US ABM Systems

THAAD-ER

http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?137702-THAAD-Extended-Range&p=2288497#post2288497

Kinda cool actually. Odd though they reduced the number of missiles per system though.  As well, wasnt thaad kinda lackluster in performance?

Anyway, gives Russia some insight of potential issues they will need to overcome.

Austin wrote:THAAD-ER

http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?137702-THAAD-Extended-Range&p=2288497#post2288497

Austin, you've been a member long enough to know not to link to other forums, you could've easily just copied the image links and posted them here...but it seems that simple task was too difficult.

Are S-500 and THAAD-ER comparable ? US wants THAAD-ER to intercept hypersonic cruise missiles.

JohninMK wrote:[i]The Pentagon's $40 billion missile defense system, designed to shield the US from incoming ballistic missiles attacks, could not be made workable, Theodore Postol, professor emeritus of Science, Technology and National Security at MIT told RT.

I've shared it already (in above post). Moreover, US gmd is a failure everyone knows which they meant to use against ICBM's. Their SM-3 block IIA and THAAD is for BM's including PAC-3 .

Isos wrote:

Interesting to see that the US are still using inclined lunchers and not VLS like S-400/500. Are they stupid or is there a strategy behind this idea ??

Vhile generally more advanced, VLS technology has some disadvantages compared to inclined launchers:

1. Inclined launchers don't require a "cold-lauch" technology - therefore they are cheaper, technologically easier to produce and/or maintain.
2. Missiles don't require addinitonal perpendicular boosters to direct the missile towards the target immediately after the launch before main missile motor starts.

Vhile generally more advanced, VLS technology has some disadvantages compared to inclined launchers:

1. Inclined launchers don't require a "cold-lauch" technology - therefore they are cheaper, technologically easier to produce and/or maintain.
2. Missiles don't require addinitonal perpendicular boosters to direct the missile towards the target immediately after the launch before main missile motor starts.

Vertical launchers don't require cold launch either.

Angled launchers are limited as to the direction they can engage aircraft... they must be facing the direction of the threat... which is a problem when the direction of the threat is unknown or variable.

A vertically launched Kalibr cruise missile does not use side thrusters to orient the missile immediately after launch.

Most long range missiles with two stages and therefore a solid rocket booster generally don't do very much manouvering immediately after launch... they tend to go up and slowly roll into the direction they are being launched.

For a very long range SAM a steep climb is actually rather beneficial in terms of kinetic range performance... if the target appears within about 5km it would already be within the minimum effective range of most large SAM systems anyway.

Judging by presentation shots, THAAD ER is to have x3 the range of baseline THAAD. Which should be about 600 km give or take.

SERIOUS FLAWS REVEALED IN U.S. ANTI-MISSILE NUCLEAR DEFENSE AGAINST NORTH KOREA

Two serious technical flaws have been identified in the ground-launched anti-missile interceptors that the United States would rely on to defend against a nuclear attack by North Korea.

Pentagon officials were informed of the problems as recently as last summer but decided to postpone corrective action. They told federal auditors that acting immediately to fix the defects would interfere with the production of new interceptors and slow a planned expansion of the nation's homeland missile defense system, according to a new report by the Government Accountability Office.

As a result, all 33 interceptors now deployed at Vandenberg Air Force Base in Santa Barbara County and Ft. Greely, Alaska, have one of the defects. Ten of those interceptors — plus eight being prepared for delivery this year — have both.

Summing up the effect on missile-defense readiness, the GAO report said that "the fielded interceptors are susceptible to experiencing … failure modes," resulting in "an interceptor fleet that may not work as intended."

The flaws could disrupt sensitive on-board systems that are supposed to steer the interceptors into enemy missiles in space.

The GAO report, an annual assessment of missile defense programs prepared for congressional committees, describes the problems in terse, technical terms. Defense specialists interviewed by The Times provided more detail.

The interceptors form the heart of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, GMD for short. Four of the massive, three-stage rockets are stationed at Vandenberg and 29 at Ft. Greely.

They would rise out of underground silos in response to an attack. Atop each interceptor is a 5-foot-long "kill vehicle," designed to separate from its boost rocket in space, fly independently at a speed of 4 miles per second and crash into an enemy warhead — a feat that has been likened to hitting one bullet with another.

The GMD system was deployed in 2004 as part of the nation's response to Sept. 11, 2001, and a heightened fear of attack by terrorist groups or rogue states. It has cost taxpayers more than $40 billion so far and has been plagued by technical deficiencies.

One of the newly disclosed shortcomings centers on wiring harnesses embedded within the kill vehicles' dense labyrinth of electronics.

A supplier used an unsuitable soldering material to assemble harnesses in at least 10 interceptors deployed in 2009 and 2010 and still part of the fleet.

