Pantsir missile/gun AD system: #2

You were there with them ? What I understand is that they didn't even detected the attack which is very unlikely if the systems were operated. At least those 35mm should have opened fire at the last moment. The most likely is that they were turned off and the crew was sleeping.

Those batteries are around defended rafinery, what mean they are on duty. If they sleep, when they are on duty, this is a problem of discipline. If they are working and didn't see them, than it could be, that the crews are bad at training or they are bad at maintaing radars and they are not working properly.

IADS means early warnings too. So they need radars at borders to detect the entry of cruise missiles into the territory and put on combat duty all the air defence systems if they are not which they didn't. The best way to do so is put many small radars in places were cruise missiles have advantage over your air defence line mountainous areas or deserts were there is no one.

That's what russia did in Syria. They deployed 1l122 there. But they can also deploy more Kasta than a small country as they produce them and they are cheap for them. Syria is full of such radar around Hmeimim ro provide early warning.

Of course. IADS means integration of all air defense components including air force into one working organism. They are all sharing their pictures and higher levels coordinate the work of all units, that engagemns are optimal. It's not good if three batteries engage the same target, while the rest are flying through.

Absolutely Russia send many different radaras to test them in real combat conditions. Also having more radars at different locations is a kind of protection against anti radar missiles as you could divide transmiting of radars in short time period, that anti radar missiles could not lock on radars. Also it works against jamming and increase precision in detection by triangulation.

Saudis have radars and SAMs at the border with Yemen as there is war and Houtis often launch drones and missiles into Saudi Arabia. Why they didn't detect is question for Saudies.

They are helped by russians for their airdefence. Very unlikely it was alone. Even with a baterie they would need to destroy tens of missiles in matter of 1 minute.

Yes, Russians help Syrians with informations, rebuilding air defense and training crews. But they could still hardly help them, when they did something stupid. For sure Syrians know, they should not divide batteries, but they did. Most probably their problem lies in fact, that they have too small number of such complexes to protect all needed objects all around Syrian territory. Battery of Pantsir have 6 TELARs with 12 missiles each. Every TEALR could engage 4 targets simultaneously, what means Pantsir battery could engage 24 targets simultaneously. But when the missile hit the target, one missile channel is free and you could launch another missile. This mean Pantsir battery could theoreticaly launch 72 missiles at 72 targets in one salvo. Than they need to reload. 72 drones or cruise missiles is quite a big number and they cost a lot of money.

. This mean Pantsir battery could theoreticaly launch 72 missiles at 72 targets in one salvo. Than they need to reload. 72 drones or cruise missiles is quite a big number and they cost a lot of money.

It is limited by the fact that it can point its radar in one direction. If the attack comes from every sides, a single pantsir will be saturated by even 4 missiles.

Kasta has has 40km range against a 2 m2 target flying at 100m. Against a cruise missile with a rcs of 0.2m2 flying at 50m ot would be something like 20km. If the missile is flying at 800km/h it means a warning time of 1.5 minutes. Basic maths. If the pantsir operator is not in the pantsir smocking a cigar or in W.C, the target is done.

1,5 minutes is more than enough time to detect, lock and engage by the sistem like Pantsir. Do you understand, what means crew rotation? When you are on duty, you are behind your working station. No smoking, eating, etc. If you need to go to WC, you call for replacement and than go to the WC. Operator is inside 24/7 and ready to fire. How do you think Russians shot down Grad rockets? Operator is all the time in Pantsir and Tor. They have enough crews to rotate.

Isos wrote:

. This mean Pantsir battery could theoreticaly launch 72 missiles at 72 targets in one salvo. Than they need to reload. 72 drones or cruise missiles is quite a big number and they cost a lot of money.

It is limited by the fact that it can point its radar in one direction. If the attack comes from every sides, a single pantsir will be saturated by even 4 missiles.

And? You have a bettery of 6 Pantsirs. Every one cover its main sector. You see on your search radar, where the targets are. If attack come from the side or back, other Pantsirs in the circle will engage them. If there are too many from one direction, than neighbor Pantsirs will also engage them. This is why you work in battery and have a battery command post.

Having an AWACS platform flying around a bit would also be useful for very early detection and perhaps working out where the threat is coming from so instead of swatting down wasps you can locate the nest and deal to it...

Isos wrote:

. This mean Pantsir battery could theoreticaly launch 72 missiles at 72 targets in one salvo. Than they need to reload. 72 drones or cruise missiles is quite a big number and they cost a lot of money.

