Iskander-M/K (SS-26 Stone):

The weird thing is that the P-500 and P-1000 are naval missiles and the Granat they are talking about is the 2,500km range cruise missile the Klub system is based on.

I remember reading an article about the Iskander about various planned upgrades including one to take its range well beyond the 500km allowed by the INF treaty.

I rather suspect that if the US persists in its ABM in Europe that the INF treaty will go and we will see 2,000km range Iskander missiles and 2,500km range cruise missiles deployed by Russia.

GarryB wrote:The weird thing is that the P-500 and P-1000 are naval missiles and the Granat they are talking about is the 2,500km range cruise missile the Klub system is based on.

I remember reading an article about the Iskander about various planned upgrades including one to take its range well beyond the 500km allowed by the INF treaty.

I rather suspect that if the US persists in its ABM in Europe that the INF treaty will go and we will see 2,000km range Iskander missiles and 2,500km range cruise missiles deployed by Russia.

That's right . Just second guessing here , but I think the wiki source was referring to the R 500 misile ( and not the P 500).The R 500 was previously used only with tactical ballistic missiles. It is designed to operate at ranges of up to 280 km, flying a radar-evading trajectory, and has a reported CEP of 3 meters. But then the R 500 was already successfully test fired in 2008 itself and displayed in MAKS 2011. It was derived from the 3M 10 long range cruise missile of the USSR (The Chinese DH 10 is also said to be copied from the 3M 10 as well).

I think P-500 is a land-based cruise missile possibly armed with a nuclear warhead like RK-55 Granat

S-10 Granat was a version of RK-55 launched from submarines, like today Klub missiles

The ground-launched variant was subject to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in December 1987 and had been tested but not deployed by that time.

I think this missile is an answer to US ABM and its deployment will be clearly a strategic political decision.

What do u think?

George1 wrote:I think this missile is an answer to US ABM and its deployment will be clearly a strategic political decision.

What do u think?

Which missile P500 or R 500 ? Sorry for sounding dense.

R 500

George1 wrote:R 500

The US ABM program is already in jeopardy . Czech Republic is not going to allow it's soil to be used for the ABM systems. None of the countries in Europe are interested in a Missile Crisis engulfing Europe.

Technically , you may say Russia's reprisal options are not restricted to the Iskander K / R 500 . Topol M still remains the post potent reply .

Even if the United States expands the system, say, by increasing the number of interceptors, it would not be able to
neutralize the retaliatory capability of the Russian military force .Overall, the European system in the configuration that is proposed by the United States today cannot present a significant direct threat to the Russian strategic force. The location of the radar in the Czech Republic ( if at all it comes about) would not allow the US to detect missiles launched from any of the Russian test sites used for launches of sea or land-based ballistic missiles. The curvature of the Earth prevents this. Thus the radar cannot be used to gather intelligence on Russian missiles. Technically it is possible to equip interceptors with nuclear warheads. Yet it is pointless from military and political points of view.

One of the most difficult thing to do is to intercept a cruise missile . That's why the R 500 is important . Since it is derived from a long range cruise missile it is reasonable to expect that it will have a range of 2500 kms .

Poland and Romania will allow SM-3 development in their soil

George1 wrote:Poland and Romania will allow SM-3 development in their soil

There was a hue and cry here in South Asia and South East Asia in 2010 after China announced that it has developed a "carrier killer" IRBM . Please note that it is relatively easier to intercept an IRBM than a cruise missile because Cruise missile flight paths make detection a particularly challenging undertaking. Studies conducted in the US to figure out whether the SM 3 is capable of destroying the warhead in an IRBM found out that the SM 3 has a 20% rate of success ( as opposed to the 84% advertised by Pentagon). All the tests of the SM 3 and similar missile system that has been done so far clearly states that SM 3 makes contact with incoming threats with regular frequency, however it only struck the warhead directly in tests twice out of ten tries. That means the warhead could still be loose in the atmosphere, free to fall wherever gravity takes it. In other words it merely nudges a missile on most occasions. So if an IRBM is targeted to hit WestMinister a SM 3 hit will only ensure that the warhead missies WestMinister and hits Trafalgar Square instead .

