New Russian heavy ICBM - Sarmatian

RIA Novosti


Russia to build 100-ton ICBM to penetrate US missile defenses

Russia will develop a new liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile to overcome the U.S.’s prospective missile defense system, Strategic Missile Forces chief Lt. Gen. Sergei Karakayev said on Friday.

A decision has been made to create a new silo-launched heavy missile that will have “enhanced capability to breach a hypothetical US missile defense system,” he said.

The new missile will replace the Voyevoda R-36M2 Satan ICBM.

Russia’s solid-propellant ICBMs may be unable to penetrate missile defenses, the general said.

He also said the Strategic Missile Forces will test launch 11 ICBMs next year.

The United States is building a missile defense system in Europe to protect against possible attack from ‘rogue states’ such as Iran.

Karakayev said Iran has neither technology nor industrial potential to build ballistic missiles.

There have been media reports about test launches of Iranian intercontinental ballistic missiles but the SMF doubts these missiles will have the effective range to reach Europe, he said.

http://www.en.ria.ru/mlitary_news/20111216/170301667.html

It has being speculated for the last few years or so but since the last year we have final conformation.

Excellent since Satan and Stiletto needs to be replaced with something heavier than Topol.

Such a large missile could carry an enormous load of decoys and jammers and all sorts of stuff.

Will be very interesting.

even though this new missile is twice as heavy as the Topol, it still is smaller than the SS-18 Satan (RS-20V). The Satan weighs in at 200 tons.

The class of ICBM is pretty much based on throw weight... how much payload in kgs that can be delivered x thousand kilometres.

As such the total weight of the missile is not so important as its throw weight... just off the top of my head TOPOL is about 1.5 tons while the SS-18 is something like 8 tons.

This new missile might only be 100 tons in weight, but with new rocket engines, new fuels, new much lighter electronics with much more precise control systems, plus of course lighter and stronger materials to make the actual missile from will all reduce weight and increase performance. It is like building a race car... you make the structure as light but strong as possible, and then you put the biggest motor you can shoehorn in.... and take it from there.

Liquid propellents are generally more powerful than solid propellents, with cryogenic liquids using hydrogen and oxygen being the most powerful of all, but are not storable on the missile and generally used for rockets for launching satellites and deep space missions.

Why did Russia opt for liquid-fuel in its next generation ICBMs?


What is Parallel Seperation Warheads ?

What a weird article.

What boost phase threat is it actually talking about?

Is the US going to be building ABM systems around Russian ICBM fields?

Regarding Parallel Separation of warheads, I believe they are referring to the early release of warheads without a warhead bus.

Ie once the ICBMs last stage has burnt out it is basically going as fast as it will go, and instead of the normal release of the warhead bus which carries the warheads along the flight path... occasionally manouvering to release a warhead to a specific target on the way till all the warheads are released, the new Russian missiles release all the warheads after the third stage burn out so instead of trying to hit one bus, the interceptors have to hit 6-10 individual warheads. Their new hit to kill payloads will be very inefficient for this...

I would add that making a new missile that is liquid fuelled is hard to understand in the west because they spent a lot of money on solid fuelled rockets and think they are wonderful.

The simple facts are that the Russians invested a lot of money in solving the problems of liquid fuelled rockets and made they rather more powerful than western rockets, so actually using solid fuelled rockets is strange for the Russians.

As shown by the accident with the SS-N-20 solid fuelled rocket while loading on an Akula class SSBN (Typhoon) a solid rocket missile is actually more dangerous to load as it is full of fuel and when dropped they burst into flames.

Liquid fuelled rockets can be loaded empty but pressurised so once they are onboard you can pressure fill them rapidly and then fit their nuclear warheads and it is much safer than the same operation with solid fuelled rockets.

