Russian Military Reform

The main advantage of having all the land based warfare under the Army, all the air based warfare under the Aerospace Forces, and all the sea based warfare under the Navy, would be that it helps on the optimization of the resources. Unified vision of the needs on land, sea and air warfare:

- Helps in the definition of the overall priorities
- Helps in the definition of the right criteria in the development of new warfare
- Helps in the standardization of the respective fleets
- Helps in the optimization of the use of every pieze of warfare
- Helps in the optimization of the maintenance services
- Helps in the optimization of the age of the fleet
- Helps in the optimization of the order for replacements
- Helps in the optimization of the new purchases
- Helps in the optimization of the knowledge required to design the fleet
- Helps in the optimization of the knowledge to operate right every type of warfare
- Helps in the optimization of the training services
- Helps in the optimization of the infraestructure needed for every type of warfare, that is very different and expensive
- Helps in the definition of the structure for the entire branch

Basically, to have separate Air Force, Naval Aviation and Army Aviation, makes to the Armed Forces to fall in lots of redundances in most of the chapters included in the point about optimization, This example is easy to explain, but it also happens with other cases like land based Air Defense under the Aerospace Forces, or with Naval Infantry under the Navy. Basically the result is better in terms of optimization if a branch, say to other we need this, and the specialized branch solve it including the need in their mix of requirements. To fall in unnecessary redundances makes to increase the costs significantly.

It is not rare to see how these services that are not in their natural branch, can fall in lower standards than the main forces of their natural branch. For a branch that need to run a service that is not in their main knowledge it is difficult and expensive to reach the standards of the branch that has most knowledge on it. As example, for the Navy it is difficult to reach the standars of the Aerospace Forces in the Naval Aviation (lower thechnological level of some aircrafts, age of the fleet,...). Other example, for the Aerospace Forces it is difficult to reach the standars of the Army in the Air Defense forces (lower level of protection of the crews, lower level of saturation of the reserves than in other land forces,...).  

Surely there are still more details of interest to comment.

The main problem of this type of structure can be in the coordination of the different branches when it is necessary a work together, but with regional coordination at different levels, surely the benefits would be important.

The case of the Airborne/Shipborne Troops makes sense, and was included in my scheme as the fourth branch because of some reasons:

- It would keep the land forces as its main area. Its main knowledge would be in the land forces.
- It can be big enough to reach high own standards.
- It would not need to operate air or sea based warfare, except some UAVs, like in the case of the Army or the Navy.
- It would require some specific warfare and training that would not be necessary to be in the Army in case of a separation.
- It would work in totally different territory than the Army, except for their bases in the mainland.
- It would help to a higher optimization still of the Army, thanks to make this branch very stable.

Under the proposed scheme:

- The Army would work in the most internal area, in the mainland of the country. A fixed territory that would not change.
- The Aerospace Force would work over all the territory.
- The Navy and the Airborne/Shipborne Troops would work in an external ring of territory around the mainland.

It opens two spaces of coordination:

- The coordination in the mainland between the Army and the Aerospace Forces.
- The coordination in the external ring, between the Aerospace Forces, the Navy and the Airborne/Shipborne Troops.

The coordination between them in both areas seems necessary, and can be organized easily in the overall level, and also in regional levels.

Every scheme with divided branches needs coordination. Only a scheme with a single branch would need not coordination between branches (but would need also internal coordination).

Another important advantage of this scheme is that would allow easily to restrict the non-combat services of every branch to work only in the safety of the mainland (training services, non-combat air and land transport,...)

Under this scheme the Army would be a very stable force, thanks to attend a territory that would not change. It would be optimizable until an extreme degree. The Airborne/Shipborne Troops would be less stable and would be more affected by the changes in what the gobernment can afford or not (temporary contracts, volunteers to combat in the borders or outside in a concrete campaign,...). The Airborne/Shipborne Troops, would own the entire bench of modern land warfare, including land based air defense and even land nuclear weapons, but also would own the old material that is to be finnished fast after years in the reserve in the Army and the Airborne/Shipborne Troops (maybe for sales, maybe as help to third countries, maybe in own combat operations,...). The optimization of the Airborne/Shipborne Troops would be more difficult, but also the less optimizable land areas would be restricted to this branch.

This, and the more risky nature of the transport operations where the Airborne/Shipborne Troops would be involved, with likely need of air and/or sea escorts for the air and/or sea transport makes difficult to think in a viable own service of transport. It would be expensive, and unefficient.