Satellite assets have difficulty detecting cruise missiles through dense cloud cover.Unlike ballistic missiles, which break through the highest bands of clouds, the low-flying nature of cruise missiles enables them to use the cloud deck as cover from space-based detection

Next is the crucial issue of cost exchange advantage. That is to say that the SM 3 must always be cheaper than whatever the R 500 could do at the margin, so that the attacker could not possibly scale his way out of the challenge posed to the attacker by the defender. SM-3 Block IIAs have an estimated unit procurement cost of about $20 million to $24 million . The R 500 comes at approx 1/4th that price. Now you do the math .

In short , therefore , Poland , Romania will run out of SM 3 before Russia runs out of R 500s.

The R 500 was previously used only with tactical ballistic missiles.

Well... actually I think Mig had an R-500 at one stage that was a long range SAM, but lets go with the norm for Russian tactical missiles which is R-xx.

It was derived from the 3M 10 long range cruise missile of the USSR (The Chinese DH 10 is also said to be copied from the 3M 10 as well).

It must have a much larger warhead, or it really takes the scenic route to the target area...

I think P-500 is a land-based cruise missile possibly armed with a nuclear warhead like RK-55 Granat

S-10 Granat was a version of RK-55 launched from submarines, like today Klub missiles

I agree with everything you say, but if the missile cannot be allowed to fly 2,500km because of the INF treaty why make the missile the same size as the original weapon?

Wouldn't it make sense to make it 1/6th the size so you could load 6-10 per launcher?

Or is it part of the plan... every Iskander battery will have these vehicles present and if they retain the original missile shape they retain the original missiles range potential so when Russia decides to withdraw from the INF treaty they can simply unlock the max range on the missiles and have a ready made inservice 2,500km reach weapons.

The problem is that a 2,500km range missile flying at subsonic speeds takes hours to get to its targets so really they wont be an anti ABM system they will likely be used to attack Europe instead of nuclear armed ballistic missiles. Starting off with a couple of high altitude explosions using TOPOLs to make radar and radio useless the cruise missiles will go in and take out all the targets the BMs were supposed to hit.

The US ABM program is already in jeopardy .

The Americans have said it is going ahead no matter what. To stop it now would be a sign of weakness for them and I think they would rather waste money on a huge white elephant than admit they were wrong... because that would make them appear weak.

The Czechs might be seeing reason but I am sure there are plenty of other Eastern Europe that still fear Russia and will want a nuclear missile shield just to get US troops on their soil and make them feel like they have a good firm grip on the hem of the NATO dress they are hiding behind when they shout insults to Russia.

Worst case the British are happy to cooperate and the Baltic states already have radar arrays pointing at Russia to defend their "airspace".

Even if the United States expands the system, say, by increasing the number of interceptors, it would not be able to
neutralize the retaliatory capability of the Russian military force

But the danger is not that they can neutralise the Russian retaliation capability, they danger is that they might think they can even when they can't. Look at how the US treats its former opponents that it does not control but does not have a powerful nuclear arsenal to protect itself with... namely Cuba, Iran, North Korea.

Equally the initial system will not be perfect, but the further upgrades add multiple engagement capability and improved interceptors... and simply replacing the hit to kill interceptor missiles with nuclear warheads suddenly makes them able to hit a group of warheads with one warhead.

Also as the new Start treaty takes effect the actual numbers of missiles is shrinking dramatically too so the number of actual targets that need to be dealt with gets smaller and easier too.

With an ABM system mounted on all their AEGIS class ships (and they have more than just a few of those), which can be positioned either side of the US and in the arctic ocean plus the interceptors in Alaska and with Britain talking of an ABM shield with the US and south korea and Japan doing the same they start to add up.

Overall, the European system in the configuration that is proposed by the United States today cannot present a significant direct threat to the Russian strategic force.

There is no system today. The system they project by 2020 is supposed to be able to deal with any BM threat... their terminology...

SM-3 Block IIAs have an estimated unit procurement cost of about $20 million to $24 million . The R 500 comes at approx 1/4th that price. Now you do the math .

Except that you are ignoring the greater cost of an ABM system making a war more likely because the operators of the ABM system think they are much safer than they actually are, so when both systems start to be used the cost is in lives and property damage which will be far beyond the cost of any missiles.

The US was wrong about Iraqi WMDs but the people who died don't get their lives back no matter what you do.

It was very much like you pressed down on the accelerator pedal when parking your car instead of the brake pedal and drove your car through the front wall of a bank. Now you help yourself to some money and then get out as fast as you can hoping no body will say anything.