The same material was used in the eight interceptors that will be placed in silos this year, according to GAO analyst Cristina Chaplain, lead author of the report.

The soldering material is vulnerable to corrosion in the interceptors' underground silos, some of which have had damp conditions and mold. Corrosion "could have far-reaching effects" because the "defective wiring harnesses" supply power and data to the kill vehicle's on-board guidance system, said the GAO report, which is dated May 6.

When Boeing Co., prime contractor for the GMD system, informed government officials of the problem last summer, they did not insist upon repair or replacement of the defective harnesses, according to the report.

Instead, Missile Defense Agency officials "assessed the likelihood for the component's degradation in the operational environment as low and decided to accept the component as is," the report said.

The decision minimized delays in producing new interceptors, "but increased the risk for future reliability failures," the report said.

Chaplain told The Times that based on her staff's discussions with the Missile Defense Agency, officials there have "no timeline" for repairing the wiring harnesses.

The agency encountered a similar problem with wiring harnesses years earlier, and the supplier was instructed not to use the deficient soldering material. But "the corrective actions were not passed along to other suppliers," according to the GAO report.

L. David Montague, co-chairman of a National Academy of Sciences panel that reviewed operations of the Missile Defense Agency, said officials should promptly set a schedule for fixing the harnesses.

"The older they are with that kind of a flawed soldering, the more likely they are to fail," Montague, a former president of missile systems for Lockheed Corp., said in an interview.

The second newly disclosed defect involves a component called a divert thruster, a small motor intended to help maneuver the kill vehicles in flight. Each kill vehicle has four of them.

The GAO report refers to "performance issues" with the thrusters. It offers few details, and GAO auditors declined to elaborate, citing a fear of revealing classified information. They did say that the problem is different from an earlier concern that the thruster's heavy vibrations could throw off the kill vehicle's guidance system.

The report and interviews with defense specialists make clear that problems with the divert thruster have bedeviled the interceptor fleet for years. To address deficiencies in the original version, Pentagon contractors created a redesigned "alternate divert thruster."

The government planned to install the new version in many of the currently deployed interceptors over the next few years and to retrofit newly manufactured interceptors, according to the GAO report and interviews with its authors.

That plan was scrapped after the alternate thruster, in November 2013, failed a crucial ground test to determine whether it could withstand the stresses of flight, the report said. To stay on track for expanding the fleet, senior Pentagon officials decided to keep building interceptors with the original, deficient thruster.

The GAO report faulted the Missile Defense Agency, an arm of the Pentagon, for "omitting steps in the design process" of the alternate thruster in the rush to deploy more interceptors. The skipped steps would have involved a lengthier, more rigorous vetting of the new design, defense specialists said. The report said the omission contributed to the 2013 test failure.

All 33 interceptors now deployed have the original, defective thruster. The eight interceptors to be added to the fleet this year will contain the same component, GAO officials told The Times.

The missile agency currently "does not plan to fix" those thrusters, despite their "known performance issues," said the GAO report.

Contractors are continuing to work on the alternate thruster, hoping to correct whatever caused the ground-test failure. The first test flight using the alternate thruster is scheduled for late this year.

The GAO had recommended that the Pentagon postpone integrating the eight new interceptors into the fleet until after that test. Defense Department officials rebuffed the recommendation, the report said.

In a response included in the report, Assistant Secretary of Defense Katharina G. McFarland wrote that delaying deployment of the new interceptors "would unacceptably increase the risk" that the Pentagon would fall short of its goal of expanding the GMD system from 33 interceptors to 44 by the end of 2017.

Asked for comment on the report, a spokesman for the Missile Defense Agency, Richard Lehner, said in a statement that officials "have in place a comprehensive, disciplined program to improve and enhance" the GMD system "regarding the issues noted by the GAO."

"We will continue to work closely with our industry partners to ensure quality standards are not only met, but exceeded," the statement said.Boeing declined to comment.

The GMD system is designed to repel a "limited" missile attack by a non-superpower adversary, such as North Korea. The nation's defense against a massive nuclear assault by Russia or China still relies on "mutually assured destruction," the Cold War notion that neither country would strike first for fear of a devastating counterattack.

GMD's roots go back to the Clinton administration, when concern began to mount over the international spread of missile technology and nuclear development programs. In 2002, President Bush ordered "an initial set of missile defense capabilities" to be put in place within two years to protect the U.S.

To accelerate deployment, then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld exempted the missile agency from the Pentagon's standard procurement rules and testing standards.

Engineers trace the system's difficulties to the breakneck pace at which components were produced and fielded. In precisely scripted flight tests above the Pacific, interceptors have failed to hit mock-enemy warheads about half the time.