Doubt a 100 tonne missile would carry an "enormous" amount, which means meeting or surpassing at the very least, the Peacekeeper's throw weight. Not to mention that actual amounts of warheads and decoys carried is moreso dependent on the room allotted, which is determined by the missile's width. It'd stand to reason that a missile half as heavy as the Satan would probably be shorter and not as wide, thus, more than likely, not be able to carry as much megatonneage as the Satan. But with Russian advances in guidance, they may perhaps be fully shifting to the Western philosophy of more accurate warheads over more powerful warheads.

Super accuracy is only useful for a first strike.

I would suspect they will go for numbers and decoy and jammer capacity to overwhelm a defensive system than for high power warheads.

The purpose of the 25 megaton warhead of one of the SS-18s mods was purely to hit Cheyanne mountain (ie the home of the stargate... ).

For a deterrent, simple and relatively small warheads make much more sense as the explosive power of nuclear weapons does not increase at the same rate as the damage it does does.

What I am trying to say is that on a flat city target a 25 MT warhead will likely destroy the entire city no matter how big the city is, but 4 warheads of about 200KT properly spaced over a city would be just as lethal and yet would be small enough to allow an SS-18 to carry 30 200kt warheads as opposed to the single 25 MT warhead it carried.

In specific cases a heavy warhead is warranted, but as a dedicated second strike weapon the main targets will be population centres... there is no point in hitting ICBM fields because even if you launch first they will be empty by the time your missiles get there.

It makes rather more sense simply to target enemy population centres... and to make that known so the enemy is clear about the consequences of a preemptive strike.

Reductions in the weight of structural materials, electronics, improvements in rocket materials and performance, and reductions in size of warheads along with an increase in accuracy should lead to an effective weapon.

It doesn't need the performance of Minuteman to do its job, which is to be a numbers missile to make ABM systems pointless.

IronsightSniper"]Doubt a 100 tonne missile would carry an "enormous" amount, which means meeting or surpassing at the very least, the Peacekeeper's throw weight.

What has to do LGM-118 with the planned next generation liquid fuel ICBM and "meeting or surpassing" its throw weight ? This appear as a sort of joke.

If Russia would have any intention to simply produce a 100 ton class ICBM with the only prerequisite of greater throw weight ,much greater destructive power vastly superior cardinal parameter than LGM-118, it could simply construct some......... antediluvian RT-23 Modelets (SS-22 Scalpel).

they may perhaps be fully shifting to the Western philosophy of more accurate warheads over more powerful warheads.

I have heard this ridiculous low level platitude (including some laughable Cold War's PR-constructed allegations,naturally completely debunked at today, on advancements in Soviet ICBM's guidance systems obtained through theft of westren technology ) hundreds of times in public accessible media but,unluckly, this supposed difference in ICBM philosophy is simply a low level petropolitan myth.

This assuption was compatible.... and moreover only partially ( as well discovered after the end of Cold War by Westren experts of the sector ) only with the most older Soviet liquid fueled ICBM employing Delta algorithmical guidance ,for Soviet scientifical community one of the most crucial prerequisite for theirs ICBM was,in fact, very high resilience of theirs ICBM's electronic guidance components in an environment with high gradient of Alpha and Gamma primary radiations and high atmosphere re-ionization-induced screening effects and the sensors for relative Earth gravitational field monitoring and the accelerometer's CPU for error mitigation ,in those very likely full scale thermonuclear war condictions, would have been or totally inoperable or, even worse, would have produced totally wronged inertial pact corrections !! .

Moreover the product of the REAL difference in CEP between Soviet and USA ICBM designs of the same "generation" and in the same class (marginal at most in front of an incomparably greater immunity and efficiency in an highly electromagnetized environment)and the average differences in warhead potential, result in a much ,much greater destruction power and significantly greater chance of first hit destruction of strategic sensible targets in favour of Soviet ICBM .