GarryB wrote:Worst case the British are happy to cooperate and the Baltic states already have radar arrays pointing at Russia to defend their "airspace".

Exactly seventy years ago the Japanese overran Britain’s ‘Impregnable Fortress’ of Singapore, unleashing forces that dramatically changed the map of Asia.

We're the Battling Bastards of Bataan,
No Mama, No Papa, No Uncle Sam,
No aunts, no uncles, no cousins, no nieces,
No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces,
And nobody gives a damn!

That World War II limerick about the plight of American soldiers trapped in Bataan in the Philippines would have been a fitting epitaph about Britishcapitulation in Singapore.In 1941 Britain found itself facing the nightmare scenario of having to fight a war on three fronts – Western Europe, the Mediterranean and the Far East. Net result: with its resources stretched, it abandoned its Anglo cousins in the Pacific....... you get the drift ?

Today, the Americans say the Asia-Pacific is their priority; tomorrow who knows.

I get your drift... I am pretty sure that any ABM system the US builds anywhere will have very little to do with the countries they are built on.

They are all about encircling Russia.

The missiles they were originally going to be put in Poland... GBIs or something were 5,000km range missiles designed to hit ballistic missiles in the middle or near the start of their flight and would have been useless against a missile directed at Poland from Iran.

Their only sensible purpose would be against Iranian missiles on their way to the east coast of the US over europe or Russian missiles on high ballistic paths to the UK and France.

With the INF treaty the Russians have to use ICBMs to engage even quite close targets that are outside the 500km range limit of INF... so a target 600km distant must be engaged with a TOPOL... how wasteful is that?

Of course the same restriction applies to the US but not to her NATO allies, but US missiles in the Baltic states can reach most of the targets they would want to reach in western Russia within the 500km range limitation...

The irony is that a 500km range missile for Russia is a tactical weapon, but for the US it is a strategic weapon.

I think I read an article on the internet that said that someone in Russia gave information about the Iskander to the US. is this correct?

There's this:

http://www.armybase.us/2009/10/russia-jails-serb-for-u-s-military-spying/

Forum rules require your first post to be an introduction in the members introductions and rules section.

Too late for you now, but please post an introduction thread ASAP.

You managed to create this thread so you already know what to do, but feel free to ask if you are not sure... while in the members rules and introductions section you might want to read through the introduction threads of other members so you know who you are talking to and also have a quick read of the rules threads.

Regarding the topic, AFAIK there was a recent prosecution of a guy that reportedly sold Bulava information, but I have not read of leaks regarding Iskander.

It has now been reported ( during Eurosatory ) that Barak-8 LR-SAM or even the Barak-2 MR-SAM can intercept the Iskander E coz the iskander-E’s terminal homing phase does have evasive manoeuvring capabilities, however, these are all pre-programmed, and are not REACTIVE in real-time to any BMD network.Consequently, the Iskander-E’s terminal flight-path too is vulnerable to interception .

Sujoy wrote:It has now been reported ( during Eurosatory ) that Barak-8 LR-SAM or even the Barak-2 MR-SAM can intercept the Iskander E coz the iskander-E’s terminal homing phase does have evasive manoeuvring capabilities, however, these are all pre-programmed, and are not REACTIVE in real-time to any BMD network. Consequently, the Iskander-E’s terminal flight-path too is vulnerable to interception .

Please can point out who has uttered this ....claim (possibly with the source of the news) ?

Even more interesting would be know how much and what kind of tests (even only against antediluvian theatre ballistic missiles with performances several dozen of times inferior to the export version of Isdkander -Iskander-E-) Barak-8 LR has completed to even only get an elementary basis to open the mouth on this subject .

Last time i've checked, IAI was all rejoicings and chest thumps in 2011 after the first successful interception by part of ...Arrow II (a purposely designed ABM defence system with capabilities several order of magnitude greater than Barak-8 against similar targets) of a target simulating a ballistic missile immeasurably less capable than the export version of Iskander.


I am very, very curious

Those Israeli claims are suspect to say the least, given that Iskander's flight characteristics are very secret stuff.

Mindstorm wrote:

Please can point out who has uttered this ....claim (possibly with the source of the news) ?

