INF Treaty - coming to the end of its life

Interesting article and interesting topic. 

Ivanov made some good points. (google translator does some wired translation but you can easily catch the idea)

The INF Treaty can not operate indefinitely, said Ivanov wrote:Open-ended contract on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) signed December 7, 1987 in Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. Parties to the treaty pledged not to develop, produce, test or deploy ballistic and cruise missiles and land-based intermediate-and shorter-range missiles.

MOSCOW, June 21 - RIA Novosti. head of the presidential administration Sergei Ivanov said that the agreement between the U.S. and the USSR on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-range land-based - a controversial, and states that the infinite can not continue, given that other countries such weapons may have.

Open-ended contract on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) signed December 7, 1987 in Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. Parties to the treaty pledged not to develop, produce, test or deploy ballistic and cruise missiles and land-based intermediate-and shorter-range missiles.

"The controversial (decision), to say the least, because I honestly did not understand earlier and now I do not understand, especially why it was done. Americans this class of weapon is not needed at all, did not need not before, not now. Because with the help of such weapons, they could theoretically fight only with Mexico or Canada, because the radius of action will not reach to Europe, "- said Sergei Ivanov, the TV channel" Russia-24 "on the sidelines PMEF.

According to him, the military in their calculations when planning always come from the worst scenarios.

"Why is everything anyone can have this class of weapons, and we and the United States - can not? Question arises, on the one hand, we signed the Soviet-American. We perform, but to infinity can not go on," - said the head Kremlin administration.

LINK

As pointed out it is more limiting for the Russians because the US can actually forward deploy missiles with a range of 500km or less and still hit strategic targets within Russia from NATO countries, while for Russia it means that NATO targets in Europe and China and indeed Japan further than 500km from Russia territory can only be engaged with weapons with a flight range of 5,500km+.

Moreover it means that Russia basically can only have ICBMs as land weapons to defend its territory when in actual fact a range of smaller and cheaper weapons in the 2,000-4,000km range would be much better and not limited by treaties like new Start.

Sounds like signal that they'll be abandoning the treaty

Cyberspec wrote:Sounds like signal that they'll be abandoning the treaty

I think so too. Speculations about it have been circling around for too long. This is I think first official confirmation of what is coming. 

It will be interesting thing to see results (political and military) of cancelling INF treaty implications.

At the time it was signed it removed a real threat that was short range missiles forward deployed that could hit targets in single figure minutes with precision and nuclear warheads which was very destabilising and meant important decisions had to be made rapidly to ensure decisions could be implemented in time.

Ironically at the time it was the Soviets that gave up the most as they had to remove the SS-20s from service and a range of other relatively cheap but effective weapons.

Withdrawing from the INF treaty will mean the Russians can build as many short and medium range ballistic and cruise missiles to deal with any ABM system the US would likely to build in Europe or anywhere else without it effecting their strategic missile forces.

It is also an area of huge export potential... an Iskander with a range of 2,500km and a conventional 500kg warhead with a CEP of less than 20m would be a very useful tool... the west wouldn't develop it because their air force would perform such missions, but for the Russian Army they have traditionally prepared for situations where there is no air cover or air support so it makes a lot of sense for them...

They also had to destroy all R-400 OKA (SS-23 Spider) missiles as well. Probably the best missile of it's class at the time. The Iskander is the successor to it but has less range

Cyberspec wrote:They also had to destroy all R-400 OKA (SS-23 Spider) missiles as well. Probably the best missile of it's class at the time. The Iskander is the successor to it but has less range

Iskander's real range is at least on Par with Oka, and it is a much more advanced system all around.

Good for Russia on the treaty, it is not advantageous at this point.

However if the ICBM arsenal works, I hope they don't spend too many resources on a full spectrum of IRBM weapons. Yes the flexibility would be nice but the whole point of a nuclear arsenal is a safety net cheaper than giant conventional forces.