Only for remain within the previously mentioned ICBM sample (RT-23 Modelets and LGM-128 Peacekeeper) we have respectively a CEP of 185 m for the former and 120 m for the latter ,in front of a single re-entry vehicle explosive potential of 550 kT against 300 kT ; now IronsightSniper exit from your house and try to figure how much space is 65 meters.
Done? Well now take into account that the difference in potential betwen the warheads on each RV of those two ICBM is more or less equal to ........23 times the Hiroshima bomb !!!
65 m......23 times Hiroshima ... ....65 meters for 23 times the Hiroshima Bomb's explosion !!!

shifting to the Western philosophy of more accurate warheads over more powerful warheads.

.........oh yes sure .

Mindstorm wrote:

IronsightSniper"]Doubt a 100 tonne missile would carry an "enormous" amount, which means meeting or surpassing at the very least, the Peacekeeper's throw weight.

What has to do LGM-118 with the planned next generation liquid fuel ICBM and "meeting or surpassing" its throw weight ? This appear as a sort of joke.

If Russia would have any intention to simply produce a 100 ton class ICBM with the only prerequisite of greater throw weight ,much greater destructive power vastly superior cardinal parameter than LGM-118, it could simply construct some......... antediluvian RT-23 Modelets (SS-22 Scalpel).

The LGM-118 is relevant in that it's also a 100 tonne missile and has the 2nd largest throw weight of ICBMs (next to the Satan of course). The use of the Peacekeeper in this discussion was to counter the argument that this new Russian missile would,

GarryB wrote:Such a large missile could carry an enormous load of decoys and jammers and all sorts of stuff.

Will be very interesting.

which we know (by it's sheer mass) would not carry "an enormous" load, in the sense that it's only half the size of what Russia did 4 decades ago, thus we can't pretend that it's going to be another Tzar in the Russian line of Tzars.

they may perhaps be fully shifting to the Western philosophy of more accurate warheads over more powerful warheads.

I have heard this ridiculous low level platitude (including some laughable Cold War's PR-constructed allegations,naturally completely debunked at today, on advancements in Soviet ICBM's guidance systems obtained through theft of westren technology ) hundreds of times in public accessible media but,unluckly, this supposed difference in ICBM philosophy is simply a low level petropolitan myth.

This assuption was compatible.... and moreover only partially ( as well discovered after the end of Cold War by Westren experts of the sector ) only with the most older Soviet liquid fueled ICBM employing Delta algorithmical guidance ,for Soviet scientifical community one of the most crucial prerequisite for theirs ICBM was,in fact, very high resilience of theirs ICBM's electronic guidance components in an environment with high gradient of Alpha and Gamma primary radiations and high atmosphere re-ionization-induced screening effects and the sensors for relative Earth gravitational field monitoring and the accelerometer's CPU for error mitigation ,in those very likely full scale thermonuclear war condictions, would have been or totally inoperable or, even worse, would have produced totally wronged inertial pact corrections !! .

Moreover the product of the REAL difference in CEP between Soviet and USA ICBM designs of the same "generation" and in the same class (marginal at most in front of an incomparably greater immunity and efficiency in an highly electromagnetized environment)and the average differences in warhead potential, result in a much ,much greater destruction power and significantly greater chance of first hit destruction of strategic sensible targets in favour of Soviet ICBM .

Only for remain within the previously mentioned ICBM sample (RT-23 Modelets and LGM-128 Peacekeeper) we have respectively a CEP of 185 m for the former and 120 m for the latter ,in front of a single re-entry vehicle explosive potential of 550 kT against 300 kT ; now IronsightSniper exit from your house and try to figure how much space is 65 meters.
Done? Well now take into account that the difference in potential betwen the warheads on each RV of those two ICBM is more or less equal to ........23 times the Hiroshima bomb !!!
65 m......23 times Hiroshima ... ....65 meters for 23 times the Hiroshima Bomb's explosion !!!

shifting to the Western philosophy of more accurate warheads over more powerful warheads.

.........oh yes sure .