Yes Sir . I was at Eurosatory this month and was interacting not only with the Indian contingent but also with participants from other nations . My question to the Israeli delegation was not as to whether the Barak 8 is effective against the Iskander , but whether India will be able to intercept TBMs & IRBMs like the Ghaznavi , Shaheen 2 and DF 21 . To this their reply was that the Barak-8 LR-SAM, will be optimised for use against NLOS-BSMs like the Abdali, P-20/Nasr, Iskander-E & B-611M, & BP-12A. That said , I still recon that the terminal homing phase of any modern day TBM missile , including the Iskander does not have evasive manoeuvring capabilities, because these are all pre-programmed, and are not REACTIVE in real-time . That's not to say that these missiles ( as I have argued earlier in this thread) are ineffective against ABM systems , but just that the claims of evasive manoeuvring capabilities need to be judged in context.

Mindstorm wrote:
Even more interesting would be know how much and what kind of tests (even only against antediluvian theatre ballistic missiles with performances several dozen of times inferior to the export version of Isdkander -Iskander-E-) Barak-8 LR has completed to even only get an elementary basis to open the mouth on this subject .

The Barak-8 LR-SAM hasn’t even entered that phase as yet. AFAIK - the Barak-2 MR-SAM has been test-fired only against ‘electronic’ targets, and not actual physical targets . I did ask one of the BRAHMOS official present there whether the Barak 2 will be able to intercept a BRAHMOS supersonic cruise missile . Without divulging details they stated that that Barak 2 to the best of their knowledge has never been tested against a sea skimming supersonic cruise missile like the BRAHMOS. This begs the question why is India then purchasing / developing the Barak . But then that is another story .

Mindstorm wrote:
I am very, very curious

If you have read my earlier comments in this thread you probably would have realized that I am not a big fan of ABM systems.

TR1 wrote:Those Israeli claims are suspect to say the least, given that Iskander's flight characteristics are very secret stuff.

Very true . Just as no one can be forced into belief, so no one can be forced into unbelief . Only wanted to hear their side of the story

That said , I still recon that the terminal homing phase of any modern day TBM missile , including the Iskander does not have evasive manoeuvring capabilities, because these are all pre-programmed, and are not REACTIVE in real-time .

An object travelling at mach 7 is a tricky target even when no manouvering. The range of the Iskander is limited by export treaties and it has the capacity to reach considerably longer ranges if desired in the domestic model. The extra range capacity in the export model is not available to export customers but that extra volume can be utilised in other ways... like a noise jammer or disposable decoys. I have read comments about A-100s being able to redirect Iskanders in flight to new targets, which makes me think that perhaps reactive manouvering is not impossible. A random manouver dance in to the target would be as problematic to defeat as reactive manouvering because the interception point is several kilometers in front of the missile so a small turn at the last second and all of a sudden the interceptor missile has to detect that turn, continue to track the target to determine a new interception point and then turn and get to that interception point in time to be there when the target is there... a very difficult task even at the best of times let alone when there are several Iskanders in flight... even a failed attack would reveal a lot about the local IAD.

That said , I still recon that the terminal homing phase of any modern day TBM missile , including the Iskander does not have evasive manoeuvring capabilities, because these are all pre-programmed, and are not REACTIVE in real-time .

Please Sujoy say to me that the man uttering this clamorous INTERPLANETARY IDIOCY was not part of the company's technical delegation, but was simply a low level marketing employer (anyhow a very unprofessional one); otherwise it would become very quickly the most leg pulled technician at world ,among the in-field operatives.

1) Is this world is the intercepting element in similar engagement at react to the trajectory's variations proposed by the offensive element and ,therefore, only the element's aerodynamic/structural limits, G-pull thresholds and -for the offensive one- the cycles of the pseudo-random speed's variations will have a role in deciding the chances of successuful interception ;the inverse process is simply a ridiculous....non-sense (the intercepting element simply follow its proportional closed-loop homing and missile-target correlation guidance).

2) The problem linked to the possible interception of Iskander-type ballistic missiles is under scrutiny and without a solution ,at today, by part of Institutions of the field with tradition and rooted scientific know-how dozen of times greater than those involved in the Barak-8-LR project (which will surely be a good SAM system ,but that even only consider an anti-ballistic capable missile represent a immense warping of its capabilities) .
At now ,in the West the most promising route for attempt ,in future, to intercept a similar ballistic missile is in work in Europe with a purposely modified Aster-30 missile (and i image you know the huge difference in manoeuvring ,aerodynamic stress limit and ....costs between a Barak-8-LR and an Aster-30).
Well, also for THIS SAM the plan is, in future, to attempt an interception in the small time window between ballistic missile re-allignment and start of the manoeuvring phase.