However if the ICBM arsenal works, I hope they don't spend too many resources on a full spectrum of IRBM weapons. Yes the flexibility would be nice but the whole point of a nuclear arsenal is a safety net cheaper than giant conventional forces.

It could go one of two ways... either smaller shorter ranged missiles will be developed to hit targets in Europe and China/Asia and the Middle East that previously needed ICBMs. This will allow more ICBMs to be targeted at long range targets in the US, or it could lead to a reduction in the ICBMs needed by Russia to defend her territory as the ICBMs pointed at China and Europe could be replaced by smaller shorter ranged cheaper missiles.

Replacing INF treaty has its own pitfalls because US could develop an IRBM and deploy in Europe in support of allies or Europe to can develop its own IRBM to target Russia.

So it will severely complicate BMD for Russia since Tactical Weapons dont come under any treaty and hence can be deployed in Numbers.

Its like opening a can of worms with effects unknown.

The best thing for Russia is to develop Hypersonic Cruise Missile  and Supersonic/Subsonic Cruise missile to target Europe and China and keep some percentage of existing ICBM to be targetted at Europe and China.

Replacing INF treaty has its own pitfalls because US could develop an IRBM and deploy in Europe in support of allies or Europe to can develop its own IRBM to target Russia.

They certainly could, but what real difference would that make?

Europe can already do this as they have not signed the INF treaty... it only applies to Russia and the US. In fact the French and British ballistic nuclear arsenal largely consist of IRBMs anyway.

A US ABM shield in Europe already consists of lots of missiles that when fitted with a nuclear warhead could be used as IRBMs anyway and there is no restriction on their deployment, no requirement for inspections by Russia or anyone, no limitation on their performance.

So it will severely complicate BMD for Russia since Tactical Weapons dont come under any treaty and hence can be deployed in Numbers.

Not really... the numbers of things such weapons could be used to target are finite and most Russian Army and Air Force SAMs can engage ballistic weapons to one extent or another... the shorter range targets are slower and therefore easier to engage for the more numerous smaller model SAMs.

Its like opening a can of worms with effects unknown.

The fact is the the INF treaty is binding or limiting only Russia and the US... in fact the US has little to care about Russian IRBMs as they can't reach the US, so it really only limits the Russians to using ICBMs to do a job smaller cheaper weapons could achieve.

The best thing for Russia is to develop Hypersonic Cruise Missile  and Supersonic/Subsonic Cruise missile to target Europe and China and keep some percentage of existing ICBM to be targetted at Europe and China.

The INF treaty covers all ground launched weapons whether they are ballistic or cruise missile.

But I agree a 6,000km range cruise missile family would be cheaper and simpler than an ICBM... some form of rocket booster launched scramjet powered cruise missile of 6,000km range would be ideal as it would be easy to hide (rail cars or shipping crates) and easy to produce in large numbers.

Making Air Launched Hypersonic Cruise Missile like Zircon-S and Subsonic cruise missile like Kh-101 is best option , plus develop naval variant thats can be launched from conventional/nuclear submarine.

US will just take INF scrapping as an opportunity to deploy 100's of IRBM on Europe along ABM systems already planned to be deployed.

China is the only major concern but China can be dealt with asymetric Nuclear Weapons detterent which means few weapons like ICBM and Hypersonic missile targetting key cities with mega ton warhead.

What IRBMs would US place in Europe?

It certainly is in no financial position to develop anything significant in this field, nor do they have any requirement to do so. No political will either.

I was thinking in line what TR1 wrote. Today is totally different political situation in EU. 

Russia has moral right to respond to US ABM shield in EU. On the other hand US can in no way justify deployment of IRBM with nuclear or conventional 

warheads in EU. Russia is no SSSR and there are no 60 000 tanks on its borders sitting and waiting for political hint to roll over EU. 

Different set of problems would represent:

1. Amount of money needed to develop and deploy those missiles

2. Amount of money needed to develop protection (SAM systems) that could deal up to some point with this newly emerged threat 

3. In some wild calculations I would imagine that Russia would suit situation where US is put on defensive with massive amount of money being spend on defensive 

   systems.


