Future russian aircraft carriers. #3

PTURBG wrote:Why is it worth arguing about aircraft carrier design when there will absolutely be no free drydocks for them in the next 15 years? By that time ACs will be completely obsolete because of ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

Why is it worth arguing about aircraft carrier design when there will absolutely be no free drydocks for them in the next 15 years? By that time ACs will be completely obsolete because of ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

Why catapults? what would it change?

Because Brits tried to ridicule Kuz. If Americans would to the same why he couldn't say exactly about Ford class?

And the answer is also the same, we use Tanks to hold ground, so we use Carriers to hold the Sea.

GarryB wrote:

And the answer is also the same, we use Tanks to hold ground, so we use Carriers to hold the Sea.

Agree, but would say Carriers protect the ships and the Ships hold the sea...

Why catapults? what would it change?

Cats allow heavier more effective aircraft to operate... specifically AWACS platforms...

Because Brits tried to ridicule Kuz. If Americans would to the same  why he couldn't say  exactly about Ford class?

Russia would have little use for a Ford Class carrier...

SeigSoloyvov wrote:

GunshipDemocracy wrote:

Vladimir79 wrote:We need a carrier with catapults and AWACs, the size of it should not be less than 50k tons.

Why catapults? what would it change?

Better take off ability and heavier load.

GunshipDemocracy wrote:

why would you need that if you have (V)STOL fighters and skijump?

AlfaT8 wrote:I get where this line of thought is coming from, it's the same with Tanks and man-portable ATGMs.
And the answer is also the same, we use Tanks to hold ground, so we use Carriers to hold the Sea.

Vladimir79 wrote:We don't have VSTOL fighters and you can't launch an AWACs without it. As mentioned the payload and range are shortened without the higher take-off speed the catapults provide. When you have to choose between a full tank of fuel or stripping payload, ski jumps are not the answer.

Vladimir79 wrote:We need a carrier with catapults and AWACs, the size of it should not be less than 50k tons.

GunshipDemocracy wrote:You both are wrong. Carriers are part of sea control strategy. Subs, missiles and long range aviation of sea denial. Soviet Union and Russia is playing Sea Denial strategy as is effective yet much more cost effective.

GunshipDemocracy wrote:True but this was actually response that QE2 sucks Twisted Evil Twisted Evil Twisted Evil implying US CVNs dont

VSTOL AWACS

A request for information has been made external link by the US Marine Corps for an unmanned system capable of acting in the airborne early warning (AEW), electronic warfare (EW), and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) role. The request has been made on behalf of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Expeditionary (MUX) project—a USMC effort seeking a “ship-based, extended range, long endurance, and multi-mission UAS” that “shall complement the long range capabilities of the F-35B/C, CH-53K, MV-22 and Future Vertical Lift (FVL).” It must be able to “start up, take off from L-Class (Amphibious Class Ships (LHA/LHD, LPD, LX(R), and ESB) ship” while having the same dimensions close to UH-1Y. It should cruise at “200-300 kts with full payload” out to a combat radius between 350-700 nm. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is hoped for 2028

Vladimir79 wrote:We need a carrier with catapults and AWACs, the size of it should not be less than 50k tons.

Tend to agree. But I would consider capacity the key parameter and not displacement (for instance newest deign from Krylov has same capabilities than K with 30% less weight). This last proposal would be for me an acceptable bare minimum for RuN going serious about carriers, probably nuclear propulsion would be relevant too.

Vladimir79 wrote:We don't have VSTOL fighters and you can't launch an AWACs without it. As mentioned the payload and range are shortened without the higher take-off speed the catapults provide. When you have to choose between a full tank of fuel or stripping payload, ski jumps are not the answer.

GunshipDemocracy wrote:You both are wrong. Carriers are part of sea control strategy.  Subs, missiles and long range aviation of sea denial.  Soviet Union and Russia is playing Sea Denial strategy as is effective yet much more cost effective.

Then STOVL and LHAs/TAKR or whatever would carry them are also wasting money. Tools of "neo-colonialism" all the same.

GunshipDemocracy wrote:True but this was actually response that QE2 sucks  Twisted Evil  Twisted Evil  Twisted Evil  implying  US  CVNs dont

That is because QE sucks and USN CVNs don't...

