S-300/400/500 News [Russian Strategic Air Defense] #1

Sujoy wrote:Not to mention the cost issue . The system should have a cost-exchange advantage at the margin in the worst case; that is to say, the unit of defense must always be cheaper than whatever the offense could do at the margin, so that the attacker could not possibly scale his way out of the challenge posed to the attacker by the defender

Cant agree. Mentioning Kremlin and missile cost efficiency in the same sentence or paragraph simply do not add up because Kremlin has no price and no one will view spend 48N6 to shoot down cruise missile as a bad trade off. 

Sujoy wrote:Say a hostile missile is approaching the Kremlin at low altitude . Do you use the S 300 / S 400 or do you use your Pantsirs and VSHORADS ? The warhead on the S 300 missile is approximately 140 kgs . The warhead on the cruise missile will weigh approximately 400kgs . When two such missiles collide at such high speeds at low altitude the combined force of the blast will cause a great deal of damage on the ground . That's why you use a smaller missile like the 57E6 or 2A38M 30 mm autocannon guns . Destroying the warhead aboard an ICBM is different from simply destroying the launch vehicle.

I think you are using the wrong starting point. Lets say you have a cruise missile flying toward some target defended by S-300V/BUK/TOR/ZSU-23.
You radar sees the targets well in advance and sends information to command post which performs calculations: What do you think it will do?

- let the rocket pass all S-300V/BUK/TOR only to be shoot down with ZSU-23 because of cost efficiency
- send one 9M83 on the target and if the target is shoot down than all is oke but if not send one 9M38 and after that if target is still alive one 9M330.
- something else ?
- and a question - what if you have a low flying target detected and aimed but not being able to reach by short range AD systems

Just to remind you that Russians had long time ago decided to shoot all flying targets be it a decoys, missiles, planes or AWACS etc - thats why Almaz-Antej motto is "clear skies - is our bussines"

Sujoy wrote:

Viktor wrote:while EU SAM air defenses are basically non existent they have capable air force that will cover low level approach

The greatest advantage of aircraft-based AEW/ Interceptor systems is also the source of their greatest limitation for sustained cruise missile defense, especially for the homeland. They are few in number and have high procurement and operating costs. They require bases and infrastructure which add to those costs.While front-line combat aircraft are profoundly capable assets, they are not optimal resources on which to base an effective and cost-effective continuous defense against cruise / ballistic missiles. Fighters are expensive to operate and maintain and have very limited on-station endurance, regardless of whether they are based on land or aircraft carriers.

Further, interception times and basing locations may not permit the timely interception of cruise missiles on short notice as might well be the result of surprise launches of cruise missiles from offshore cargo ships or submarines. Combat aircraft are best employed in in-theater warfighting, which is their primary function.

I completely agree. Thats why I said:

Viktor wrote:To loose (or not to have) any one of those things means severely degrading your ability to withstand air attacks.

Thing is that while I agree with you, EU countries decided to rely on radar coverage in cooperation with fighters to repel any attacks. And while that is not

the most luckiest combination it still excluded AAA from the equation which was my point. Iran is your only example of using S-200/AAA in combo to apply tactics

you described. Even Iran will send some fighters in to deal with low flying menaces.

Viktor wrote:Mentioning Kremlin and missile cost efficiency in the same sentence or paragraph simply do not add up

Check again , I didn’t I used the Kremlin analogy to describe a high value target .It could be anything else . An airport , power plant , the whole nine .

Viktor wrote:I think you are using the wrong starting point. Lets say you have a cruise missile flying toward some target defended by S-300V/BUK/TOR/ZSU-23.
You radar sees the targets well in advance and sends information to command post which performs calculations: What do you think it will do?
- let the rocket pass all S-300V/BUK/TOR only to be shoot down with ZSU-23 because of cost efficiency

That comes later . But first , I will position AEW&C aircraft and Combat Air Patrol between the intended targets and known threat axis from which the hostile cruise missile appears. The longer the duration of the cruise missile’s flight the better detection and engagement opportunities.