It is interesting to note, that while the air and sea warfare after 50 years of active/reserve service becomes very dangerous and is better to be scrapped or to be in museums, the land warfare can have still some use in the short term. I find interesting to send it to the borders, and to put it under the control of the land forces for the difficult borders, and outside operations.

Cases of friend fire can happen even inside the same unit.

I do noth think a concrete example that happened under a different organization can be a good example of what I'm proposing, basically because I'm proposing regional coordination of the different branches, something that I doubt it was done at the time of the case that you explained.

Regional coordination between different branches has been strengthened in recent years in Russia and it is a key tool for a right functioning of the Armed Forces in overal terms. As example to have a coherence between the regions of every branch operating in the same territory helps a lot in the coordination. Even a regional coordination can be done at different levels.

One of the problems that this type of structure would try to avoid is a bad use of the warfare by officials with low knowledge of the cababilities of the warfare of a branch that is not their natural branch, because it is a true risk for the life of the crews and for the survivability of the warfare pieces.

All the branches of the Armed Forces are part of the same organization. To understand a branch like an independent organization is a mistake. A branch in overall terms, is one more of the types of unit. Like there are regiments, brigades, divisions, armies,... there are also different branches of the Armed Forces. The different branches should not be more independent than a regiment or a brigade. No-one in the Armed Forces should have a degree of independence that makes the other parts of the organization operating in the same area to know not what is being done. Like we see perfectly possible the coordination between battallions, regiments, brigades, it is possible the coordination between the different branches of the Armed Forces.

Also it is important to remember some thing. The platforms of every branch have Anti-air weapons. Land based platforms have SAMs, sea based platforms have also their own SAMs, and Air based platforms have Air-Air systems installed in the aircrafts, helicopters and spacecrafts. The same happens with radar and similar systems. Every type of platform have their own radars, but for a right coverage of the entire territory or at regional level it is necessary a common work in the different levels of coordination (national and regional of different leves). And like you said there is room for use of common weapons and technologies between the different branches if they are not too expensive or too specific.

Not only civilian leaders can fall in lack of enough knowledge to manage properly some weapons and platforms, also military officials can fall on it if it is not a technology of their own main knowledge. But also, it is very expensive to give to military officials of all the branches the necessary knowledge for the use of all the weapons. It is very expensive on money and on time of the officials and their teachers. Basically it is easier and cheaper to restrict the knowledge of the use of weapons to the officials and soldiers of one branch and to find a right coordintation between the people with the knowledge of every type of weapon.

I think Russia improved significantly on coordination of the different branches since 2008. Surely it is possible for Russia to improve still and to get closer to the ideal functioning. Also the unification of the Aerospace Forces helps on it, because a simplified structure of branches and inside the branches is easier to coordinate. This is one reason more of why the type of structure that I proposed is as symple

sepheronx wrote:So Franco, after the 2 divisions headed west (so additional 20,000 troops), what will be the total amount of troops in western district of Russia?

Edit: OK, so Franco left without answer, and this is becoming quite confusing.  So what is Russia doing to re-inforce the area? 20,000 troops is not even close to enough, and I don't even know what they currently have in place.

Land Combat Units in the West not including those assigned to Northern Command or Kaliningrad after the new divisions;

1 Tank Division
1 Tank Brigade
3 Motor Rifle Divisions
3 Motor Rifle Brigades
3 Airborne Divisions
2 Spetsnaz Brigades
1 Airborne Recon Brigades
2 Artillery Brigades
1 MRL Brigade
3 SSM Brigades

Total units manpower = ~82,000

sepheronx wrote:So this is after the 2 new divisions heading west?

Yes, but not sure of your heading west other then they (or at least 3 of the 4) will be stationed close to the Western border. All four new divisions are brand new formations. Talk has been that a regular brigades (4500 men) will be used as the base to build each of the new 10,000 man divisions. The fourth division will be stationed in the southern Urals from where it can operate in Central Asia or re-enforce the West or East.

There would be another 10,000 in Kaliningrad and another 10,000 in the Northwest. Plus you would have another 80-90,000 in the Southern Military District. More then enough compared to the what they are facing off against. Of course that is not taking into consideration that the President of Ukraine just announced last week that the Ukrainian Army is now the most powerful in Europe.