As a result, the missile agency projects that four or five interceptors would have to be fired at any single enemy warhead, according to current and former government officials. Under this scenario, a volley of 10 enemy missiles could exhaust the entire U.S. inventory of interceptors.

The Obama administration, after resisting calls for a larger system, pledged two years ago to increase the number of interceptors to 44. Both Republicans and Democrats in Congress have pushed for further expansion. The House this month passed a bill authorizing $30 million to plan and design a site for interceptors on the East Coast. The White House called the move "premature."

Guess US is also working on GAN semiconductor for their THAAD-ER radars. ( Quoting someone from another forum)



RAYTHEON AWARDED $29.3 MILLION PHASE 3 CONTRACT FOR WIDE BANDGAP SEMICONDUCTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Raytheon Company has been awarded a $23.9 million phase 3 contract from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to continue work on the agency's Wide Bandgap Semiconductor (WBGS) Development program.

Raytheon is demonstrating that transmit-receive modules using GaN-powered monolithic microwave integrated circuit amplifiers have a significant performance advantage in that they provide significantly higher radio frequency power with greater efficiency than current modules. GaN technology significantly extends the warfighter's reach into the battlespace by increasing radar ranges, sensitivity and search capabilities. Alternatively, the technology enables reduction in the size of the antenna, which improves transportability and reduces acquisition and lifecycle costs without sacrificing performance.


This 38-month phase of the program is a collaboration between DARPA and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Its objective is to rapidly mature and demonstrate the capabilities of gallium nitride (GaN) to improve the performance of missile defense radars. To accelerate the technology development, it will combine the results of Raytheon's DARPA-funded WBGS Phase 2 and the MDA-funded Next Generation Transmit Receive Integrated Microwave Module programs.

"Our research continues to demonstrate that GaN technology will improve the capability and performance of current and future military systems," said Michael Del Checcolo, vice president of Engineering for Raytheon Integrated Systems. "Under the WBGS program, we have the opportunity to combine research findings from multiple organizations, allowing us to develop and provide the most advanced technologies to help keep our warfighters and homeland safe."

US Army Uses Northrop Grumman-Built System to Destroy Multiple Targets in Air and Missile Defense Test




The IBCS utilized sensors and interceptors from different air defense systems connected at the component level to operate on the IBCS integrated fire control network. Using tracking data from Sentinel and Patriot radars, the IBCS provided the command-and-control (C2) for a Patriot Advanced Capability Three (PAC-3) interceptor to destroy a ballistic missile target and a PAC-2 interceptor to destroy a cruise missile target.

IBCS replaces seven legacy C2 systems to deliver a single integrated air picture and offer the flexibility to deploy smaller force packages. By networking sensors and interceptors, IBCS provides wider area surveillance and broader protection areas. With its truly open systems architecture, IBCS enables integration of current and future sensors and weapon systems and interoperability with joint C2 and the ballistic missile defense system.

US Missile Defense Agency Fails to Meet 2015 Testing Goals



To execute all of its delayed and planned flight tests, the MDA must increase its pace by conducting more tests, delaying tests, or removing tests, the GAO stated.

"GAO found that while the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) successfully conducted key flight and ground tests for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in fiscal year 2015, it did not achieve its testing goals," the report stated on Thursday. "MDA conducted 11 out of 20 flight tests."

The GAO warned that the failure to carry out the full testing program increased the risk for future testing delays.

"From fiscal year 2010 to 2015, MDA delayed or removed about 40 percent of its planned flight tests… The constant change to BMDS testing makes it difficult to trace progress and costs," the report noted.

The $161 billion missile system designed to protect the US from Iran and North Korea is falling behind schedule

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency has had to scrap 40 percent of the tests for a multibillion-dollar program that is supposed to protect the country from long-range ballistic missile threats like North Korea and Iran, according to a new federal watchdog report.

The Government Accountability Office’s latest annual audit of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) found that risky purchasing practices, including simultaneous development and production of new anti-ballistic missiles (a.k.a. interceptors), and the use of unproven targets mean the MDA might have trouble meeting the Obama Administration’s goal of fielding the system by 2018.

Furthermore, the “constant change to BMDS testing makes it difficult to trace progress and costs,” according to GAO.

The system, composed of a variety of sea- and ground-based interceptors and an accompanying command-and control system, has cost taxpayers $123 billion to develop since 2002. The Defense Department estimates it will spend an additional $38 billion on BMDS through 2021, for a total of $161 billion.

However, between fiscal years 2010 and 2015, the missile agency had to scuttle 40 percent of the system’s test. Unforeseen circumstances, like bad weather or test equipment malfunctions, were to blame in some instances, but others arose from high-risk acquisition strategies, that see the development and production of interceptors simultaneously and a test schedule "which leaves little to no margin to address problems that past experience has shown are likely to occur,” the audit stated.