Viktor wrote:- send one 9M83 on the target and if the target is shoot down than all is oke but if not send one 9M38 and after that if target is still alive one 9M330.

Likely but not necessarily .

Viktor wrote:- - something else ?

This is what will happen .
First, the incoming cruise missile in a given time period enters an initial engagement queue based on an assessment of the likelihood that cruise missiles will be a threat to the S 300 or to critical infrastructure targets. Second, if no interceptor missile fired from the S 300 defeats the incoming cruise missiles, the cruise missile will join a second queue to be engaged by the TOR , Pantsir or MANPADs.

Viktor wrote:- - and a question - what if you have a low flying target detected and aimed but not being able to reach by short range AD systems

Just to clarify , why would short range AD systems NOT be able to intercept a low flying target ?

Viktor wrote:- Just to remind you that Russians had long time ago decided to shoot all flying targets be it a decoys, missiles, planes or AWACS etc - thats why Almaz-Antej motto is "clear skies - is our bussines"

Do they add a DISCLAIMER that they work on cloudless days as well Just curious .

Sujoy wrote:This is what will happen .
First, the incoming cruise missile in a given time period enters an initial engagement queue based on an assessment of the likelihood that cruise missiles will be a threat to the S 300 or to critical infrastructure targets. Second, if no interceptor missile fired from the S 300 defeats the incoming cruise missiles, the cruise missile will join a second queue to be engaged by the TOR , Pantsir or MANPADs.

Thats right.
Depending of the command post calculation missiles will be fired in line from S-300, BUK, TOR etc until all targets are destroyed. So I just wont to make a point that if you have dozens, of targets command post will based on its calculations decide what system will destroy what targets with how many missiles. You wont let go missiles slip buy because of something/what ever reason - target distribution is performed by command post and if you have integrated mixed systems targets (specially tricky ones) will have to pass all layers of SAM systems including the shortest ones.

Sujoy wrote:Just to clarify , why would short range AD systems NOT be able to intercept a low flying target ?

Viktor wrote:- - and a question - what if you have a low flying target detected and aimed but not being able to reach by short range AD systems

Because of range. If the cruise missiles are passing by at distance greater than the range of short range AD systems!
In that case those targets will be engaged by S-300 systems or BUK . Thats why

Viktor wrote:In that case those targets will be engaged by S-300 systems or BUK .

Correct . Or the MIG 31 will adopt a look down , shoot down approach ( depending of course how far the hostile missile is from the target )with it's large look-down/shoot-down radars, IRST systems and engage the cruise missile with a R 37

 

Lets say you have a cruise missile flying toward some target defended by S-300V/BUK/TOR/ZSU-23.
You radar sees the targets well in advance and sends information to command post which performs calculations: What do you think it will do?......

Viktor this kind of questions are very tricky and the response depend mostly on :

1)  Strategic level of alert

2)  Extent of the attack

3)  Capability and expected time to achieve degrading attrition on the enemy reserves and/or the carrying vectors of those cruise missiles



1)  For the highest level of Federation strategic alert ,against a world level enemy threat , several ПВО sites in key positions and several squadrons of air component interceptors shift very quickly to nuclear-tipped interceptor missiles (with much greater effective range than theirs conventional counterparts , lacking any need for kinetic energy reserve for execute the close intercepts of maneuvering/small targets in the coasting phase and requiring no more than vague coordinates , even from OTH or space based sensors, to execute perfectly the task) capable to destroy ,with no more than two three shots and in immense radius, entire groups of incoming offensive elements independently from theirs nature or flight's profiles.



2)  For cruise missile attacks of not-strategic scale and of conventional nature , Central Command and Control structures ,together with that of each IAD node, modulate employment of defense resources from each layer, crossing the data on the potential cruise missiles menace coming from any sensor and "harmonizing" them with the number and nature of the IAD's elements present in the area, following the concept of "critical offensive density" for unitary time for the just more internal next IAD's layer and ,obviously, that of priority of "not-depleting/low cost" neutralizing resources over "depleting/high cost" ones.


