Russian Nuclear Triad: Status and Warheads

Very simply an SLBM attack on Soviet ICBM fields would have given them approximately 5 minutes to launch... which includes time to actually make the decision to launch a full retaliation strike, or in the case of an error to do nothing... there would be no time to mount warheads or pump fuel into missiles...

Stilleto was considered one of their best missiles are you trying to say it was useless?

That is why I am suggesting your information is bollocks... or if you prefer... bullshit.

I actually don't know, just reporting what I have read. If I had read it from just from one source, wouldn't have thought twice about it but now am suspicious. I do agree that it doesn't make a lot of sense to have a system that cannot be put into use in a very short time.

By the way, the correct answer to what trumps a bollock.... is a Donald


Yeah I know, don't give up my day job

New START March 2017 numbers

https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/269406.htm

new video of US vs Russia nukes..

Anyone can confirm his numbers?
and his conclusions?

SIPRI's annual assessment of world wide nuclear weapons. Russian employees 15 Nuclear Weapon Storage Centers although I wouldn't be surprised the one that is less then 50 kilometers to the Ukrainian border is not used.

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-06/fs_1707_wnf.pdf

I actually don't know, just reporting what I have read. If I had read it from just from one source, wouldn't have thought twice about it but now am suspicious. I do agree that it doesn't make a lot of sense to have a system that cannot be put into use in a very short time.

Multiple sources are not better if they are just copying and pasting the same crap... I have read from multiple sources that Russian tank mounted main gun autoloading systems removed arms on a regular basis, yet I am still waiting to see the parades of one armed Russian tankers.

Sadly to stupid to think for yourself and too lazy to check facts do not seem to be barriers to being a source of information in the west.

GarryB wrote:

I actually don't know, just reporting what I have read. If I had read it from just from one source, wouldn't have thought twice about it but now am suspicious. I do agree that it doesn't make a lot of sense to have a system that cannot be put into use in a very short time.

Multiple sources are not better if they are just copying and pasting the same crap... I have read from multiple sources that Russian tank mounted main gun autoloading systems removed arms on a regular basis, yet I am still waiting to see the parades of one armed Russian tankers.

Sadly to stupid to think for yourself and too lazy to check facts do not seem to be barriers to being a source of information in the west.

Excuse me...

Why do you want to be excused?

GarryB wrote:Very simply an SLBM attack on Soviet ICBM fields would have given them approximately 5 minutes to launch... which includes time to actually make the decision to launch a full retaliation strike, or in the case of an error to do nothing... there would be no time to mount warheads or pump fuel into missiles...

Stilleto was considered one of their best missiles are you trying to say it was useless?

That is why I am suggesting your information is bollocks... or if you prefer... bullshit.

Latest START definition for "RANGE"

https://ibb.co/bZOXQF

Updated map on location of Russian nuclear weapons deployed and storage.

http://russianforces.org/maps/Russia-12thGUMO.html

Associated article; http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/lock-them-up-zero-deployed-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-in-europe-en-675.pdf

And what is the credibility of that?  Russia wouldn't place its storage units right at the borders of Russia.  Something is seriously wrong here.  Pavel Podvig is evident that this may be garbage.

Most of its data is 2012 too it seems.

Our research relied on openly available information about a series of orders issued in 2009 by the
Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. These orders assigned distinct insignias to a
number of military units that have been otherwise identified as being part of the 12th Main
Directorate. Additional research of various open sources, such as social media accounts, online fora,
and collaborative mapping platforms, corroborated this information and allowed to identify the links
between units and the organizational structure shown in Figure A1. Publicly available commercial
satellite imagery helped identify the locations of potential storage sites exhibiting the distinct physical
features described in this appendix.

miketheterrible wrote:And what is the credibility of that?  Russia wouldn't place its storage units right at the borders of Russia.  Something is seriously wrong here.  Pavel Podvig is evident that this may be garbage.

Most of its data is 2012 too it seems.

Our research relied on openly available information about a series of orders issued in 2009 by the
Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. These orders assigned distinct insignias to a
number of military units that have been otherwise identified as being part of the 12th Main
Directorate. Additional research of various open sources, such as social media accounts, online fora,
and collaborative mapping platforms, corroborated this information and allowed to identify the links
between units and the organizational structure shown in Figure A1. Publicly available commercial
satellite imagery helped identify the locations of potential storage sites exhibiting the distinct physical
features described in this appendix.

