S-300/400/500 News [Russian Strategic Air Defense] #1

First of all LPI mode in an AESA is of ZERO use to an air defence SAM in most cases.
PESA antennas already benefit from very small sidelobes... the Patriot system that shot down a few allied aircraft in the gulf was defeated by a HARM only because the aircraft armed with the HARM was being painted by the radar of the Patriot.

The PESA radars of S-300 and S-400 will only be vulnerable to ARMs if these radars are already targeting the aircraft carrying those ARMs... in which case the S-300 and S-400s ability to shoot down both aircraft and ARMS will mean an AESA was not necessary.

Regarding jamming the range of the S-400 means that jamming platforms will not be able to get close enough to be effective so AESA is no advantage here either.

There are a lot of other sensors that operate with S-300 and S-400 batteries that don't emit anything at all that are also used for target detection and tracking.

So, on the S-400/500, does Russia have a ground-based ASAT weapon comparable to the SM-3 yet?

Very funny man.

Moscow ABM system has been operational for 40 years...

GarryB wrote:First of all LPI mode in an AESA is of ZERO use to an air defence SAM in most cases.
PESA antennas already benefit from very small sidelobes...

I wouldnt say ZERO use because you can make the AESA run in LPI mode and make the whole battery less vulnerable to detection and HARM attack.

Certainly compared to fighter aircraft using LPI/AESA for stealthy track a SAM battery would have lesser use.

the Patriot system that shot down a few allied aircraft in the gulf was defeated by a HARM only because the aircraft armed with the HARM was being painted by the radar of the Patriot.

The PESA radars of S-300 and S-400 will only be vulnerable to ARMs if these radars are already targeting the aircraft carrying those ARMs... in which case the S-300 and S-400s ability to shoot down both aircraft and ARMS will mean an AESA was not necessary.

Well a AESA or PESA does not necessarly have to paint the aircraft to make it vulnerable to HARM attack , SAM batteries will be vulnerable to HARM attack if its emitting or just scanning the airspace and got detected as hostile by RWR/Sensors of HARM aircraft.

The aircraft in gulf fired the HARM because the Patriot detected it as hostile in friendly airspace due to IFF issue and as self defence the aircraft has to fire HARM because its RWR accurately identified it as being under attack in friendly airspace.

Regarding jamming the range of the S-400 means that jamming platforms will not be able to get close enough to be effective so AESA is no advantage here either.

Yeah it will be very difficult to jam those huge power PESA of S-300/400 that has extremely potent ECCM features , the only way is to overwhelm its tracking/guiding capability by using many decoys missile,real missile,harm and Jammers all working in tandem to overwhelm S-300 radars , any thing less will be bad for the adversary

There are a lot of other sensors that operate with S-300 and S-400 batteries that don't emit anything at all that are also used for target detection and tracking.

Yes lots of passive sensors , triangulation at emmiting target using passive sensors and firing LR missile , different bands of radars , bistatic radars etc

I wouldnt say ZERO use because you can make the AESA run in LPI mode and make the whole battery less vulnerable to detection and HARM attack.

No version of HARM has a range of 400km so encouraging a HARM attack would mean getting the platform as well as any weapons it launches.

S-300 and S-400 missiles will be co-located with systems to defeat HARM type weapons like TOR or PANTSIR.

S-300 and S-400 systems are fully mobile and will not simply sit and broadcast their location all the time.

Well a AESA or PESA does not necessarly have to paint the aircraft to make it vulnerable to HARM attack , SAM batteries will be vulnerable to HARM attack if its emitting or just scanning the airspace and got detected as hostile by RWR/Sensors of HARM aircraft.

PESA and AESA use very narrow beams and generate very small sidelobes. Sidelobes is wasted energy that the ARMs normally home in on. This makes PESA and AESA much harder to target with ARMs.

The aircraft in gulf fired the HARM because the Patriot detected it as hostile in friendly airspace due to IFF issue and as self defence the aircraft has to fire HARM because its RWR accurately identified it as being under attack in friendly airspace.

And the only reason it successfully got a HARM kill is because the missile was fired from the aircraft being targeted at the time... it homed on the main beam rather than the sidelobes.

PESA and AESA are electronically scanned! The scan rate can cover the entire FOV of the radar in a milisecond... no ARM can use that to home in on.

Yeah it will be very difficult to jam those huge power PESA of S-300/400 that has extremely potent ECCM features , the only way is to overwhelm its tracking/guiding capability by using many decoys missile,real missile,harm and Jammers all working in tandem to overwhelm S-300 radars , any thing less will be bad for the adversary

And those S-300 and S-400 batteries are not operating in a vaccuum.
If an enemy airfield is shown to be the source of decoys then that airfield can be engaged. A mobile battery can be moved to a position where a jammer aircraft orbiting offshore could also be engaged.

Not all air defences are in the control of the inept.

GarryB wrote:No version of HARM has a range of 400km so encouraging a HARM attack would mean getting the platform as well as any weapons it launches.

Well just because S-400 has 400 km range does not mean any aircraft cant go beyond that bubble , there are tactics ,low level flight ,DRFM jamming, stealth aircraft to get close and that just applies to any SAM out there.

S-300 and S-400 missiles will be co-located with systems to defeat HARM type weapons like TOR or PANTSIR.

S-300 and S-400 systems are fully mobile and will not simply sit and broadcast their location all the time.

No doubt they would try hard to not get beaten by HARM , its a game of tactics , innovation ,motivation and capability on both sides.