Shoigu Press

- COMBAT POTENTIAL OF RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES UP 32% IN THREE YEARS
- RATIO OF MODERN ARMS IN RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES REACHES 47%
- STATE DEFENSE ORDER ALMOST DOUBLED SINCE 2013, TROOPS RECEIVED OVER 15,000 NEW WEAPONS IN THAT PERIOD OF TIME
- COMBAT STRENGTH OF SOUTH MILITARY DISTRICT ENHANCED, TROOPS EQUIPPED WITH HIGH-PRECISION LONG-RANGE WEAPONS
- CENTRAL MILITARY DISTRICT STARTS TO RECEIVE UPGRADED T72B3 TANKS; ALREADY RECEIVED UPGRADED SUKHOI SU-24M, SU-25 JETS
- ONE ROCKET FORCE IN CENTRAL MILITARY DISTRICT TO BE REARMED WITH ISKANDER-M OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILE SYSTEMS
- OVER 80 MILITARY UNITS WILL GET MODERN WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING 34 DRONE SYSTEMS, THIS YEAR
- NEW FORMS OF COMBAT TRAINING BEING INTRODUCED IN RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES WITH CONSIDERATION OF EXPERIENCE OBTAINED IN SYRIA
- Russian military are trained for brief conflict
- Aviation, naval crews spend more than twice as much time in air, at sea
- Number of contract servicemen in Russia equaled number of conscripts for first time in 2015, now exceeds number of conscripts by 30%

In overall terms I see well the situation of the Russian armed forces. The cover of the local technology of all the military warfare areas is very high, and the level of the technology is good. Also the exposition of the Russian military warfare to foreign supplies is so low, and the works to replace foreign pieces affected by sanctions is being done fast enough.

While there are not critical problems, always there is something to do to improve the situation. Taking into account that the delivery to the Russian Armed Forces of the first unit of the S-350, Mi-38, Ka-60/62 and Yak-152, is expected before the end of 2017, these would be the reforms that I would expect first at a material level:

0.- Finalisation and confirmation of the total retirement, including of the reserve, of:

Kraz-214
Kraz-255
Kraz-260
Zil-130

100mm BS-3
023mm ZU-23(-2)
GT-MU
T-54
AT-T

Be-12

1.- To assure common standards in procurement and decommissions for land forces, common standards for sea forces, common standards for aerospace forces, common standards for land forces deployed by air and sea means, and common standards for military intelligence:

Russian Army
Russian Strategic Missile Troops
Russian Military Police
Russian Air Defence Troops
Russian Coastal Troops

Russian Aerospace Forces
Russian Naval Aviation
Russian Army Aviation

Russian Navy

Russian Airborne Troops
Russian Naval Infantry
Russian Navy Special Forces

Main Intelligence Directorate

2.- To define more clearly the limits for the equipment exclusive of the Russian Armed Forces. I would expect a militarization of some warfare that is now managed by non military security forces. It means the transference of low amounts of:

Project 11351 (3 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project 1265 (1 unit from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project 1330 (5 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project T-4 (3 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project 1176 (2 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
2S1 (12 units from Border Service of the FSB to R Army)

3.- To finnish the process of replacement of foreign components, and a plan for the scrapping, sale or demilitarization of foreign material of the Russian Armed Forces. It would include foreign designs, but not Russian or Sovietic designs produced out of Russia.

Dry cargo ships purchased for the operation in Syria

Type Dora
Type Dubna
Project REF-675
Project REF-100
Project R-5757
Project UK-3
Project V92
Project V820
L-39
L-410

An-140
Iveco LMV
IC16M Project IC16MII
An-148/158/178

4.- Total retirement from active service of the last heavy towed weapons except the biggest Surface-Air (A-135) and Surface-Surface (SS-18 and SS-19) missiles. In the case of the (M)T-12 I expect a total decommission with a retirement also of the reserve:

2A19/29 (M)T-12

2B16 Nona-K
2A36 Giatsint-B
2A18 D-30
2A65 Msta-B

5.- To exclude since the begin the procurement of the foreign and relatively weakest, less standard (including launched grenades) and less modern weapons (including the last variants) and auxiliary equipment in production:

An-140
Iveco LMV
IC16M Project IC16MII
An-148/158/178

2A19/29 (M)T-12

2A65 Msta-B

SPG-9
2B14 Podnos
GM-93/94 (LPO-97)