It is limited by the fact that it can point its radar in one direction. If the attack comes from every sides, a single pantsir will be saturated by even 4 missiles.

That's the rationale of programs like Morfey and S-350: active homing missiles and 360° targeting radars (for mid-course guidance) are  intended for counteract such massive, concentrated attacks.
And in case of the 9M100 missile they could be used on Pantsir platform.

marcellogo wrote:

Isos wrote:

. This mean Pantsir battery could theoreticaly launch 72 missiles at 72 targets in one salvo. Than they need to reload. 72 drones or cruise missiles is quite a big number and they cost a lot of money.

It is limited by the fact that it can point its radar in one direction. If the attack comes from every sides, a single pantsir will be saturated by even 4 missiles.

That's the rationale of programs like Morfey and S-350: active homing missiles and 360° targeting radars (for mid-course guidance) are  intended for counteract such massive, concentrated attacks.

Yes and no. Active radar homing missiles are proper for medium and long range SAMs and they have their own targets and value in IADS. Those missiles are expensive, so you will not launch it against everything. Patriot missile cost 3 million $. More it is sophisticated, more expensive it is. Just look at VL Mica and Iris-T SL. They are extreamly expensive and only the most rich states could buy them. Let say, that such complex buy one usual state. How many missiles they could buy? 50? Maybe 100? How many attacks they could fight off with so big arsenal? Maybe one or maybe not even one, because there will not be enough missiles. Radio guided missiles are cheap and even they cost money. Every Tor and Pantsir have PESA tracking radar, which cover its sector. In battery all vehicles cover their given sector and they all together cover 360⁰. In Ukraine one officer complain, that shooting down a small quadrocopter with Osa-AKM missile is too expensive to afford it and Osa radio guided missile is cheap. SHORAD missiles have to be cheap, that you could have them in large numbers. SHORADs are those who shot down drones, cruise missiles, bombs, missiles, rockets,... With small arsenal of missiles you will not last long. New cheap and simple treats also need cheap solutions. You could not fight against 1000 cheap kamikaze drones with 100 expensive ARH missiles. This is why AA guns are coming back. Gun round is also cheap. Russia is also developing new 30 mm and 57 mm ammunition to engage such targets.

Rob Lee
@RALee85
·
17m
An OPK source tells TASS that Russia will being exporting Rezonans-NE over-the-horizon radars capable of detecting capable of detecting low radar signature cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles to "several" Middle Eastern countries in 2021.


Seems I was right. Next step is the missile systems.

The Iran arms embargo ends in 2020.

It is limited by the fact that it can point its radar in one direction. If the attack comes from every sides, a single pantsir will be saturated by even 4 missiles.

Not really... the Pantsir should be able to detect targets out to about 20km even at low level, and with very high speed missiles engagement times are short so even with a single Pantsir (which is not likely in Russian forces), being attacked from the four cardinal points.... N S E and W the search radar can detect all four incoming threats and decide based on distance and speed which to intercept first, and then second and third and fourth...

In actual practise the IADS network would detect the missiles well before they get anywhere near the target, and each of the 6 Panstirs operating there will be given a sector to defend... with some sectors getting extra coverage as needed.

That's the rationale of programs like Morfey and S-350: active homing missiles and 360° targeting radars (for mid-course guidance) are intended for counteract such massive, concentrated attacks.
And in case of the 9M100 missile they could be used on Pantsir platform.

And of course 57mm cannon shells can also add to that... plus of course active electronic jammers and EMP weapons... and simply troops with Verba or Igla-S MANPADS can all contribute...

The S-350 is to replace the old model S-300s, and the 9M100 morfei is to replace the SA-13, the replacement for TOR and Panstir are new model TOR and new model Pantsir missiles... cheap and simple command guided weapons that are fast and small and accurate.

For some drones even Kornet or AT-3 Sagger modified missiles would be good...

Seems I was right. Next step is the missile systems.

Missiles are pointless if you never see the threat, so it makes a lot of sense to buy radars first and they might find with proper radars and a proper IADS that they don't need new missiles... they just needed better detection.