This is an extract from France Senate interrogation on ballistic missile defence subject and the joint MBDA, SAFRAN et THALES project:

M. Antoine Bouvier -MBDA President- : En outre, l'exoatmosphérique ne traite pas l'intégralité de la menace, loin s'en faut. La faisabilité technique des systèmes d'interception à altitude moyenne/haut endoatmosphérique n'est plus remise en cause. Ces systèmes permettent de couvrir la gamme de menaces balistiques de nouvelle génération, non interceptables par les systèmes exoatmosphériques. Il s'agit par exemple des missiles russes de type SS 26 Iskander ou chinois M9. Cette menace n'est couverte ni par la nouvelle génération de missiles Patriot, ni par le missile SM-3, ni même par les systèmes THAAD (Theater High Altitude Area Defense).
Il existe donc dans les systèmes américains ce qu'on pourrait appeler des « trous dans la raquette » qui sont autant d'opportunités pour l'Europe de contribuer en nature ses propres systèmes.......
La première étape serait de disposer dès 2015 d'une première capacité de théâtre autonome pour les menaces de portée inférieure à 600 km. Pour cela, il audrait finaliser la capacité anti-balistique du SAMP/T ce qui nécessite l'acquisition de deux radars GS1000, acquisition qui n'est pas prévue avant 2022.

...............

Les Russes ont développé le SS-26 Iskander, les Chinois le M9, les Syriens le M600 et les Iraniens le Fateh 110. Ces missiles ne font pas appel à des technologies nouvelles. Nous les avions déjà utilisées pour le missile « préstratégique » Hades.
Ces missiles présentent une particularité. Ils volent dans l'atmosphère, en dessous de 60 à 70 kilomètres, et lorsqu'ils rentrent dans les couches denses de l'atmosphère, à 25 ou 30 kilomètres, ils acquièrent une capacité manoeuvrante qui les rend quasiment impossibles à intercepter.
L'interception de ces missiles doit donc se faire entre 25/30 et 60/70 kilomètres. Comme je l'indiquais, aucun des programmes américains ne répond à cette exigence. D'après nos analyses, le THAAD ne descend pas en dessous de 50 kilomètres. Le Patriot ne monte pas au dessus de 20 à 25 kilomètres. Quant au SM-3, il évolue dans l'espace exoatmosphérique.

Naturally all of that happen on planet Earth , now we must only discover from what planet come from the guy who have talked with you at Eurosatory......

Mindstorm wrote:

That said , I still recon that the terminal homing phase of any modern day TBM missile , including the Iskander does not have evasive manoeuvring capabilities, because these are all pre-programmed, and are not REACTIVE in real-time .

Please Sujoy say to me that the man uttering this clamorous INTERPLANETARY IDIOCY was not part of the company's technical delegation, but was simply a low level marketing employer (anyhow a very unprofessional one); otherwise it would become very quickly the most leg pulled technician at world ,among the in-field operatives.

1) Is this world is the intercepting element in similar engagement at react to the trajectory's variations proposed by the offensive element and ,therefore, only the element's aerodynamic/structural limits, G-pull thresholds and -for the offensive one- the cycles of the pseudo-random speed's variations will have a role in deciding the chances of successuful interception ;the inverse process is simply a ridiculous....non-sense (the intercepting element simply follow its proportional closed-loop homing and missile-target correlation guidance).

2) The problem linked to the possible interception of Iskander-type ballistic missiles is under scrutiny and without a solution ,at today, by part of Institutions of the field with tradition and rooted scientific know-how dozen of times greater than those involved in the Barak-8-LR project (which will surely be a good SAM system ,but that even only consider an anti-ballistic capable missile represent a immense warping of its capabilities) .
At now ,in the West the most promising route for attempt ,in future, to intercept a similar ballistic missile is in work in Europe with a purposely modified Aster-30 missile (and i image you know the huge difference in manoeuvring ,aerodynamic stress limit and ....costs between a Barak-8-LR and an Aster-30).
Well, also for THIS SAM the plan is, in future, to attempt an interception in the small time window between ballistic missile re-allignment and start of the manoeuvring phase.