In substance the first concept just mentioned mean that if a squadron of 8 MiG-31s, in a long range interceptor mission of incoming subsonic cruise missiles, verify/ID that a particular offensive group is composed by 30 cruise missiles and 25 decoys (the radar/IR track's IDs of which is passed instantaneously to the entire IAD so to don't waste any asset or effort on them)  this MiG-31 squad will NOT employ all its interceptor missiles against the 30 cruise missiles, but will attempt to neutralize only some of them,  (at example only 16 cruise missiles with 20 R-33S/R-37M from the middle of the group because the assets of the most internal layer is computed capable to neutralize the remaining density of cruise missile menaces in the unitary time ) so to get the chance to "dilute" up to the theirs utter inefficiency others, otherwisely saturating, incoming groups of cruise missiles.

This same working mechanism aimed at lower the menace under the critical density for the subsequent stratum, work equally for each single layer of the IAD , so to neutralize order of magnitude greater level of cruise missiles/PGM attacks.


The second concept establish, instead, a strict hierarchical order of employment of the IAD resources at second of its depleting/not-depleting nature and its cost/availability in respect to the offensive element.
If at example a group of incoming cruise missiles possibly heading (from node's command and control's computation data) or for an hardened C4 installation or for two radar installations, after passing in a zone of coverage of a SPN-40 or ,worse, Krasuha-4 suddenly modify their flight pact to East of those sites toward a mountainous or tundra sector devoid of any important military/civil sensible target, not ANY IAD's resource will be expended to neutralize those cruise missiles because this group will, very likely ,detonate totally out of its intended course in a mountain or in a open area without inflicting any military or civil sensible damage ; them will be ,instead, merely monitored to preserve the possibility for the IAD to destroy them in a later time, if the group appear to return over a dangerous course.
The same would be true for a group of cruise missiles directed against a decoy battalion on S-300-PM or a group of cruise missiles directed against a SPN-4 battalion already evacuating the zone through a redeploying tunnel etc… etc...




   
3)  The IAD's resources of a particular sector to neutralize cruise missile/PGM attacks are managed considering the average cycle of theirs reiteration after that attacks to theirs stock sites and sites hosting theirs carrying vectors are executed.
In substance if a saturating "Kaliber" cruise missile attack is expected to destroy, with a very high percentage of success, the unique two opponent's airfields (and obviously also its cruise missile depots) allowing some enemy tactical aircraft to attack a particular Federation IAD sector with JASSM, or a pair of group of TU-22M3 with Kh-22/32 to destroy a particular CVBG even before it will reach a particular IAD sector ; IAD's resources for this sector are managed accordingly.


Anyone is perfectly capable to realize that overall efficiency, extension and density of an IAD is by far the major contributing factor also in deciding survival chances of offensive menaces capable to endanger the enemy IAD. , therefore assuring for the side enjoying the IAD advantage a progressively faster degradation of enemy offensive capabilities and ,in this way, also its growing advantage over the progressively shrinking enemy capabilities and offensive options.


       

- let the rocket pass all S-300V/BUK/TOR only to be shoot down with ZSU-23 because of cost efficiency

       (better say a Tunguska or an Igla-S;)


Paradoxically that is much more near to operational reality than what someone could think, in particular for very intense cruise missiles saturating attacks.

Tnx Mindstorm, very informative as always.

Majority of cruise missiles will be launched from sea, be it from subs or from ships. Tracking their positions is also very important and from their positions could be calculated flying paths of cruise missiles to important targets. In that case navy could represent first wall of AD, specially brown sea navy could place its ships in area of flight path and shot down many missiles over sea. Cruise missiles don't do many maneuvers over sea, so they are quite easy targets for naval AD on ships like 76 mm or 100mm radar controlled guns, CIWS and missiles. After navy, coastal defense will meet them with their AD units, so the inland AD brigades will more shot on missiles, which succeed to come through.

Up to now, states attacked with cruise missiles didn't have big navy and was mostly docked in harbors (Iraq, FRY, Libya), didn't have active air force, so the whole job fall on inland AD brigades, which were also ancient and heavily degraded with electronic warfare. But still Serbian AD manage to shot down around 200 cruise missiles.