PESA and AESA use very narrow beams and generate very small sidelobes. Sidelobes is wasted energy that the ARMs normally home in on. This makes PESA and AESA much harder to target with ARMs.

Low Side Lobes makes HARM job that much harder but not impossible , HARM like KH-31P too have wide band sensors to attack a range of target , have pre-set target data stored in them about target information obtained from even a low scan exposure , so even if the target radar shuts off due to attack , its position is already noted in HARM/RWR memory and they travel at that preset location to attack.

I have also read of israel HARM system that just loiters over an area for long time and in case SAM lits up it glides to the target and attack it

And the only reason it successfully got a HARM kill is because the missile was fired from the aircraft being targeted at the time... it homed on the main beam rather than the sidelobes.

It was attacked in self defence in friendly airspace and direct painting made the HARM job easier , like I said low side lobes makes the job harder for HARM , AESA has lower sidelobe then PESA.

AESA can manage their energy much better and smarter then a PESA.

An AESA SAM battery with LPI will just mange its energy well and with a lowest side lobe will make a smart HARM attack that more difficult

PESA and AESA are electronically scanned! The scan rate can cover the entire FOV of the radar in a milisecond... no ARM can use that to home in on.

Even a single scan is good for modern ESM to know it was scanned and know the bearing , modern ESM has 100 % probability of intercept capability , unless its an LPI , milisec scan that would be difficult but not impossible.

And those S-300 and S-400 batteries are not operating in a vaccuum.
If an enemy airfield is shown to be the source of decoys then that airfield can be engaged. A mobile battery can be moved to a position where a jammer aircraft orbiting offshore could also be engaged.

Like I said S-300 and 400 will be a difficult customer and its also about tactics , training , motivation and innovation by field SAM operators.

During Kosovo NATO was given a bloody nose by Serbia SAM operators even though they operated 70's SAM but had better tactics , training , motivation and were innovative , inspite of airspace filled with modern HARM , jammers,fighters and UAV they could stay alive and fight till the end

Never underestimate people ability to innovate and beat the best.

Not all air defences are in the control of the inept

Agreed , I can take two opposite example of Syria,Iraq and Kosovo , I bet Warsaw trained Serbia could beat the best even though they were underdogs with inferior syste,

GarryB wrote:First of all LPI mode in an AESA is of ZERO use to an air defence SAM in most cases.
PESA antennas already benefit from very small sidelobes... the Patriot system that shot down a few allied aircraft in the gulf was defeated by a HARM only because the aircraft armed with the HARM was being painted by the radar of the Patriot.

The PESA radars of S-300 and S-400 will only be vulnerable to ARMs if these radars are already targeting the aircraft carrying those ARMs... in which case the S-300 and S-400s ability to shoot down both aircraft and ARMS will mean an AESA was not necessary.

Regarding jamming the range of the S-400 means that jamming platforms will not be able to get close enough to be effective so AESA is no advantage here either.

There are a lot of other sensors that operate with S-300 and S-400 batteries that don't emit anything at all that are also used for target detection and tracking.

So, on the S-400/500, does Russia have a ground-based ASAT weapon comparable to the SM-3 yet?

Very funny man.

Moscow ABM system has been operational for 40 years...

Yeah, that's why I'm asking, ABM-135 Galoshs with Nuclear warheads aren't exactly comparable

The S-300 can be linked up with the 1L119 Nebo SVU AESA radar.

If 1L119 Nebo SVU is linked with the S-300 it will open entirly new windows of opportunity in both the offensive and defensive roles.
As a side note I have listened USA trying to defeat S-300 & the evolving series using the principles of SIGNIT:

Take the music analogy. If you hear a piece of music, am certain you are sophisticated enough to recognize the trumpet, the snare drum, the cymbals, the bass guitar, and so on. You should be able to replicate that piece to a high degree of fidelity.

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is no different except that the radar signal is nowhere as structurally complex as Beethoven's Fifth or Led Zeppelin's Stairway to Heaven. We have been conducting SIGINT flights throughout the Cold War.

For example...
http://www.wvi.com/~sr71webmaster/sr_sensors_pg3.htm
The SR-71's Mach 3 speed during its normal operational mission profiles created a very beneficial side effect which was to stimulate the enemy's radars and missile systems. Their responses to the Blackbird's flight path resulted in jamming, missile system tracking, and other electronic activity. The electronic signals generated during these responses were collected by the SR-71's own Electro-Magnetic Reconnaissance (EMR) System as well as other collection assets propositioned in the area at the time. The enemy's capabilities and frequencies used for each radar or missile site were then recorded and documented revealing the enemy's battle plan.

What we do is provoke the Soviets into transmitting their air defense radars. The longer we record their transmissions, the better we understand Soviet tactics and technology.

SIGINT is not confined to airborne methods...
Have no doubt we can replicate the S-300's radar signals to %99.999 fidelity and apply it against any aircraft we want...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Mildenhall
From Mildenhall the RC-135s flew ELINT and COMINT missions along the borders of Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The twenty or so specialists on board the RC-135s during such missions listened to and recorded military radio frequencies and communications.
http://www.wvi.com/~sr71webmaster/sr_sensors_pg3.htm
In the 1970s, funding was available for an improvement to the system, so its replacement was come to be known as the Elint-Improvement Program (EIP) System...

