Future Russian Aircraft Carriers and Deck Aviation. #2

At least a dozen Tu-22Ms were needed to engage a CBG with a good chance of success:

We have no evidence the US Navy can deal with Kh-32 anti ship missiles, so while of course any attack on a US carrier would use as many assets as they had available, I would say his assessment that four Tu-22M3s with Kh-32s would be a serious threat to a US carrier group would be valid... it would certainly stop them from doing what ever they were doing and get them to move on.

This is what he posted:

The US has no defence against the KH-32 or even the older KH-22. 4 TU-22s will defeat any carrier group..

I was referring to them armed with KH-22; but even for the KH-32, they still would need more bombers to strike all ships in the CBG with more than 1 missile to ensure that at least some would get through & score a hit. Bombers & missiles may malfunction or make mistakes even w/o any action on the part of defenders

Tsavo Lion wrote:This is what he posted:

The US has no defence against the KH-32 or even the older KH-22. 4 TU-22s will defeat any carrier group..

I was referring to them armed with KH-22; but even for the KH-32, they still would need more bombers to strike all ships in the CBG with more than 1 missile to ensure that at least some would get through & score a hit. Bombers & missiles may malfunction or make mistakes even w/o any action on the part of defenders

You don't really need to strike all ships to stop a CBG, once you score a serious hit on the carrier, all ships will be engaged in rescue and recovery and I really do not see how a carrier can be operable after a hit from a KH-32. The missile will hit dead center at mach 5 and the warhead will explode deep in the carrier or underwater where it will break the ships back, heck even if the warhead fails we are talking 2 tons at mach 5...

If they persist the 2nd wave will be even more effective

Indeed... the current air defence of US carrier groups consists of F-18 hornets with AMRAAM missiles... and AFAIK the AMRAAM does not have the capacity to reach 40km altitude where the Kh-32 missiles will be travelling at mach 4.5...

Not even sure the AEGIS class cruisers could intercept such targets reliably... that is why they fly at that speed and at that altitude.

US carrier groups are centred around their carriers... the carrier is the strike platform and the other ships defend it... damage the carrier and the rest of the ships will likely leave with it.

The US Navy in its time was very nervous about the Kh-22M, and is even more worried about the Kh-32 that replaced it... so worried I think many are in denial.

In the 1980s four Backfires mounting a surprise attack on a carrier (ie flying low to evade radar and then when in range of the carrier climbing and launching and then leaving the area) would be a very difficult one to stop for the F-14s and Phoenix missiles they had.

Today, with missiles with longer range and operating at twice the altitude and speed the problems will be multiplied several times...

They are on the verge of introducing a new hypersonic manouvering missile called Zircon which is going to mean just one Backfire could probably launch half a dozen of these missiles and take out a carrier group on its own from 1,000km range...

I can see why people claim the carrier is useless and a big sitting duck, but for Russia lets be realistic... no platform they have will survive WWIII under their doctrine... their doctrine is basically that WWIII is suicide... everyone dies, so there would be no value in having aircraft carriers that did survive anyway.

The point is that during peace time and small wars and conflicts that aircraft carriers are actually rather useful... they are certainly not cheap, but what part of C4IR is cheap? It is clearly worth it.

In Syria, Russia launched cruise missiles against point targets in Syria and took out a lot of enemy positions that undermined their ability to continue to fight the war. Instead of using Russian troops to steam roller ISIS and western supported terrorist groups, they used technology and tactics to kick the foundations out from under the enemy force and make it collapse much faster than if they had just tried to chip away at them from the outside.

This was not just a case of developing and producing cruise missiles... you need well trained and well equipped special forces and other platforms like A-50U and other aircraft to detect enemy activity and determine where their command centres are and where their weapons are stored, how they get fuel and weapons, how they get money to pay for everything and then start to hit all that with missiles and air power.

An aircraft carrier contributes to the C4IR, but is also adds in many other ways too... a big platform that can carry bigger helos if needed... you could launch any drone you like from that deck... you could have it sitting in the middle of the atlantic or pacific and have one of their new 12,000km range drones land on it to refuel and perhaps change the payload and then launch again... turning a 12,000km range drone into a 24,000km range drone.

Providing commanders with accurate relevant information in peace time is also very valuable, aircraft can intercept and escort and identify objects on the sea surface and in the air, and can defend themselves... unlike drones which are pretty much sitting ducks most of the time.