More on INF Treaty from VPK

LINK

Making Air Launched Hypersonic Cruise Missile like Zircon-S and Subsonic cruise missile like Kh-101 is best option , plus develop naval variant thats can be launched from conventional/nuclear submarine.

Ground launched missiles are much cheaper to operate and store... these large missiles would require large aircraft to deploy... aircraft that could be better used for other purposes.

Personally I would think a large 3-4 ton cruise missile with a very long range... perhaps 6-8,000km range and a payload of half a dozen small compact nuclear devices of 5-10KT. For the first part of the flight the missile will use a large wing with external fuel tanks to climb to medium altitude using rocket boosters and jet engines to get airborne. Once in flight it can accelerate and climb dropping fuel tanks as they empty. After it has travelled 3-4K KM then it will be much lighter and the large high lift wing can be jettisoned and the jet engine can adapt to a scramjet to continuously accelerate the missile to hypersonic speed as it approaches enemy territory where it can release warhead payloads over 6 target areas.

US will just take INF scrapping as an opportunity to deploy 100's of IRBM on Europe along ABM systems already planned to be deployed.

Why would the scrapping of the INF treaty as such require US deployed IRBMs or cruise missiles in Europe? If they did it would be clearly to target Russian interests and the ABM system in Europe would be revealed for what it really is.

I rather suspect only former eastern european countries would agree to have US offensive missiles based in their countries anyway.

China is the only major concern but China can be dealt with asymetric Nuclear Weapons detterent which means few weapons like ICBM and Hypersonic missile targetting key cities with mega ton warhead.

But that is the point... for the cost of an ICBM targeting Chinese or European cities they could have 500 cruise missiles or 200 IRBMs for the same price with much better coverage... which they don't really need so in actual fact it means they will likely have the missiles they need and save the difference in cost.

3. In some wild calculations I would imagine that Russia would suit situation where US is put on defensive with massive amount of money being spend on defensive

systems.

The US wasting money on things that don't actually make Americans safer is the game isn't it? That is what the US likes to do to Russia... put military forces around their border and directly interfere in the politics of their neighbours so they need a strong military and to increase military spending...

Viktor wrote:Russia has moral right to respond to US ABM shield in EU.

Not this again. Russia's objection to ABMs in Europe, especially when you consider the actual number of ABMs to be deployed, is a bit of an oxymoron given that they are also developing ABM systems of their own.Meaning that it's OK for Russia to be able to shoot down a US ICBM, but not the other way around. This was never about nuclear deterrence and all about political influence over Eastern Europe.

SOC wrote:

Viktor wrote:Russia has moral right to respond to US ABM shield in EU.

Not this again.  Russia's objection to ABMs in Europe, especially when you consider the actual number of ABMs to be deployed, is a bit of an oxymoron given that they are also developing ABM systems of their own.Meaning that it's OK for Russia to be able to shoot down a US ICBM, but not the other way around. This was never about nuclear deterrence and all about political influence over Eastern Europe.

1. Russia is building ABM on its own territory
2. Russia does not object to US ABM on US soil
3. I agree with you. US started this ABM venture purely for political reasons. They knew Russia will react in a way they said they will (because they have no other option) and the US (protector of freedom and democracy) will have every excuse to once again show to the whole world how aggressive and violent that nation is.
By doing so they will divide the EU once again. Sabotaging CFE Treaty was in the light of all that happened necessity.

Not this again. Russia's objection to ABMs in Europe, especially when you consider the actual number of ABMs to be deployed, is a bit of an oxymoron given that they are also developing ABM systems of their own.

How many ABM systems is Russia building in Canada?

Russia has no problem with US based ABM systems... it is systems in Europe to give the US depth and of course the supporting radars looking deep into Russian air space that is the real problem.

The number is irrelevant as that can be changed at the stroke of a pen without consultation with anyone.