This is an extract from France Senate interrogation on ballistic missile defence subject and the joint MBDA, SAFRAN et THALES project:

M. Antoine Bouvier -MBDA President- : En outre, l'exoatmosphérique ne traite pas l'intégralité de la menace, loin s'en faut. La faisabilité technique des systèmes d'interception à altitude moyenne/haut endoatmosphérique n'est plus remise en cause. Ces systèmes permettent de couvrir la gamme de menaces balistiques de nouvelle génération, non interceptables par les systèmes exoatmosphériques. Il s'agit par exemple des missiles russes de type SS 26 Iskander ou chinois M9. Cette menace n'est couverte ni par la nouvelle génération de missiles Patriot, ni par le missile SM-3, ni même par les systèmes THAAD (Theater High Altitude Area Defense).
Il existe donc dans les systèmes américains ce qu'on pourrait appeler des « trous dans la raquette » qui sont autant d'opportunités pour l'Europe de contribuer en nature ses propres systèmes.......
La première étape serait de disposer dès 2015 d'une première capacité de théâtre autonome pour les menaces de portée inférieure à 600 km. Pour cela, il audrait finaliser la capacité anti-balistique du SAMP/T ce qui nécessite l'acquisition de deux radars GS1000, acquisition qui n'est pas prévue avant 2022.

...............

Les Russes ont développé le SS-26 Iskander, les Chinois le M9, les Syriens le M600 et les Iraniens le Fateh 110. Ces missiles ne font pas appel à des technologies nouvelles. Nous les avions déjà utilisées pour le missile « préstratégique » Hades.
Ces missiles présentent une particularité. Ils volent dans l'atmosphère, en dessous de 60 à 70 kilomètres, et lorsqu'ils rentrent dans les couches denses de l'atmosphère, à 25 ou 30 kilomètres, ils acquièrent une capacité manoeuvrante qui les rend quasiment impossibles à intercepter.
L'interception de ces missiles doit donc se faire entre 25/30 et 60/70 kilomètres. Comme je l'indiquais, aucun des programmes américains ne répond à cette exigence. D'après nos analyses, le THAAD ne descend pas en dessous de 50 kilomètres. Le Patriot ne monte pas au dessus de 20 à 25 kilomètres. Quant au SM-3, il évolue dans l'espace exoatmosphérique.

Naturally all of that happen on planet Earth , now we must only discover from what planet come from the guy who have talked with you at Eurosatory......

Never cross my mind about that sort of problems. Interesting.

Tnx mindstorm for info and if you have some more, please post it.

Mindstorm wrote:

Please Sujoy say to me that the man uttering this clamorous INTERPLANETARY IDIOCY was not part of the company's technical delegation, but was simply a low level marketing employer (anyhow a very unprofessional one); otherwise it would become very quickly the most leg pulled technician at world ,among the in-field operatives.

Checked his business card again , it says Managing Director .

Mindstorm wrote:
1) Is this world is the intercepting element in similar engagement at react to the trajectory's variations proposed by the offensive element and ,therefore, only the element's aerodynamic/structural limits, G-pull thresholds and -for the offensive one- the cycles of the pseudo-random speed's variations will have a role in deciding the chances of successuful interception ;the inverse process is simply a ridiculous....non-sense (the intercepting element simply follow its proportional closed-loop homing and missile-target correlation guidance).

2) The problem linked to the possible interception of Iskander-type ballistic missiles is under scrutiny and without a solution ,at today, by part of Institutions of the field with tradition and rooted scientific know-how dozen of times greater than those involved in the Barak-8-LR project (which will surely be a good SAM system ,but that even only consider an anti-ballistic capable missile represent a immense warping of its capabilities) .
At now ,in the West the most promising route for attempt ,in future, to intercept a similar ballistic missile is in work in Europe with a purposely modified Aster-30 missile (and i image you know the huge difference in manoeuvring ,aerodynamic stress limit and ....costs between a Barak-8-LR and an Aster-30).
Well, also for THIS SAM the plan is, in future, to attempt an interception in the small time window between ballistic missile re-allignment and start of the manoeuvring phase.

