Coast Defense troops have a very long history. Their task is obvious: to prevent the enemy fleet from reaching their shores, preventing the landing of enemy assault forces and the fire action of enemy ships on their ground targets.
Of course, until the second half of the 20th century, the concepts of “coastal defense” and “coastal artillery” were almost complete synonyms. Coastal batteries were installed primarily near their naval base, as well as on the most airborne hazardous areas of the coast. Since these batteries were almost always stationary, large-caliber guns could be installed on them, including towers removed from battleships and cruisers. Coastal guns, especially of large caliber, proved to be very effective against the ground forces of the enemy, if they approached the defended naval base. In particular, the joint operations of the coastal and naval artillery of the Baltic Fleet in 1941 prevented the Germans from capturing Leningrad (if it had fallen, most likely we would have lost the war), and in 1942 the coastal guns of the Black Sea Fleet forced them to pay a very high price for the capture of Sevastopol.
After World War II, coastal guns began to be gradually replaced by coastal anti-ship missiles (usually similar to those installed on warships). The advantages of coastal rocket batteries now over ships carrying the same anti-ship missiles are obvious: coastal installations are much cheaper than ships, smaller in size (therefore they are more maneuverable and can be masked), they are much more convenient to cover with air defense systems. The disadvantages, however, are also obvious: coastal batteries are tied to the shore, which automatically limits the radius of destruction of enemy ships by them. In addition, like air defense, coastal defense is always passive, that is, the initiative in the battle with it always belongs to the naval forces of the enemy. Because of these shortcomings, many countries of the world have abandoned coastal defense altogether, and for those who did not, it usually compensates for the weakness of the fleet.
The Soviet leadership highly appreciated the successes of coastal defense during World War II, and also understood very well that the Soviet Navy (especially the surface fleet) could not compete with the fleets of NATO countries on equal terms. Therefore, from the 50s of the twentieth century, the Soviet coastal defense, which was a kind of Navy troops, began to switch to rocket weapons.
In 1958, the coastal SCKK Sopka with the Komet Comet was adopted for service, and now it has long been decommissioned. In 1966, it was followed by a more advanced Redut missile launcher with supersonic (1.8M) P-35 anti-ship missiles (cruisers of pr. 58 and pr. 1134 were armed with similar missiles). The latest modifications of these missiles (3M44 "Progress") have a flight range of 460 km. The division of this SCRC included two missile batteries of 3-4 launchers in each. In 1978, the coastal PKRK Rubezh with the P-15 anti-ship missiles entered service. These missiles were armed with missile boats pr. 183 and pr. 205, which by that time in the Egyptian and Indian fleets had already achieved military success against the Israeli and Pakistani navy, respectively. P-15 had a range of 8 to 80 km. The Rubezh PKKK division included 4 launchers and ROMs — 2 launchers each.
An attempt to create an ocean-going navy in the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s led to a weakening of attention to coastal defense; after the collapse of the USSR, the situation, of course, worsened. “Redoubts” and “Boundaries” after “Sopka” are seriously outdated, so the country faced the prospect of being completely without coastal defense in the face of a sharp weakening of the Navy. Therefore, urgent measures were taken to change the situation. In 2008, the coastal ballistic missile system "Bal" was adopted for service with anti-ship missiles X-35. In the battalion of this SCRC, there are 4 launchers of 8 anti-ship missiles each, and the missile range reaches 260 km. In 2010, the coastal Bastion anti-ship missile system with the world's most advanced Onyx anti-ship missile system was put into service. It is supersonic (up to 2.6 M), flight range reaches 500 km. In the division - 4 launchers and 4 TZM - 2 anti-ship missiles each.
Today, coastal missile brigades of the Russian Navy have, as a rule, a standard composition: two Bastion divisions and one Balov division. So equipped with the 536th brigade of the Northern Fleet (deployed in the village of Guba Olenya, Murmansk Region), the 25th brigade of the Baltic Fleet (the village of Donskoye, Kaliningrad Region), the 11th brigade of the Black Sea Fleet (Utash village near the city of Anap, Krasnodar Territory), 520- I (the Englishwoman village near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky) and the 72nd (the Smolyaninovo village near Vladivostok) Pacific Fleet brigade. However, Vladivostok is hiding behind only one Bastion division, the other two divisions of the 72nd Brigade are transferred to the South Kuril Islands, disputed by Japan. The PKKK Bastion division is located on about. Iturup, division of PKK "Ball" - on about. Kunashir. The 11th Black Sea Fleet brigade is the only one in the Navy that has a battery of 6,130 mm coastal self-propelled guns “Bereg” in service. We have nowhere else onshore artillery and, apparently, will not.
In addition, the Novosibirsk Islands (administratively owned by Yakutia, which is part of the BBO responsibility zone, but, like other Arctic islands included in the North USC), there is a Bastion PKRK battery (2 launchers).
The Caspian flotilla has the 51st coastal missile battalion of the Bal SCRC stationed in Kaspiysk.