Meaning that it's OK for Russia to be able to shoot down a US ICBM, but not the other way around.

It was not OK for the Soviets to base nuclear weapons in Cuba, but it is OK for the US to base nukes in Europe... this double standard is not new.

The US need not worry and certainly does not need to understand.

Any move Russia makes will be painted as aggression and a slide back to the cold war, so there is no real point in discussing it, but these actions are logical for Russia whether the US understands it or not.

This was never about nuclear deterrence and all about political influence over Eastern Europe.

Eastern European countries are hostile to Russia at a very low grass roots level... they don't need US ABMs based there to get independence from Russian influence... they already have it.

This is really about pushing Russia into a corner... containment.

After containment restraint you generally then try to disarm and subdue... then you steal their wallet...

They knew Russia will react in a way they said they will (because they have no other option) and the US (protector of freedom and democracy) will have every excuse to once again show to the whole world how aggressive and violent that nation is.

All part of the plan... divide and conquer.

GarryB wrote:Russia has no problem with US based ABM systems... it is systems in Europe to give the US depth and of course the supporting radars looking deep into Russian air space that is the real problem.

What. Both sides have ample surveillance systems and methods to see what the other is doing, be they land, air, or space-based. Plus, we can do fun things like this with space-based assets: http://www.mda.mil/news/13news0002.html

GarryB wrote:The number is irrelevant as that can be changed at the stroke of a pen without consultation with anyone.

The number is certainly relevant when the systems are silo-based. If we say 10 silos and put in 10 silos, you're damn sure going to notice if we decide to start dropping fifty more holes in the ground. Except you won't notice holes in the ground, I forgot...because the GMD system is not deploying in Europe. Just AEGIS Ashore, which isn't going to kill an ICBM in its current iteration. PAA-IV proposed for 2021 may give it actual ABM capability, but that's 1) not even tested, yet alone ready for deployment, and 2) not even guaranteed (it might've been cancelled?).

GarryB wrote:It was not OK for the Soviets to base nuclear weapons in Cuba, but it is OK for the US to base nukes in Europe... this double standard is not new.

Totally agree there, US IRBMs in Europe were a driving factor behind moving nukes to Cuba.

GarryB wrote:The US need not worry and certainly does not need to understand.

I'd argue that neither side needs to worry. I'm not sold on Postol's calculations either, I don't think the Topols from Western Russia are anywhere near as "vulnerable" as he wants the world to think. At any rate, they've got the range to shoot the western ones on eastbound trajectories, and the eastern ones on western trajectories, making the whole argument pointless before you even factor in SLBMs.

Do I think the Iranian threat was over-hyped to get systems built in Europe? Yes, although I do buy that they were basically playing preventative defense.

Do I think the most current idea they had for Europe had any sort of realistic impact on the Russian nuclear deterrent? No. Not even PAA-IV. PAA-IV integrated with the at-sea AEGIS BMD though, that'd be a far, FAR different equation.

All this says is that the political arguments thrown around by both sides are lacking in realism to various degrees.

Maybe this really is related to the INF/CFE treaties, but not in the assumed context. Maybe the US wanted an ATBM complex in Europe all along, believing that Russia would drop INF since we dropped the ABM treaty, and doing it in this fashion allowed it to basically preempt Russia's INF withdrawal by getting a potential countermeasure for future SRBM/MRBM systems in place.

What. Both sides have ample surveillance systems and methods to see what the other is doing, be they land, air, or space-based. Plus, we can do fun things like this with space-based assets: http://www.mda.mil/news/13news0002.html

If the radar coverage was sufficient then why does the ABM system need a new set of radars?

The number is certainly relevant when the systems are silo-based. If we say 10 silos and put in 10 silos, you're damn sure going to notice if we decide to start dropping fifty more holes in the ground. Except you won't notice holes in the ground, I forgot...because the GMD system is not deploying in Europe. Just AEGIS Ashore, which isn't going to kill an ICBM in its current iteration. PAA-IV proposed for 2021 may give it actual ABM capability, but that's 1) not even tested, yet alone ready for deployment, and 2) not even guaranteed (it might've been cancelled?).