Eastern Europe was a necessary deployment for the SA series. It was out of Mildenhall that we finally in 1978 recorded enough of the SA-5's track and targeting radars to develop an ECM against it and the success was from such a coordinated mission. What happened was that prior to EIP, we could only do the 'shotgun' approach and record as much of the known spectrum as we can. Post EIP enabled the SR-71 to focus on the SA's volume search freq, wait for the associated track freq, then seek out the inevitable targeting freq. The upgrade enabled the SR-71 to ignore the rest of the spectrum. Then the information was analyzed and correlated against what the larger -135 recorded. The result was that we had the SA-5's entire radar operation, from acquisition (volume search), to individual target track, and finally to fire control.

Russian air defense have AESA acquisition radars Nebo-SVU, Gamma-DE and in development Nebo-M. They could work together with S-300/400.

The parallel importance and dependency between the transmitting mechanism (antenna) and the data processing capability (computer) cannot be understated. Currently, the technology bias is in favor of the computer, meaning there is -- and has been for decades -- an excess of data processing capability for every design, be it for air traffic control or airborne detection. The initial perception is that for airborne platform, resource limitations, from internal space to electrical, are the reasons why there is a great capability discrepancy between the AWACS class and the 'fighter' class. That said...In reality and in details, and the devil lives in details, the 'single-beam' limitation in the classical antenna, be it concave dish or planar array, is the primary determinant on how much data processing capability is installed into the entire design. If the need is great even the small F-16 has enough internal space to house a more capable computer and its electrical system is more than sufficient to power that computer.

The single-beam feature is a known structural limitation that rendered most 'multi-functions' radars sequential in those functions. Some designers even gone as far as categorizing them as 'pseudo' multi-functions systems. The more capable systems can alter beam characteristics, such as pulse repetition freq (PRF) or pulse widths, to adapt to new environments and to improve target resolutions. But the radar computer must still adapt in sequence in both beam characteristics and in the data processing that came from those diverse beam characteristics. Then the system must prioritize between functions and this mean making compromises between functions. For example, an air defense radar may have to ignore 'friendly' identifications in favor of the immediate high altitude threats but then leaves itself vulnerable to low altitude 'pop-up' inbound threats. The result is that an air defense radar system must have multiple transmitters at different freqs and all data processing must be centralized, creating an unwielding, clumsy, and not very mobile system.

An 'active electronic scanning array' (AESA) system is in principle the same as that multi-beams and multi-freqs air defense radar system. The array partitioning software create multiple beams and for the first time in these decades, there is a balance, or at least a near balance, between transmitting mechanism (antenna) and data processing (computer). It is now that the aircraft resource limitations argument is valid. However, because the main issue is still data processing, an ineptly designed and built AESA system, particularly its softwares, can be outclassed and defeated by a superior designed and built traditional single-beam system.

Enter 'God'...

Session 3B.1 Ubiquitous radar: an implementation concept


A 'single-beam' system can only 'look' in the direction of its antenna. With an AESA system, the theoretical beam quantity it can produce is of its total transmit-receive (TR) modules quantity installed, meaning if the array has 1000 TR modules, there can be 1000 beams. Realistically, because of other factors like interference between TR neighbors, beam widening over distance, and many others, the total effective beams that can be produced are far less than theoretical. Nevertheless, the accummulated engineering and operational skills from the traditional single-beam systems so far have been transferred to the current generation of AESA systems.

Active Electronically Scanned Array - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Ground stations or AWACS type radar platforms do not have the same physical limitations as the smaller fighter-type aircrafts. Advances in computing power moved the 'ubiquitous radar' out of the conceptual stage and into the financial stage. This level of observance and awareness, or 'omnipotence' in a manner of speaking, is possible only with an ESA system.

Session 3B.1 Ubiquitous radar: an implementation concept

To date, the greatest threats to US 'stealth' class aircrafts are bi-static radars and this 'track-before-detect' feature made possible with an ESA system. Bi-static radars are proven concepts and systems but they are structurally demanding, requirements are multiple stations that should remain stationary for long periods of time, thereby making them vulnerable to attacks, and precise synchronization between stations down to the pico-seconds level, in order to be effective. This requirement renders most militaries out of the race in 'stealth' detection, ground or airborne. This leaves the 'track-before-detect' feature.

SkylondaWorks Scrapbook Coherent vs. Non-Coherent Integration


Just about %99.999 of single-beam radar systems deployed, ground or airborne, are 'detect-before-track' systems. This means a body's radar reflectivity must rise above a certain signal strength -- clutter rejection threshold -- before the radar system will associate a data set identifier and assign a priority level to this body. This is a declaration that a target warrant focus of attention.

Track-before-detect - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


What 'track-before-detect' does is invert the conventional radar operations wisdom in that the clutter rejection threshold is lowered to either zero or near zero, then all objects that produces spatial-temporal dislocations, fancy words for movements, will be monitored without declarations until any of those dislocations crossed a threshold. Variations of track-before-detect schemes have been installed with some traditional single-beam radar systems but operational effectiveness remains limited precisely because of the single-beam versus search volume relationship. Other issues are that the lowered clutter rejection threshold produced false positives. Software based compensators alleviated some but not eliminated these false positives. The antenna's mechanical sweeping or rotating movements produces time delays in tracking these spatial-temporal dislocations. Because of these issues, track-before-detect detection schemes proved useful in meteorological observations where there is no need to focus on any individual body like a rain drop, other than the main body of the meteorological phenomenon under observation, and not widely deployed in military applications. Because track-before-detect is data processing related, other companion software based compensation methods were also created to deal with the limitations of the traditional single-beam radar system, such as order statistic constant false alarm rate processing (OS-CFAR)...