But if their current missiles are ARH then new missiles like TOR or Pantsir will make defence much more affordable as well as more effective.

medo wrote:But it is unprecedented number for western complexes. Even if Patriot could not see and engage them, because it work in sector only and may look in other way, they should be engaged by three baterries of Skyguard 35 mm guns and by one baterry of Crotale missiles. They are there for this kind of treat. Four batteries for close protection could not see them and shot them down?

medo i produced ,at hot, an initial assessment of the attack to Abqaiq that revealed itself grounded taking into consideration the actual news on the AD assets present in the place.

In substance as said the attack capitalized three big limits of the AD elements present in the area.

- The 120 degrees coverage limits of AN/MPQ-53 of Patriot batteries (there was two ,not one Patriot batteries covering Abqaiq one to the East-SE and one at SW of the installation with probably the S-SE not perfectly operative)






- The lower altitude engagement limits of the single Shahine SAM site
- The operative rotation of Skyguard batteries (the SE and SW  ones was effectively empty) and theirs relatively high times of reaction.







Therefore very likely the attack to Abqaiq ,not for chance prepared using entirely UAVs, was executed coming from a N-NE -outside the FOW of in-place eastern AN/MPQ-53 incoming vector and covering the last 15-20 km of course at 100m or less AGL under the detection and engagement limit of the Shahine battery; then the UAVs turned to the South with different angles of veer so to compact the UAV group and prepare for the last phase of attack turning to the North toward the installation.
In this way the northern Skysguard battery has not get enough time to engage them (in the initial plan was probably computed that 4 or 5 UAVs could have be downed, not having precise data on the reaction times of Skyguard that proved to be way higher than) because the targeted Abqaiq installations was placed at about half the maximum range of engagement of the battery.


Obviously this attack show ,more in general, the extreme vulnerability to even the most simple stand-off ammunition attack of western military installations defended by western type "IAD" (if is possible to even employ the term) effectively devoid of any kind of modern medium range SAMs, SHORADs , EW network and area masking elements.
Wide majority of the highly dispersed western Air Bases and Command Centers have level of defences very often even lower than those present at Abqaiq.

@ Mindstorm

Thank you for the pictures of Saudi air defense batteries in Abqaiq. We could well see, that there are prepared positions for 4 Skyguard batteries, 1 Shahine battery and 2 patriot batteries. Of course not all positions are occupied. But even if there are only 2 Skyguard batteries, 1 Shahine battery and 1 Patriot battery, thism is still whole air defense batalion, forming a proper cluster. Attack happened from direction north, north-west. According to your pictures, 2 Skyguard batteries cover this direction and Shahine battery also have clear visibility in this direction. Skyguard search radar have range of 20 km and Shahine radar have range of 19,5 km. Shahine is most probably there in towed version, not tracked version based on AMX-30 tank.







Those drones were quite big, as they have to fly over 1000 km and carry a proper warhead and they are not that fast, as they fly at speed 250-300 km/h. They should not be a problem for Skyguard and Shahine and they should have enough time to detect, lock and engage.

We should know, that similar generation complex Osa-AKM ( SAM-8 ) didn't have problems with shooting down drones. Osa shot down in eighties Israeli made drones IAI Scout over Lebanon and over Angola. Armenian Osa shot down in Nagorno Karabakh far smaller drone Orbiter from Azerbaijan. They also shot down drones in Ukraine. If Osa could do this job well, I don't see a reason, why Skyguard and Shahine could not do it as well. They were not in their base, where they are training, but in positions around rafinery to protect it.

Pantsir-SM

Nice.

Will be in big demand no doubt...

medo wrote:But even if there are only 2 Skyguard batteries, 1 Shahine battery and 1 Patriot battery, thism is still whole air defense batalion, forming a proper cluster. Attack happened from direction north, north-west. According to your pictures, 2 Skyguard batteries cover this direction and Shahine battery also have clear visibility in this direction. Skyguard search radar have range of 20 km and Shahine radar have range of 19,5 km. Shahine is most probably there in towed version, not tracked version based on AMX-30 tank.

medo the presence of a battery in the initial direction of the incoming UAV attack (that very likely came from N-NE of Abqaiq facilities not N-NW) do not assure the possibility to engage those UAVs if the limits of the system's interceptors are surpassed.

The UAVs probably have maneuvered to the south to circumvent the main footprint coverage of the northern Skyguard battery passing, at very low altitude, under the minimum engagement range of Shahine.

In this way the Skyguard battery that lack both the very short reaction times and fire density of the most advanced gun-based models of SHORADs, has been effectively hindered in its possibilities to engage the incoming UAVs.


