Vietnam War Aircrafts Losses: NVPAF and USAF

BlackArrow wrote:

I didn't post a Wikipedia link.

18 combat losses, btw. Some other airframes also wrote off due to combat damage.

BlackArrow wrote:So, are you disputing the figures, or have you got figures of your own?

http://in.rbth.com/blogs/2015/04/30/vietnam_war_the_critical_role_of_russian_weapons_42917.html

Vietnam War: The critical role of Russian weapons

April 30, 2015 Rakesh Krishnan Simha
Exactly 40 years ago the Vietnamese burst into Saigon, catching the Americans in their underpants. As well as mounting a brave defence of their country, the Vietnamese used one superpower’s firepower to defeat another.


North Vietnamese Air Force MiG-17 pilots walk by their aircraft. Source: wikipedia

To get a sense of how viciously the Vietnam War was fought and – more importantly – the sweeping nature of Vietnamese victory, chew on this: during the conflict the Americans lost more than 2,000 aircraft; the Vietnamese lost just 131 planes.
This astounding record notched up by the Vietnamese against a superpower with virtually unlimited military resources – and which could also count on combat support from allies such as Australia, South Korea and New Zealand – was possible because of the almost superhuman fight put by the Vietnamese military and civilians.
The war began in 1954 and ended with a Vietnamese victory on April 30, 1975. For this resounding victory the people of Vietnam did not just make tremendous sacrifices; they made those sacrifices count. The Vietnamese leadership evacuated entire cities (600,000 of Hanoi’s 800,000 civilians moved out from the city to the countryside and mountains); children went to school with leaves attached to their shoulders as camouflage from aerial attacks; transport trucks hid by day in the jungles and moved at night guided by lights hung under their chassis.

Vietnamese engineers invented submersible bridges which could not be seen from the air. They also developed a complex network of tunnels – some of them passing right under American-held areas – to move troops, food, fuel, civilians and the injured.
They made each bullet count. On December 22, 1972 a Vietnamese anti-aircraft unit using a single-barrel 14.7 mm gun shot down an F-111 supersonic fighter-bomber. What was remarkable was the anti-aircraft gun had only 19 shells left when they spotted the American aircraft.
While Vietnamese morale, patriotism, superior training and the belief that theirs was a just cause were clearly critical factors, the victory was also due to the virtually ceaseless flow of weapons from Russia.
During the 1950s and early 1960s, Moscow had employed a hands-off policy towards the conflict in Southeast Asia. Premier Nikita Khrushchev, for instance, wanted to avoid yet another nuclear standoff as had happened in 1962 in Cuba. But his successors Alexey Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev wanted to please the hardliners in the Soviet military and consequently ramped up military aid.

Russians are coming

By the spring of 1967, a river of aid was flowing from Russia into North Vietnam.
By the late 1960s more than three-quarters of the military and technical equipment received by North Vietnam was coming from Moscow. Sergei Blagov writes in Asia Times that Moscow contributed weapons essential to North Vietnamese defence capabilities against the American air war, including radar systems, anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). “Without this materiel, Vietnamese air defence would have been hardly feasible,” he says.
Russia military supplies completely transformed the nature of the war. Unlike what they show you in Hollywood movies, the Vietnamese did not fight with just cunning and camouflage, they hit the Americans with firepower on a staggering scale. Their arsenal included 2,000 tanks, 7,000 artillery guns, over 5,000 anti-aircraft guns and 158 surface-to-air rocket launchers.
The new weapons – although not the latest in Moscow’s arsenal – were more advanced than the American ones, leading to many battlefield routs of US military forces. American aircraft ran into skies streaking with SAMs and thick with ack-ack salvoes.
Entire waves of American aircraft were blasted out of the skies because the Vietnamese fired ceaseless barrages of SAMs, knowing more Russian supplies were on their way. “In August 1965, the first SAMs were fired at four F-4 Phantoms over Vietnam, shooting down three. This marked the first time that US planes were attacked by SAMs,” writes Blagov.
US strategic bombers tumbled out of the skies after being hit by Russian-supplied SAMs (the granddaddies of today’s S-300 and S-400 missiles). Russian crews fired SAMs at the B-52 bombers, which were the first raiders shot down over Hanoi. A Soviet rocketeer told Russian Radio: “After our arrival in Vietnam, American pilots refused to fly.” (However, after 1966, no Soviet troops directly participated in combat because the Vietnamese forces had been trained to handle the Soviet equipment, the Russian magazine Eko Planety – Echo of the Planet – says.)