Performance analysis of order-statistic CFAR detectors in time diversity systems for partially correlated chi-square targets and multiple target situations


The list of these software based compensators is considerable and a testament to the creative genius of working radar engineers but the flexibility of an AESA system is driving them towards these newer ESA-based radar designs. It is only because of manufacturing difficulties and therefore costs that the AESA type is not widely deployed.

Bottom line is this...Against US 'stealth' class bodies, the traditional single-beam mechanically motivated radar system known today will have statistically insignificant odds at effective detection, let alone track, of those 'stealth' aircrafts. A 'non-stealth' fighter equipped with an AESA radar system, assuming all the commensurate softwares are also installed, will have a grossly unfair advantage over its adversary in detection range and target resolutions. An AESA system is not magic, but with the right software engineering talents to support the hardware, to a defeated adversary it might as well be magic.

Well just because S-400 has 400 km range does not mean any aircraft cant go beyond that bubble , there are tactics ,low level flight ,DRFM jamming, stealth aircraft to get close and that just applies to any SAM out there.

S-400 and S-300 are mobile forces. You can set up one S-400 system with radars going and also set up other S-x00 systems around that with their radars on listen mode ready to receive target data and share data on emitting targets. 400km away from an emitting S-400 base you could be flying over a radar silent S-300 base.

I was also thinking in terms of jammers, which to be effective against such powerful radars would need to be based in large aircraft, which would be in serious danger at less than 400km distance from an S-400 battery.

There are also all sorts of jammers and decoys that come with S-400 batteries that can be used to emit the same signals as the main radars to attract attention so the threat launch platform is kept interested while the battery lofts a few shots at it.

No doubt they would try hard to not get beaten by HARM , its a game of tactics , innovation ,motivation and capability on both sides.

Not to mention technology. A TOR battery or Pantsir battery is not going to be co-located with an S-x00 battery for fun.

Low Side Lobes makes HARM job that much harder but not impossible , HARM like KH-31P too have wide band sensors to attack a range of target , have pre-set target data stored in them about target information obtained from even a low scan exposure , so even if the target radar shuts off due to attack , its position is already noted in HARM/RWR memory and they travel at that preset location to attack.

You are confusing two things here. The wide band seekers on ARMs let them attack a wider array of radars from artillery spotting radars to aircraft and ground based radars. The older model Kh-25 based missiles had separate homing heads for the ARM mission, with one seeker head optimised for the continuous wave radar of the Nike-Hercules and the HAWK, and another seeker option for the Patriot type radars. The seekers were interchangeable but obviously not in flight. The new broadband seekers fitted to the new Kh-25, Kh-31, and Kh-38 missiles mean that they can engage all sorts of radars on the ground and sea and air if some sources are to be believed.
Sidelobes are like with a torch where you have a bulb and around the inside of where the torch bulb is it is shiny and shaped to focus the light into a strong narrow beam. In the dark however you see two lots of light coming from the torch... a concentrated beam in the centre but around that the area is lit directly from the light coming off the bulb.
The concentrated beam is the pencil beam to track the target or scan for targets while the dimmer wide cone of weaker light is the sidelobes.
The difference is that in a radar the emitting element is covered up so it doesn't shine out like a light bulb does because that will effect the results by adding noise.
Most of the sidelobe energy in a radar goes out sideways.

Most ARMs climb after launch so they don't impact trees or buildings near the target or on the way to the target and dive at the target radar at a shallow angle of 30 degrees or so.

Such a target would be an ideal target for the SAMs co-located with the S-x00 site... it is what they are there for.

I have also read of israel HARM system that just loiters over an area for long time and in case SAM lits up it glides to the target and attack it

That would be the British ALARM... a very impressive missile that can be used in many modes including being fired into a danger area where it climbs to altitude and then deploys a parachute so it can stay in the air for a long period protecting the launch aircraft.

Obviously it has the same problem HARM has... that it can be decoyed by alternative emitters and it can of course be shot down.

Of course nothing is perfect.

It was attacked in self defence in friendly airspace and direct painting made the HARM job easier , like I said low side lobes makes the job harder for HARM , AESA has lower sidelobe then PESA.

I would say direct painting made it possible not easier.
With an array of emitters I don't see how AESA can have lower sidelobes than a PESA with one emitter.

AESA can manage their energy much better and smarter then a PESA.

I don't see how that is possible... the emitter is what is using the energy, so having 1,000,000 emitters in an AESA compared to 1 transmit receive modules in a PESA should mean the AESA uses more power... it is just basic physics.

AESAs are notorious for generating a lot of heat, now the primary function of the modules is not to generate heat... heat is just a byproduct. If it generates more heat then it must generate more powerful signals and if it does that then it must also use more power.

An AESA SAM battery with LPI will just mange its energy well and with a lowest side lobe will make a smart HARM attack that more difficult

A HARM attack is already dealt with as a threat by the colocation of TOR or PANTSIR. Both can engage HARM like targets and their missiles are very simple and very cheap. The sensors and electronics on the vehicles are expensive but the missiles are dirt cheap because they contain no sensors... which means you can use them in enormous numbers without breaking the bank.

Even a single scan is good for modern ESM to know it was scanned and know the bearing , modern ESM has 100 % probability of intercept capability , unless its an LPI , milisec scan that would be difficult but not impossible.

The first model Kh-58 (AS-11) used similar location technology to determine the location of the target site before launch so that even if it turned off it would still detonate its 150kg HE payload somewhere near the vulnerable radar antenna. Even with its 200km range from a Mig-25 launch it would still not be a huge threat to an S-x00 battery...