Meanwhile, technical, funding and testing woes have forced MDA to delay 12 of the 27 capabilities planned for delivery between 2016 and 2020; some of the capabilities have been pushed back a few months or years while others have been delayed indefinitely, according to the GAO report.

“The constant change to BMDS testing diminishes the traceability of progress and costs. The repeated flight test delays, renaming and combining tests, and removing tests, while necessary to some degree, make it difficult to determine what objectives have been met, when, and with what test,” the audit found.

MDA “is also challenged to provide the actual costs associated with testing,” the GAO added.

Since the BMDS is made up of so many platforms, it’s difficult to tell how much the umbrella effort has been or could be delayed. For instance, GAO noted, MDA delivered missile defense capabilities, as planned and other systems years ahead of schedule.

MDA "added a new capability, expected for December 2017, designed to enable radar on the ground to track various space objects," the report stated. "It also added two capabilities, expected in December 2020, to assess intercepts from space and improve discrimination."

Still, the pressures on the agency’s buying plan and testing regime “could be compounded going forward as MDA plans to increase the pace and complexity of flight testing,” the report warns,

“To execute all of its tests through 2018”and meet the deadline for the Obama administration plan for missile defense, dubbed the European Phased Adaptive Approach, “MDA must increase its pace by conducting more tests than it has averaged in the past or make prioritization decisions and delay or remove tests,” according to GAO.

A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan

A National Defense Strategy Based on Provably False Assumptions


Both are related ( 2nd pdf link explaining in detail.)

http://defense-update.com/20151122_ekv-mokv.html

Rmf wrote:http://defense-update.com/20151122_ekv-mokv.html

Using MKV in space is useless - you will have to have hordes of target discrimination radars from different sites operating simultaneously with a hell-knows-what effectiveness. Because in space you cant reliably determine if this is a light well made decoy or a real warhead. Meanwhile a clouds of passive jamming units are said to be a kilometres long. This is why all major BMD-system always have a pretty tough "low-tier" intercepting units, like Gazelle - cause atmosphere is their ally. And if you read MDA papers on their success - they don't even plan to intercept a tough ICBM with a extensive countermeasures system - cause all main BMD component needed to overcome it are either dead or just a shadow of their former self.

In reality modern MDA-approach suffers from many factors, and even polygon launches are not that successful. Yeah, TGA-issue, glancing blow issue. Massive launch haven't even been tested.

never the less it increases abm effectiveness....
i guess thats why russia is working on hypersonic scramjet warhead that works in 50-70 km range... in that area conventional SAM does not work and kinetic interceptors dont work either due to wind and small atmosphere.and lets not forget added benefit of indenpendently targeted warheads who can cover wide areas...

rail ICBM is good idea, weight of ICBM missiles is 50 tonns and that weight in cargo is best hauled by rail , its nothing for a locomotive and can go around very fast for long time.
road trucks are not very mobile with combined weights of 70 tonns or more (missile+ truck), on road they can go 50 km/h fast but are detectable ,offroad less but then they are much slower.

How it increases effectiveness ? Do you know why it was cancelled in first place ? Due to budget restrctions yes but A “bandolier” of eight to 20 miniature interceptors that would destroy missiles and decoys in space concept was made but the technical challenge of creating and launching tiny “kill vehicles” that could find and destroy far heavier warheads in space proved insurmountable. Among many other obstacles, existing ground-based rockets would have had to be retrofitted or replaced. The concept never reached the stage where a test flight could be conducted.

and till date Raytheon said has only completed the first program planning review with the U.S. Missile Defense Agency on the future Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) concept. It seems after 2009 cancellation MDA revived it again under the name Multiple-Object Kill Vehicle Program and awarded contracts to design concepts for the new kill vehicle in 2015 which LM and Raytheon won and they're supposed to come up with a prototype for testing by 2020.

I think it would be smart for US to actually work on what they have first before trying to venture into something that not only will probably not work well, but probably not at all. Currently, their ABM system is abysmal with a spotty chance of shooting down a Scud-B for christ sakes. Scud B. A missile with the most basic trajectory.

sepheronx wrote:I think it would be smart for US to actually work on what they have first before trying to venture into something that not only will probably not work well, but probably not at all.  Currently, their ABM system is abysmal with a spotty chance of shooting down a Scud-B for christ sakes.  Scud B.  A missile with the most basic trajectory.

Na I won't say that. Their Integrated missile defense system can easily shoot down Scuds if fired on usa territory. Even saudi managaed to intercept scuds using PAC-3 during yemen conflict , not all of them but then there is a difference between export models and an integrated multilayer missile defense system.

Get Ready, Russia and Iran: America Wants to Kill Nuclear Missiles in Space