Military Forum for Russian and Global Defence Issues
nastle77 wrote:Does anybody know how many S-300 launchers were operational at the end of the cold war in the late 80s ?
I have read number of 80 - 85 launchers but it did not list a source ( it was the "essential weapon identification guide" series)
Could the PVO have destroyed massed XB-70 attacks in the early 60s? KomissarBojanchev Mon Aug 07, 2017 11:40 am
At two secret meetings on 16 and 18 November 1959, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General Twining, recommended the Air Force's plan for the B-70 to reconnoiter and strike rail-mobile Soviet ICBMs, but the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General White, admitted the Soviets would "be able to hit the B-70 with rockets" and requested the B-70 be downgraded to "a bare minimum research and development program" at $200 million for fiscal year 1960. President Eisenhower responded that the reconnaissance and strike mission was "crazy" since the nuclear mission was to attack known production and military complexes, and emphasized that he saw no need for the B-70 since the ICBM is "a cheaper, more effective way of doing the same thing". Eisenhower also identified that the B-70 would not be in manufacturing until "eight to ten years from now" and "said he thought we were talking about bows and arrows at a time of gunpowder when we spoke of bombers in the missile age"
During the cold war, how did the soviets plan to use their various kind of SAMs? their tactics nastle77 Tue Aug 29, 2017 1:40 pm
nastle77 wrote:Can you recommend a good source in English language that goes over the organization and the deployment of the different surface-to-air missile systems of the Soviet era
During the latter half of cold war, the soviet airforces had the problems of
Fighters dependent of GCI
Fighters esp mig-21 and mig-29 short ranged
few AWACS
so did they develop any mobile GCI radars that could keep up with these fighters ? esp if they considered offensive operations and the frontal aviation fighters were supposed to keep pace with changing frontline ?
GarryB wrote:It is funny that so many in the west like to suggest GCI is bad, but it was good enough to defend Britain, and modern NATO forces use Air control intercept with a guy in an AWACS aircraft in the air instead of in a van on the ground.
Austin wrote:I see USN latest Haykye AWACS uses S band radar and they mention its Anti-Stealth properties.
So both L and S band are good for LO targets.
GarryB wrote:During the latter half of cold war, the soviet airforces had the problems of
Fighters dependent of GCI
Hahahahaha.... yeah... those poor fighter pilots having someone tell them where to fly to to intercept their targets efficiently and quickly so they don't even have to turn on their on radars and give away their presence.
PVO aircraft used GCI support to intercept threats.
Fighters esp mig-21 and mig-29 short ranged
They were short ranged fighters... they flew to an interception point and launched missiles and then returned to base.
They were not short ranged for their mission.
few AWACS
They had an extensive ground network of mobile radars including those attached to SAM batteries, and other sensors.
AWACS were just to fill the gaps.
so did they develop any mobile GCI radars that could keep up with these fighters ? esp if they considered offensive operations and the frontal aviation fighters were supposed to keep pace with changing frontline ?
They had a wide range of mobile radar sets including those associated with major SAM sites.
In empty siberia up to four MiG-31s could link radars to cover a front over 1,100km wide where targets could be detected... including very low flying threats.
Big_Gazza wrote:GarryB wrote:It is funny that so many in the west like to suggest GCI is bad, but it was good enough to defend Britain, and modern NATO forces use Air control intercept with a guy in an AWACS aircraft in the air instead of in a van on the ground.
HATOstani mockery of GCI is usually based on the 1982 air war in Lebanons Bekaa Valley where Western conventional wisdom is that GCI was the leading cause of the one-sided Turkey shoot. The reality is that Soviet export-grade MiG radars were compromised by turncoats within the Soviet MIC who sold out the specs allowing the Zionistanis to develop effective jammers. Syrian pilots found themselves blinded and their radar-guided AAMs wouldn't work.
but will this also be the case in offensive operations by VVS ? e.g in East germany 16th AA has great radar support but how will they provide radar GCI when they are operating over west germany ? did the GCI radars were road mobile and can move with the fighter bases ?
During the latter half of cold war, the soviet airforces had the problems of Big_Gazza Thu Jan 11, 2018 11:30 am
nastle77 wrote:Big_Gazza wrote:GarryB wrote:It is funny that so many in the west like to suggest GCI is bad, but it was good enough to defend Britain, and modern NATO forces use Air control intercept with a guy in an AWACS aircraft in the air instead of in a van on the ground.
HATOstani mockery of GCI is usually based on the 1982 air war in Lebanons Bekaa Valley where Western conventional wisdom is that GCI was the leading cause of the one-sided Turkey shoot. The reality is that Soviet export-grade MiG radars were compromised by turncoats within the Soviet MIC who sold out the specs allowing the Zionistanis to develop effective jammers. Syrian pilots found themselves blinded and their radar-guided AAMs wouldn't work.
was this situation corrected by 1989 ? were the soviet radars in a better shape by then ?
In 1989 the Antiaircraft Rocket Troops manned 12,000 strategic surface-to-air missile launchers at 1,400 sites inside the Soviet Union. These forces were organized into brigades of launch battalions. Soviet SA-3 and SA-5 antiaircraft missiles, first produced in the 1960s, together with older SA-1 and SA-2 missiles, constituted over 90 percent of the Soviet surface-to-air missile inventory. In the late 1980s, the new SA-10 was entering service to replace SA-1 and SA-2 missiles.
By the mid-1990s the missile forces were equipped with approximately 2,500 launchers deployed in about 250 different sites around the country. Air defense forces have particular responsibility for defending administrative and industrial centers; for instance, they surround Moscow with about 100 missile launchers. The missile troops were equipped with about 150 SA-2 Guideline, 100 SA-3 Goa, 500 SA-5 Gammon, and 1,750 SA-10 Grumble missile launchers. A program to replace all of the older systems with the SA-10, well under way by 1996, has been considered by experts to be one of the most successful reequipment programs of the post-Soviet armed forces.
nastle77 wrote:During the cold war, how did the soviets plan to use their various kind of SAMs? their tactics
Is there any article /book in english that covers this ?
e.g were SA-4 only at a divisional level
SA-6 and SA-8 at battalion level accompanying mobile units
SA-9 and SA-7 with mechanized infantry
and the SA-5 /SA-10 defended strategic sites only like rocket and airbases etc
any info is appreciated
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