GunshipDemocracy wrote: OK I deserved a cookie now

@LMFS - well if Krylov stuff can sail and is nuclear why not? but in Arctic unlikely you can park fighters on deck.

again wrong.  With limited budget TAKR or modular CVN is best you can get with comparable firepower to classical CVNs.

mind to elaborate why QE2 sucks and US dont?

LMFS wrote:

GunshipDemocracy wrote: OK I deserved a cookie now

Ok cookie for you, but this no new invention sorry.

@LMFS - well if Krylov stuff can sail and is nuclear why not? but in Arctic unlikely you can park fighters on deck.

Wait, hangars can be bigger as expected too, due to new design hull is substantially wider at the stern that conventional designs.

again wrong.  With limited budget TAKR or modular CVN is best you can get with comparable firepower to classical CVNs.

TAKR is just the Soviet definition for a carrier with pimped-up defensive means and formally intended not to contravene Montreux Convention's terms, where carriers are not listed as capital ships allowed to cross the straits. But they are carriers, live with it.

I'm left wondering what a modular CVN is... you should patent the term, it sounds fantastic

And then, every attempt to match US/NATO on the high seas is (according to you) doomed to fail, why trying to match firepower of classical CVNs??? Make up your mind man!

USN CSGs are the reference in protection and firepower among all navies, even when the last advances in missile technology have left them exposed in some aspects, I think we can agree on that can't we?

GunshipDemocracy wrote:I didnt see any "significantly wider" stern. But it would be most reliable source  if we  hear it from Krylov about place in hangars.

LMFS wrote:

GunshipDemocracy wrote:I didnt see any "significantly wider" stern. But it would be most reliable source  if we  hear it from Krylov about place in hangars.

Here:

GunshipDemocracy wrote:

LMFS wrote:And then, every attempt to match US/NATO on the high seas is (according to you) doomed to fail, why trying to match firepower of classical CVNs??? Make up your mind man!

You dotn match US on high seas by means of midway battles.Do you want to change Russian doctrine by yourself?  WOW!    
Huskies, Tu-22M3s  or Poseidons or Yasens are for this job.

GarryB wrote:

And the answer is also the same, we use Tanks to hold ground, so we use Carriers to hold the Sea.

Agree, but would say Carriers protect the ships and the Ships hold the sea...

LMFS wrote:

GunshipDemocracy wrote:I didnt see any "significantly wider" stern. But it would be most reliable source  if we  hear it from Krylov about place in hangars.

Here:

AlfaT8 wrote:Correct, the Carriers allow the ships to hold Sea.

eehnie wrote: The Russian Maritime Doctrine of 2015 has been exposed here multiple times, with clear references to aircraft carriers. And you know it.

GunshipDemocracy wrote:

AlfaT8 wrote:Correct, the Carriers allow the ships to hold Sea.

so why Russia neither Soviet Union ever built any? Only USA has 11. And budget $760bln yr.  NATO almost $1000bln /yr. Russia  $46bln yr (with PPP blow $100).

AlfaT8 wrote:Because the only seas they actually held were those near their airbases.

SeigSoloyvov wrote: Different Doctrines at the time the USSR wanted pure carriers just way too late they realized they needed some. USSR would not have made 11 carriers but it would have built 4-6 Six at most.

GunshipDemocracy wrote:

AlfaT8 wrote:Because the only seas they actually held were those near their airbases.

and with 20x 11x smaller budget how do you want to do this  ?      
BTW Size of Russia, availability of long range aviation with precision weapons render actually South America? Nigeria/ Namibia or south of India Ocean hard to reach only.

Economy says: 10 Yasens or Huskies or  1 CSG. (₽33 bln  per 885M = $500mln ;  ₽164 bln / 5 series ) .

SeigSoloyvov wrote:

kumbor wrote:

LMFS wrote:

GunshipDemocracy wrote:I didnt see any "significantly wider" stern. But it would be most reliable source  if we  hear it from Krylov about place in hangars.

Here:

Stern section is rather broad, with significant overhang over stern perpendicular.

This a model the actually ship IF they build it would look different do no quote the model has fact on what the ship will look like.

GunshipDemocracy wrote:

eehnie wrote: The Russian Maritime Doctrine of 2015 has been exposed here multiple times, with clear references to aircraft carriers. And you know it.

and precisely what did you understand form this doctrine? was there about 11 CSGs? or size min 90 fighters? dont be shy, Id love to know.

