I do not know if it is the right section, I was more looking for a history of russian/soviet aircraft industry thread, but it is an interesting article.
I also highlighted the parts to show how much Khrushchev and the Ukrainian lobbies pushed to give advantages to the projects from Ukrainian SSR to damage to the ones from the Russian SSR.
Hopefully in the future new projects will not be so much influenced by regional lobbies.
There are a lot of projects in Kazan, and it is good that they expand their facilities and numbers of aircraft being built, as long as no wrong decisions are taken for political reasons.
And if Russia decides to rebuild the aircraft engine manufacturing in Zaporozhye (after it will have been liberated), it should be probably done without allowing interference from new lobbies.
https://aviation21.ru/sovetskij-turbovintovoj-voenno-transportnyj-samolyot-an-12/
Soviet turboprop military transport aircraft An-12
10.11.2024, 15:29
Due to its versatility and ease of operation, the An-12 military transport aircraft, along with models from the Mikoyan and Tupolev Design Bureaus, became a symbol of Soviet aviation. It was in demand to support the development of hard-to-reach areas, to provide assistance in natural disasters, and to participate in military conflicts and political events. Along with the similar American Lockheed C-130, the An-12 remained the world's main transport vehicle for many years.
In the summer of 1955, the leader of the USSR Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev visited the Antonov Design Bureau in Kyiv to see how the development of the An-8 transport aircraft was progressing. The visit was not accidental, as Khrushchev played an important role in the relocation of the Antonov Design Bureau from Novosibirsk to the capital of the Ukrainian SSR in the summer of 1952. At that time, the design bureau was on the rise: work on the An-8 was proceeding successfully, the team of young designers was actively developing, and Antonov himself was full of ideas.
Khrushchev inquired about foreign analogues of the new aircraft, and was told that all aircraft of this class had four engines. It is likely that during this conversation Antonov proposed to the head of state and the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to develop an aircraft with four engines, optimally suited for both passenger and transport needs. Such a solution would reduce the cost of design, establish mass production and simplify operation.
Antonov's idea impressed Khrushchev, and soon the USSR Council of Ministers issued a Resolution (dated November 30, 1955) on the termination of work on the "N" aircraft project and the beginning of the development of the An-10 and An-12 models. In parallel, the same document ordered chief designers Nikolai Kuznetsov and Alexander Ivchenko to develop the NK-4 and AI-20 turboprop engines.
The choice of engine was ultimately significantly influenced by the fact that the Antonov Design Bureau was located in Ukraine. There were two main power plant options: the NK-4 engine (OKB-276 N.D. Kuznetsov, Kuibyshev), which had high specific characteristics, and the AI-20 (OKB-478 A.G. Ivchenko, Zaporozhye), which had reliability based on proven design solutions. Oleg Antonov decided to equip the An-10 model with the NK-4, and the An-12 with the AI-20
This choice reflected the influence of domestic policy on technical design issues. One of the factors that predetermined the choice of the power plant in favor of the AI-20 was the statement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the preference for a Ukrainian engine for an aircraft created on Ukrainian soil.
Thus, the AI-20 became the main engine, which was installed in various modifications on the An-8, An-10, An-12, An-32, Il-18, Il-38 and Be-12 aircraft.
Despite the fact that the main emphasis was placed on the passenger version, the An-10 and An-12 design was developed with military purposes in mind. The general characteristics and dimensions of the fuselage, the parameters of the wing and chassis were laid down with the possibility of producing both civil and military versions with a high degree of unification, which made it possible to quickly convert one type of aircraft into another. Unification of design parts provided the first serial machines with up to 86% commonality in the airframe and 100% in the power plants. However, this approach to design sometimes led to irrational decisions.
For example, early versions of the An-12 had a pressurized middle fuselage section, similar to the An-10, while the tail section remained unpressurized. The An-10 design, due to a similar floor arrangement, had an excess of passenger space with a lack of baggage compartments. This configuration entailed significant weight gain, especially in the case of the An-10, which was repeatedly noted by Sergei Ilyushin, who considered the An-10/12 concept flawed due to its reduced weight efficiency compared to the Il-18.
Despite this, Antonov consciously accepted these weight costs, considering them an acceptable price for other advantages. Although from a modern point of view this decision is subject to criticism, but at that time a different view prevailed. In the conditions of excess kerosene in the country and the emphasis on accelerating progress, the An-10/12 concept seemed quite attractive and even economically feasible, allowing for the simultaneous development of military transport potential and civil aviation.
However, the practical implementation of the unification idea turned out to be far from the theoretical justifications. Differences in target equipment, as well as the constant improvement of aircraft and their production at different plants, led to the fact that the designs of the An-10 and An-12 began to differ more and more. In the USSR, the An-12 was mass-produced at three aircraft plants. In 1957-62, 155 aircraft were manufactured at the Irkutsk aircraft plant, 258 machines were produced in Voronezh over six years (1960-65), and 830 An-12 aircraft were built at the Chkalov aircraft plant (No. 84) in Tashkent between 1962 and 1972.