Russia is slowly modernize its navy, while on the contrary China very rapidly build its navy and become the strongest in Pacific, so attack with cruise missiles on China will be more or less uneffective.

Most long range cruise missiles operate at medium to high altitude for the early portion of their flight to maximise their range.

You are quite right that many will be sea launched and as such will be detectable at sea and at reasonable ranges because of their higher operating altitudes and their fairly predictable flight paths using known likely launch points with deep water and of course the terrain near the target.


Most cruise missiles don't like navigating over water as it cannot get an elevation location fix, so getting them to land fall quickly allows them to establish their position better. Flying behind mountain ranges hiding from main radar centres etc allows both the attacker but also the defender find vulnerable areas... for the attack to exploit and the defender to put mobile units into.

Where ever you look, left and right, exercises everywhere, snap checks, massive maneuvers all year long   

EKR in exercises near Astrakhan hit targets using drones

The audit readiness duty forces air defenses successfully repelled the attacks about 40 simulated enemy air targets, including the use of unmanned aircraft.


MOSCOW, July 24 - RIA Novosti. Brigade Air Defense Troops of Aerospace Defense (ASD) for tactical exercises in the Astrakhan region successfully hit about 40 simulated enemy air targets, including the use of drones, told reporters on Wednesday a representative of the press service Information and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on East Col. Alexei Zolotukhin.

"At the landfill," Ashuluk "began tactical exercises connections defense Forces Aerospace Defense. At the first stage of the exercise air defense units to march into new positioning areas to accomplish the mission. As part of the activities of air defense brigade of troops EKR has taken over guard duty airspace boundaries of the protected area. During the test the combat readiness of air defenses duty forces successfully repelled the attacks about 40 simulated enemy air targets, including the use of unmanned aircraft, "- said Zolotukhin.

The final step is to conduct tactical training field firing anti-aircraft missiles (SAM), S-300 "Favorite" in difficult noise conditions, the representative of SAI. "Battle calculated to destroy high-altitude and low-altitude targets, simulating as aerodynamic and ballistic targets at all altitudes and speeds," - said Zolotukhin.


To participate in tactical exercises on the ground "Ashuluk" located in the Astrakhan region, about 500 soldiers arrived Forces aerospace defense.

LINK

Which reminds me on this exercise.

LINK

Similarities - here we had mixed brigade with S-300 - I can not find the picture showing positions of the AD batteries. damn

GarryB wrote:Most cruise missiles don't like navigating over water as it cannot get an elevation location fix, so getting them to land fall quickly allows them to establish their position better.

Plus, it's kinda hard to get TERCOM updates flying over the water. Ideally you get over land as soon as possible to start making the required course corrections to make sure you end up where you want to end up.

Sept 2012 news on S-500 but interesting

http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=358711

S-500 missile system will be completed on time, surpass foreign analogs - ministry (Part 2)

MOSCOW. Sept 5 (Interfax-AVN) - The new S-500 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system being built for the Russian Aerospace Defense will surpass U.S. analogs by tactical and technical characteristics, Aerospace Defense Troops Commander Col. Gen. Oleg Ostapenko told Interfax-AVN.

"Work on the S-500 SAM system is going to be scheduled. The work is part of the state armament program and will be completed before 2020," Ostapenko said.

The S-500 will be better than any U.S. analog, he said.

"Our newest S-500 system with a new missile is better than any other U.S. analog. While Americans are still seeking publicity in electronic mass media, we already have an actual missile," the general said.

Fifth-generation missiles, including S-500 SAM systems, will be the basis of Russia's Aerospace Defense in the 2020s, he said.

The work on the S-500 SAM system is going concurrently with efforts to create a new missile for this new system, Ostapenko said.

The commander would not give the technical characteristics of the missile for the S-500.

"Our work on the missile is going to plan, there are some great ideas but not without elements of superstition. We do not normally talk about it before it (the missile) flies," the general said.