That is OK because the Russians haven't withdrawn from the INF treaty either it is only planned and might be cancelled too.

The point is that the future plans for the system show a growth toward a system capability that will become something that needs to be countered by the Russians if they want to retain deterrence.

Right now it is no threat at all, but future plans and changes could make it a real problem so the Russians are doing you the courtesy of telling you now what the effect of your progress and development will be.

The US claims its goals are security and peace and yet if Russia is forced to developed IRBMs and build more missiles to assure its safety then the reverse of those goals will actually be achieved.

The fact that the US will go ahead with its plans just shows its stated goals are a ruse and its real goals are simply to move US bases in Europe east out of old europe and into new europe closer to Russian borders.

I'd argue that neither side needs to worry. I'm not sold on Postol's calculations either, I don't think the Topols from Western Russia are anywhere near as "vulnerable" as he wants the world to think. At any rate, they've got the range to shoot the western ones on eastbound trajectories, and the eastern ones on western trajectories, making the whole argument pointless before you even factor in SLBMs.

You aren't getting it... noone will know 100% whether these ABMs are effective or not till they are used and by then it is too late, it will mean little to the Russians if every one of their missiles gets through in a war started by a US leader who thinks they are safe behind an ABM system that is fundamentally flawed.

The Russians aren't after the capability to destroy the west, they are after the capability to deter the west from attacking them in the first place. Being able to destroy the west does not mean Russia will survive... on the contrary they know both sides will suffer horrendously... do you think they don't know what it is like to suffer in war?

A US ABM system will directly result in no further nuclear weapon reductions by Russia... theatre or strategic.

Ask most westerners about Scud and they think the Patriot defeated it... we know better, but that doesn't matter.

After decades of building it do you think the politicians are going to be honest about the performance of the ABM system to the people who will likely spend trillions on it?

Do I think the Iranian threat was over-hyped to get systems built in Europe? Yes, although I do buy that they were basically playing preventative defense.

Preventative defence was Germanys' attack on Europe and Japans attack on Pearl Harbour. Spending trillions making an ABM system for a threat that might happen is delusional... if you want to kill someone and they buy a brand new state of the art bullet proof vest that will stop any known projectile... you set them on fire. Money well spent on that vest BTW.

Do I think the most current idea they had for Europe had any sort of realistic impact on the Russian nuclear deterrent? No. Not even PAA-IV. PAA-IV integrated with the at-sea AEGIS BMD though, that'd be a far, FAR different equation.

It doesn't matter what you or I think... it just takes one idiot to get into office in the US (and you seem to have a queue of those ) to think an ABM system will do what it says on the box and we can escalate anything to any level because we are safe... take the BMs out of the equation and our uber stealth fighters should be able to take on 16 Blackjacks and some WWII bombers.

Maybe this really is related to the INF/CFE treaties, but not in the assumed context. Maybe the US wanted an ATBM complex in Europe all along, believing that Russia would drop INF since we dropped the ABM treaty, and doing it in this fashion allowed it to basically preempt Russia's INF withdrawal by getting a potential countermeasure for future SRBM/MRBM systems in place.

Except that if they had stayed in the ABM treaty then they could not build ABM systems in Europe or on their AEGIS cruisers so the Russians would not have any reason to want IRBMs... ICBMs on very high trajectories can still do the job of hitting targets at intermediate ranges... even if smaller shorter range weapons can do it cheaper and more efficiently.

GarryB wrote:If the radar coverage was sufficient then why does the ABM system need a new set of radars?

Because an engagement radar is a nice thing to have to actually, you know, blow something up?

As far as the rest, I had a nice reply, and then lost it when I confused the Favorites bar in Chrome with individual tabs So, more on this later.

GarryB wrote:The point is that the future plans for the system show a growth toward a system capability that will become something that needs to be countered by the Russians if they want to retain deterrence.