Two things, I don't know where you're getting the Molodet's 185 m CEP accuracy from, the numbers I got ranged from 150 m to 500 m, and you have to remember that CEP accuracy only means 50% of the projectiles would land in that radius. 95% of those projectiles however, would land in a radius of 2n (n = CEP accuracy). Thus, the Peacekeeper is almost guaranteed to land a reentry vehicle within a 240 m radius circle, and the Molodets is almost guaranteed to land a reentry vehicle within a circle with a radius between 300 m to 1000 m. Here's a visual comparison of the two: (notes-filled in blue circle is the 95% accuracy of the Peacekeeper, un-filled blue circle is the idealized destructive power of a single 300 kt warhead, filled in red circle is the 95% accuracy of the Soviet-estimated accuracy of the Molodets, un-filled red circle is the idealized destructive power of a single 550 kt warhead, the target is the Cheyenne Mountain complex)

The LGM-118 is relevant in that it's also a 100 tonne missile and has the 2nd largest throw weight of ICBMs (next to the Satan of course). The use of the Peacekeeper in this discussion was to counter the argument that this new Russian missile would,

The Peacekeeper is an old American ICBM and has little or no relevance to a discussion about a new Russian ICBM to replace an old Soviet missile.

The new missile is designed to replace the SS-18 and as such will need to be classed as a heavyweight missile. Heavyweight ICBMs are not defined as heavy weight by their total liftoff mass, but by their throw weight.

Modern missiles with much greater accuracy and modern technology warheads should be able to carry rather more for their fixed throw weight.

Decoys are a fraction of the weight of the real warheads... thousands could be carried in form of corner reflectors that occupy the space of one warhead.

Space for warheads is no problem... just extend the fairing to allow another layer of warheads... with new composite materials structural mass is low so making the payload fairing longer will not effect performance very much at all.

which we know (by it's sheer mass) would not carry "an enormous" load, in the sense that it's only half the size of what Russia did 4 decades ago, thus we can't pretend that it's going to be another Tzar in the Russian line of Tzars.

Being a heavyweight missile intended to perform the same function as the SS-18 suggests to me that it will have a significant payload capacity.

(notes-filled in blue circle is the 95% accuracy of the Peacekeeper, un-filled blue circle is the idealized destructive power of a single 300 kt warhead, filled in red circle is the 95% accuracy of the Soviet-estimated accuracy of the Molodets, un-filled red circle is the idealized destructive power of a single 550 kt warhead, the target is the Cheyenne Mountain complex)

Your figures for accuracy are western estimates?

Cheyenne Mountain will be hit with a 25 MT SS-18 warhead that detonates underground. When SS-18 is retired its role will likely be replaced with this new missile, one to three of which will likely have a 20-30MT warhead for Cheyenne Mountain and likely the underground facilities at the Pentagon and the White house, and the rest will have a dozen or more warheads for a range of much softer targets.

GarryB wrote:

The LGM-118 is relevant in that it's also a 100 tonne missile and has the 2nd largest throw weight of ICBMs (next to the Satan of course). The use of the Peacekeeper in this discussion was to counter the argument that this new Russian missile would,

The Peacekeeper is an old American ICBM and has little or no relevance to a discussion about a new Russian ICBM to replace an old Soviet missile.

The new missile is designed to replace the SS-18 and as such will need to be classed as a heavyweight missile. Heavyweight ICBMs are not defined as heavy weight by their total liftoff mass, but by their throw weight.

Modern missiles with much greater accuracy and modern technology warheads should be able to carry rather more for their fixed throw weight.

Decoys are a fraction of the weight of the real warheads... thousands could be carried in form of corner reflectors that occupy the space of one warhead.

Space for warheads is no problem... just extend the fairing to allow another layer of warheads... with new composite materials structural mass is low so making the payload fairing longer will not effect performance very much at all.

Yet it's only half the weight of the Satan? Like I've said, this new missile is not a replacement, it's a downgrade from the Satan.