2S23
SA-13
BTR-80
MT-LB
BPM-97 (4x4)
BMD-4

6.- Upgrade on self propelled Surface-Surface, Surface-Air and Artillery warfare, with the replacement of the tractor elements with unarmoured cabin by (more standardized) tractor elements with armoured cabin, according to the modern safety standards for the rest of the land warfare, and to make full mobile the SS-29, SS-27 and SS-C-1. The retired unarmoured tractor elements can be used as military auxiliary vehicles in non-contested areas (transport, engineering,...), in agreement with the situation of use of every type of vehicle, and affecting to the procurement of land auxiliary vehicles:

SS-29
SS-27
SS-25
SS-26
SS-21
SS-1
SS-C-7
SS-C-6
SS-C-5
SS-C-3
SS-C-1
BM-30
BM-27

SA-21
SA-10/12/20/23
SA-22
SA-8

A-222

BM-21

7.- Very intense procurement in relative terms on:

Surface-Air systems (by lack os saturation of the reserve)

Infantry Vehicles (to improve the fleet toward the modern standards)

8.- Finalisation of the development of new weapons and non-combat equipment, and delivery of the first unit, to complete the new generation of equipment developed in the first quarter of the XXI century. Listed the key projects (except components but including ammunition) where the first unit is not in production in 2017. Bolded the projects where the timeline still assures not a first unit by 2025, and something else that I think would be interesting:

New ammunition for the SA-4 tractors (I see not news despite a lack of projects for new surface-air systems/ammunition for the 15-50Km range, approximately the original range of the SA-4)
New ammunition for the 125mm tanks of range over 17.5 Km to allow them to fight also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons of the adversary.
New ammunition for the TOS-1 of range over 17.5 Km to allow them to fight also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons of the adversary.

A-235
SS-30/RS-28

Project 23000 (multirole Aircraft Carrier)
Project 23560 (multirole Cruiser/Destroyer)
Project ????? Lavina or Project ????? Priboi (multirole Amphibious Ship)

SA-??/S-500
SA-??/Morphey
SS-31/RS-26
TOS BM2 with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. (Armata platform)
SS-32/RS-27?
2S?? 125mm Sprut SDM-1 with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons.(BMD-4M platform)
2S42 120mm Lotos (BMD-4M platform)
2S?? 240mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. Successor of the 2S4 at production level. (Armata platform)
2S?? 203mm for long range direct fire. Successor of the 2S7 at production level. (Armata platform)
2S?? 203mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. New. (Armata platform)
2S?? 152mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. New. (Armata platform)
2S?? 152mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. Successor of the 2S34 at production level. (Kurganets platform)
2S?? 152mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. New.(Kurganets platform)
2S?? 125mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. Successor of the BMP-3 100mm at production level. (Kurganets platform)
2S?? 152mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. Successor of the 2S23 at production level. (Bumerang platform)
2S?? 152mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. New. (Bumerang platform)
2S?? 125mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. New. (Bumerang platform)
T-14 152mm with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. (Armata platform)
BMPT Terminator 3 with some weapon that allows to the project to work also outside of the range of the portable/man-portable weapons of the adversary. (Armata platform)
BMO-2 (Armata platform APC)
T-16 (Armata platform engineering vehicles)

MiG-41/PAK-DP
Tu-PAK-DA

Mi-46 (in the An-24/26/30/32 size class with around 10 tons payload).
Il-214 40 or Tu-330 (transport in the Tu-204/214 size class with around 40 tons payload, with the 3 sizes philosophy).
Ka-102 (in the An-72/74 size class with around 15 tons payload).
PTS 80 or Il-106 (transport in the An-22 size class with around 80 tons payload, with the 3 sizes philosophy).
Il-214 20 (transport in the An-10/12 size class with around 20 tons payload, with the 3 sizes philosophy).
PTS 160 (transport in the An-124 size class with around 160 tons payload, with the 3 sizes philosophy).
Il-214 60 (transport in the Il-76/78 Be-A50 size class with around 60 tons payload, with the 3 sizes philosophy).

Current key projects where a timeline longer than 2025 for the delivery of the first unit would not be a problem from a military point (bolded the most interesting and innovative projects for the next generation):

Yak-135 as light supersonic trainer (plus FGA to export)
Il-PAK-TA as supersonic transport
Unmanned Long Range Shipborne Maritime Patrol VTOL aircraft/helicopter
Unmanned Combat Helicopter compatible with all the branches of the Russian Armed Forces

Il-90 or Frigate Ecojet (airliner in the Il-62 size class for double configuration: 1 mid passenger capacity + long range, 2 high passenger capacity + mid range).
Tu-304 or Comac C929 (airliner in the Il-86/80/96 size class for high passenger capacity + long range).
MS-21/Yak-242 (airliner in the Tu-204/214 size class for mid passenger capacity + mid range).