OK? It doesn't matter where you hit the ICBMs from, if you've got an ABM to take out ICBMs then that eats into deterrence. Hence, the S-500 comparison. If the US system lets us take out 10% or Russian missiles, but S-500 deployment and A-235 lets Russia take out 50% of ours, how much is what we're doing really causing Russia a problem.

GarryB wrote:Right now it is no threat at all, but future plans and changes could make it a real problem so the Russians are doing you the courtesy of telling you now what the effect of your progress and development will be.

And that's how it should be. Russia should do more acting in its interest and less trying to pander to the US. Reference the lack of S-300s in Syria and Iran.

GarryB wrote:The US claims its goals are security and peace and yet if Russia is forced to developed IRBMs and build more missiles to assure its safety then the reverse of those goals will actually be achieved.

Debatable. If IRBMs make Russia more comfortable in its deterrent, and this system makes us more comfortable with ours, then where's the disconnect? How is that not an expensive continuing of the current status quo?

GarryB wrote:The fact that the US will go ahead with its plans just shows its stated goals are a ruse and its real goals are simply to move US bases in Europe east out of old europe and into new europe closer to Russian borders.

No. You're looking at two very small complexes, not massive bases housing 14 tank divisions or 6 fighter wings or something. Plus, these are actually what you'd want and where you'd want them for midcourse intercept of an Iranian missile. So the system capabilities and small footprint on the ground is not in line with the idea that the US is trying to move all sorts of bases into Eastern Europe.

GarryB wrote:You aren't getting it... noone will know 100% whether these ABMs are effective or not till they are used and by then it is too late, it will mean little to the Russians if every one of their missiles gets through in a war started by a US leader who thinks they are safe behind an ABM system that is fundamentally flawed.

The Russians aren't after the capability to destroy the west, they are after the capability to deter the west from attacking them in the first place. Being able to destroy the west does not mean Russia will survive... on the contrary they know both sides will suffer horrendously... do you think they don't know what it is like to suffer in war?

You need one missile to be able to get through to make deterrence viable. One. That's thanks to Ulam figuring out radiation implosion. A couple of megatons as a surface burst in D.C., and depending on the weather, you'll kill everyone from D.C. to Boston. That's one warhead, and that's why I really don't think anyone is asinine enough in this day and age to actually push the button. Hell we were basically enemies for decades and relations got a hell of a lot worse than they are now and we're still all here. And that's with one of the worst US administrations ever as far as the military and foreign policy is concerned being in charge until a trip to Dallas.

GarryB wrote:A US ABM system will directly result in no further nuclear weapon reductions by Russia... theatre or strategic.

Good for them, that's there prerogative. I have no argument with Russia doing things it wants or needs to do, just with some of the asinine justification that comes from both sides on the issue.

GarryB wrote:It doesn't matter what you or I think... it just takes one idiot to get into office in the US (and you seem to have a queue of those ) to think an ABM system will do what it says on the box and we can escalate anything to any level because we are safe... take the BMs out of the equation and our uber stealth fighters should be able to take on 16 Blackjacks and some WWII bombers.

Clearly I need to be President. Get out of Europe and the Middle East, concentrate on Asia, and declare terrorism a WMD.

GarryB wrote:Except that if they had stayed in the ABM treaty then they could not build ABM systems in Europe or on their AEGIS cruisers so the Russians would not have any reason to want IRBMs... ICBMs on very high trajectories can still do the job of hitting targets at intermediate ranges... even if smaller shorter range weapons can do it cheaper and more efficiently.

Except that the European system and the current AEGIS systems are ATBM systems, and fall within the allowed limits of the old agreement. Just like PAC-3, THAAD, S-300V, etc. All of those were legal, the only problem would potentially be the performance of the associated radars. Illegal would've been the S-225, which actually was an illegal system while being developed into the very early 1980s.