(notes-filled in blue circle is the 95% accuracy of the Peacekeeper, un-filled blue circle is the idealized destructive power of a single 300 kt warhead, filled in red circle is the 95% accuracy of the Soviet-estimated accuracy of the Molodets, un-filled red circle is the idealized destructive power of a single 550 kt warhead, the target is the Cheyenne Mountain complex)

Your figures for accuracy are western estimates?

Cheyenne Mountain will be hit with a 25 MT SS-18 warhead that detonates underground. When SS-18 is retired its role will likely be replaced with this new missile, one to three of which will likely have a 20-30MT warhead for Cheyenne Mountain and likely the underground facilities at the Pentagon and the White house, and the rest will have a dozen or more warheads for a range of much softer targets.

Cheyenne mountain is not relevant to this discussion. The accuracy of the Molodet's reentry vehicle v.s. the accuracy of the Peacekeeper's reentry vehicle, however, is, in relation to their respective warhead's power. In that regard, the Molodets, as you can see illustrated in the picture, though inaccurate, makes up for it.

The new missile is a UR-100 replacement, big enough for the task.

Yet it's only half the weight of the Satan? Like I've said, this new missile is not a replacement, it's a downgrade from the Satan.

You hear the total weight and make lots of assumptions.

The purpose of the new missile is to fill a role that was previously performed by the SS-18.

The purpose of Iskander was to perform the mission of the Scud and it is not only much lighter, it is also a much smaller missile. Obvously a much more extreme example as the Scud is a 1950s missile and the Iskander has its origins in the 1970s with OKA, but another difference is that the cold war ended a while back, so focuses can change.

Cheyenne mountain is not relevant to this discussion. The accuracy of the Molodet's reentry vehicle v.s. the accuracy of the Peacekeeper's reentry vehicle, however, is, in relation to their respective warhead's power. In that regard, the Molodets, as you can see illustrated in the picture, though inaccurate, makes up for it.

And see... that is your mistake. Accurate and inaccurate don't come in to the equation. There is only effective or ineffective, there is no accurate.

Iraqi modified Scuds fitted with HE or concrete warheads were inaccurate. With nuclear warheads they are either effective or ineffective... in this context they would be effective in triggering a nuclear response from the US for for a few minutes they would be effective and then half an hour later ineffective.

The SS-18 is a Ukrainian missile and must be withdrawn from service.
This creates a gap that they clearly have decided cannot be filled by their existing weapons (Yars and TOPOL-M for land based weapons and Bulava and Liner/Sineva for sea based ballistic missiles).

To fill this gap they have decided to develop and produce a new liquid fuelled missile... they wont have decided the max weight of the missile from thin air.
They will have decided on the required payload for the mission... including decoys and jammers and other bits and bobs based on the weights and performances of warheads and decoys etc etc.

If they think they can get the job done with a 100 ton missile who am I to tell them different. More importantly who are you to say it will be inferior to an American missile.

Who cares if it is inferior in total weight or throw weight, or numbers of warheads, or number of rivets on the left side.

It will not be a TOPOL-M with its payload expanded to 10 warheads... that is what Yars is already. This will be in the heavyweight missile class with a heavy weight throw weight, and like the SS-18 will likely have a single warhead version with a heavy warhead to hit hard targets and a version with lots and lots of smaller warheads to greatly increase the number of warheads and decoys any US ABM has to deal with if used for real.

Before developement was awarded, NPO Mash proposed to "recycle" the first stage of the SS-18 missile, and make it a base for a new one. From the words of one official: "This engine is still unmatched today, we need just to recycle it onto a new missile, maybe with the help of ukrainian (Yuzhmash) specialists, but that is up to negotiation" This was to be a rather simple way of developement, but later developement was awarded to KB Makeyev, so Serdyukov would have direct supervision of funding.

And definitions of "heavy missile" are rather messy. In Russia 100 ton UR-100 is considered not as heavy, but medium weight missile. Judging from developement intentions it did not look that "heavy" was only relative. But missiles were really categorised by throw weight and payload, not much of simply missile weight.