In substance i believe that KSA's Air Defense present at Abqaiq (at least the short range batteries but not the Patriot''s AN/MPQ-53) have indeed detected part of or even the whole incoming UAV group, but cause the big limits of the outdated interceptors of those AD systems ,conceived at maximum to respond to '80 years low altitude bombers intrusion) have not get a single chance to open fire on any element of the attacking air group.

It appears to me that the Pantsir-SM is also designed to have a cheaper engagement radar than the Pantsir-S.

The Tor design was always attractive because of the decision to limit its off-boresight beamforming capability to a small angular sector but let the array have double element spacing. In practice this means that the Tor design needs only half the phaseshifter/element amount of the Pantsir design engagement radar but is limited to multiple engagements that are close to each other.
The cost effective approach on the engagement radar and the operation in a four vehicle battery are plus points of it, despite its somewhat expensive tracked platform.

The complex backfeed PESA array of the Pantsir with full element layout could target an object within a 90° azimuth but at significantly higher cost than the Tor's engagement radar.

The Pantsir-SM would solve the complexity issue with the engagement radar by a less complex, lower cost horn feed layout from the front. Element spacing would still be "full" to allow multiple engagements at large angular distance to each other.
The twin Janus faced PESA acquisition radar is also changed to a single faced design, apparently an AESA to allow for long duration continuous operation.

All of these changes are in line with the purpose of the Pantsir compared to the Tor: independent operation.
The Pantsir-SM has made its engagement radar cheaper (but still larger?) compared to the -S and omitted one array for it's acquisition radar in order to have an AESA acquisition radar that has higher MTBF reliability.

So the fundamental concept of independent operation, even outside the IADS, of the Pantsir is improved with the -SM on the critical continuous operation parameter, increased engagement range as well as less complex subsystem (engagement radar).

The fundamental concept of the Tor remains: Operation within a battery of 4 vehicles with IADS support and dedicated AAA components.
In this concept the battery has 4 times redundancy of the PESA acquisition radars if one fails (but needs two in simultaneous operation for full hemisphere coverage). The limitation of the off-boresight simultaneous targeting by the engagement radar is also significantly reduced as for completely different sectors can be covered.

So the Tor is ideal to protect a very important object against PGMs, in a battery of four, inside an intact IADS and with dedicated AAA assets. In the -M2 version the battery has 64 ready to fire missiles which are protected by armor as well as 16 guidance channels.

The Pantsir-SM can operate alone, without any IADS, reach ranges/altitudes outside the SHORAD/counter-PGM role and at lower MR-SAM range. It also has its own emergency/low-threat AAA component but "only" 12 ready to fire missiles.

I expect that tracked chassis and missiles excluded, the Pantsir-S and -SM systems would likely cost twice as much as a Tor.
Certainly each of the two systems has its right role.
China has selected the Tor design for its future needs and Iran is about to finish the works on a own Tor variant, both purchased the Tor in the past.

Mindstorm wrote:

medo wrote:But even if there are only 2 Skyguard batteries, 1 Shahine battery and 1 Patriot battery, thism is still whole air defense batalion, forming a proper cluster. Attack happened from direction north, north-west. According to your pictures, 2 Skyguard batteries cover this direction and Shahine battery also have clear visibility in this direction. Skyguard search radar have range of 20 km and Shahine radar have range of 19,5 km. Shahine is most probably there in towed version, not tracked version based on AMX-30 tank.

medo the presence of a battery in the initial direction of the incoming UAV attack (that very likely came from N-NE of Abqaiq facilities not N-NW) do not assure the possibility to engage those UAVs if the limits of the system's interceptors are surpassed.

The UAVs probably have maneuvered to the south to circumvent the main footprint coverage of the northern Skyguard battery passing, at very low altitude, under the minimum engagement range of Shahine.

In this way the Skyguard battery that lack both the very short reaction times and fire density of the most advanced gun-based models of SHORADs, has been effectively hindered in its possibilities to engage the incoming UAVs.


In substance i believe that KSA's Air Defense present at Abqaiq (at least the short range batteries but not the Patriot''s AN/MPQ-53) have indeed detected part of or even the whole incoming UAV group, but cause the big limits of the outdated interceptors of those AD systems ,conceived at maximum to respond to '80 years low altitude bombers intrusion) have not get a single chance to open fire on any element of the attacking air group.  