The Black Sea Fleet is now the only one of the domestic fleets whose coastal defense includes, apart from missile units, a motorized rifle brigade. This is the 126th coastal defense brigade deployed in the Crimean village of Perevalnoye. It is armed with 41 T-72B tanks, 40 BTR-80s, 1,122 mm D-30 howitzers and BM-21 Grad MLRS, 8 ZU-23–2 anti-aircraft guns. And the 15th brigade (deployed in Sevastopol) is the only one that included the Utes rocket launcher with the 3M44 Progress anti-ship missile, and these missiles are mine-based (which greatly improves their combat stability). In addition, the 15th Brigade has one division each of the Bal and Bastion PKRK.
Outside of Russia, China has the most powerful coastal defense, of course, and it is part of the PLA ground forces. It includes 10 brigades (301st - 304th in the Eastern Command, 311st and 312th in the South, 332nd - 335th - in the North).
The potential of the coastal defense of Syria is very significant. It consists of six divisions of the Sopka and Rubezh anti-ship missile systems, two Bastion anti-ship missile divisions, the S-802 Chinese anti-aircraft missile division (obtained from Iran), and also the SM-4–1 3.130 mm coastal guns. It should be noted that in a civil war, coastal defense is useless, and the threat of a full-scale strike from the sea by the US Navy and other NATO countries for Syria is removed after the deployment of the Russian military group in the country (April 2017-2018 “performances” with “Tomahawks” cannot be considered real blows )
The coastal defense of Vietnam has almost the same serious potential. It also has two divisions of the Bastion PKKK, several divisions of Sopka and Rubezha each, a significant number of artillery pieces.
As part of the coastal defense of the DPRK, there are HY-1, HY-2 (Chinese-made), "Sopka", and SM-4–1, M-1992, M-46, and ML-20 guns. Their number is unknown, but obviously very large. However, all this technique is seriously outdated.
In Cuba's coastal defense there are the same Rubezh anti-aircraft missile systems, including P-15 anti-ship missiles, removed from missile boats and mounted on the chassis of T-55 tanks, guns A-19, M-46, ML-20. Their number is also unknown and clearly much less than that of the DPRK.
The coastal defense of Japan has a very significant potential (it is not part of the Navy, as in most countries, but the ground forces, as in China), it is armed with at least 100 launchers of self-made anti-ship missiles Tour 88 and 6 launchers of the latest anti-ship missiles Tour 12.
In Iran, there is one brigade of Chinese coastal anti-aircraft missiles HY-2 and S-802, produced in this country under license.
In Yemen, there are two divisions of the Rubezh PKKK and 36 SM-4–1 guns (130 mm). Their legal capacity is currently in great doubt. At the same time, Hussite rebels, namely coastal anti-ship missiles, hit the high-speed catamaran HSV-2, which worked in the interests of the UAE. Apparently, they did this with the help of the Sino-Iran S-802.
The coastal defense of Egypt, as well as their other types and types of troops, is eclectic and armed with both Western (Italian SCRK Otomat) and Soviet (SCRK Rubezh, guns SM-4–1) systems.
The two countries have coastal defense based on the French Exoset SCRC. In Cyprus, there are 24 launchers of such missiles, and Qatar has 3 launchers.
In NATO, only three countries have coastal defense forces. The Spanish Armed Forces are unique in that they have only coastal artillery (1.155 mm SBT155 / 52APUSBTV07 guns) in the absence of anti-ship missiles. The Polish Navy recently adopted two batteries of the Norwegian anti-ship missile system NSM (12 launchers of 4 anti-ship missiles). Croatia is armed with three Swedish RBS-15K SCRK batteries and 21 artillery batteries.
On the same SCRK RBS-15 based coastal defense of two European neutrals. The Swedish Armed Forces themselves have 6 RBS-15KA launchers, as well as 90 RBS-17 launchers, which are an anti-ship variant of the American Hellfire anti-ship missile system (they can only effectively hit boats). The Finnish Armed Forces have 4 RBS-15K launchers, as well as significant coastal artillery - 30 K-53tk guns, 72 K-54RT (Soviet M-46), 1,130K90-60 (130 mm), 16 T-55 tank towers (100 mm ) (the latter may have been decommissioned).
Thus, both in quantitative and in qualitative parameters, the coastal defense of the Russian Navy is the strongest in the world. Which does not mean at all that its forces and means are sufficient to cover the gigantic length of the Russian coast. This is especially true of two ocean fleets - SF and Pacific Fleet.
In addition, the question arises - should we stop stamping numerous corvettes of several completely different projects at once (“Is the“ mosquito fleet ”relevant in the 21st century”, “NVO”, 06/28/2019)? And wouldn’t it be easier and cheaper to deploy additional forces of this coastal defense, as well as ground-based mobile launchers of cruise missiles instead? After all, there is no agreement on the INF Treaty now, and all these corvettes were just planned as carriers of the SLCM, when the agreement was still in place. Having abandoned them, it would be possible at the same time to stop being tormented by the issue of import substitution of diesel engines for all of our coastal "little things." But no, corvettes with very weak air defense and absolutely no means of anti-aircraft defense, of course, will be built. Just because the “process has begun” and the funds must be mastered.
Home
Latest images
Register
Log in
Isos