Anyway, regarding the payload, KB Makeyev stated that it would be either 15 medium or 10 heavy warheads, heavy by any definition.

GarryB wrote:
and like the SS-18 will likely have a single warhead version with a heavy warhead to hit hard targets and a version with lots and lots of smaller warheads to greatly increase the number of warheads and decoys any US ABM has to deal with if used for real.

I do not think they will deploy any single heavy warhead versions, simply because there is no longer need for such missions.

The advantage of heavy throw weight missiles is that Russia could deploy any number allowed (Start no longer covers missile classification), some with reduced amount of warheads (like 4) and big amount of decoys, so with similar number of launchers deployed as the US, Russia would be in an advantageous situation by having a much greater upload potential. In case of treaty withdrawal for whatever reason Russia would quickly surpass the US in number of deployed warheads, and put them in a situation on which is difficult to compete (simply because US cannot compete by building more missiles). So that would make the US to have a strong interest in to keeping Russia in the treaty.

While I agree they wont be all heavy warhead missiles, I rather expect a few will retain deep penetration capability against heavily protected targets... like major bunkers in the US and elsewhere.

I would think that with the right warhead weight and the right trajectory a new 100 ton missile with a 15-25 MT warhead that was light enough could be launched in an opposing trajectory. The Planet Earth is a ball so any missile flight trajectory from one point to another... if continued will form a complete circle of the planet... though due to the rotation of the earth it will be like a split ring rather than a complete circle. Launched in the opposite direction with a partial orbit of the planet the warhead can be placed in the near vicinity of the target area... not accurate enough to even hit a city, but accurate enough to detonate well above the atmosphere of the US and generate an EMP burst large enough to render radar and radio communications pointless for about 30 minutes...

If the ABM treaty is out of date then the SALT treaty must be so too.

Finally i have some time for write something , let start.

The LGM-118 is relevant in that it's also a 100 tonne missile and has the 2nd largest throw weight of ICBMs (next to the Satan of course).

And this information is patently false !
I truly don't understand what is the point to compare a new generation Russian liquid fuel ICBM with an old American ICBM already vastly inferior in its operative life against Russian counterparts of the time.
Even the stones are perfectly aware that Russian enjoy since half of Cold War a very ,very huge trow weight advantage on American ballistic missile corresponding (and in general still in rocketry science technology up to the point that even the most biased or even "controlled" western expert of the sector are forced to admit that the latest ICBM now operative in Russia represent, under virtually all the most crucial cardinal parameters, the pinnacle of ballistic missile technology )

The use of the Peacekeeper in this discussion was to counter the argument that this new Russian missile would,

Are you serious ? IronsightSniper do you realize that i just have pointed out a very old Russian ballistic missile ,in the same tonnage category of the next generation planned liquid fuel ICBM, operative in the same years of LGM-118 that had not only a greater trow weight moreover employing....solid fuel....but was largely superior to Peacekeeper in practically all technical fundamentals ?
Attempt to put in the same discussion on the specifics of the Russian next generation liquid fuel ICBM and the specific of..... an American ICBM widely outdated and underperforming against Soviet corresponding in its operative years could appear even comical if it wouldn't seem grotesque.

Two things, I don't know where you're getting the Molodet's 185 m CEP accuracy from, the numbers I got ranged from 150 m to 500 m

