fleets subordinate to them.  The source says the disappearance of a naval component in GOU planning began with the downgrading of the GOU’s naval directorate to a “direction,” and with the concomitant reduction in the quality of its naval staff officers.

Khodarenok writes there is confusion today over what ships to build, how many, what tactical-technical capabilities they should have, and what missions they should perform. The Navy CINC has “no rights” but many demands made of him in this regard.


The Navy CINC’s responsibilities for procurement intersect with those of the MOD’s state defense order (GOZ) support department.  It’s unclear exactly where their respective authorities begin and end.  The Main Staff source says all sorts of nonsense result from the confusion.

Still, the CINC has to answer for almost everything that happens in the fleet, according to Khodarenok.

The Navy Main Command’s (Glavkomat’s) move to St. Petersburg was a big mistake, but a return to Moscow would be equally disruptive.  A Glavkomat source tells Khodarenok, as long as the leadership sends people to Vladivostok or elsewhere twice a week over the littlest issues, it really doesn’t matter where the headquarters is.

Khodarenok sums everything this way:

“In other words, there are more than a few problems in the fleet today.  It undoubtedly won’t do to put their resolution on the back burner.  They won’t disappear somewhere from there.”

Source:
https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2016/08/29/weak-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel/

Benya wrote:It seems that there are some problems in the navy

...Why are people still posting Groenburg's trash. Is posting his articles a new form of trolling? Like I said before...Groenburg's articles are as trustworthy as a Jeffrey Dahmer veggie burger!

magnumcromagnon wrote:

Benya wrote:It seems that there are some problems in the navy

...Why are people still posting Groenburg's trash. Is posting his articles a new form of trolling? Like I said before...Groenburg's articles are as trustworthy as a Jeffrey Dahmer veggie burger!

That was him? I did not click on the link but I did not recognize him without his trademark ''Russian engines are inferior to Ukrainian'' line.

He must be getting wee bit smarter...

magnumcromagnon wrote:

Benya wrote:It seems that there are some problems in the navy

...Why are people still posting Groenburg's trash. Is posting his articles a new form of trolling? Like I said before...Groenburg's articles are as trustworthy as a Jeffrey Dahmer veggie burger!

Actually, who the heck is that "Groenburg" guy? Is he a paid ukrainian or israeli or NATO guy who claims himself a military expert?

Benya wrote:It seems that there are some problems in the navy

---

Weak Light at the End of the Tunnel

In recognition of Navy Day several weeks back, Mikhail Khodarenok examined the current state of the Russian Navy for Gazeta.ru.

Khodarenok offers a pessimistic assessment of the navy’s shipbuilding program.  He notes there is still significant disagreement over what to build.  The navy, he argues, has also lost some of its bureaucratic heft when it comes to planning for shipbuilding as well as for the operational employment of naval forces.

Black Sea Fleet Nanuchka III-class PGG Shtil in the Navy Day Parade

Late of Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer, Mr. Khodarenok — you’ll recall — is an ex-General Staff officer and serious military journalist.  He shares interesting and credible opinions from several well-placed former naval officers in his article.

According to him, all observers agree that the start of serial construction of ships after more than 20 years is “one of the most important vectors of the fleet’s current development.”  This might seem obvious, but it’s not widely appreciated.

Khodarenok walks quickly through the current construction program:

• four proyekt 20380 corvettes in the fleet with eight on the buildingways;
  

• three proyekt 11356 frigates delivered, others uncertain;
  

• proyekt 22350 frigates under construction;
  

• six proyekt 636.3 diesel-electric submarines complete, six more for the Pacific Fleet to be built in 2017-2020;
  

• proyekt 955 Borey-class SSBN is a success with three delivered;
  

• a single proyekt 885 Yasen-class SSN has reached the fleet, others will likely not arrive until after 2020.
  

One can quibble with his points.  For example, it’s premature to declare Borey a success when its Bulava SLBM still hasn’t been accepted into the navy’s inventory (NVO made this point flatly on 12 August).  Perhaps Borey is a success, but only in comparison to Yasen.

Khodarenok doesn’t dwell on these points, and his general themes are of greater interest.

He quotes former deputy chief of the Navy Main Staff, Vice-Admiral Vladimir Pepelyayev:

“Serial production is generally a very big deal.  It has big pluses in the deployment plan, lowering costs of subsequent ships in the series compared with the lead unit, and simplification of training personnel for new ships.”

According to Khodarenok, Pepelyayev feels there is light at the end of the tunnel for the navy, but it’s dim and flickering because navy ship construction “fully reflects the realities and condition of the Russian shipbuilding industry,” and not just shipbuilding.