If you look at the arrow for North, than you could see, that hits come from northwest, not from northeast. Those UAVs were not small quadrocopters, which you could buy in a shop to make selfies, but big ones to fly over 1000 km and bring proper warhead to the target.

I hardly buy this explanation, that Skyguard and Shahine could not engage and shot down at least some of those drones. Osa ( SAM-8 ) is from the same generation and have no problems to shot down even smaller UAVs like Orbiter or quadrocopters.

https://www.azatutyun.am/a/30183482.html

https://twitter.com/Zinvor/status/1176866528555405312

http://yandunts.blogspot.com/2016/04/april-2016-war-in-karabakh-chronology.html

The fundamental difference between Pantsir and TOR is the latter is intended to defend mobile armoured forces from a range of threats including A-10 and AH-64 aircraft and their weapons, while Pantsir is very much more of a static system for defending airfields and bases and larger SAM sites.

The TOR, by virtue of its low cost munitions can also be used for the same missions as the Pantsir, but you would need a more tunguska like platform version of pantsir to operate with mobile army forces.

Detection and tracking of drones and low flying cruise missiles is hard, and the west has thus far only paid lip service to the problem they plan to use as an attack method on their future enemies.

The result is that Russia is vastly better able to stop a western attack than the west is able to stop its own attack method... and with the increased use of drones and standoff munitions by Russia suggests a real shift in power because of this neglect.

In a combat situation the west would be better protected than the incident with Saudi Arabia would suggest because AWACS platforms would have noticed the attack and aircraft used to intercept the threats would have been more effective than what we saw, where none were detected and all seemed to hit their targets.

If they had been detected you would assume even an incompetent force could have brought down a few threats, but it is very clear this was a well planned attack with good information on the local air defence of the targets that utilised gaps and problems with the systems involved to get complete surprise, which led of course to an overwhelmingly successful attack outcome.

Now these planners are not super geniuses... so this should be put in contrast to Israeli attacks on Syria where enormous amounts of ordinance are being used where occasionally a munition gets through... now we can be sure those planning these attacks have access to all the intel they need, but it is clear that the defenders are rather better equipped and getting surprise is not happening, so the performance of the defensive systems is reducing the effectiveness of the attacks to the point where they are not really cost effective and becoming more and more expensive.

Design-parameter for the Crotale was 1m² RCS --> Su-7/-17/-20/-22 and then future Su-24.

Design-parameter for the e.g Tor was 0,1m² to counter cruise missiles and ARMs/AGMs/PGMs.

This is the generational difference which probably stopped those un-upgraded Saudi Crotales to perform the job.

The Iranian cruise missile is also smaller than Tomahawk/Kh-55 class cruise missiles. The drones are even harder to track with RCS well below 0,1m².

The Skyguard tracking radar, although newer than the Crotale's is designed to engage at much shorter ranges. Adding track initiation an reaction times as well as distances and flight-paths, a scenario may be created where no system has any mean to engage the targets.
Remember that Iran operates both the Skyguard and it's own Crotale variants.
A very detailed attack plan could be worked out with the exact envelopes leading to detailed success-rate calculations.

Saudis paid for Egyptian TOR-M2U and Emiratis have Pantsir-S1... those could have saved them as systems 1-2 generations ahead.

PeeD wrote:Design-parameter for the Crotale was 1m² RCS --> Su-7/-17/-20/-22 and then future Su-24.

Design-parameter for the e.g Tor was 0,1m² to counter cruise missiles and ARMs/AGMs/PGMs.

This is the generational difference which probably stopped those un-upgraded Saudi Crotales to perform the job.

The Iranian cruise missile is also smaller than Tomahawk/Kh-55 class cruise missiles. The drones are even harder to track with RCS well below 0,1m².

The Skyguard tracking radar, although newer than the Crotale's is designed to engage at much shorter ranges. Adding track initiation an reaction times as well as distances and flight-paths, a scenario may be created where no system has any mean to engage the targets.
Remember that Iran operates both the Skyguard and it's own Crotale variants.
A very detailed attack plan could be worked out with the exact envelopes leading to detailed success-rate calculations.

Saudis paid for Egyptian TOR-M2U and Emiratis have Pantsir-S1... those could have saved them as systems 1-2 generations ahead.