Jets that survived these brutal knockouts were picked out by Vietnamese Air Force aces flying MiG-17s and MiG-21s; these combat aircraft were vectored towards their targets by Russian-supplied radars.
To give you an idea of just what the Vietnamese were up against, in 1965 just 30 MiGs were doing combat against 660 American aircraft. And yet the Americans lost 46 F-4 fighters, of which 13 were downed by MiGs.
The odds were evened soon. In 1966 the Vietnamese Air Force started receiving the latest MiG-21 interceptor. On July 7, two MiG-21s shot down an F-105 with a Russian Atoll air-to-air missile, creating panic in the US Air Force.
By now the Vietnamese pilots were growing more familiar with their Russian jets. Roger Boniface writes in MIGs Over North Vietnam: “The MiG-17 pilots started to indulge in dogfights with American aircraft; the former were growing in confidence all the time as they could constantly turn inside the faster F-4s and use their cannon to lethal effect from close range. The MiG-21 would use their superior speed and dive on the Americans from higher altitudes. The VPAF would use both the MiG-17 and MiG-21 against the Americans, using their techniques in unison by catching the Americans in what can only be described as a diving and turning “sandwich”.
The American pilots became so scared of encountering the Vietnamese air aces that they in several cases they fled the scene of combat at full speed.
Early warning by Russian military intelligence saved countless Vietnamese lives. Truong Nhu Tang, a senior North Vietnamese official, writes in A Viet Cong Memoir that Russian ships in the South China Sea gave vital early warnings to Vietnamese forces. Russian ships would pick up American B-52 bombers flying from Okinawa and Guam. Their airspeed and direction would be noted and then relayed to Vietnamese political and military headquarters. The Vietnamese would then calculate the bombing target and vector their fighters into attack trajectories. These advance warning gave them time to move out of the way of the bombers and while the bombing runs caused extensive damage, because of the early warnings from 1968-1970 they did not kill a single military or civilian leader in the headquarter complexes.
Russia also supplied Vietnam with medical supplies, food, oil, machinery and spare parts. And unlike the material and weapons supplied by China – which demanded deferred payment – most Russian assistance was supplied as aid rather than loans. Over the course of the war the money donated to the Vietnamese cause was equal to $2 million a day.
In late March 1965, Brezhnev announced that his government had been receiving "many applications" from Soviet citizens offering to serve as volunteers in Vietnam. However, Russian freelancers were not really needed. From July 1965 to the end of 1974, around 6,500 officers and generals, as well as more than 4,500 soldiers and sergeants of the Russian armed forces visited the country as ‘advisors’. In addition, Russian military schools and academies trained more than 10,000 Vietnamese military personnel. Just 13 Soviet citizens lost their lives in the entire conflict, says Eko Planety.