OK? It doesn't matter where you hit the ICBMs from, if you've got an ABM to take out ICBMs then that eats into deterrence. Hence, the S-500 comparison. If the US system lets us take out 10% or Russian missiles, but S-500 deployment and A-235 lets Russia take out 50% of ours, how much is what we're doing really causing Russia a problem.

You are not getting it. Deterrence requires both sides to be able to take out the strategic nuclear capability of the other side and cause immeasurable damage to make thoughts of a preemptive strike seem to be suicide.

Russia having the capacity to stop 50% or 100% of US strategic nuclear weapons would not stop NATOs conventional arsenal from doing it serious damage.

Russia knows such systems will never be that efficient however, but that is not even the problem... no matter what their efficiency an ABM system makes nuclear war more plausible as an option rather than less plausible and in that sense it is destabilising. That is why the ABM treaty was signed in the first place because if either side just believed they were safe enough then the risk of mutually assured destruction no longer applied which is what deterrence is based upon.

Debatable. If IRBMs make Russia more comfortable in its deterrent, and this system makes us more comfortable with ours, then where's the disconnect? How is that not an expensive continuing of the current status quo?

Because the US will make it so... it has new eastern european allies that will think all these Russian IRBMs will be pointing at them and demand an american equivalent... leading to an arms race... of course the Russian missiles will replace ICBMs doing the same job and will save a lot of money. Equally later ground launched hypersonic cruise missiles will make them more effective at evading any ABM system.

So the system capabilities and small footprint on the ground is not in line with the idea that the US is trying to move all sorts of bases into Eastern Europe.

It doesn't need boots on the ground in Europe... even small bases allow tentacles... look at the articles about rendition... in addition to the official military bases look at all the CIA secret ones... makes Hostel look like a documentary...  

And that's with one of the worst US administrations ever as far as the military and foreign policy is concerned being in charge until a trip to Dallas.

I agree, but can you blame the Russians for not wanting to take the word of the west? MAD is foolproof... anything else requires trust and the western record is dire in the post cold war period.

Clearly I need to be President. Get out of Europe and the Middle East, concentrate on Asia, and declare terrorism a WMD.

You'd get my vote...

Except that the European system and the current AEGIS systems are ATBM systems, and fall within the allowed limits of the old agreement. Just like PAC-3, THAAD, S-300V, etc. All of those were legal, the only problem would potentially be the performance of the associated radars. Illegal would've been the S-225, which actually was an illegal system while being developed into the very early 1980s.

SM-3 Standard hit a satellite... naughty naughty... plus the US AEW system in Flyingdales UK is no where near a US border, and nor is Thule in Greenland... one radar near your capital or ABM base and the rest around your border facing out... naughty naughty again... but you already know that.

Something wrong in the U.S assessment of Russian violations

Intelligence officials said internal assessments identified Russia’s new Yars M missile that was tested earlier this month as an INF missile with a range of less than 5,500 kilometers.

“The intelligence community believes it’s an intermediate-range missile that [the Russians] have classified as an ICBM because it would violate the INF treaty” if its true characteristics were known, said one official.

However, Russia is denying its new Yars M missile represents an INF violation.

This just shows Americans are just watching hollywood movies.Yars-M is 11k PLUS km range ICBM and Americans are saying it 500 plus km range
intermediate range missile  

There now is a broad pattern of INF-related Russian compliance issues being reported in
the Russian press. In fact, Russia hasrepeatedly threatened to withdraw from the INF Treaty.
This issue was first raised by then-Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov (now Kremlin Chief of Staff)
who called the Treaty a “mistake” and a “Cold War relic.”6
Then-Chief of the General Staff

General YuriyBaluyevskiy threatened to pull out of the treaty unless Washington decreased its
missile defense plans. By 2007, President Vladimir Putin threatened to withdraw from the

Treaty unless it was made universal, which was clearly impossible. In February 2007,

thenCommander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov said, “If the

political decision is made to withdraw from this treaty (the Russian-American Intermediate

Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF) the Russian Strategic Missile Forces will be ready to
fulfill this task.”7

Now even the Iskander is taken as vilation of INF treaty truly Hilarious Acedemia these..
You never know what they will say and write and ariticle just to get the sales booming..