Pepelyayev continues:

“A ship is a visible and material reflection of practically all the technological capabilities of the state.  In a word, we build that which we can build.”

Khodarenok adds:

“Specialists believe that another fifteen years are still needed to recover after many types of restructuring, the 1990s, and the hiatus in fleet construction at the beginning of the 2000s.”

Turning to the sore point of gas turbine engines, Khodarenok writes that Rybinsk may well be able to make them for the Russian Navy by 2017-2018, but someone still needs to replace the reduction gears also once made for navy ships in Ukraine.  This is a more difficult task.  The Zvezda plant in St. Petersburg has gotten the job.

Ex-deputy CINC of the Navy for Armaments Vice-Admiral Nikolay Borisov says:

“This is a highly complex task — highly complex and modern equipment, particularly gear cutters, are needed to work with high-alloy steel.  Whether this task will be completed at Zvezda is an open question.  Many specialists doubt the enterprise’s capability to handle the task in the established timeframe.”

Khodarenok turns to the proposed nuclear-powered destroyer Lider (proyekt 23560), concluding there isn’t agreement among specialists whether the fleet even needs this ship. An unnamed highly-placed source tells him the fleet needs 20 frigates more than 15 frigates and five Lider destroyers.  The source continues:

“Lider will be a ship of the second half of the 21st century.  However, there are no new weapons which correspond to the second half of the 21st century for it.  There’s just no sense in building a hull and power plant.”

Retired Rear-Admiral Yuriy Gorev, who was involved in ship acquisition, tells Khodarenok that the navy should continue building corvettes and frigates while continuing development of Lider. But the new destroyer shouldn’t be a goal of the fleet’s near-term plans.

Next, the always-pregnant question of aircraft carriers…

An unnamed Navy Main Staff source says:

“Today there are no conditions for the construction of a ship of such a design.  No buildingway, no drydock.  There is simply nowhere to build an aircraft carrier.”

“The construction of such ships should be realized for concrete tasks, but today the Russian Navy simply doesn’t have such missions.”

“And with further development of aviation, aircraft carriers could even die out altogether as a class.”

Recall that MOD armaments tsar Yuriy Borisov said an aircraft carrier contract won’t be signed until late 2025, and there are three existing “not bad” designs for it.

Former chief of the naval “direction” (department, i.e. not a major bureaucratic entity) of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate (GOU), Rear-Admiral Arkadiy Syroyezhko believes there are no insurmountable obstacles to the construction of a nuclear-powered strike carrier in Russia.  He thinks Sevmash could handle the job since it was originally conceived as a yard for major surface combatants and later concentrated on submarines.

But Syroyezhko admits, without preparation to support carriers, Russia could end up with extremely expensive, sporadically constructed carriers. Today, he concludes, Russia is able to fulfill combat missions typically placed on carriers by other means.

Changing gears, Khodarenok covers the state of play in the Russian Navy’s Main Staff.

According to him, specialists unanimously report that the operational-strategic component has disappeared from the Main Staff’s work.  It no longer plans for the fleet’s employment — for strategic operations in oceanic theaters of military operations.  The naval planning job has gone to Russia’s operational-strategic commands (military districts) and the four geographic fleets (as the operational-strategic large formations of those MDs).  

A Main Staff source tells Khodarenok that the MD commanders have come up with disparate rules for directing the fleets subordinate to them.  The source says the disappearance of a naval component in GOU planning began with the downgrading of the GOU’s naval directorate to a “direction,” and with the concomitant reduction in the quality of its naval staff officers.

Khodarenok writes there is confusion today over what ships to build, how many, what tactical-technical capabilities they should have, and what missions they should perform. The Navy CINC has “no rights” but many demands made of him in this regard.

Russian Navy CINC Admiral Vladimir Korolev

The Navy CINC’s responsibilities for procurement intersect with those of the MOD’s state defense order (GOZ) support department.  It’s unclear exactly where their respective authorities begin and end.  The Main Staff source says all sorts of nonsense result from the confusion.

Still, the CINC has to answer for almost everything that happens in the fleet, according to Khodarenok.

The Navy Main Command’s (Glavkomat’s) move to St. Petersburg was a big mistake, but a return to Moscow would be equally disruptive.  A Glavkomat source tells Khodarenok, as long as the leadership sends people to Vladivostok or elsewhere twice a week over the littlest issues, it really doesn’t matter where the headquarters is.

Khodarenok sums everything this way:

“In other words, there are more than a few problems in the fleet today.  It undoubtedly won’t do to put their resolution on the back burner.  They won’t disappear somewhere from there.”