It is necessary to analyze if the rest of the new projects of heavy equipment known publicly, maybe only a distraction of efforts and funds.

In overall terms, in the following years, the total decommission (including of the reserve) of the relatively weakest, less standardized and/or less modern material, is likely to come (except in the case of the foreign material included in the point 3) by natural exhaustion after its use by the Russian armed forces, because of external demand or by transference to Russian non-military security forces in the case of the exceeding less modern infantry vehicles. With the likely apparition of Rocket Assisted Projectiles for 125mm (that should have longer range than the 120mm RAP) and longer range rockets of 220mm for the TOS-1, the (M)T-12 would be the alone remaining heavy equipment that must be always inside the range of portable/man-portable weapons of the adversary to do its work, and is likely to be used and totally disappear first.

Also, in the refered to the point 5, to note that I do not expect to see completed the order of Be-200 for the role of maritime patrol. While the selection of the Be-200 and Be-A-42 for the role of maritime patrol is right according to the old model of maritime patrol, a new more modern alternative is coming fast with the development of long range shipborne unmanned aircrafts (including VTOL aircraft/helicopters). The Be-200 has a future as civil aircraft, but for military use, a more modern alternative is too close to spend on new aircrafts of the old mold. The Russian Naval Aviation needs to share procurement standards with the Russian Aerospace Forces, like is said in the point 1, avoiding an image of less technologically advanced air force.

Filnally, there is a potential decission to be made. It is about the adoption of standard calibers for launched grenades (30mm, 45mm and 73mm, the last likely to disappear in the future). For it the 40mm and 43mm grenades can be moved to the standard 45mm caliber. It would be an improvement in standardization and also in the power of the projectiles. Note that the GP-25, GP-30 and GP-34 are not in the list of the point 5 because are a component, but if this decission is made, their production would be stopped too as 40mm grenade launchers.

The new State Armament Program 2018-2025 would give the chance to reach these improvements by 2025. The point 0 can be solved before.

In the case of the An-2, I never would say that an aircraft active after 66 years has been bad. It is more to say that the aircraft is out of its time, and is of lower technological level than the rest of the aircrafts in active service in the Russian air transport fleet.

Habitually the Russian Armed Forces are citicized by having old and outdated warfare and transport vehicles. I do not think it is right in overall terms, but examples like this, that are fairly old, help to the argument.

See folks, nothing to worry about! The new Russian military is a paper tiger.


http://www.jamestown.org/regions/russia/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45462&tx_ttnews[backPid]=48&cHash=0a57ed405b1f66a00dc7c043936a93f5#.V0a3EpErK1s

franco wrote:See folks, nothing to worry about! The new Russian military is a paper tiger.  


http://www.jamestown.org/regions/russia/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45462&tx_ttnews[backPid]=48&cHash=0a57ed405b1f66a00dc7c043936a93f5#.V0a3EpErK1s

How do you even find such websites?

Do you have to desperatley search for "russia is shit" in google or how do you come across such websites?

Werewolf wrote:

franco wrote:See folks, nothing to worry about! The new Russian military is a paper tiger.  


http://www.jamestown.org/regions/russia/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=45462&tx_ttnews[backPid]=48&cHash=0a57ed405b1f66a00dc7c043936a93f5#.V0a3EpErK1s

How do you even find such websites?

Do you have to desperatley search for "russia is shit" in google or how do you come across such websites?

What??? You don't like? What was it Sun Tzu said about enemies again?

For the record a link off a web site that some in the West perceive as an expert on the Russian Military

28th Motor Rifle Brigade starts transferring to Bryansk region from Yekaterinburg. Rumors have been that the 4 new divisions being formed are all being built around 4 regular brigades already in service.

- 28th Brigade in Bryansk and Smolensk regions to make some unnamed as of yet division.
- 9th Brigade in Voronezh and Belgorod regions to form either the 10th or 1st Division
- 136th Motor Rifle or 33rd Mountain brigade to Rostov region to form the 150th Division. If it is the 136th, the 33rd transfers to Buynaksk to replace it in Dagestan.
- 7th Tank brigade to form unnamed division in Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk regions. The 201st Military base in Tajikistan will be downsized to a Motor Rifle brigade so that would free up a Motor Rifle Regiment for this force.