I did not compare Crotale with Tor, because generation of Tor is Crotale-NG. I compare Crotale / Shahine with Osa ( SAM-8 ), which was developed in sixties and come in armament in seventies. They don't have problems to shot down drones in different conflicts. They are also shot down by ZU-23-2 and ZSU-23-4 AA guns.

http://yandunts.blogspot.com/2016/04/april-2016-war-in-karabakh-chronology.html

04:00 In a later interview, Defense Army Zu-23-2 AA gun operator described shooting down a Harop UAV at about 04:00 on April 4; around the same time another Harop drone was reported brought down by another Armenian Zu-23-2 AA gun in the same area.

11:45 Karabakh Defense Army reports continued artillery attacks against civilian areas in Mardakert and Martuni districts. Video published of Armenian Osa-AKM crew hitting another Azerbaijani drone, likely an Orbiter 2M.

22:45 An Armenian ZSU-23-4 AA self-propelled gun reportedly brought down another Harop suicide drone

Harop, that was shot down by Armenian AD

Harop is for sure far more developed and more stealthy than drones used by Houties against KSA. Orbiter-2 is also very small drone. Armenia doesn't have Tors and Pantsirs and they still manage to detect them and shot them down with old systems. If ZSU-23-4 could shot down Harop, I don't know, why more modern Skyguard could not do that as well.

GarryB wrote:If they had been detected you would assume even an incompetent force could have brought down a few threats, but it is very clear this was a well planned attack with good information on the local air defence of the targets that utilised gaps and problems with the systems involved to get complete surprise, which led of course to an overwhelmingly successful attack outcome.

Problem is, that those units around rafinery were guarding strategicaly important object, what means they are on duty 24/7 with rotation of crews. They are not the unit in its home base, which have systems in garages and need to be alarmed. Skyguard and Shahine batteries have their own search radars operating 24/7 and they have to detect any treat by their own. They must not depend on outside warning. Of course it is way better, if they got warning some time before. Could be, that Saudi AD crews have problems with discipline and didn't do their job as they should, like turning the system off and sleeping, but no planer could rely on that. But for now, no investigation bring out, that the crews are sleeping, what could mean, that western systems are not as good as their eastern counterparts although they are far more expensive.

Crotale-NG has an expensive missile, so in that area it may be on-pair with the Tor/Pantsir but its tracking radar is still of the original Crotale generation, a single engagement system.

In total you can engage any targets with AAA Osa or original Crotale (primary via optical channel), it just must be close enough, at day light and with warning in advance. However with the Pantsir/Tor you want to have a system that can kill anything, anytime at a stated nominal range.
There are worlds between those two capabilities. Tor and Pantsir-S are 24/7 systems with redundant acquisition radars in their battery structure. Pantsir-SM with AESA acquisition radar, may qualify to something closer to a 24/7/365 system as single vehicle.
So ideally even such generation systems need to have at least spotters at forward positions, better a upper tier gapfiller radar to get into alarmed state and turn on the acquisition radar.
Now compared to this the legacy Crotale has just one tube electronics powered monopulse acquisition radar for a whole battery of launchers, impossible to run it 24/7/365. If very reliable like the Skyguard seems to be, it may be active for many weeks.

Compared to the Armenian scenario, these drones and CMs were almost certainly flying in a terrain masking mode, at max. distance to the threat systems and at night. Iran also likely modeled/simulated the complete engagement as it has all Saudi systems on its own.
In Armenia and Ukraine drones were certainly flying in daylight and at upper altitude to use their cameras or sniff for EM emissions (Harop).

Depending on the RCS of the drones and missiles, even the TOR-M1 could have failed in this situation since these could have RCS well below its 0,1m² design-point. So if no tracking can be established at lets say >6km, and no thermal camera channel is available, it may fail to stop the attack because the planners have them fly at 7km distance to the export Tors and munitions RCS is 0,05m².
The attack may could be partially neutralized if Tor-M2U, Pantsir or Crotale-NG would use their thermal cameras for track, once new generation acquisition radars detect the 0,05m² targets at lets say 10km.
Of course this is only about the principles at work here, actual Performance parameters outside those 1m² RCS for legacy Crotale and 0,1m² for export TOR-M1 are not available.
The attack was simply extraordinary well done.

PeeD wrote:Compared to the Armenian scenario, these drones and CMs were almost certainly flying in a terrain masking mode, at max. distance to the threat systems and at night. Iran also likely modeled/simulated the complete engagement as it has all Saudi systems on its own.
In Armenia and Ukraine drones were certainly flying in daylight and at upper altitude to use their cameras or sniff for EM emissions (Harop).