Source:
https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2016/08/29/weak-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel/

The article for me is so bad. It reflects a strong lack of understanding about what Russia has been doing the last 25 years, about what Russia plans and about what is in the interest of the Russian Navy:

1.- The fleet of Russia is not old, even Russia has been doing lots of early decommissions of young ships.

2.- The fleet of Russia is not obsolete, Russia has been leaving the most modern part of its fleet while doing early decommissions, and building some new ships to cover new roles.

3.- Russia is not desperate for building new ships because its fleet is not old and/or obsolete.

4.- The Russian leadership has been convinced about the need of a reduction of the Russian fleet in the last 25 years.

5.- The Russian leadership only will stop early decommissions if the projected size of the Russian Navy is reached, or if they have some doubt about to continue with the reduction. But assuming a phase of reduction, they did right the process. Early decommissions was the way.

6.- Early decommissions are not compatible with a bounce in the ship building. No-one country do decommissions of ships that are not exhausted and have still some life to build other ships to replace them, and less if the country has some plan of expanding the fleet. This is silly. Early decommissions only make sense in a phase of reduction of the fleet.

7.- Russia is still doing some (very few) early decommission. Then low production of new ships is very logical and is right.

8.- Russia will only to begin the production of new ships at higher rates when more of the current ships get exhausted and finish their cycle of life (maybe since 2025 or 2030), or in case of war.

9.- Russia is building only the ships that need to cover new roles and the ships that need to have open lines of production of new modern ships. This is why Russia is building only one ship of some classes. Far from a failure, it is a success to have open lines of production of modern ships of almost all the types.

10.- Russia needs and wants to have a modern design and a modern line of production ready for every type of ship, to be able to active a fast production if necessary.

11.- Russia has not a modern destroyer or cruiser with an open line of production. Then, the Project 23560 will advance fast until the first unit is commissioned.

12.- Russia has not a modern aircraft carrier with an open line of production. Then, the Project 23000E will advance fast until the first unit is commissioned.

If the writer has something to say about the right size for the Russian Navy fleet, it is possible to argue, but there are lots of non-sense in the article.

i think Russia cant catch USA in construction of multirole vessels and SSNs. It is obvious that until the end of the decade only 1-2 Project 22350 ships and 1-2 Yasen class SSN will be in service with Russian Navy.
The rate of production for Arleigh Burk class destroyer and Virginia class SSN (2-3 ships per year and 1 sub per year respectively) are much more higher..

George1 wrote:i think Russia cant catch USA in construction of multirole vessels and SSNs. It is obvious that until the end of the decade only 1-2 Project 22350 ships and 1-2 Yasen class SSN will be in service with Russian Navy.
The rate of production for Arleigh Burk class destroyer and Virginia class SSN (2-3 ships per year and 1 sub per year respectively) are much more higher..

Focus on keeping the edge in AShMs and general ASW should provide the qualitative edge needed to keep the USN in check. Numeracy isn't always a superiority.

George1 wrote:i think Russia cant catch USA in construction of multirole vessels and SSNs. It is obvious that until the end of the decade only 1-2 Project 22350 ships and 1-2 Yasen class SSN will be in service with Russian Navy.
The rate of production for Arleigh Burk class destroyer and Virginia class SSN (2-3 ships per year and 1 sub per year respectively) are much more higher..

It's not about catching up with 2 Burks per year.

Russia needs those 20 frigates, 12 Liders and then needs to maintain those numbers.

Liders will not be much of an issue surprisingly if nuclear icebreakers are any indication. Nuke ships have never been problematic for Russian shipbuilders so this should work fine. And most of weapons and electronics for them are off the shelf stuff with some exceptions.

Frigates depend on engines. Construction facilities are there now. Once engines are finally solved they can get cracking.

Subs are not doing perfect but situation is moving along.

Rest of the fleet is being built at good pace.

eehnie wrote:
The article for me is so bad. It reflects a strong lack of understanding about what Russia has been doing the last 25 years, about what Russia plans and about what is in the interest of the Russian Navy:

1.- The fleet of Russia is not old, even Russia has been doing lots of early decommissions of young ships.

2.- The fleet of Russia is not obsolete, Russia has been leaving the most modern part of its fleet while doing early decommissions, and building some new ships to cover new roles.

3.- Russia is not desperate for building new ships because its fleet is not old and/or obsolete.

4.- The Russian leadership has been convinced about the need of a reduction of the Russian fleet in the last 25 years.

5.- The Russian leadership only will stop early decommissions if the projected size of the Russian Navy is reached, or if they have some doubt about to continue with the reduction. But assuming a phase of reduction, they did right the process. Early decommissions was the way.