When it comes to NLOS-BSMs like the Iskander-E, BP-12A or B-611M, what matters more is not the hittile-probably of the interceptor missile’s kill vehicle, but the ability to track such NLOS-BSMs since they will be adopting a depressed flight trajectory for low-observability. On the other hand, being single-stage missiles, they will have highly restricted manoeuvrability due to their depressed flight trajectories—something that can be taken advantage of by hypervelocity interceptor SAMs PROVIDED accurate real-time targetting cues are available from radars like the EL/M-2084 MMR.

Mindstorm wrote:
This is an extract from France Senate interrogation on ballistic missile defence subject and the joint MBDA, SAFRAN et THALES project:

M. Antoine Bouvier -MBDA President- : En outre, l'exoatmosphérique ne traite pas l'intégralité de la menace, loin s'en faut. La faisabilité technique des systèmes d'interception à altitude moyenne/haut endoatmosphérique n'est plus remise en cause. Ces systèmes permettent de couvrir la gamme de menaces balistiques de nouvelle génération, non interceptables par les systèmes exoatmosphériques. Il s'agit par exemple des missiles russes de type SS 26 Iskander ou chinois M9. Cette menace n'est couverte ni par la nouvelle génération de missiles Patriot, ni par le missile SM-3, ni même par les systèmes THAAD (Theater High Altitude Area Defense).
Il existe donc dans les systèmes américains ce qu'on pourrait appeler des « trous dans la raquette » qui sont autant d'opportunités pour l'Europe de contribuer en nature ses propres systèmes.......
La première étape serait de disposer dès 2015 d'une première capacité de théâtre autonome pour les menaces de portée inférieure à 600 km. Pour cela, il audrait finaliser la capacité anti-balistique du SAMP/T ce qui nécessite l'acquisition de deux radars GS1000, acquisition qui n'est pas prévue avant 2022.

...............

Les Russes ont développé le SS-26 Iskander, les Chinois le M9, les Syriens le M600 et les Iraniens le Fateh 110. Ces missiles ne font pas appel à des technologies nouvelles. Nous les avions déjà utilisées pour le missile « préstratégique » Hades.
Ces missiles présentent une particularité. Ils volent dans l'atmosphère, en dessous de 60 à 70 kilomètres, et lorsqu'ils rentrent dans les couches denses de l'atmosphère, à 25 ou 30 kilomètres, ils acquièrent une capacité manoeuvrante qui les rend quasiment impossibles à intercepter.
L'interception de ces missiles doit donc se faire entre 25/30 et 60/70 kilomètres. Comme je l'indiquais, aucun des programmes américains ne répond à cette exigence. D'après nos analyses, le THAAD ne descend pas en dessous de 50 kilomètres. Le Patriot ne monte pas au dessus de 20 à 25 kilomètres. Quant au SM-3, il évolue dans l'espace exoatmosphérique.

SAMs like THAAD, Arrow-2/3, S-300V or even Patriot PAC-3 were never originally optimised for intercepting NLOS-BSMs, but are instead to be used against solid-/liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles (both single-stage & two-stage) that fly a pure ballistic flight-path & NOT a depressed trajectory flight-path. It remains to be seen how effective the kill vehicles of Barak-8 LR-SAM & the MEADS will be & what will be the degree of sophistication of their sensor-fusion technologies.

Checked his business card again , it says Managing Director .

Ok, at least the good repute and honour of Israeli scientific institutions of the sector are safe.

When it comes to NLOS-BSMs like the Iskander-E, BP-12A or B-611M, what matters more is not the hittile-probably of the interceptor missile’s kill vehicle, but the ability to track such NLOS-BSMs

That, Sujoy is simply and plainly not true.

Detection and Tracking of a similar ballistic missile is the last problem afflicting an Air Defence structure tasked to neutralize a similar menace ; what matter ,instead, literally several hundreds of times more is the average closing speed involved at the computed interception point (and also ,of course, the cycle and intensity of the velocity variations of the re-entry element),the G-limits of both offensive and intercepting elements (...i image that you are perfectly aware that intercepting element must pull multiple times the G pull of the manoeuvring re-entry vehicle in order to have a chance to intercept it) and the responsiveness of aerodynamic surfaces/actuators to trajectory's variations to reduce in-flight times of redirection to a new interception point.
Even very small variations in those factors generate vastly disproportionate effects in the related interception sequence and final Pk of the SAM interceptors .The failure to comply with requirements of even only one of those variables and your chances of a successful interception become instantly near to zero , you could at this point put in the air the interceptor missiles of three four AD regiments without get one chance on thousands to intercept one incoming missile !!!