It was reported earlier that about ten divisions of S-500 SAM systems are due to be purchased under the state armament program to 2020. They will become the main weapon of the newly formed Russian Aerospace Defense Forces.

The S-500 SAM system designed by Almaz-Antei is a long-range, high-altitude interception system with an enhanced missile defense potential.

The main requirements for the S-500 SAM system are: an increased capability to destroy ballistic targets (medium-range ballistic missiles, tactical and operational-tactical ballistic missiles) at an interception altitude of up to 200 kilometers and flight speed of up to 7 kilometers per second, and a capability to destroy warheads of hypersonic cruise missiles, according to the Russian Defense Ministry.

Sept 2012 news on S-500 but interesting

Hey hey hey  

Good find Austin

SOC wrote:

GarryB wrote:Most cruise missiles don't like navigating over water as it cannot get an elevation location fix, so getting them to land fall quickly allows them to establish their position better.

Plus, it's kinda hard to get TERCOM updates flying over the water.  Ideally you get over land as soon as possible to start making the required course corrections to make sure you end up where you want to end up.

Don't they use satellite navigation? GPS or Glonass?

GPS can be interfered with and of course the obvious problem that the satellite navigation systems might not be operational for very long into WWIII so you can't really rely on them being there anyway.

Most used terrain comparison compared with digital maps stored in their memories... newer missiles obviously able to store much larger and more detailed and more accurate digital maps...

Of course GPS/Glonass will be compromised in case of a major conflict.
On the other hand, how much is TERCOM to be relied on in case of conflict.
If the cruise missile is using radar to view the terrain - radar can be jammed.
If it uses Infra-Red or thermal or laser to view the terrain, all of these can be interfered with as well.
Hell, even the terrain can be altered (erect huge reflecting tents or structures or blimps to make look like hills).

Ideas???

TheArmenian wrote:On the other hand, how much is TERCOM to be relied on in case of conflict......
Ideas???

TERCOM uses a pre-recorded contour map of the terrain that is compared to measurements made during flight by an on-board radar altimeter. The onboard radar system of the cruise missile  is constantly bouncing signals off the ground below in order to measure changes in elevation . Therefore , an interference can be induced in the the radar signals . To minimize this risk TERCOM works in conjunction with INS. What INS does for you  is if you know where you used to be, and all of the changes in direction and velocity since that point in time and space, you can calculate where you are now.

At the heart of the INS  is an arrangement of accelerometers that will detect any change in vehicular motion.The accelerometer measures acceleration along the fore-and-aft axis of the missile .If the missile speed were constant, the distance covered could be calculated simply by multiplying the speed by time of flight. But because the acceleration varies, the speed also varies. For that reason, a second integration is necessary.

Modern day cruise missiles uses Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC)during the terminal phase to maximize accuracy . DSMAC compares a stored image of target with the actual target image . During flight, the missile will navigate using TERCOM and DSMAC and GPS . To effectively jam all the three is extremely difficult . Therefore, if any one of the guidance method works the missile can home in on the target.

Moreover , there are other alternatives available as well .

Ground based Differential GPS can be attached to  specific recieivers for DGPS in the VHF band or Local Area Augmentation System for precision approach  . Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast  in conjunction with IFF can also ensure that it is impossible to jam the cruise missile .

These days Airbus A330/A340 aircraft  uses a system  called T3CAS  . This system is a  combination  of:

1.Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
2.Terrain Awareness Warning Systems (TAWS)
3.Mode S Transponder
4.SafeRoute ADS-B Solutions and Air Traffic Situational Awareness ADS-B applications (ATSA)

http://www.acss.com/wp-content/uploads/T3CAS.pdf

This system does have the potential to be effective in cruise missiles as well .

If the cruise missile is using radar to view the terrain - radar can be jammed.