6.- Early decommissions are not compatible with a bounce in the ship building. No-one country do decommissions of ships that are not exhausted and have still some life to build other ships to replace them, and less if the country has some plan of expanding the fleet. This is silly. Early decommissions only make sense in a phase of reduction of the fleet.

7.- Russia is still doing some (very few) early decommission. Then low production of new ships is very logical and is right.

8.- Russia will only to begin the production of new ships at higher rates when more of the current ships get exhausted and finish their cycle of life (maybe since 2025 or 2030), or in case of war.

9.- Russia is building only the ships that need to cover new roles and the ships that need to have open lines of production of new modern ships. This is why Russia is building only one ship of some classes. Far from a failure, it is a success to have open lines of production of modern ships of almost all the types.

10.- Russia needs and wants to have a modern design and a modern line of production ready for every type of ship, to be able to active a fast production if necessary.

11.- Russia has not a modern destroyer or cruiser with an open line of production. Then, the Project 23560 will advance fast until the first unit is commissioned.

12.- Russia has not a modern aircraft carrier with an open line of production. Then, the Project 23000E will advance fast until the first unit is commissioned.

If the writer has something to say about the right size for the Russian Navy fleet, it is possible to argue, but there are lots of non-sense in the article.

Well yeah, after reading this article a few more times, and after doing a bit of research, I found out that it is seriously flawed.

Actually, I agree with your statements, but allow me to post my opinion.

1. Who said that the Russian Navy is old/obsolete? Indeed, they are mostly using ships/subs from the 80s, so most of them are around 30 years old, but are working fine, and with some major overhauls they could operate 20 years more. But that would be a serious waste of resources/funds in long terms, so they are constantly building new ships/subs and introducing new ship/sub classes as time goes on.

2. Your third statement perfectly explains itself.

3. Well, if you are talking about the Lider, it is said that it would enter prduction in the mid 2020s, and its production will be ramped up until early/mid 2030s.

4. According to your 6th and 7th statements, minor decommissions are/were surely carried out.

5. I greatly agree with your 8th, 11th and 12th statements too.

eehnie and Benya are the only two that get it. Russia's fleet, as "old" as it is (30 years old for most ships) isn't old. Majority of these ships go through some kind of midlife refit with newer electronics, replacement of weapons, and a paint job. In the end, the ships work as intended and replacing them with another ship doing the same thing, isn't going to benefit Russia at all. It would be like me replacing a perfectly good car, for another car the exact same thing, but newer and no KM's on it. Really wont make any difference besides put me in the financial hole for longer.

Russia's submarine building is going quite well besides the Yasen class, and it all has to do with price and not knowing what they want. Lets face it, if Russia went back to the drawing boards and stated "we can just build more Oscar class subs" then they could and would start developing quite fast (a lot faster than Yasen). Would it benefit them? Dunno. I imagine Russia is more interested in SSBM's and Diesel attack subs instead. Eventually things will give way and they will need to develop something to replace a lot of the current ships, but not now. These small ships like Buyan and such will be the future of Russia's navy - lean and mean, with the larger ships like Liner doing all other jobs. The other issue is that in Russias shipbuilding industry, every shipyard has its own ships it builds. If lets say that Gorshkovs were to be built in both Kaliningrad Shipyard and St.Petersburg shipyard then I imagine they can churn out more than simple 1 shipyard making them. If the other smaller shipyards were left to making corvettes of one type (Steregyushi), then I imagine they could pump out plenty more of those quite fast (there is what, 3 shipyards that could build those?).

It comes down to the fact that yes, there is a general lack of knowing what they want and having too many project ships. But, as Eehnie and Benya pointed out, build various types of ships now (1 or two or such) and then when it comes time to having to replace a lot of the older ships, then they can churn out more of these especially since a lot of the technology behind, all issues hammered out already.

I too would like to see Gorshkovs and such everywhere in Russia, but reality is that a lot of these older ships are still capable and still useful for Russia.

I guess the analogues in military aviation are the B-52 and Tu-95. We are talking about 1950s aircraft in operation over 60 years
later and no hurry to retire them. For some reason people expect navy ships to be like consumer automobiles with a 10 year
lifespan.

sepheronx wrote:eehnie and Benya are the only two that get it. Russia's fleet, as "old" as it is (30 years old for most ships) isn't old.  Majority of these ships go through some kind of midlife refit with newer electronics, replacement of weapons, and a paint job.  In the end, the ships work as intended and replacing them with another ship doing the same thing, isn't going to benefit Russia at all.  It would be like me replacing a perfectly good car, for another car the exact same thing, but newer and no KM's on it.  Really wont make any difference besides put me in the financial hole for longer.