Kalashnikov vs Colt

On the ground the picture was grimmer – if that was possible – for the Americans. The Vietnam War was the first conflict in history in which assault rifles were used by both sides on an extensive scale.
Vietnamese soldiers were fortunate to get that era’s most advanced rifle – the AK-47. The Kalashnikov’s lighter bullet meant each Vietnamese could carry around 350 bullets on their person, which allowed them to fight long after their opponents ran out of ammo. The rifle was also remarkably low-maintenance, translating into better performance in Vietnam’s wet and humid environment.
In contrast the American infantryman was armed with the shockingly poor Colt M16, which jammed so often that newly arriving American soldiers would perform the macabre drama of walking amidst injured or dying American soldiers to grab M16s that hadn’t jammed during battle.
There were numerous instances of American platoons losing firefights because of malfunctioning M16s. During a night ambush by Vietnamese guerrillas, the last words radioed by an American company of troops were: “Out of hand grenades, all weapons jammed.”
The situation was so dire that some Americans started picking up AK-47s that belonged to dead Vietnamese soldiers, Esquire magazine reports. It was a dangerous practice because it risked drawing ‘friendly’ fire, owing to the Kalashnikov and the M16 having distinctly different sounds. On one occasion a US sergeant carrying an AK-47 was stopped by his commander, who demanded to know why he was carrying a Russian weapon. The sergeant replied, “Because it works!”
The AK-47 vs M16 scenario was symbolic of the superior quality of Russian weaponry throughout the war. In fact, Russian weapons performed so well that the Chinese started pilfering the shiny new gear passing through their territory. Moscow was forced to use the dangerous sea route to ensure the Vietnamese got the supplies they needed to win the war.
American losses would have been greater had Russia provided the Vietnamese armed forces with the latest weapons in its arsenal. For instance, the OSA class missile boats – that India had used to destroy Karachi harbour during the 1971 War – never reached Vietnamese navy. These boats armed with the highly accurate Styx missile had the potential to play havoc with the US Navy. Perhaps the brass at Moscow believed the Americans would have resorted to a nuclear strike on Vietnam had they lost one of their large capital ships such as the aircraft carrier Enterprise.

Blagov says the Vietnamese reportedly complained they were getting missiles of obsolete designs. “Some of the missile complexes supplied to Vietnam from the Soviet Union during the war were actually second-hand weapons, produced in 1956-1958,” he writes. “The main reason for Moscow's failure to supply North Vietnam with the newest armaments was the Kremlin's fear that the Vietnamese could leak Soviet military secrets to the Chinese.”

Endgame

Carl von Clausewitz defined war as, “an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will”. The Vietnamese generals simply refused to give the much larger American military the war it wanted. Through their brilliant strategies and sustained firepower they compelled the US to withdraw its forces and finally dump its puppet government in Saigon.
On April 30, 1975 the world was treated to the sight of Vietnamese T-54 tanks bursting through the gates of the Presidential Palace in Saigon. In another part of the city, angry Vietnamese stormed the US embassy, catching the American ambassador Graham Martin virtually in his underpants. Vietnamese army units had the helicopter in which he was being evacuated in their sights but the long war was finally over and they figured it wasn’t worth adding his miserable scalp to the American toll of 58,200 dead, more than 150,000 injured and 1600 missing.

TheArmenian wrote:I'll just post this here:

higurashihougi wrote:@nemrod: Vietnam's MiG-21 is the Death Threat of American F-4 during the Vietnam War.

Helicopter Losses During the Vietnam War

Bell Helicopter built 10,005 Hueys from 1957 to 1975. Prior to 1957, there were three XH-40 prototypes and six
YH-40 test helicopters manufactured. Of the 10,005 production Hueys, the first 732 were designated HU-1A and
HU-1B. 9,216 of these went to the U.S. Army, 79 to the U.S. Air Force, 42 to the U.S. Navy, and 127 to the U.S.
Marine Corps. The rest went to other countries.
Our records show that 7,013 Hueys served in the Vietnam War. Almost all were Army.
------------------------------------KIA -----KIA
-----------served---- destroy --pilots ----crew
UH-1-------- 80 --------80------ 36--- ----17
UH-1A------- 8 ----------1
UH-1B -------729------- 376--- 139-- ---144
UH-1C --------696----- 415 ---167 ------158
UH-1D -------1,926----1,028-- 224-- ---247
UH-1E --------156 ------100---- 39 ------41
UH-1F ----------31------ 18----- 4-------- 5
UH-1H -------3,375--- 1,285--- 457---- 487
UH-1L ---------2
UH-1M --------5------------------ 5------- 3
UH-1N ---------2 ---------2
UH-1P ---------3-------------- ----3 --------1
----- ----- ----- -----
----------------7,013 ---3,305--- 1,074 ---1,103