Like I said S-300 and 400 will be a difficult customer and its also about tactics , training , motivation and innovation by field SAM operators.

At least the ALARM is trying something sort of new... the HARM is old school for old threats.

During Kosovo NATO was given a bloody nose by Serbia SAM operators even though they operated 70's SAM but had better tactics , training , motivation and were innovative , inspite of airspace filled with modern HARM , jammers,fighters and UAV they could stay alive and fight till the end

NATO fired hundreds of HARMs to little effect. The ALARMs were more effective because they were relatively unknown by the operators. Neither would be new to an S-x00 battery.

Yeah, that's why I'm asking, ABM-135 Galoshs with Nuclear warheads aren't exactly comparable

The S-500 will have similar performance to ABM-135 but with a hit to kill warhead.
I am surprised the US was dumb enough to start a weapon race with ABM systems because the US has a huge lead in satellite resources and ABM systems would make ideal anti satellite weapons that will undermine their dominance in space.

Still I guess the ABM drive is motivated by politics rather than common sense. The irony is that MAD or mutually assured destruction actually worked whether you trusted the other guy or not. It seems they want to undermine MAD so you are going to have to learn to trust or you are going to create a situation where no one is safe... what a nightmare!

The enemy's capabilities and frequencies used for each radar or missile site were then recorded and documented revealing the enemy's battle plan.

What we do is provoke the Soviets into transmitting their air defense radars. The longer we record their transmissions, the better we understand Soviet tactics and technology.

Except that the Soviets knew you did that and operated at different frequencies and tactics during peacetime than they would use in war.

The upgrade enabled the SR-71 to ignore the rest of the spectrum. Then the information was analyzed and correlated against what the larger -135 recorded. The result was that we had the SA-5's entire radar operation, from acquisition (volume search), to individual target track, and finally to fire control.

Yet they still refused to fly into Soviet air space?

SIGINT is not confined to airborne methods...
Have no doubt we can replicate the S-300's radar signals to %99.999 fidelity and apply it against any aircraft we want...

So they know everything about the S-300 yet Israel still objects to Russia selling S-300 to Iran?
Then it claims it will develop countermeasures and spread those countermeasures around to render the S-300 ineffective... if Russia sells to Iran... or Syria.

The reality is that the measure/countermeasure game is ongoing and it really depends when they are used as to how effective they turn out to be. Everything is being updated all the time and most of the updates are intended to close gaps in the armour so to speak.

For instance an SR-71 might have captured all the radar information about the SA-5 but had it tried to penetrate an SA-5 screen in the Soviet Union it might have found the Soviet model had a back up IR guidance especially for hot high flying targets like the SR-71... or that the placement of the SA-5 batteries was especially designed to make them fly closer to Mig-31 bases that carry R-40TD... the largest AAM in the world but with a modern IR seeker and a long range at high speed that can deal with high fast targets head on.

However, because the main issue is still data processing, an ineptly designed and built AESA system, particularly its softwares, can be outclassed and defeated by a superior designed and built traditional single-beam system.

Hurray!!! the point I am making.

The Russians have lots of experience with the cheaper PESA radar technology. AESA might have a lot of promise but until the elements needed for it (the transmit/receive modules) are in mass production to make them both smaller and cheaper then it makes no sense making a half a$$ed early model AESA radar for something as important as your standard air defence SAM system that you are going to rely on for the next 20-30 years.

By 2020 it will likely have all AESA radars as will Vityaz and Morfei and all the other new front line SAM systems in Russian service.

Against US 'stealth' class bodies, the traditional single-beam mechanically motivated radar system known today will have statistically insignificant odds at effective detection, let alone track, of those 'stealth' aircrafts.

Most current Russian ground based AESA radars are long wave radars.
These are easier to make because their antenna modules are larger and easier to make than smaller higher frequency AESAs, but they also operate in frequency ranges that are more useful for detecting targets that use shaping to deflect rather than reflect radar waves. (ie stealth targets).

So, really not sure why you were discussing the Moscow ABM system when I was asking about ASAT weaponry, but anywho, on the subject of ABM systems, we Americans really leaped into such a venture after it was clear that there were nations out there with ballistic missiles who wouldn't mind undermining MAD. In my opinion, until Lockheed Martin complete development of their Multiple Kill Vehicles, Russia has nothing to worry about in regards to U.S. ABM systems. In fact, I doubt Russia actually minds developments of ABM technologies (just ask the Commissar that decided to send S-400's to their border with Korea).

Another quarrel I have to pick with is even if Israel has advantageous information regarding the S-300s in Iran, that does not mean they still won't object to Russia selling it to them. It would be quite obvious Garry that Israel would probably rather just not have to deal with S-300s at all, so that's why they're contacting Russia about it. Besides, if Israel does get around attacking Iran, maybe their version of Suter will pop up again and just make the S-300s shoot at birds.

So, really not sure why you were discussing the Moscow ABM system when I was asking about ASAT weaponry,

Because an ABM missile is designed to hit targets flying at near orbital speed well outside the Earths atmosphere.
An ASAT weapon is a missile designed to hit targets flying at orbital speed well outside the Earths atmosphere.

The ASATs job is easier because a satellite is a much larger and more fragile target. It is often harder because the satellite operates at higher altitudes than a BM.

In my opinion, until Lockheed Martin complete development of their Multiple Kill Vehicles, Russia has nothing to worry about in regards to U.S. ABM systems.

And the fact that they are developing such a thing... why shouldn't the Russians be worried?