Russian Federation Marine Doctrine

Vladimir Putin held a meeting to discuss the new draft of Russia’s Marine Doctrine.

July 26, 2015 16:00Baltiisk
Vladimir Putin held a meeting to discuss the new draft of Russia’s Marine Doctrine.
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Vladimir Putin held a meeting to discuss the new draft of Russia’s Marine Doctrine.
The meeting took place on board the frigate Admiral of the Soviet Navy Gorshkov. Participants included Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, Commander of the Navy Viktor Chirkov, and Commander of the Western Military District Anatoly Sidorov.

* * *

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Colleagues, good afternoon.

We have been updating the Russian Federation’s Marine Doctrine. This very complex document’s main aim is to provide our country with an integral, consistent and effective naval policy that will protect Russia’s interests.

The Doctrine has been drafted and approved. This is a big event for our future navy, and for developing our shipbuilding industry, because the main customer – the navy in this case, and the Defence Ministry – formulate their future needs, and the industry must carry out these tasks. Industry adapts to new tasks depending on the needs formulated.

Let me note that for the first time, the Doctrine also includes provisions of a purely social nature. They cover marine medicine, and provisions for improving the health of sailors and the specialists working in the marine field. This is very important. People need to know that from now on, our strategic documents for developing our country’s fleet and navy will address the social aspect too, and will give people what they expect from their service, as they carry out the tasks that face our country today in this very complex and important area.

Let’s now discuss in more detail the Doctrine’s key provisions. Mr Rogozin, you have the floor.

Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin: Thank you.

Mr President,

This new draft of the Russian Federation Marine Doctrine is a fundamental document of key importance, setting out our country’s naval policy. In other words, it is one of our country’s strategic planning documents.

The Russian Government’s Marine Board undertook the document’s drafting, with the navy playing the leading role in this work. In all, 15 federal executive agencies and organisations took part in drafting the new Doctrine.

We proposed making changes to the Marine Doctrine adopted back in 2001 for the period through to 2020 for two reasons: above all, the changing international situation; and, of course, strengthening Russia’s position as a sea power.

The Marine Doctrine covers four functional areas and six regional areas. The four functional areas are naval activity, marine transport, marine science, and mineral resources development. The six regional areas are the Atlantic, Arctic, Pacific, Caspian, and Indian Ocean, and we have added Antarctica, as a fair number of events involving Antarctica have taken place of late and this region is of considerable interest to Russia.

The main focus is on two areas: the Arctic and the Atlantic. The reasons for this are the following. We emphasise the Atlantic because NATO has been developing actively of late and coming closer to our borders, and Russia is of course responding to these developments.

The second reason is that Crimea and Sevastopol have been reunited with Russia and we need to take measures for their rapid integration into the national economy. Of course, we are also restoring Russia’s naval presence in the Mediterranean.

As for the Arctic, several events motivate our decision. One is the growing importance of the North Sea Route. Mr President, I reported to you that we have begun work on building a new fleet of atomic-powered icebreakers. Three new atomic icebreakers will be ready for work accompanying ships along the northern route in 2017, 2019, and 2020. Furthermore, the Arctic also assures us free and unhindered access to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Then there are the riches of the continental shelf, the development of which calls for an attentive approach.

The Marine Doctrine pays particular attention to environmental issues too, because it is important for us not only to develop these riches, but also to preserve them for future generations.

The Marine Doctrine contains a new section on shipbuilding. This is to a large extent linked to the fact that over these last 10–15 years, we have developed a shipbuilding industry that in terms of naval shipbuilding is doing work on a scale comparable to what was happening during the Soviet period. As for civilian and commercial shipbuilding, we are taking measures to encourage the establishment of private shipbuilding companies, which have demonstrated successful results.

State management of marine activities is an important part of the Marine Doctrine. This section stresses the role of the Government’s Marine Board and clarifies the powers of the other state agencies. Essentially, once you approved the Marine Doctrine, we will be able to start drafting the whole list of planning documents for our country’s marine activities in the short, medium and long term.

That concludes my report.

Russia's new maritime doctrine

Russian president Vladimir Putin announcing the country's new maritime doctrine as he attended a navy parade in Baltiisk, western Russia, on 26 July during celebrations for Russia's Navy Day. Source: PA Photos
Russian president Vladimir Putin used the occasion of the Navy Day festivities on 26 July to announce the approval of a new 'Maritime Doctrine-2015' for the Russian Federation. Nikolai Novichkov assesses the key changes.