If aircraft are not valuable why do most Frigates and larger ships have organic helicopters?

Some corvettes also have helicopters or drones too... aircraft are important and while they are not cheap they make your Navy stronger and safer and more effective.

The Aegis ABMs are designed to intercept ballistic missiles. The have very limited abilty to manuver and the KH-32 can be programmed with several approaches to target. So the probabilty of intercept is remote, at best, with the current tech. I am not sure what RIM can deal with but even if it hits KH-32 in terminal phase the carrier gets hit with 2 tons of hypersonic debris....if the Russians are in a mean mood they can even target the reactor compartment and shower the group with radioactivity in which case they will be compelled to scuttle the carrier with torpedos.

We can argue endlessly about the veracity of a given SAM/ABM against a given SS/AShM/CM but at the end of the day its easier to attack a ship with a missile than it is to defend.  When tech levels between the protagonists are essentially equivalent, the attacker will always have the advantage.  If the USN is ever foolhardy enough try to attack Russia or China I fully expect them to come off 2nd best in any such engagement, and it won't be pretty.

They don't say that "the best defense is a good offense" for no reason...

This is very true.... when I did a computer security paper at university a few decades ago the lecturer described the job as think about a skyscraper building... but every window to the outside opens and any prick in any room can open a window... because it is hot or they want fresh air.

Your job as a computer security specialist is to make sure all the external windows and doors are kept shut and locked and many of the internal doors shut and locked too but people also have to use the building, which means working out who has legitimate reason to access different areas of the building and who doesn't and control access with key cards or other access devices.

The point is that in defence any open window will defeat all your other security precautions... so you need to keep thousands of doors and windows closed and locked but you need to give legitimate users access so they can do their job... but then you have to work out who is a legitimate worker.

For the thief all they need to do is find one door or window at any time day or night to gain access...

Ironically having a big open space where things don't normally go with what you are protecting out in the open in plain sight makes it easier to determine if someone is trying to steal it... a US carrier group operating close to Russian shores will be carefully watched... doubly so in times of tension... so any attempt at an attack could lead to immediate retaliation on a number of US assets around Russia... if American forces attack Russia from the Ukraine, Russia wont be bombing Kiev... it will be the Pentagon that will be targeted.

But as I keep saying if you think an aircraft carrier, or even 20 will save the Russian fleet and keep them safe even in a WWIII scenario then you are dreaming and wasting a lot of money and time and effort.

If you want one or two to support operations make them safer and more likely to complete their mission, and be able to complete missions they could not even attempt without air support then having carriers makes sense despite the higher cost of having them... the penalty of not having them is a less useful and less safe navy... how many ships do you need to lose before the extra cost of a carrier is deemed to have been worth it?

The British in the Falklands had aircraft carriers but they were only tiny little things with helicopter AEW rather than proper AWACS which they had recently had on their previous carries that had fixed wing fighters and AWACs aircraft.

If the British had the Ark Royal in service in 1982 I don't think Argentina would have invaded... I suspect the combination of a small unproven carrier with slow unproven fixed wing VSTOL fighters, and indeed the fact that the British Prime minister was a woman all contributed to Argentina thinking it was worth a gamble to take back what they think is theirs.

If they didn't have those little carriers I don't think they could have taken the islands back... if they had proper carriers with AWACS aircraft they probably won't have lost anywhere near the number of ships they lost because their radar range and aircraft CAP circles would have been much much bigger so I don't think the Argentine pilots could have gotten to launch range without being attacked and with much earlier warning of incoming anti ship missiles I think they would have been better able to defend themselves...

You could argue that Russia doesn't have territory around the world it has claimed ownership from that would be challenged in this way, but there will be situations where another naval power might consider challenging Russian surface vessels and Russian will either need to assert their position or run away.

Source: the 1st aircraft carrier in Russia will be built taking into account the drawings of the Soviet Ulyanovsk

It may not even be close to the Storm design.

Tsavo Lion wrote:Source: the 1st aircraft carrier in Russia will be built taking into account the drawings of the Soviet Ulyanovsk

It may not even be close to the Storm design.

it is the thing that make more sense.

It has exactly the size that the Russian Federation would need, and it is already meant for the russian naval warfare concepts.

It could also be built in Zaliv, after they deliver the new amphibious assault ships.