Oh dear ,not ! IronsightSniper hear well what i say now, ok?
Do you see any source (independently from its supposed professionalism) where you find that supposedly in Russian sources is reported a.....CEP .... of 500 m for SS-24 Scalpel ?
Well you can quietly communicate to them mine firm deploration for theirs truly lowermost level of professionalism . If some of them attempt to replicate anything ask to them to point to you not 30 ..not 10...not some...but even only ONE authoritative, not secondary, Russian sources where 500 m is suggested as the measure associated with 15Zh60/15Zh61 (SS-24 Scalpel)...CEP .
In reality in ANY primary Soviet/Russian sources ,where present , 500 m is cited as the SS-24's Index of Maximum Error -this one is, in fact, the specific parameter for precision of missiles present in Russian literature of the sector- and even the stones are aware that this figure is equal about to 2.3 times the figure of western CEP (2,68 times the miss distance's standard deviation ).
We are in 2012 and still is possible to find ,widely scattered ,similar comical Frankenstein-like data , but i shouldn't be surprised anymore ,it is the same Internet where AIM-120C5 has 110 km of range and F-22 an average RCS of 0,0001 Sqm

This figure of 500 m is often found in western for not other reason that figure is that present in box 8 of the deposit of Vitalii L. Kataev's writings -now fostered at the Hoover Institution at Stanford and representing almost the only near-documental material in Western possession on URSS strategic weapon's capabilities- for SS-24's Index of Maximum Error ,equivalent to a CEP of about 217 m.
It is for this rerason that Richard L. Garwin and P. Podvig cite a figure of about 220 m for SS-24's CEP; unluckily also the parameters in V. Karaev's writings demonstrated to be often unreliable,in particular for the "latest" weapon systems ; in this specific instance the parametrical data it had transcribed was related to the test beds of 15Zh60 and 15Zh61 missiles (see "Prizvany vremenem" by S. N.Konyukhov pag 447) in fact also the warhead's potential it point out -400kT- was the potential initially planned for the Molodet's 10 warheads in its prototypes, which was replaced ,as we well know, in the final version of the missile by 10 550 kT RV.

15Zh60 model (the silo based) in its mass produced version had demonsted in the tests an Index of Maximum Error slightly better, about 430 m (about 470 m for the rail based 15Zh61 ) for an equivalent CEP figure of 187m . This figure - rounded at 185 m in theirs publications- is that cited,among the others, by William Priedhorsky or Duncan Lennox and represent the figure most near to SS-24 effective CEP ; therefore at maximum someone could argue between a range of CEP's figures for SS-24 included between 187 m and 217 m .

Thus, the Peacekeeper is almost guaranteed to land a reentry vehicle within a 240 m radius circle, and the Molodets is almost guaranteed to land a reentry vehicle within a circle with a radius between 300 m to 1000 m. Here's a visual comparison of the two:

I believe that is not necessary to spend any further words on the CEP depicted .
Much more important is realize that warheads with greater nominal potential, while less space-efficient in respect to more numerous and scattered smaller warhead amounting the same potential against very soft targets ,like densely populated areas in flat terrain (see note°), are enormously more effcient against military targets ,in particular hardened ones.
The point here is not different than the rationale of conventional weapons warhead's potential and theris CONOPS; you could destroy a particular small reinforced command post or a little bridge with only one shot with a missile with a 60 kg HE filler but could get old in the attempt employing 120 warheads with 0,5 kg explosive fillers .
For some hyperhardened targets both in Russia and in USA ,like that in your figure, any warhead except a multimegaton one would result in precious nuclear offensive means totally wasted.



Note ° : Also this parameters is not applicable to our example because LGM-1118 and RT-23UTTH have the same number of warheads and a 550 kT explosion at zero level ,like that depicted by you, cause a circle of potential destruction for concrete buildings the range of which is about 1,3 km greater than that of a 200 kT detonation and you can easily realize of what enormous area we talk here in a densely populated area...

Note ° : Also this parameters is not applicable to our example because LGM-1118 and RT-23UTTH have the same number of warheads and a 550 kT explosion at zero level ,like that depicted by you, cause a circle of potential destruction for concrete buildings the range of which is about 1,3 km greater than that of a 200 kT detonation and you can easily realize of what enormous area we talk here in a densely populated area...

