Theses on Russian Federation

Eurasianism. The new ideology of Russia?

Eurasianism is a political movement in Russia, that is focused on the geopolitical concept of Eurasia.

Neo-Eurasianism

Neo-Eurasianism is a Russian school of thought, popularized in Russia during the years leading up to and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, that considers Russia to be culturally closer to Asia than to Western Europe.

The school takes its inspiration from the Eurasianists of the 1920s, notably Prince Nikolai Trubetzkoy and P.N. Savitsky. Lev Gumilev is often cited as the founder of the Neo-Eurasianist movement, and he was quoted as saying that "I am the last of the Eurasianists."

At the same time, major differences have been noted between Gumilev's work and those of the original Eurasianists. Gumilev's work is controversial for its scientific methodology (the use of his own conception of ethnogenesis and the notion of "passionarity"). At any rate, Gumilev's work has been a source of inspiration for the Neo-Eurasianist authors, the most prolific of whom is Aleksandr Dugin.

Recent developments in Central Asia -- with Russian geopolitical influence again rising, while US power in the region wanes – stand to invigorate a long-running debate over the philosophical foundation of the Kremlin's foreign policy. The turn of events could breathe new life into so-called Eurasianists, who argue that Russia has a unique identity and should thus embark on a development course apart from the West.

Since the Soviet collapse in 1991, Russian academics and policy-makers have struggled to develop a concept that could guide Russia's revival. Westernizers and Eurasianists have played prominent roles in the ongoing debate. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Eurasianism as a political philosophy was first advanced by leading Russian émigré thinkers in the 1920s, including Nikolai Trubetskoi and Pyotr Savitsky. Today, the concept remains ill-defined – a hodge-podge of themes that have guided Moscow's development over the centuries. Inherent in Eurasianist thinking are notions of benevolent imperialism, Orthodox messianic qualities and a belief that a "third way" of economic development is possible – a path between capitalism and communism. In addition, there is a vital geographical component to Eurasianism, dictating that Russia should control the Eurasian heartland, including Central Asia and the Caucasus. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Critics of the Eurasianist ideal say that its proponents are selective in their historical memory, tending to romanticize Tsarist Russia's imperial experience. Indeed, Russia's brutal behavior in Chechnya would seem to blow up the notion that Russia can act a benevolent leader of a cluster of states in search of a new development paradigm. Some say few differences separate Eurasianist thinking from the far-right ideology of National Bolshevism.

Modern-day Eurasianists, including Alexander Dugin, have steadfastly predicted that Russia and the US-led West are destined to clash. The two sides have "strictly opposing" interests, Dugin maintained in a June commentary published by the Argumenty i Fakty.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's stance towards Eurasianism remains murky. During Putin's first years in power there were high hopes among Eurasianists that he would steer Russia in a clearly Eurasian direction. After the September 11 terrorist tragedy, however, Putin pursued a moderate policy, Westernizing in its orientation, as the US rapidly expanded its strategic profile in Central Asia. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. In 2005, however, the United States experienced a sudden geopolitical reversal in Central Asia, with regional leaders becoming wary, if not entirely distrusting of the US presence. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Underscoring the drastic decline of the United States' regional position was Uzbekistan's decision in late July to evict US military forces from an air base at Karshi-Khanabad. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Russia has rushed to fill the geopolitical vacuum in Uzbekistan, rapidly strengthening bilateral ties over the past year. Moscow is now considered Tashkent's chief political backer, as Uzbek President Islam Karimov seeks to stamp out all traces of democratization in the country. Russia's diplomatic success in Uzbekistan is raising hopes among Eurasianists that Putin's Kremlin will press a broad geopolitical offensive to push American forces out of Central Asia entirely, and virtually eliminate Washington's influence in the region. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

Putin has offered evidence that he is again leaning in a Eurasian direction. During an August 26 celebration of the city of Kazan's 1,000th anniversary, Putin publicly praised Lev Gumilev, the historian and philosopher who is recognized as a founder of the modern Eurasianist movement.

At this time, when it appears that Eurasianist thinking is again on the ascendancy in Moscow, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the ideological foundation of Eurasianism. The concept has been marginalized in Western scholarship, as there are no English-language books on Eurasianism currently in print. Meanwhile, there has been a steady stream of books on Eurasianism, and related topics, published in various parts of the former Soviet Union.
Before war broke out between Russia and Georgia in 2008, Aleksandr Dugin visited South Ossetia and predicted, "Our troops will occupy the Georgian capital Tbilisi, the entire country, and perhaps even Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula, which is historically part of Russia, anyway."[4] Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity is a Eurasianist and argues that South Ossetia never left the Russian Empire and should be part of Russia.