Of course, the design would need to be updated to reflect the use of new sensors, nternal electronics systems, the
new nuclear propulsion systems and the new weapons.. Furthermore, if they replace the 12 p700 granit launchers with 40 or 48 UKSK launchers (in nakhimov they were able to put 80 UKSK in place of 20 P700 granit launchers) it would have a very good punch on its own.

I mean, the levantin concept is interesting, but as far as I know it has no cruise missile launchers.

Can Russia build an aircraft carrier?
https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2835642.html

So, if the article is right, even if they start it at the end of this decade, it won't sail before 2030; in the best case, it will sail by 2033-35, or 13-15 years from now.

Once they have decided what to build it wont take 10 years to build... coincidentally the only shipyards big enough to handle an aircraft carrier production job also means it is well funded and totally modernised and ready to build new ships.

As I have said several times however their first nuclear carrier wont be in service before 2030 simply because they need to build it and install all new equipment and sensors that need testing... that is why I was suggesting upgrading the Kuznetsov with a few of the systems to get them tested now instead of waiting a decade to test them in the water with the first CVN...

But they don't need surface action groups to operate outside of Russian ground based air power yet or for a few years to come and the K will be in service before then.

It is a real opportunity to look at rigid airship AWACS platforms... EMALS should be developed because the technology would be very useful in a range of areas, but an Airship AWACS might be quicker and cheaper and an export option for many countries who can't afford an aircraft carrier but want AWACS support well beyond their borders for long periods...

It may not take 10 years to build, but if they start after 2025 (by then the other ships & subs r built), then it won't sail on its 1st deployment before the end of 2029 for sure.
Rigid airships will be very slow but they'll need to cover a lot of areas or get from point A to point B fast-so it won't be tactically feasible to rely on them for AWACS. Having a blimp above a CBG or even 12s of miles away from it will be demasking its presence as it'll be highly visible to other ships, aircraft, UAVs, satellites, & submarines' periscopes.
Also, if they need to be lowered to the deck for maintenance/repairs or personnel transfer, flight ops may be disrupted.

Tsavo Lion wrote:It may not take 10 years to build, but if they start after 2025 (by then the other ships & subs r built), then it won't sail on its 1st deployment before the end of 2029 for sure.
Rigid airships will be very slow but they'll need to cover a lot of areas or get from point A to point B fast-so it won't be tactically feasible to rely on them for AWACS. Having a blimp above a CBG or even 12s of miles away from it will be demasking its presence as it'll be highly visible to other ships, aircraft, UAVs, satellites, & submarines' periscopes.
Also, if they need to be lowered to the deck for maintenance/repairs or personnel transfer, flight ops may be disrupted.

Building CVN is very complicated and costly business. Minimum building period five years + 3-5 years of working up and training. That gives ten years.

kumbor wrote:

Tsavo Lion wrote:It may not take 10 years to build, but if they start after 2025 (by then the other ships & subs r built), then it won't sail on its 1st deployment before the end of 2029 for sure.
Rigid airships will be very slow but they'll need to cover a lot of areas or get from point A to point B fast-so it won't be tactically feasible to rely on them for AWACS. Having a blimp above a CBG or even 12s of miles away from it will be demasking its presence as it'll be highly visible to other ships, aircraft, UAVs, satellites, & submarines' periscopes.
Also, if they need to be lowered to the deck for maintenance/repairs or personnel transfer, flight ops may be disrupted.

Building CVN is very complicated and costly business. Minimum building period five years + 3-5 years of working up and training. That gives ten years.

Well, the initial building phase for the british aircraft carrier queen Elizabeth took 5 years (from July 2009 until July 2014) until it was launched) and then fitting out and testing took another 3 years, until December 2017 (including about one and half years for the fitting out part. In Russian service, however, it would not have been commissioned, as there were still defects to be corrected when they accepted into the navy. Furthermore it is still not fitted yet with all of its antiair defences and still lacks its aircrafts. They expect to initial operational capability in 2020, but this could be delayed.

In contrast, I believe that russian ships are not commissioned until they demonstrate their operational capabilities (an exception was the first Lada class submarine, that was commissioned in 2010, but not accepted into service, since it falled short of requirement during trials).

But yeah, we can expect first training deployment in about 7/8 years from start of construction and entry into service in about 10 years total.