This is a very odd thing to say about a
missile that is supposed to be short-range. After Mr. Ivanov’s announcement,Russian officials
went silent about the new missile, which is unusual. Indeed, while President Putin gave the
developers of the R-500 missile the Russia State Award, their names were not mentioned

Doctors said this   

The first test of the R-500 in 2007 was announced by thenFirst Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov.
Mr. Ivanov said, “It can be used at long range with
surgical precision, as doctors say,”11 (Emphasis added)

    Russian ICBM

    Russian exiting from INF ?

             Very old 2007 Munich security-Ivanov on INF

GarryB wrote:You are not getting it. Deterrence requires both sides to be able to take out the strategic nuclear capability of the other side and cause immeasurable damage to make thoughts of a preemptive strike seem to be suicide.

Russia knows such systems will never be that efficient however, but that is not even the problem... no matter what their efficiency an ABM system makes nuclear war more plausible as an option rather than less plausible and in that sense it is destabilising. That is why the ABM treaty was signed in the first place because if either side just believed they were safe enough then the risk of mutually assured destruction no longer applied which is what deterrence is based upon.

Well, when we get more than 44 actual ABMs in service (that being the number of GBIs deployed in Alaska/California when they finish digging holes), then this might be relevant. Right now AEGIS is an ATBM.

GarryB wrote:Russia having the capacity to stop 50% or 100% of US strategic nuclear weapons would not stop NATOs conventional arsenal from doing it serious damage.

The US stopping Russian warheads wouldn't stop Russia from kicking the conventional crap out of Europe, either.

GarryB wrote:SM-3 Standard hit a satellite... naughty naughty... plus the US AEW system in Flyingdales UK is no where near a US border, and nor is Thule in Greenland... one radar near your capital or ABM base and the rest around your border facing out... naughty naughty again... but you already know that.

Neither side really played by the rules. The S-225's engagement radar was sent to Kamchatka. Then there was the BMEW radar at Pechora, clearly not along a border. The SM-3 ASAT test, however: not a violation. That was a full six years after leaving the treaty.

Intelligence officials said internal assessments identified Russia’s new Yars M missile that was tested earlier this month as an INF missile with a range of less than 5,500 kilometers.

“The intelligence community believes it’s an intermediate-range missile that [the Russians] have classified as an ICBM because it would violate the INF treaty” if its true characteristics were known, said one official.

However, Russia is denying its new Yars M missile represents an INF violation.

There is the possibility that Yars M, minus the first stage, could represent a very simple to test and field IRBM. It's not like they haven't done basically the same thing before. The fun part would be that you could stick them onto Yars TELs and nobody would know if it was an IRBM or ICBM inside.

Well, when we get more than 44 actual ABMs in service (that being the number of GBIs deployed in Alaska/California when they finish digging holes), then this might be relevant. Right now AEGIS is an ATBM.

By the time it is an ABM it is already a global coverage ABM system with hundreds if not thousands of mobile silos... kinda think by then it would be too late to start to react or object...

Neither side really played by the rules. The S-225's engagement radar was sent to Kamchatka.

Kamchatka is a border area...

Then there was the BMEW radar at Pechora, clearly not along a border.

A northern inhabited area for a radar facing north... as opposed to a radar in a foreign country (like UK and Greenland).

The reasoning behind demanding they were placed at the borders and were facing out was to prevent their direction being over the defending country for use and an air defence battle management radar so Pechora is not a violation in letter or in spirit.

Krasnoyarsk was a violation and was moved before becoming operational.

There is the possibility that Yars M, minus the first stage, could represent a very simple to test and field IRBM. It's not like they haven't done basically the same thing before. The fun part would be that you could stick them onto Yars TELs and nobody would know if it was an IRBM or ICBM inside.

The SS-20 was basically the first two stages of the SS-16 too.