Alexander Dugin wrote:Today, Russia thinks of itself as a nation-state. Putin is a realist; nothing more. Walt is right about that. But the Theory of a Multipolar World and the Fourth Political Theory, as well as Eurasianism, are outlines of a much broader and large-scale ideology, directed against Western hegemony and challenging liberalism, globalization, and American strategic dominance. Of course, Russia as a nation-state is no competition for the West. But as the bridgehead of the Theory of a Multipolar World and the Fourth Political Theory, it changes its significance. Russian policies in the post-Soviet space and Russia’s courage in forming non-Western alliances are indicators. For now, Putin is testing this conceptual potential very gingerly. But the toughening of relations with the West and most likely the internal crises of globalization will at some point force a more careful and serious turn toward the creation of global alternative alliances. Nevertheless, we already observe such unions: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, the Eurasian Union—and they require a new ideology. Not one like Marxism, any universalism is excluded, but also not simple realist maneuvers of regional hegemons. Liberalism is a global challenge. The response to it should also be global. Does Putin understand this? Honestly, I don’t know. Sometimes it seems he does, and sometimes it seems he doesn’t.

Alexander Dugin wrote:
Eurasianism is a developed worldview, to which I dedicated a few books and a countless number of articles and interviews. In principle, it lies at the basis of the Theory of a Multipolar World and the Fourth Political Theory, combined with geopolitics, and it resonates with Traditionalism. Eurasianism’s main thought is plural anthropology, the rejection of universalism. The meaning of Empire for me is that there exists not one Empire, but at minimum two, and even more. In the same way, civilization is never singular; there is always some other civilization that determines its borders. Schmitt called this the Pluriverse and considered it the main characteristic of the Political. The Eurasian Empire is the political and strategic unification of Turan, a geographic axis of history in opposition to the civilization of the Sea or the Atlanticist Empire. Today, the USA is this Atlanticist Empire. Kenneth Waltz, in the context of neorealism in IR, conceptualized the balance of two poles. The analysis is very accurate, although he erred about the stability of a bipolar world and the duration of the USSR. But on the whole he is right: there is a global balance of Empires in the world, not nation-States, the majority of which cannot claim sovereignty, which remains nominal (Stephen Krasner’s ( Theory Talk #21) ‘global hypocrisy’). For precisely that reason, I am a philosopher of Empire, as is almost every American intellectual, whether he knows it or not. The difference is only that he thinks of himself as a philosopher of the only Empire, while I think of myself as the philosopher of one of the Empires, the Eurasian one. I am more humble and more democratic. That is the whole difference.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=186525

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav080205a.shtml

Well whatever Russia's identity truly is, it seems Eurasianism is where its heading.

Ofcourse at one/some points, it was all about Slavic Nationalism.
But with the ending of the Warsaw Pact, that one is quiet, for a good while atleast.

To me, its a shame that the Slavic world is split. I mean the typical Russian has much in common with Slavic nations - by history, by language, and often by the branch of Christianity. Perhaps more so than some minority nationalities of Russia.

But even historically, Russia was at war with Poland, or in dispute with the Austro Hungarian (largely Slavic) Empire.

Largely, Russian Eurasianism is working ok. Ofcourse there are problems with Wahabist nuts, courtesy of Saudi Arabia and American terrorism sponsorship etc. (Anyone check that Chechen-Georgian terrorist in Syria who the US openly admit he was trained as one of their "main men" - I tink RBTH or RT had a story).

Ofcourse Russia has some big questions coming up. Can it draw European countries - Serbia, the Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania etc into the fold? Perhaps Poland, the Czech Rep further forward in the future. Perhaps the descendants of Russian emigres or even W Europeans drawn to an exciting future in the new Russia.

The other factors in it all are the future of the Caucus states, and Eurasian Union enlargement.
Things are further alongw ith some states than others. Hopefully, they will choose Russia rather than any rivals such as Turkey, China or the Middle East.

The East-West and North-South corridors may also shape Russia's future identity.
India is some way from being a real megapower. But it is a much better military partner for Russia than China. The problem is to settle connection issues (Pakistan, Iran etc mean that sea/rail connections etc aren't as convenient as those between Russia and China).

The Enterprise Zone in Russia's F East means that Russia can benefit from China, S Korea AND Japan. It could easily support 30million well paid jobs in 20 yrs time.

However, Russia doesnt wish (nor should it wish) to have an open borders policy, so that it becomes some Muslim/Chinese hybrid state. Most Russians are largely European culturally, and largely European genetically. Yes Russian politics is Eurasian and not EU style. Russia might be moving towards Asia economically, but I still think its much more European than Asian.

It will be interesting to see how things develop.