Nagorno Karabakh, where conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan went is mountainous region, so far better terrain for masking than flat desert in Saudi Arabia. Also Azerbaijan use Harop drones for strikes in night times.





Harop is made as stealth suicide drone with very small RCS and it is equipped with both day and night camera. ZSU-23-4 could shot it down in night time only in radar mode. More interesting question is, how they shot them down by ZU-23-2. Maybe they use old light reflectors to enlight them. When they are seen, they are easy targets as old WW1 biplanes. They have similar speed and altitude.



Harop is no doubt the most similar suicide drone to those, which hit Saudi rafinery. No doubt, that Israeli Harop is far more sophisticated and stealthy than anything, what Yemen could build together even with help from Iran.

Thanks for the Karabakh videos Medo ...hadn't seen them before.

There's some reports that say Saudi Patriots are manned by US crews...not sure if true

Could be, that Saudi AD crews have problems with discipline and didn't do their job as they should, like turning the system off and sleeping, but no planer could rely on that. But for now, no investigation bring out, that the crews are sleeping, what could mean, that western systems are not as good as their eastern counterparts although they are far more expensive.

The more information the planner has when planning the more likely the attack will succeed.

I would speculate they knew exactly what systems are defending this plant and I would go further and say they probably sent spies to the location with detection equipment... it wouldn't need to be anything super high tech... just a hand held radio type device that can detect the radar frequencies used by these air defence systems... put it out in the open and leave it for a week or two and it can record how often it was swept by a particular radar and you could quickly work out how often each radar was scanning the airspace... when it was turned off... how often and for how long it was scanning... did they scan with all radars or did they alternate them... if they alternated them was there any order... what sort of radio communications were happening... how often did they change shifts and when did that happen...

They could have been watching for years... this is a primary target and well worth a lot of research because if you do it right you can hit it successfully and cause damage well beyond the actual physical damage you create.

They did their homework and slipped an attack through a gap in the defences.

Now the defences might have been sloppy and planning was easy, or defences might have been tight and only careful planning led to this complete success.

They were clearly expecting a manned aircraft attack and didn't consider their enemies might use drones and cruise missiles... ironically like they do in Syria against Russian and Syrian forces.

Obviously if the targets had been less fragile and less flammable then this attack could only have done minor damage, but because it was an oil refinery the results appear to be pretty spectacular... makes me want to dig out my old game of Enemy Engaged and fly some Havocs and Hokums and take on some oil refineries in Yemen...

GarryB wrote:I would speculate they knew exactly what systems are defending this plant and I would go further and say they probably sent spies to the location with detection equipment... it wouldn't need to be anything super high tech... just a hand held radio type device that can detect the radar frequencies used by these air defence systems... put it out in the open and leave it for a week or two and it can record how often it was swept by a particular radar and you could quickly work out how often each radar was scanning the airspace... when it was turned off... how often and for how long it was scanning... did they scan with all radars or did they alternate them... if they alternated them was there any order... what sort of radio communications were happening... how often did they change shifts and when did that happen...

They could have been watching for years... this is a primary target and well worth a lot of research because if you do it right you can hit it successfully and cause damage well beyond the actual physical damage you create.

They did their homework and slipped an attack through a gap in the defences.

No doubt on that. Houties themselves said, that they plan the strike with the help of informations, which were provided by people there. But considering, that there were more batteries than one, you could expect, that not all crews are rotating at the same time. When the crew is changing, the system is working, you only turn off emmiting, that crew could safely come to the system and leave the system. Other batteries are on safe distance, so they could guard the sky in that time. Having three or four batteries means the sky is guarded constantly without any gaps. But for now, there is no onformations on any objections against AD crews or punishments in Saudi case, what could mean they are doing their job. Most probably radar pictures are recorded and this silence could mean, that radar scopes in that time were empty. There was no jamming, as jamming is a big alarm, that strike is going on and air force would be activated as well.

Actually this is very interesting, that in Karabakh old analogue systems like ZSU-23-4 and Osa have no problems to engage different drones in real combat, including suicide Harops, while more modern digital Skyguard and Shahine could not do in real situation. Osa is older than comparable Crotale or Roland and Skyguard came in armament in the eighties, while ZSU-23-4 in the sixties. Skyguard is comparable with Tunguska. I would not be nice to mention, that in that time those western complexes were way more expensive than their eastern analogues, similar as today.