Another point when drawing circles on maps showing warhead damage or destruction you have to keep in mind that the patterned release of multiple smaller warheads will greatly spread effective damage... the radius of damaging concrete walls by one explosion might be shifted dramatically by the presence of a small hill, or large mountain range... or the detonation of other weapons from the same ICBM.

As shown clearly on nuclear test videos when a distance from the centre of a blast first exposed material is ignited by the intense light from the blast carrying IR radiation... then a blast wave hits and smashes structures, but a few seconds later the blast wave "comes back" as the air that was superheated over ground zero rises rapidly and sucks in air from the surroundings to fill the vacuum.

At a point directly between two blasts therefore there would be flash burns from two blasts and two blast waves followed by two sudden reverse blast waves.

In a large city like London there will likely be 6 or more... (and that is not including any the French might launch... )

Another point when drawing circles on maps showing warhead damage or destruction you have to keep in mind that the patterned release of multiple smaller warheads will greatly spread effective damage... the radius of damaging concrete walls by one explosion might be shifted dramatically by the presence of a small hill, or large mountain range... or the detonation of other weapons from the same ICBM.

Yes GarryB all true, but is necessary to remember that this greater space efficiency in lethal range resulting from the employment of multiple smaller warheads,with equal total potential of a bigger warhead, is a profitable element only against very soft targets (mostly civialian highly populated areas ); to the contrary for military class targets ,in particular heavily hardened ones such as several type of bunkers, underground hangars,underground production or storage facilities, hardened command centers, ther employment of warheads with high or very high yield are not simply emormously more efficient but often even a strict ,unavoidable requirement (any single silo mouth since Silo Type III-G MOD was immune to detonation of any thermonuclear warheads with yield up to 170 kT from few dozen meters !! (the latest silos modifications and ,even more the future multimouth silo planned for the new generation heavy liquid fuel ICBM have requirements to sustain 50 m close detonations by part of warheads with yeild much, much,much higher than that....).

Yes, I totally agree.

It is like the difference between a cluster bomb and an earth penetration bomb.

You can have cluster bombs with penetrators that will penetrate armour or damage concrete runways, but the focus is normally to spread damage over an area because either there are multiple targets to hit, or an area of concrete has to be damaged to be effective.

An earth penetration bomb on the other hand is after a specific and not so big target.

If the target is a group of tanks then a cluster bomb with anti armour submunitions will likely get more tanks than a single penetration bomb.

If the target is a runway then hitting it with lots of concrete piercing darts that shatter concrete down to a few metres that are scattered over a wide area is more likely to take out a runway than a single penetration bomb.

A runway hit by a single penetration bomb might leave half the runway operational so planes can still operate.

Against an underground bunker the submunitions in cluster bombs will not have the penetration to reach anything important and will make lots of shallow holes in the ground.

The penetration bomb will explode inside the bunker and do the most damage.

Lots of small nukes clustered around Cheyenne mountain will do little to the complex itself, whereas a 25MT bomb that penetrates soft ground near the complex will do serious siesmic damage to the region, though it is still a very difficult target... other targets like the bunkers under the Pentagon and the White house are also key targets that small multiple warhead weapons would have little effect against.

A new ICBM with 10 warheads it will not comply with New START that reduces the number of warheads at 1500.
We will have in the future about 1100 warheads in SLBMs, about 300-320 in ICBMs and the remaining number for strategic bombers.

Until now for ICBMs we have
72x1=72 Topol-M
15x6=90 RS-24

Probably these numbers will evolute like this
80x1=80 Topol-M
40x6=240 RS-24

So i don't see any space for a new heavy ICBM.

The new ICBM code named "Inevitability" will replace the existing SS-18 in service.

A lot of the SS-19 , SS-25 will be removed from service this decade as they reach end of operational life , so its really not a concern.

Infact according to new START disclosure Russia is below its 1500 warhead limit and US is over it.

http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/04/march_2012_new_start_data_rele.shtml
http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/04/parsing_the_new_start_data.shtml