On December 16, 1957, in Irkutsk, in the presence of all the employees of the aircraft plant, at 14:37, the first prototype of the An-12 (aircraft "T", tail number 7900101) performed its first flight. The aircraft was piloted by a crew consisting of commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, test pilot Yakov Vernikov, second pilot G.I. Lysenko, navigator P.I. Uvarov, flight engineer I.M. Morozov, radio operator M.G. Yurov and gunner V.G. Zhilkin. The flight lasted only nine minutes - due to vibrations in the nose of the fuselage, the crew was forced to stop the flight and land. It turned out that the vibration did not pose a threat and was caused by an open door of the front landing gear.
Factory tests showed both the advantages and disadvantages of the An-12 design. Pilots noted the high power-to-weight ratio and aerodynamic qualities of the aircraft, but there were difficulties with controllability, especially during takeoff, when on a lightweight, unloaded machine they often did not have time to create an angle of attack for takeoff in time, and the liftoff from the runway occurred at an increased speed.
In addition, due to the powerful reactive torque of the four left-hand propellers, the right landing gear was loaded more than the left one, and the aircraft tended to turn to the right during takeoff. It was impossible to counteract this effect with brakes due to the narrow track of the landing gear. This drawback was eliminated by equipping the front landing gear of subsequent machines with a rotation mechanism controlled by pedals.
One of the serious problems with the An-12 was its difficult landing. The aircraft refused to land when the engine control levers were in the "Flight Idle" position. When the throttle levers were moved to "Ground Idle", negative thrust was generated and the aircraft descended unacceptably quickly, creating the risk of a rough touchdown on the runway. This became apparent during the sixth flight. A sharp movement of the throttle levers during alignment resulted in one of them jamming. The An-12 banked so much that its wing touched the ground, then rolled to the opposite side and landed off the runway. A new landing technique was developed to solve the problem. The inner engines were switched to "Ground Idle" mode, and the outer ones to "Flight Idle".
In addition to technical difficulties in control, the tests also revealed shortcomings in the aircraft's stability. To improve lateral and longitudinal stability, the angle of the transverse V of the wing consoles had to be changed. Another problem was the cargo hatch. During the first flight with the hatch open, the doors did not lock due to the deformation of the fuselage from air loads. The aircraft had to land with the hatch open. Subsequently, the fuselage in the cutout area was reinforced.
During the eight months of 1958, the An-12 completed the factory testing program. The aircraft performed flights with maximum speed pressure, as well as landings with one and two engines inoperative. By August 1958, when the tests were completed, three aircraft were already performing flights. In parallel with the tests, crews were trained to work with the new machine.
In 1959, An-12 aircraft began to be delivered to the USSR Air Force for military testing. Their intensive development by transport aviation pilots allowed the An-12 to be quickly integrated into military logistics operations, which were of strategic importance for both the army and the civilian infrastructure. Reliability and ease of maintenance made the aircraft popular for performing tasks in various climatic conditions. The machines were widely used in the harsh conditions of winter Siberia and in the hot climate of Central Asia.
The An-12 in various modifications became the basis of the military transport aviation of the Soviet Union. Special versions of the aircraft solved a wide range of tasks, including supporting airborne troops, quickly transferring not only combat units (up to 60 people on one side), but also armored vehicles. This gave the country the ability to quickly respond to events anywhere in the world, including providing assistance to victims of natural disasters and supporting national liberation movements.
During the war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, the An-12 was used intensively by both Soviet and Afghan pilots to transport people and cargo. The specific conditions of Afghanistan revealed another advantage of the An-12: the ability to land on high-altitude unpaved airfields, which the larger Il-76 could not do. The survivability of the aircraft was demonstrated by the successful completion of flights even with significant damage to the skin and onboard systems from enemy small arms fire from the ground.
In 1991-92, the Air Force Research Institute pilots set 39 world records for altitude and flight speed on the An-12. The aircraft was exported to India, Bulgaria, Indonesia, Iraq, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, Cuba, China and Yemen. A total of 183 aircraft were delivered to these countries. At least 10 more countries purchased the An-12 through intermediaries.
In the 1990s, tests were conducted, as a result of which the service life of the An-12 was increased to 47,000 hours, 15,000 flights and 40 years of operation. The technical condition of aircraft with high operating hours was studied by analyzing the accumulated operating experience of the An-12, which confirmed the high reliability of its design.
Further studies of the operational capabilities and technical condition of the An-12 aircraft were conducted in the 2000s. At the Antonov ASTC, life tests of the airframe were performed, areas with fatigue cracks were checked, and structural elements were analyzed after extreme tests. This allowed the aircraft's service life to be extended to 50,000 hours, 17,000 flights, and a service life of 50 years to be set. In Russia, the service life of the An-12 aircraft has been extended until 2030, after which their life cycle will end and the Russian Ministry of Defense will stop operating the An-12.