The last time Russia issued a maritime doctrine - which codifies the country's naval priorities, strategy, and procurement - was in 2001, so a new document was thus overdue. According to Russian deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin there were two main reasons behind changes the 2015 doctrine brings into play: the changed international situation and improvements to Russia's navy since the last doctrine.

Regional focus

Maritime Doctrine-2015 divides Russian naval policy between six regions: Atlantic, Arctic, Antarctic, Caspian, Indian Ocean, and Pacific. Within each region the doctrine assesses four naval functions: operations, transport, marine science, and the development of natural resources. The focus of the doctrine is on two of these regions: the Arctic and the Atlantic.

The national maritime policy in the regions is to be enforced by the navy's strategic and operational units of the Northern, Pacific, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets and the Caspian flotilla.

Rogozin notes the Atlantic has been emphasised because of NATO expansion, the need to integrate Crimea and the Sevastopol naval base into the Russian economy, and to re-establish a permanent Russian Navy presence in the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, the Arctic focus is down to the growth of the Northern Sea Route, the need for free entry into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the wealth of the continental shelf.

To implement the doctrine's provisions related to the Atlantic and Arctic regions, the structure and performance of the Baltic, Black Sea and Northern fleets will be improved. Enhancements to the combat capabilities of the fleets are also planned. For example, the Black Sea Fleet's infrastructure in Crimea and Novorossiysk will be bolstered.

Shipbuilding strategy

The 2015 doctrine adds a new section to the mix: shipbuilding. This, the doctrine states, is due to the re-emergence of the Russian shipbuilding sector over the past 10-15 years.

Admiral Victor Chirkov, commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy states that the navy's priority is to develop and deploy advanced equipment to enable Russia to make up for lost ground (against rivals) and to become superior to them in certain areas. In addition to refitting the fleets, the navy is looking to build up stocks of weaponry and materiel; improve naval command and control (C2); integrate joint force C2 into the various theatres; and improve the navy's basing and support systems.

Among these, priority will be given to supporting Russia's ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) within the Northern and Pacific fleets.

Additionally, the doctrine seeks to create a general-purpose marine force armed with long-range and high-precision strike systems capable of providing a non-nuclear deterrent.

The navy's future surface fleet is to be divided between long-range multirole vessels and short-range vessels with modular capabilities. Looking ahead, the service intends to field a multi-service naval strike force capable of quick relocation to threatened areas.

The doctrine also foresees the introduction of new and innovative technologies such as: artificial intelligence systems, unmanned aerial, surface and underwater vehicles (UAVs, USVs, UUVs), non-lethal weapon systems, and new weapon types such as directed-energy weapons.

Russia will now look to create a single, integrated, and jam-proof fleet-wide C2 system for use at all levels from the strategic to the tactical. This is intended to be adaptable and to form a single information control complex to enable network-centric command of diverse naval and joint-service assets in any theatre of operations.

In connection with the maritime doctrine, and amendments in some aspects of force development, the Russian Navy is expected to gain some additional resources because the creation of a well-balanced and equipped naval force is a long-term effort of 30-40 years. Considering this and the duration of ship design/construction work, the conceptual approach to the development of the navy will be an ongoing issue for 45-50 years.

To take account of the implementation time and existing/forecast resource and technology restrictions, the creation of the new-model navy has been divided into three phases: up to 2020; 2021-2030; and 2031-2050. The content of each phase was outlined by Adm Chirkov for the various elements of the navy.

Strategic nuclear forces

Up until 2020 the maritime strategic nuclear force will focus on completing the development and launching of its fourth-generation Borey-class (Project 955/955A) SSBNs, while maintaining its remaining Delta III/IV-class (Project 667BDR/667BDRM) SSBNs in operational service.

During the 2021-2030 phase work will proceed on replacing the Delta class with fourth-generation SSBNs. Within this second phase Russia will also work on developing a new ship-based (in fact submarine-based) strategic missile system and a fifth-generation SSBN class. The doctrine sets out that series production of the fifth-generation SSBN will then commence in the final 2031-2050 phase.

