sepheronx wrote:My guess he is talking about manoeuvrability, which is correct. And maybe at what ranges it can engage aircrafts like AWACS and or Tankers, due to its massive radar (Irbis-E has longer tracking/engagement range than the APG-79 radars). But, when against 5th gen, thanks to F-22's and F-35's sensor fusion, it would get detected sooner than the Su-35 (Simply because, even though it has a powerful radar, the sensors on the F-22/35 will be able to pick up the radiation from the Irbis-E radar before the Irbis-E radar would be able to pick up the F-22/35). So in terms of BVR combat, it would be more than 10% less capable.
Correct. But this is not confined to the F-22 and F-35 but effectively to all radar warning receiver systems, especially the ones designed after the Cold War due to advances to technology.
We know that radar detection is based upon reflection. What this mean is that what happens to the outgoing signal is not as important to the reception half as those reflected signals. Assume that we have a maximum theoretical range of 200 km, a safe figure based upon radar antenna size typical of the fighter class. That is the maximum reach of the outgoing signal. At this point, the physical characteristics of the target is irrelevant, meaning it does not matter if the target is 'stealthy' or not. But for the sake of debate, assume that the target is 'non-stealthy' and provide the necessary amplitude for those reflected signals.
As the outgoing signals leave the transmitter, it is affected by many factors, notably the inverse square law which states that loss is inversely proportional to the square of the distance traveled. Another factor is that the atmosphere is not completely 'clean'. As the outgoing signal travels, it will collide with smaller targets ranging from birds to insects to assorted hydrometeors, fancy word for water based airborne objects. All of these will weaken the signal and that loss cannot be definitively declared simply because different altitudes have different levels of opacity regarding these smaller targets, and also the same different parts of the world for that matter.
The reflected signal will suffer the same ordeal as it travels back to the seeking radar, except now that its amplitude is weaken even more considerably because the target itself will have some absorption ability. All materials, including metals, do absorb some. By the time this signal is received by the seeking radar, it will be just a small fraction of the original outgoing signal and it may have phase and polarity changes as well.
For the target, it does not care about the reflected signal. It only care on analyzing the signal that impacted it. For the seeking radar, it must know the transmission characteristics of the transmitted signal, it must extract the reflected signal from background or what it thinks is a signal that is characteristically different from background, then compare it against the signal characteristics of the transmitted signal. It is this data processing that give us ghosts, scintillating targets, assured targets, or ambiguous targets. But as far as the target is concerned, as long as it can discriminate a signal that is radically different from background, it will know that it is being searched.
For the seeking radar, it also must contend with its own internal flaws such as radome aberration, waveguide leaks, poor electrical connections, and a long list of other potential technical deficiencies. If the target is 'non-cooperative' in design or 'stealthy', the problem of identification compounds many folds, to the extent that the reflected signals cannot be discriminated from background at all, which is the goal of 'stealth' in the first place: the insertion of the target into background noise.
So for a theoretical maximum reach of 200 km, a safe general assumption of effective detection range for 'non-stealth' targets ranges from 50-70% of that maximum. For low observable targets, more like visual range.