Not sure about the site on the Ukrainian border. These sites were all active, in fact I have a list of 14 sites. I have been watching that site to see if it closes down and nothing yet. If you remember when the West was screaming back in 2014 about all the Russian soldiers on the border ready to invade Ukraine. Some Western reporters traveled the length of the border looking for Russian soldiers within a 100 km's of the border. The only forward deployed Russian soldiers on the border they found was the 3 paratrooper bn's the Russian had inserted between the Ukrainian border and this storage facility less then 30 km away. And this article like everything else we post here has some element's of fact coupled with some not so correctional. I place the highest level on what comes out of the General Staff but even those have to be viewed with some doubt IMO. I have a rule in that I don't say anything unless I feel it is at least 90% correct and I never claim to be 100%.

franco wrote:

miketheterrible wrote:And what is the credibility of that?  Russia wouldn't place its storage units right at the borders of Russia.  Something is seriously wrong here.  Pavel Podvig is evident that this may be garbage.

Most of its data is 2012 too it seems.

Our research relied on openly available information about a series of orders issued in 2009 by the
Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. These orders assigned distinct insignias to a
number of military units that have been otherwise identified as being part of the 12th Main
Directorate. Additional research of various open sources, such as social media accounts, online fora,
and collaborative mapping platforms, corroborated this information and allowed to identify the links
between units and the organizational structure shown in Figure A1. Publicly available commercial
satellite imagery helped identify the locations of potential storage sites exhibiting the distinct physical
features described in this appendix.

Not sure about the site on the Ukrainian border. These sites were all active, in fact I have a list of 14 sites. I have been watching that site to see if it closes down and nothing yet. If you remember when the West was screaming back in 2014 about all the Russian soldiers on the border ready to invade Ukraine. Some Western reporters traveled the length of the border looking for Russian soldiers within a 100 km's of the border. The only forward deployed Russian soldiers on the border they found was the 3 paratrooper bn's the Russian had inserted between the Ukrainian border and this storage facility less then 30 km away.  And this article like everything else we post here has some element's of fact coupled with some not so correctional. I place the highest level on what comes out of the General Staff but even those have to be viewed with some doubt IMO. I have a rule in that I don't say anything unless I feel it is at least 90% correct and I never claim to be 100%.

Fair enough. But it would be suicide to have storage facilities of nuclear weapons near Ukrainian border, especially as of right now.  So i bet the facility exists, but it is probably sitting empty, especially if they have so little of forces between the facility and the border.

Agreed and there was another facility in Pskov region that was within 30 km's of Belarus and Latvia. It was closed down. Surprised that this one has not been. Could be weapon empty (one should hope) and left officially open to mess with the Ukrainians.

franco wrote:Agreed and there was another facility in Pskov region that was within 30 km's of Belarus and Latvia. It was closed down. Surprised that this one has not been. Could be weapon empty (one should hope) and left officially open to mess with the Ukrainians.

My guess you are correct or that the facility is still ran but used for other kinds of weapon storage if in case a war broke out.  Guaranteed by 99% all those nuclear weapons are sitting further within Russia. It would make more strategic sense anyway. Further away from harm and still able to strike anywhere from central Russia.

Went and checked the site sat imagery again. Couldn't spot a single vehicle on site nor at the supporting base 10 km's away. Maybe they have finally closed it down.

Couldn't that site still be used for storage and whatnot for other military purposes or is it considered dangerous due to storing nuclear material?

Not sure about the radiation aspect but there would not be much room for ammo storage. Site only had 6-8 storage bunkers plus still awful close to the border.

New START data exchange shows the United States and Russia are on track to meet the limits

The U.S. State Department released aggregate New START numbers from the 1 September 2017 data exchange. Russia declared 1561 deployed warheads, 501 deployed launchers, and 790 total launchers. In March 2017 the numbers were 1765, 523, and 816 respectively.

The U.S. numbers in September 2017 were 1393 warheads, 660 deployed and 800 total launchers (1411, 673, and 820 in March 2017).

There has been a lot of speculation that Russia might not be able (or is not going) to comply with the New START limits by the February 2018 deadline. It was never clear what what was behind these speculations, since Russia always had plenty of options to choose from - from withdrawing old R-36M2 and UR-100NUTTH missiles from service to decommissioning even older Project 667BDR submarines. Figuring out what exactly has been done may take some time, though.