Yet more proof that nonstealthy aircraft are unsurvivable

Anti-defense groups such as POGO, TCS, the NTU, PIRG, and CATO, and the anti-defense hacks they employ, falsely claim that stealthy aircraft such as the Next Generation Bomber and the F-35 are not needed and that nonstealthy aircraft like the F-16, F/A-18, B-52, and B-1 are still viable and can survive in enemy airspace.
But they’re dead wrong. They’re blathering nonsense about issues they know nothing about. And by doing so, they’re only proving how ignorant they are. For nonstealthy aircraft are unsurvivable and useless in any airspace defended by even legacy Soviet air defense systems, let alone the modern Russian or Chinese AD systems that American pilots will have to confront or evade in the future. For that reason alone, nonstealthy aircraft are completely useless, irrelevant, impotent, and obsolete.
The best air defense systems expert in the world, Dr Carlo Kopp, founder of AirPowerAustralia, has written an excellent study of the effectiveness of legacy Soviet air defense systems such as the SA-2 Guideline, SA-3 Goa, SA-5 Gammon, and SA-6 Gainful. As my Readers should know, these air defense systems proved themselves very effective at shooting down American aircraft in Vietnam (1964-1973), the War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt (late 1960s), and the Yom Kippur War (1973).
This is not only because of their jamming-resistant, long-range radar and their missiles, but also because of their well trained and highly motivated crews.

Vietnam

In Vietnam, the US military lost 8400 aircraft.  While more planes were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery (including the gun that Jane Fonda sat on) than SAMs, losses to the latter weapon type were nonetheless high, and losses to AAA were often incurred because of the need of nonstealthy aircraft to fly at low altitudes.
North Vietnam procured an unknown number (probably 50) SA-2 SAM batteries from the USSR, plus a large number of AAA batteries. SA-2 systems were deployed at strategically important targets such as industrial facilities and military bases in tandem with AAA. While the SA-2 system detected and fired at aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes, AAA was busy shooting down low-flying aircraft. American pilots were thus presented with a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” choice: fly at a high altitude be shot down by an SA-2 SAM, or fly at a low altitude and be shot down by AAA.
Moreover, to the extent possible, the North Vietnamese tried to relocate their SA-2 batteries as frequently as possible, though this was not easy, because the SA-2 is a static system. Packing the entire system onto vehicles takes 6 hours; unpacking it when it arrives at its new site and testing it also takes six hours. The same problem plagues the SA-5 Gammon and static variants of the SA-3 Goa (other SA-3 variants are mobile).
And yet, despite these mobility constraints, North Vietnamese SA-2 SAMs achieved hundreds of aircraft shootdowns. One can only imagine how much deadlier North Vietnam’s air defense network would’ve been if supplied with SA-3, SA-4, or SA-6 mobile SAM systems (which already existed at the time), or the modern, 21st century S-300, S-400, or HQ-9 SAM systems.
Attempts to take SA-2s out with AGM-45 Shrike missiles and to jam them initially succeeded, but ultimately failed, because of both the relocation tactics and the equipping of the SA-2 system with more jamming-resistant radar.

Egypt

After Egypt lost the Sinai to Israel in the Six Day War, Cairo started a War of Attrition against Israel (1967-1970) to get the Sinai back.  During that war, the Soviets began to deploy SA-2 and SA-3 SAM systems to the Suez Canal zone, shooting down many Israeli aircraft. Eventually, the Soviet Air Defense Force (PVO Strany) deployed an entire division to that area.
Soviet SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6 SAM systems (the latter two being mobile) proved themselves even deadlier during the Yom Kippur War, during which they shot down 40 Israeli aircraft. This was both because of their powerful long-range radars and long-range missiles and because of the “hide, shoot, and scoot” tactics employed by the Egyptians and the Russians using truck-mounted SA-3 and armored-vehicle-mounted SA-6 SAM systems. They frequently hid in unexpected locations to ambush unsuspecting Israeli pilots, shot at them, then scooted.
This resulted in the loss of 40 Israeli aircraft.
This also showed that even legacy Soviet SAM systems can be very deadly if employed in accordance with “hide, shoot, and scoot” tactics.