Russia's submarine building is going quite well besides the Yasen class, and it all has to do with price and not knowing what they want.  Lets face it, if Russia went back to the drawing boards and stated "we can just build more Oscar class subs" then they could and would start developing quite fast (a lot faster than Yasen).  Would it benefit them? Dunno.  I imagine Russia is more interested in SSBM's and Diesel attack subs instead.  Eventually things will give way and they will need to develop something to replace a lot of the current ships, but not now.  These small ships like Buyan and such will be the future of Russia's navy - lean and mean, with the larger ships like Liner doing all other jobs.  The other issue is that in Russias shipbuilding industry, every shipyard has its own ships it builds.  If lets say that Gorshkovs were to be built in both Kaliningrad Shipyard and St.Petersburg shipyard then I imagine they can churn out more than simple 1 shipyard making them.  If the other smaller shipyards were left to making corvettes of one type (Steregyushi), then I imagine they could pump out plenty more of those quite fast (there is what, 3 shipyards that could build those?).

It comes down to the fact that yes, there is a general lack of knowing what they want and having too many project ships.  But, as Eehnie and Benya pointed out, build various types of ships now (1 or two or such) and then when it comes time to having to replace a lot of the older ships, then they can churn out more of these especially since a lot of the technology behind, all issues hammered out already.

I too would like to see Gorshkovs and such everywhere in Russia, but reality is that a lot of these older ships are still capable and still useful for Russia.

Thanks sepheronx!

Well, I would like to see Gorshkov/Grigorovich class frigates everywhere too, but they would replace some existing ship classes, like Udaloy-class destroyers (Udaloys are among my personal favorite ships), and they are still a capapble ship class, although I have never seen reports about its nearing phasing out, so I suppose that they would remain in service until the early 2020s, though their decommission will be inevitable at some point, it wouldn't be happening in the near future.

Speaking about Admiral Gorshkov- and Admiral Grigorovich- classes, they are coming slow but sure. We know that they have suffered from engine shortages (formerly engines were supplied by Ukraine, but due to the ongoing crisis, further supplied were discontinued), and AFAIK, domestic supplier NPO Saturn will only be able to supply new engines from 2017-2018. However, I think that Admiral Kasatonov (second ship of the Gorshkov-class) is undergoing trials alongside the Admiral Gorshkov (lead ship of the class).

I don't have much information on subs, but I read that Lada-class submarines are a bit of a failure, since the last two of them were laid down with a 10 years lag between them, and both of them is said to enter service no later than 2019. That is insane!

Sometimes is difficult to follow it well, but one of the very few early decommissions of 2016 has been the B-380 submarine of the Project 641B. It was commissioned in 1982.

While we see this, it is not possible to see the building of new submarines. It is not compatible. And if someone is writing articles as suposed expert, about a failure of the new class, is not right.

kvs wrote:I guess the analogues in military aviation are the B-52 and Tu-95.    We are talking about 1950s aircraft in operation over 60 years
later and no hurry to retire them.   For some reason people expect navy ships to be like consumer automobiles with a 10 year
lifespan.  

Not the case of the Tu-95MS and Tu-142M. The basic design is from the 50's, but the aircraft went through design updates in the 70's, including structural changes, and the production ran up to the early 90's, so the oldest Tu-95 now in service must be 30 yeras old maximum. B-52s, on the other hand, were produced only till 1963 or 64, so all planes are more than 50 years old.

Big_Gazza wrote:

Benya wrote:
I don't have much information on subs, but I read that Lada-class submarines are a bit of a failure, since the last two of them were laid down with a 10 years lag between them, and both of them is said to enter service no later than 2019. That is insane!

To be fair, the Navy was far from impressed with the Lada lead vessel (Saint Peterburg) trial performance, and has refused to accept them into service.  The lead vessel has been used as a testbed for new technologies, and the 2 suspended hulls have been restarted and modified extensively as a result.  When complete they will likely be good boats, and its better that they are delayed rather than completed in an unsatisfactory state.  The lessons learnt will be rolled up into the subsequent Kalina class.

All this talking is ignoring the reality. What Russia is doing is to keep open a production line of modern conventional submarines to be able to impulse the production fast in case of need. And of course they will prove and introduce some new modifications if are good for the units produced in the future.

Russia is still retiring fairly young conventional submarines because Russia consider them to exceed the projected size for the future Russian fleet.

Russia is in a reduction mode still, surely very close to a stabilization of the fleet mode. You can discuss it if you wish, but the talking about a failure of the new clas of conventional submarines is all pure bullshit. Noting credible.