The critical point is that the deadline is a fixed point in time... they could withdraw half their forces the day before the deadline and reinstate them into active service 2 days after the deadline and still be in full compliance with the agreement...

I have doubts that 2000 nuclear warheads is enough to guarantee complete annihilation of all western countries in event of a nuclear war.

The goal of a nuclear war being to eliminate the entirety of the enemy population and minimise damage to your own country and casualties to your population.

Having only 2000 warheads some of witch will never reach the target might not completely destroy the enemy counties. In case of a nuclear war any survivors on the enemy side is absolutely unacceptable.

What are potential solutions to this problem that can be implemented into Russia strategic arsenal?

(I am in favor of a deathstar equivalent but I am guessing you are not.)

franco wrote:
New START data exchange shows the United States and Russia are on track to meet the limits

The U.S. State Department released aggregate New START numbers from the 1 September 2017 data exchange. Russia declared 1561 deployed warheads, 501 deployed launchers, and 790 total launchers. In March 2017 the numbers were 1765, 523, and 816 respectively.

The U.S. numbers in September 2017 were 1393 warheads, 660 deployed and 800 total launchers (1411, 673, and 820 in March 2017).

There has been a lot of speculation that Russia might not be able (or is not going) to comply with the New START limits by the February 2018 deadline. It was never clear what what was behind these speculations, since Russia always had plenty of options to choose from - from withdrawing old R-36M2 and UR-100NUTTH missiles from service to decommissioning even older Project 667BDR submarines. Figuring out what exactly has been done may take some time, though.

Between the 289 not deployed Russian launchers I assume it would be safe enough to say:

12 Tu-95 in the reserve
32-48 of 2-3 submarines in the reserve (recently one returned to active service)
210 SS-25 likely in the reserve
some SS-18 silos

eehnie wrote:

franco wrote:
New START data exchange shows the United States and Russia are on track to meet the limits

The U.S. State Department released aggregate New START numbers from the 1 September 2017 data exchange. Russia declared 1561 deployed warheads, 501 deployed launchers, and 790 total launchers. In March 2017 the numbers were 1765, 523, and 816 respectively.

The U.S. numbers in September 2017 were 1393 warheads, 660 deployed and 800 total launchers (1411, 673, and 820 in March 2017).

There has been a lot of speculation that Russia might not be able (or is not going) to comply with the New START limits by the February 2018 deadline. It was never clear what what was behind these speculations, since Russia always had plenty of options to choose from - from withdrawing old R-36M2 and UR-100NUTTH missiles from service to decommissioning even older Project 667BDR submarines. Figuring out what exactly has been done may take some time, though.

Between the 289 not deployed Russian launchers I assume it would be safe enough to say:

12 Tu-95 in the reserve
32-48 of 2-3 submarines in the reserve (recently one returned to active service)
210 SS-25 likely in the reserve
some SS-18 silos

Some SS-19 also, still seems a lot.

I imagine those can be moved out and ready rather quickly.

But what the fuck do I know.

franco wrote:

eehnie wrote:

franco wrote:
New START data exchange shows the United States and Russia are on track to meet the limits

The U.S. State Department released aggregate New START numbers from the 1 September 2017 data exchange. Russia declared 1561 deployed warheads, 501 deployed launchers, and 790 total launchers. In March 2017 the numbers were 1765, 523, and 816 respectively.

The U.S. numbers in September 2017 were 1393 warheads, 660 deployed and 800 total launchers (1411, 673, and 820 in March 2017).

There has been a lot of speculation that Russia might not be able (or is not going) to comply with the New START limits by the February 2018 deadline. It was never clear what what was behind these speculations, since Russia always had plenty of options to choose from - from withdrawing old R-36M2 and UR-100NUTTH missiles from service to decommissioning even older Project 667BDR submarines. Figuring out what exactly has been done may take some time, though.

Between the 289 not deployed Russian launchers I assume it would be safe enough to say:

12 Tu-95 in the reserve
32-48 of 2-3 submarines in the reserve (recently one returned to active service)
210 SS-25 likely in the reserve
some SS-18 silos

Some SS-19 also, still seems a lot.

Maybe some SS-19, yes.

I would expect, that having the choice, Russia would prefer to keep the SS-18 silos over the SS-19 silos. In part because of being more powerful system, in part because going to the SS-30 systems the SS-18 silos have better potential of adaptation.