Syria, Iraq, and Libya

Some of you may ask: “But the Israelis routed Syrian air defense systems in the Bekaa Valley in 1982, and we defeated Soviet SAM systems in Iraq in 1991 and 2003 and in Libya in 2011, so why should we worry about enemy air defense systems?”
The explanation is that these systems were defeated solely due to crew incompetence and a failure to employ well-known, proven Soviet air defense system tactics (the “hide, shoot, and scoot” tactic). Neither the Syrians nor the Iraqis and the Libyans tried to employ them, and their air defense system crews were poorly trained and poorly motivated. Had they been well trained and highly motivated, and had they employed “hide, shoot, and scoot tactics” – lying in ambush, shooting and then scooting, relocating often – they would’ve inflicted heavy damage on Israeli and Western militaries.
The systems used by the Syrians, the Iraqis, and the Libyans (the SA-2, SA-3, SA-5 and SA-6) were the same as the ones used by the Egyptians and the Russians in the Suez Canal zone during the late 1970s and in 1973, and the SA-2 was also used to a deadly effect by the Viets, shooting down many B-52 bombers, even though these bombers were heavily loaded with jammers.
No, technology was not at fault here. Tactics (or rather, the lack of proper tactics) and people were at fault.
As Dr Carlo Kopp rightly writes, the mobility of a SAM system is worth as much as its missiles. And the problem for the US is that, with the exception of the SA-2 Guideline, the SA-5 Gammon, and some variants of the SA-3 Goa, ALL Soviet, Russian, and Chinese air defense systems (SAMs, SPAAGs, and SPAAGMs) are mobile, and this is no coincidence, as all of these except the SA-2/3/5 were designed from the beginning for mobility and for “hide, shoot, and scoot” operations. See this table by Dr Kopp. The vast majority of them can relocate in minutes rather than hours or days. Moreover, the vast majority of them have a much longer range than the SA-2.
This is especially true of the modern S-300, S-400, and HQ-9 systems, all of which are vastly superior to legacy Soviet systems, have even longer ranges and more powerful radars, and enjoy the following advantages over legacy systems:
Modern SAM engagement and acquisition radars are designed from the outset to be highly resistant to jamming, and typically deliver higher peak power-aperture performance to engage lower signature targets;
Some modern SAM engagement radars are claimed to provide a basic LPI (Low Probability of Intercept) capability, making their detection and tracking difficult;
Nearly all modern SAM systems and supporting radars are highly mobile, engineered from the outset for “hide, shoot and scoot” operations;
Modern SAMs are all kinematically superior to their Cold War era predecessors, by virtue of better rocket motor technology, and digital guidance, yielding greater engagement ranges and terminal endgame manoeuvre performance.
Contemporary SAM systems in these categories include the Russian SA-20 (S-300PMU1, S-300PMU2), Chinese HQ-9/FD-2000 and Russian SA-21 (S-400). These are modern systems with highly jam resistant radars, and if the Chinese are correct, basic low probability of intercept capability.
These systems will be difficult to locate, jam and guide anti-radiation missiles against. No less importantly they have modern highly automated digital fire control systems, not unlike Western SAMs of this era. The demands for proficiency and technical understanding of operation by crews seen in early Cold War SAM systems no longer exist – operators have sophisticated LCD panel displays with synthetic presentation. In deployment, these systems are heavily automated, using mostly hydraulic rams to elevate and unfold key system components, and thus little operator skill is needed to set up or relocate a battery – most can shoot and scoot in five minutes.(…)
As a result, a modern IADS equipped with current Russian and Chinese SAM systems will be very difficult to defeat by non-lethal and lethal suppression or kill techniques. A large fraction of guided munitions launched will be shot down, or their guidance defeated.

In conclusion, the perception that contemporary Russian and Chinese SAM systems can be defeated as easily as Syrian and Iraqi systems in 1982 and 1991 is nothing more than wishful thinking, arising from a complete failure to study and understand why and how SAM defences failed or succeeded in past conflicts.
These three systems (S-300, S-400, and HQ-9) are all superior to the MIM-104 PATRIOT. Russia, Belarus, Venezuela, and China all operate them. Syria is very likely to acquire the S-300, and Iran has sued Russia in an international court to have S-300 batteries delivered. Iran also has the SA-3, SA-6, and the Raad (Thunder), a copy of the Soviet SA-11/Buk mobile SAM system, all of which would be very deadly to any nonstealthy aircraft if the Iranians applied “hide, shoot, and scoot” tactics.
In conclusion, these facts all show that even legacy Soviet SAM systems such as the SA-2/3/6 would easily survive and shoot down any nonstealthy aircraft if used in the “hide, shoot, and scoot” manner, while modern Russian and Chinese SAMs are even more deadly. Any airspace defended by even so much as legacy SAM systems is closed to any nonstealthy aircraft; any airspace defended by the S-300, S-400, or HQ-9 would be a death zone.
Thus, any notion that nonstealthy aircraft are still viable and useful is absurd and ridiculous. POGO, TCS, NTU, PIRG, ACA, and CATO anti-defense hacks, as usual, don’t know what they’re talking about.
The only Western aircraft which can survive in such airspace are the F-22, the B-2, and the planned Next Generation Bomber.