General-purpose force

The general-purpose marine force inventory will include in its first phase the creation of a strategic non-nuclear deterrent force, enhancements to its SSN and diesel-electric submarines (SSKs), the build-up of the inventory and capability of its surface forces, and the creation of the new marine rapid-response force. In the mid term the non-nuclear deterrent will be provided by Yasen-class (Project 885M) SSNs and Oscar-class (Project 885M) nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGNs). Meanwhile, the capability of Russia's non-strategic submarines will be ensured by upgrading its third-generation SSNs and building a new generation of SSKs.

During the 2021-2030 phase Russia's existing SSN/SSK fleet is planned to be improved by adding unmanned technologies, while construction of a new-generation SSN class is also planned.

Surface fleet

In the first phase Russia's Admiral Gorshkov-class (Project 22350) frigates and Steregushchy-class (Project 20380) corvettes and their variants will become the core of the surface force for long- and short-range operations.

In the mid term a new-generation destroyer featuring advanced strike, air defence and missile defence capabilities will become the navy's main oceangoing ship. Between 2021 and 2030 a new class of modular multirole surface combat ship will be designed and enter series production as the successor to the Project 22350/20380 classes. It is envisaged that these will be armed with novel weapon systems and will carry unmanned vehicles of various sorts.

The marine rapid-response force is intended to be capable of conducting missions in the maritime, aerial and land domains in any part of the world. For this, new aircraft carriers will be the core of its capability, along with multirole landing ships. Work to design a new class of Russian aircraft carrier is to be completed before 2020, with construction and entry into service planned for the second phase of the doctrine (2021-2030).

Unlike the heavy aircraft cruisers of the previous generation of Russian aircraft carriers, the new carrier design will be multirole. It is envisaged to be equipped with manned and unmanned combat systems operating in the air, at sea, underwater and possibly in space. The carrier's air groups will include radar surveillance and C2 aircraft, alongside reconnaissance and strike UAVs.

Naval Aviation

For the Russian Naval Aviation the focus in the first phase will be the development and serial production of an advanced maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) by 2020.

Additionally, Russia will look to develop and produce a new shore/ship-based multirole helicopter (to replace the Ka-27) and acquire a ship-based combat helicopter (the Ka-52K). Russia will also seek to develop advanced airborne strike systems.

The second phase will see the deployment of the new Russian ship-based radar surveillance aircraft, ship-based UAVs, and ship-based strike aircraft. The 2021-2030 period will see the Russian Naval Aviation transition to optionally piloted aircraft, including those derived from existing manned aircraft. Obsolete aircraft are to be replaced by modern, multirole manned and unmanned aircraft. During the 2031-2050 phase naval aviation focus will switch to a new generation of multirole aircraft and UAVs and field a new generation of airborne precision weapon systems.

Coastal forces

The first phase of the doctrine concerning Russia's coastal troops and marine force aims to achieve: the completion of development of advance coastal-defence missiles and the issuing of them; and the enhancement of the marine brigade's ability to operate in different climates, including extreme Arctic conditions.

Between 2021 and 2030 the doctrine plans the introduction of a highly mobile amphibious combat vehicle for the coastal troops so that they can support the marines' operations. The marines are also earmarked to begin receiving unmanned platforms during this period, possibly armed with directed-energy weapons or powered by alternative energy sources.

Long term

The direction of the final 2031-2050 phase is currently being analysed, according to Adm Chirkov. However, it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: series production of new-generation submarines; ongoing series production of the new aircraft carrier class; the start of series production of the new multirole ship class; the creation of a new generation of multirole unmanned systems; and the arming of coastal defence troops with new-generation unmanned missile systems capable of striking air, surface, sub-surface and space targets.

Long-term plans (by 2050) also call for a transition to modular combat platforms for both surface ships and submarines.

Nikolai Novichkov is a JDW Correspondent, reporting from Moscow

AlfaT8 wrote: Build the Carriers, complain about economics all you like, it's all a BS excuse. [
+++
cute guesstimates, a pity we don't know anything about the Carriers price.

No clue what your talking about in this second part.

eehnie wrote:
Bolded important references, including to aircraft carriers, that must be multirole (unlike previous "heavy aircraft cruisers") and it is envisaged to reach serial production, shipborne fighters, UAVS and other aircrafts.

The recent statements of the Navy rejecting aircraft carriers under 70000 tons and helicopter carriers, full agree with the exposed in the Russian Marine Doctrine of 2015.