Is just for those reasons that Iskander is stimed ,at today, completely not-interceptable during its manoeuvring re-entry phase and its also the reason for which the menace of its deployment in Kalingrad against the NATO ABM elements in East Europe ,by part of Russian authorities ,is used as an "exchange coin" in the diplomatic negotiation.

It is not a casualness that ALL PROJECTS in work today around the world and aimed at realize ,in future, an interceptor capable to neutralize Iskander-type BM ,foresee its interception in the small time window of its re-allignment phase ,before the beginning of its manoeuvring phase ,where it is regarded as effectively invulnerable .
That, of course, has literally NOTHING TO DO with detection/tracking of the missile. (and , for clarity, what i have cited in the prevoius post rofere to a future project aimed at interception of Iskander-class BM involving the, by far ,most sophisticated, advanced and capable western-made SAM system now present on the international scene).

they will have highly restricted manoeuvrability due to their depressed flight trajectories

If this Managing Director was in an external stand ,please suggest to it to procure, for the next time, a good hat or an internal stand....to much sun can be very dangerous for some people.

Let me guess, this authentic genius has suggested to employ Barak-8-LR.....Barak-8-LR !!! (yes exactly the same SAM that is designed to intercept aircraft, cruise missiles, UAV, helicopters etc.)....to intercept at long range and 45-50 km of altitude a random-speed variating Mach-7 class target ; a task today outside the capabilities of purposely designed anti-ballistic missiles such as PAC-3 ,THAAD and SM-3 [/b] and planned in future -2020-2022- for a purposely modified Aster-30 ?

Simply priceless

This guy is the true "Col. Fornof" of the air defense sector .

Medvedev to Discuss Iskander Missile Production Modernization

Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev will hold a meeting in Kolomna in the Moscow Region on Monday to discuss modernizing production facilities for Iskander tactical missile launchers, the government’s press office reported on Sunday.

The meeting will be held on the premises of the Kolomna Machine-Building Design Bureau and will also be attended by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, heads of core ministries and departments and defense enterprises.

Russia is currently building and modernizing the production capacities of 17 core enterprises for the serial production and deliveries of Iskander-M tactical missile launchers. Total investments from the federal budget and the enterprises’ own funds are estimated at 40 billion rubles ($1.25 billion).

The Iskander-M system (NATO reporting name SS-26 Stone) is a mobile theater missile system equipped with two solid-propellant single-stage 9M723K1 guided missiles with "quasi-ballistic" capability.

The missiles have a range of 400 km (250 miles) and can reportedly carry conventional and nuclear warheads.

Moscow reiterated in late April it may deploy Iskander theater ballistic missiles in the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad that will be capable of effectively engaging elements of the U.S. missile defense system in Poland.

The missile defense system in Poland does not jeopardize Russia’s nuclear forces, Army General Nikolai Makarov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, previously said.

“However, if it is modernized…it could affect our nuclear capability and in that case a political decision may be made to deploy Iskander systems in the Kaliningrad region,” he said.

“But that will be a political decision,” he stressed. “So far there is no such need.”

NATO members agreed to create a missile shield over Europe to protect it against ballistic missiles launched by so-called rogue states, for example Iran and North Korea, at a summit in Lisbon, Portugal, in 2010.

Russia has strongly criticized NATO’s reluctance to provide written, legally binding guarantees that its European missile shield will not be directed against Moscow.

Russia’s ground forces to get Iskander-M systems

The Iskander-M tactical missile system that surpasses similar foreign weapons should become the basis of Russia’s ground forces, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said at a conference dedicated to the modernization of the defence industry facilities in the city of Kolomna near Moscow.

The Iskander system was displayed for the first time at the MAKS Aerospace Show in 1999. It is designed to launch strikes on missile systems and aircraft at air bases and commanding and communication centres.

To launch the serial production of the Iskander-M, 17 relevant factories are now being reconstructed. The overall investment in the project is estimated at 40 billion rubles or about 1.2 billion U.S. dollars.

http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_07_23/Russia-s-ground-forces-to-get-Iskander-M-systems/