Dopplar radar altimeters use very low power signals directed straight down... and does not use them continuously... it spot checks for altitude readings to get a position fix based on a comparison between its onboard digital map with its location at launch from its launch platform and the information it has generated during its flight based on INS. (inertial navigation system).
A good INS system alone will only be out by a few kilometres after a few hours flight... a bit of terrain altitude testing and locating fixed items throughout the flight should greatly improve that level of accuracy... for instance if you know your missile will pass a specific road junction you can get it to look for it as it gets near and compare its actual position with the known position of the road junction. This will allow accuracy to be re zeroed throughout the flight so terminal accuracy should be very good... even without Glonass and excessive radar emissions.

If it uses Infra-Red or thermal or laser to view the terrain, all of these can be interfered with as well.

Why interfere? Surely if you can set up decoys or jammers then it makes more sense to set up SAMs and shoot down the incoming missiles.

Hell, even the terrain can be altered (erect huge reflecting tents or structures or blimps to make look like hills).

And hope that enemy planners will route their missiles over these tents?

Like I said if there are covered terrain areas where your radar can't see and is sparsely populated then put SAMs there... not tents. Putting a few extra small bumps wont make much difference... the missile will continue to fly until it finds terrain shapes it recognises... you wouldn't be able to create that many mountains that it will turn 180 degrees and head home.

It is no secret that as long as there are signals being let off, an enemy with decent EW capabilities will attempt to jam the signals, causing disruption in the guided munitions.

Or worse use the signals to track down your cruise missiles and shoot them down before they reach their targets.

I have read the Iranians used Su-25s to shoot down US Drones... a very useful way of using such aircraft and a relatively cheap and simple solution to a serious problem.

Comparable to the Serbs flying Hinds next to NATO UAVs and using door gunners to shoot them down...

Thanks Sujoy and Garry for your inputs.

Another shooting with S-400 regiment

- 60 pieces of equipment
- 100 PVO troopers
- 30 targets with different speeds and altitude
- shooting performed from unprepaired positions


interesting how 30-40 targets in a 5 minute window is a standard for AD regiment

TSB fighters for the first time to hold fire the S-400 in Buryatia


C-400 - Anti-aircraft missile complex of new generation high-and medium-range missiles. It can destroy all the modern means of air attack: tactical and strategic aircraft, ballistic missiles, hypersonic targets.


MOSCOW, August 7 - RIA Novosti. Martial firing anti-aircraft missile systems S-400 "Triumph" for the first time to hold units Aerospace Defense (ASD) of the Eastern Military District (VZV) in the republic of Buryatia in mid-August, said on Wednesday the head of the press service District Alexander Gordeev.
Earlier it was reported that the S-400 could be exported in a combined way to the landfill in Buryatia for large-scale troop exit the field.


"Anti-aircraft missile units connections aerospace defense of the Eastern Military District completed the march by rail and arrived today at a specialized training ground in the Republic of Buryatia, where they will hold live firing of the S-400" Triumph ". <...> Martial firing S-400" Triumph ", entered service of the Eastern Military District, held for the first time as part of a tactical exercise" - said Gordeev.
According to him, the shooting will start in mid-August and will last for a week. During the exercise personnel will deploy anti-missile systems, to conduct training on the detection and capture of goals, and destroy more than thirty different high-speed maneuvering targets, including those flying at low altitudes.
Just exercises in Buryatia involved about a hundred soldiers and about 60 pieces of equipment.
C-400 - Anti-aircraft missile complex of new generation high-and medium-range missiles. It can destroy all the modern means of air attack: tactical and strategic aircraft, ballistic missiles, hypersonic targets.

LINK

S-400 can destroy hipersonic targets?

dino00 wrote:S-400 can destroy hipersonic targets?

Yes, and so can S-300P and S-300V.

What kind of targets, if you don´t mind?
I am confused, what the mean with S-500 being able to shoot all hypersonic targets, whats the difference in the hypersonic targets?

dino00 wrote:What kind of targets, if you don´t mind?
I am confused, what the mean with S-500 being able to shoot all hypersonic targets, whats the difference in the targets?  

S-500 should be able to deal with Mach 20+ targets flying at 30-100km altitude or even higher.

S-300 deal with hypersonic targets /Mach 10-15) flying at up to 30km altitude