George1 wrote:probably 8400 aircraft including helicopters (Huey)

....United States military lost in Vietnam almost 10,000 aircraft, helicopters and 578 UAVs (554 over Vietnam and 24 over China).

Former North Vietnamese MiG-21 pilot explains how he was able to shoot down a USAF B-52 during Operation Linebacker II
By Dario Leone -Oct 16 2018

In response to the North Vietnamese “Easter Offensive” into South Vietnam in 1972, President Nixon suspended peace talks on May 8 and ordered Operation Linebacker, the renewed bombings of North Vietnam and the aerial mining of its harbors and rivers. When North Vietnam seemed ready to talk peace in October, Nixon directed yet another bombing halt. North Vietnam then balked for two months over cease-fire provisions. So, Nixon eliminated the sanctuaries and ordered the heaviest bombing of the entire war against Hanoi and Haiphong, Operation Linebacker II.

Beginning on Dec. 18, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) pounded military and transportation targets with B-52s and tactical fighters. After 11 days of intense bombing, the North Vietnamese finally agreed to return to the peace table in Paris. Consequently, the U.S. restricted its air attacks on North Vietnam to the area south of the 20th parallel.

On Jan. 15, 1973, the U.S. announced an end to all mining, bombing and other offensive operations against North Vietnam.

Seventy-five Airmen died supporting the operation, 33 of whom died in the 15 downed B-52 Stratofortress bombers – the primary bomber flown during Operation Linebacker II.

According to Vietnamese records, on the night of Dec. 27, 1972 North Vietnamese Air Force (NVNAF) pilot Pham Tuan used MiG-21MF No.5121 to shoot down a USAF B-52D Stratofortress bomber over Moc Chau.

Pham Tuan took off from Noi Bai and little later landed at Yen Bai with the help of the GCI situated in Moc Chau and Son La. He recalls in István Toperczer book MiG Aces of the Vietnam War:

“At 22:20 hours, I was given the order to take off from Yen Bai at a heading of 200 degrees and broke through the low heavy cloud layer at 200-300 meters only to find F-4s in the vicinity. In the meantime I was informed that the B-52s were approaching Moc Chau and the GCI at Son La and Moc Chau were constantly updating me on the distance of the bombers: 60 kilometers, 50 km and 40 km. As planned, I jettisoned the fuel tank and climbed to 7,000 meters while applying the throttle to increase the speed. The radars were plotting the route of the B-52s and also warned me of the escort F-4s following them. When I saw a yellow light in front of me, I turned left to 40 degrees, increased my speed to 1,200 km/h and climbed to a 10,000 meter altitude where the B-52s were cruising. I radioed to the command: ‘I have the target in sight, tally target, request order for the attack’. The response of the GCI was: ‘You have permission to fire twice, and then escape quickly’. The Americans were holding formation, keeping approximately two to three kilometers of separation. I made last minute checks on my missiles and when I reached the level of the third B-52 pushed the fire bottom on the control stick. I launched two heat seeking missiles from a distance of 2 kilometers. Big flames were visible around the second B-52 when I broke sharply to the left and descended to 2,000 meters before landing at Yen Bai. The attacked formation of B-52s immediately dropped their load and returned to base.”

The loss of Capt Mize’s B-52D bomber (56-0599) to MiG activity was never confirmed by the USAF, which, instead, claimed that the bomber was struck by a SAM.





https://theaviationgeekclub.com/former-north-vietnamese-mig-21-pilot-explains-how-he-was-able-to-shoot-down-a-usaf-b-52-during-operation-linebacker-ii/