I am sure it will kill any future agreement on reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles... in fact I think the Russians will likely want to increase warhead numbers because I think when the US has further developed their ABM missiles that China will want to increase its nuclear retaliation capability.

In fact, I doubt Russia actually minds developments of ABM technologies (just ask the Commissar that decided to send S-400's to their border with Korea).

I am sure the military will be very happy when it introduces S-500s into service and that they will not stop at just defending Moscow... most of the 4 new military regions will get ABM protection probably for any major cities and where ever the command structures are based.

All these extra missiles however wont make anyone safer... not to mention they will cost a small fortune.

Another quarrel I have to pick with is even if Israel has advantageous information regarding the S-300s in Iran, that does not mean they still won't object to Russia selling it to them.

But if they can defeat them already... as they claim, then surely they are no threat to Israel... unless Israel has plans to send aircraft into Iranian airspace.

It is like a Burglar complaining that someone is buying new locks for his doors and saying... you needn't bother because I will learn to pick them too.

Besides, if Israel does get around attacking Iran, maybe their version of Suter will pop up again and just make the S-300s shoot at birds.

The Iranians are not idiots... I rather doubt what worked against the primitive network in Syria would work in Iran.
Syria didn't even have any decent SAMs at the time anyway.

Because an ABM missile is designed to hit targets flying at near orbital speed well outside the Earths atmosphere.
An ASAT weapon is a missile designed to hit targets flying at orbital speed well outside the Earths atmosphere.

The ASATs job is easier because a satellite is a much larger and more fragile target. It is often harder because the satellite operates at higher altitudes than a BM.

Oh sure, but again, a Nuclear Warhead that can kill anything within a kilometer at space is not comparable to the SM-3, which is a hit to kill weapon and won't have the same fall out effects.

And the fact that they are developing such a thing... why shouldn't the Russians be worried?

I am sure it will kill any future agreement on reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles... in fact I think the Russians will likely want to increase warhead numbers because I think when the US has further developed their ABM missiles that China will want to increase its nuclear retaliation capability.

Oh, so you'd much rather leave us defenseless against those who would attack us? No, if Russia wants to be secure, we do too. Russia can upgrade all their S-500s to S-1000s, but for all I care is what we upgrade ours to because we won't use our Nukes and I'm sure as hell Putin won't use his, even with the most advance ABM systems imaginable, nobody except a crazed mastermind would really run the risk of glowing green.

I am sure the military will be very happy when it introduces S-500s into service and that they will not stop at just defending Moscow... most of the 4 new military regions will get ABM protection probably for any major cities and where ever the command structures are based.

All these extra missiles however wont make anyone safer... not to mention they will cost a small fortune.

MAD is the only thing you keep pulling up on. Problem is, Obama nor Putin will try to nuke each other. Not to even mention anyone in China/India/Pakistan. ABMs only make us safer from the likes of Iran or North Korea, Russia agrees with me on this as I said before, and I'd much rather waste our money on ABMs then Nukes, and again, Russia concurs.

But if they can defeat them already... as they claim, then surely they are no threat to Israel... unless Israel has plans to send aircraft into Iranian airspace.

It is like a Burglar complaining that someone is buying new locks for his doors and saying... you needn't bother because I will learn to pick them too.

What are you? Trapped in a time vortex? Israel does have plans to attack Iran, otherwise they wouldn't be spouting their crap on the media. That being said, I'd complain too if that lock wasn't a lock but was a gun because Iran doesn't have locks they have guns and that's what's scaring those IAF pilots.

The Iranians are not idiots... I rather doubt what worked against the primitive network in Syria would work in Iran.
Syria didn't even have any decent SAMs at the time anyway.

Neither are the Israelis. Suter can only evolve, and that first strike on Syria showed how effective Suter can be. Despite Pantsyrs lurking around, those F-16s passed through like a hot knife through butter. Russia could only comfort the injured souls.

Today modern Russian SAMs use PESA radars like S-300/400, Buk-M2, Tor-M2, Pantsir-S1. AESA will be on Vityaz and S-500. But those systems will not work alone. They will work integrated in whole air defense system. Russian air defense have all components as opponent air force. They have passive ELINT systems Kolchuga, Orion, Valeria,..., jammers like SPN-2,3,4,30,..., various decoys and Gazetchik chaff and flare system for defense against HARMs. Air defense also have network of visual observation posts equipped with day and night equipment (be it II or TI). In that IADS S-300/400 could get enough small cell for target from outside sources, that it doesn't need to turn on its radars, but just launch missiles with ARH to this cell, where it find target with its own radar. Other systems could also work passively on targets delivered from outside sources.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58N6Plr17GU

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nh32xqKd2dM&feature=related

On those two videos is clearly seen, that even stealth F-22 is very clearly seen optically and on FLIR. If F-22 use radar or data link, than it is seen on quite big distance with ELINT equipment. It is also seen for visual observation posts and to meter wave lenght radars like Nebo-SVU. Stealth planes doesn't represent that big danger for competent air defense.

Talking about how Israel planes jamm modern Russian air defense systems in Syria in 2007 attack is BS. What modern SAM systems Syria have in that time? Igla MANPAD. Does it have radar? No, so they could not jamm it. Other SAM systems and radars are technology from fifties, sixties and seventies (SAM-8 Osa). Nothing modern and all already known. Pantsir in that time was not even in production jet, so Syria didn't have them. On the other hand attack occur in peace time. How many SAMs have in peace time missiles on launchers and crews inside systems ready to fire? If there is an intruder in air space in peace time, will you sent fighter to intercept intruder or launch a SAM on it? What if this was civil plane and Syria launch SAM on it and shot down a passenger plane?

Oh sure, but again, a Nuclear Warhead that can kill anything within a kilometer at space is not comparable to the SM-3, which is a hit to kill weapon and won't have the same fall out effects.

First of all nuclear weapons are terribly indiscriminate weapons, but their effect in the vacuum of space is severely limited to intense heat. Blast waves don't propagate in a vacuum.
The existing radiation in space from our sun and cosmic rays make fallout a non issue.

Oh, so you'd much rather leave us defenseless against those who would attack us?

13 carrier groups, thousands of aircraft including stealth fighters and stealth bombers, hundreds of missiles with nuclear warheads and a trillion dollars a year "defence" budget... how do you manage you poor defenceless waif?

MAD works because anyone that attacks you knows the retaliation will be enough to end their existence. That is how MAD has worked and continues to work.

No, if Russia wants to be secure, we do too.

You think big expensive ABM systems make you safe?
Just because your politicians tell you they will work and make you safe doesn't mean it is true. They only say that because their campaign funds largely come from the big companies that will get the mouth watering contracts to build these white elephants.
They are top secret so they can use that to hide multi billion dollar fuckups, and 6 hour power lunches all paid for by the US taxpayer. It will all be top secret not because they don't want the information to leak to the Ruskies or the chinese... they don't want the US taxpayers to know otherwise they might ask themselves why do we need this crap anyway?

Russia can upgrade all their S-500s to S-1000s, but for all I care is what we upgrade ours to because we won't use our Nukes and I'm sure as hell Putin won't use his, even with the most advance ABM systems imaginable, nobody except a crazed mastermind would really run the risk of glowing green.

Impressed by your confidence. Probably why you think MAD is a bad idea. Problem is that it wasn't that long ago that a US administration was looking at a nuclear weapon for the purpose of bunker busting. Nah, merica wont use nukes... Again.

They will invade two countries and kill hundreds of thousands of people... hey why not use nukes... it would be cheaper. You might have even had less blood on your hands.

ABMs only make us safer from the likes of Iran or North Korea, Russia agrees with me on this as I said before, and I'd much rather waste our money on ABMs then Nukes, and again, Russia concurs.

Wrong. Russia doesn't want to pi$$ its money away on an integrated ABM system that is something the US wants.

The new Start treaty includes provisions that if an ABM system is set up in Europe that Russia can make changes to its force structure to match including the redeployment of missiles and warhead numbers increases. Doesn't sound like they are choosing ABM over nukes at all.

That being said, I'd complain too if that lock wasn't a lock but was a gun because Iran doesn't have locks they have guns and that's what's scaring those IAF pilots.

I love the arrogance... I am supposed to care about the fears of an Israeli Defence Force pilot operating in Iranian airspace illegally on presumably a mission to kill some Iranians. Fuckem.

Neither are the Israelis. Suter can only evolve, and that first strike on Syria showed how effective Suter can be. Despite Pantsyrs lurking around, those F-16s passed through like a hot knife through butter.

What are you dribbling about? The Pantsirs were not even delivered when the attack took place.

Russia could only comfort the injured souls.

Actually Russia can fill order books from the neighbours of Israel who don't want similar visits.

Will S-500 system be good against Minotaur IV?

Russian military experts gathered for a round table discussion organized by RIA Novosti news agency. The experts came to conclusion that one of the major tasks for the future missile defense system would be the struggle against hypersonic weapons of potential enemies.

Igor Korotchenko, an official with the Russian Defense Ministry, said during the conference that NATO countries, particularly the USA, had been developing a new generation of hypersonic strike weapons and hypersonic missile weapons (Prompt Global Strike).

It will be highly complicated to intercept the new missiles with the use of contemporary anti-missile systems. The flight-in time of the new weapon in comparison with air-based cruise missiles is reduced to mere minutes, which makes it impossible for the attacked side to take defense measures.

The Americans say that the hypersonic arms will be built to destroy terrorists, first and foremost. However, according to the documents of NATO's AGARD group, the hypersonic missiles will be developed to strike enemy's reinforced objects, ABM and AD systems, to obtain supremacy in the air, to effectively intercept ballistic missiles and destroy hypersonic assault weapons.

The appearance of such weapons in the United States will minimize the advantages of Russia's missile and nuclear shield. Military experts said during the discussion that Russia would not be able to defend its missile complexes - the basis of the national nuclear containment forces - in case of such an attack.

The threat of the appearance of hypersonic weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States requires adequate measures from Russia, which will include the development of space defense system and the fifth generation air defense system, experts believe.

The USA already has development prototypes of such weapons. It particularly goes about the ARRMD program - Affordable Rapid Response Missile Demonstrator - by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency). The program stipulates the development of hypersonic guided air-to-ground and ship-to-shore long range missiles.

In May 2010, the United States tested two pilot items of the hypersonic cruise missile. Minotaur IV was one of them. According to experts' estimates, the missile is capable of striking targets in any part of the globe within just one hour.

The USA is also testing Х-51А Waverider hypersonic missile. The takeoff mass of this missile makes up 1.1 tons. The weight of the warhead is 110 kilos; its range is 1,200 kilometers. The flight speed of the missile is over 2,400 meters per second. The missile is to enter service in the US Army after 2015.

On May 13th, the next day after the USA tested Minotaur IV, former commander of the Russian Air Force Anatoly Korkunov and former head of procurement Anatoly Sitnov stated that the Russian air and space defense forces were incapable of guaranteeing security to the country.

What can Russia oppose to the new challenge from the United States?

Alexander Mordovin, an expert at the council for external and defense politics stated that the creation of new missiles would pose a serious problem for Russia.

"Conventional cruise missiles could be destroyed by fighter jets, but in this case it would be very problematic. Fourth and fifth-generation fighter jets can fly at low altitudes not faster than 1,300 km/h. The hypersonic weapons will be made to fly at low altitudes, which makes it very hard to destroy them in the air. Russia wrapped up its space defense program during Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's times, including the combat lasers project. However, those lasers would be very helpful in fighting Minotaur-type missiles.

One can hope for the development of the new S-500 complex. For the time being, one may say that Russia will remain vulnerable to possible attacks with the use of hypersonic weapons for a long time in the future," the expert said.

One can hope for the development of the new S-500 complex. For the time being, one may say that Russia will remain vulnerable to possible attacks with the use of hypersonic weapons for a long time in the future," the expert said.

Unusual statement...

Russia will remain? vulnerable to Possible with the use of hypersonic weapons for a long time in the future.

The amusing thing is that most of their large SAMs are currently the most widely deployed non strategic hypersonic weapons currently in service.

Another amusing point is that most new weapons deployed are usually developed to defeat an opponents defences so to suggest Russia of today is vulnerable to US weapons of 2015 should not really fill us with dread and foreboding.
Sounds like Pantsir-S2 and TOR-M4 will need to be pretty good.

More great news:

Russia's second S-400 missile unit enters service

RIA Novosti

18:07 16/02/2011 KAPUSTIN YAR, February 16 (RIA Novosti) - The strategic command of Russia's space defense forces took delivery of its second unit of S-400 Triumf missile systems on Wednesday, which will be based in the Moscow Region, Defense Ministry spokesman Col. Vladimir Drik said.

Until now, the Russian forces have had only one unit of S-400s, based at Electrostal, near Moscow.

"The handover ceremony for the second S-400 will take place at the state firing range in Kapustin Yar from February 16-19," Drik said.

The unit will consist of two regiments, each consisting of eight launch points, each with four missiles.

The S-400 has a maximum range of up to 400 km at an altitude of 40,000-50,000 meters. The system uses a range of missiles, optimized for engaging ballistic and cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles, Drik said.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2011/russia-110216-rianovosti03.htm

The unit will consist of two regiments, each consisting of eight launch points, each with four missiles.

[quote]

Earlier it was said that division (battalion) have 8 launchers, CP and complete of radars, now it is regiment. I know polk is between batalion and brigade, like 2 polks is 1 brigade. Is regiment the same in size as battalion? It was said, that in 2010 russian army will receive 5 divisions (battalions) of S-400. Different names make a confusion here.

[quote="medo"]

The unit will consist of two regiments, each consisting of eight launch points, each with four missiles.

Earlier it was said that division (battalion) have 8 launchers, CP and complete of radars, now it is regiment. I know polk is between batalion and brigade, like 2 polks is 1 brigade. Is regiment the same in size as battalion? It was said, that in 2010 russian army will receive 5 divisions (battalions) of S-400. Different names make a confusion here.

Two batteries form one regiment in recent Russia S-400 deliveries. One battery consists of 8 lounchers.

Every regiment has its own 91N6 EW radar and 55K6 mobile command post and every battery has its own 92E6 shooting radar and 96L6

radar mounted on tower elevator for low lvl targets.

Now what I find frustrating is that there has being no talk about 40N6 missile that supposed to finished its testings by the

2010 and that there has being no word about 9M96 missile family.

This is the S-400/-500 news thread so this fits here:

Russia to start building new S-500 air defence missiles by 2014

Russia will start serial production of its next-generation S-500
missile system in 2014, an aerospace defense chief said on Thursday.
The S-500 air defense system will be able to track and destroy ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 3,500 kilometers.
"[The S-500] is currently in development. By 2014, it should enter
into serial production," aerospace defense strategic commander Lt. Gen.
Valery Ivanov said.
"This system will be able to defend territories at heights of up to 50 kilometers," he added.
Russia's aerospace defense troops currently use S-300 and S-400 systems.
New S-400 air defense missiles will be deployed at Dmitrov just outside Moscow in March, Ivanov said.

KAPUSTIN YAR, February 17 (RIA Novosti)

50km heights is not that special really... at one time they were talking about a mobile Moscow ABM system performance missile.

Actually the 3,500km range BM engagement capability seemed familiar so I looked it up and they claim the same 4.8km/s speed of the incoming target as for the S-400.

Perhaps they are confusing the two systems?

IIRC, S-400 only does 40 km altitude as of now.

Well that is the figure for the previously released info about the system.

The S-400 has a maximum range of up to 400 km at an altitude of
40,000-50,000 meters. The system uses a range of missiles, optimized for
engaging ballistic and cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles, Drik
said.

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110216/162635663.html

The missile with the 400km range might be capable of engaging targets at 40-50km altitude as its flight path should take it through that region of airspace.

Well considering the fact that the 400 km range missile for the S-400 hasn't even been deployed yet, it wouldn't be too far fetched to say that the S-500 would be armed with those missiles, at least for initial production.

IronsightSniper wrote:IIRC, S-400 only does 40 km altitude as of now.

I think that matters only for S-400 meant for export.

Viktor wrote:

IronsightSniper wrote:IIRC, S-400 only does 40 km altitude as of now.

I think that matters only for S-400 meant for export.

They're already exporting them?