The Chineses were particularly fast with their second carrier, the Shandong, since it finished the last (ninth) sea trial about 6 years after starting construction. To have a comparison, it was launched about 3 and half years after starting construction (about the same time needed from the Soviet shipbuilders in Nikolaev to float out the admiral Kuznetov (called Riga at that time)(from april 1982 to december 1985, while fitting out took considerably longer)

Rodion_Romanovic wrote:

kumbor wrote:

Tsavo Lion wrote:It may not take 10 years to build, but if they start after 2025 (by then the other ships & subs r built), then it won't sail on its 1st deployment before the end of 2029 for sure.
Rigid airships will be very slow but they'll need to cover a lot of areas or get from point A to point B fast-so it won't be tactically feasible to rely on them for AWACS. Having a blimp above a CBG or even 12s of miles away from it will be demasking its presence as it'll be highly visible to other ships, aircraft, UAVs, satellites, & submarines' periscopes.
Also, if they need to be lowered to the deck for maintenance/repairs or personnel transfer, flight ops may be disrupted.

Building CVN is very complicated and costly business. Minimum building period five years + 3-5 years of working up and training. That gives ten years.

Well, the initial building phase for the british aircraft carrier queen Elizabeth took 5 years (from July 2009 until July 2014) until it was launched) and then fitting out and testing took another 3 years, until December 2017 (including about one and half years for the fitting out part. In Russian service, however, it would not have been commissioned, as there were still defects to be corrected when they accepted into the navy. Furthermore it is still not fitted yet with all of its antiair defences and still lacks its aircrafts. They expect to initial operational capability in 2020, but this could be delayed.

In contrast, I believe that russian ships are not commissioned until they demonstrate their operational capabilities (an exception was the first Lada class submarine, that was commissioned in 2010, but not accepted into service, since it falled short of requirement during trials).

But yeah, we can expect first training deployment in about 7/8 years from start of construction and entry into service in about 10 years total.

The Chineses were particularly fast with their second carrier, the Shandong, since it finished the last (ninth) sea trial about 6 years after starting construction. To have a comparison, it was launched about 3 and half years after starting construction (about the same time needed from the Soviet shipbuilders in Nikolaev to float out the admiral Kuznetov (called Riga at that time)(from april 1982 to december 1985, while fitting out took considerably longer)

The first China made carrier took a long time because no prior experience. The second and third ones will be much faster. By 2030 China will have 4 carriers at least not including Type 075 light carriers.

GarryB wrote:
It is a real opportunity to look at rigid airship AWACS platforms... EMALS should be developed because the technology would be very useful in a range of areas, but an Airship AWACS might be quicker and cheaper and an export option for many countries who can't afford an aircraft carrier but want AWACS support well beyond their borders for long periods...

we need to live to see final decisions, meanwhile US has started to replace Grumman 2C Greyhounds with V-22 Osprey...Greyhound is same air-frame as AWACS for carriers - Grumman E-2 Hawkeye


https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/31430/behold-the-first-image-of-a-navy-cmv-22-osprey-that-will-replace-the-c-2-greyhound

New aircraft carrier based on 11437

The week before last appeared information from two unnamed sources in the shipbuilding industry regarding the development of the Russian aircraft carrier of the new project, namely: 1) the deadline for the development of the tactical and technical specifications (TTZ) for the design of the ship; 2) use in the design process of perspective AV materials of the technical design, design documentation and technological documentation (TD) of the unfinished TAVKR pr. 11437; 3) work on the new aircraft carrier, which is currently being conducted by the Nevsky Design Bureau (NPKB). The following are the comments of the author of the blog on identified and some related issues.


TTZ

According to the relevant regulatory documents of the TTZ for experimental design work (R&D) (in our case, with the code name “Marine Aircraft Carrier Complex” - ref. 1, p. 45), a state customer (Navy) is developing with the participation of its research organization (Research Institute of Shipbuilding and weapons) with the obligatory agreement with the head contractor (NPKB).

One of the sources mentioned above reports: "The Navy continues to work on the TTZ, it should be completed in 2020, after which the design assignment will go to the USC [which includes the Nevsky Design Bureau]" (ref. 2), i.e. with a significant lead ahead of the previously announced deadline (2023 - ref. 3). Considering that the information about the beginning of the development of the TTZ appeared in June last year (Ref. 4), the completion of its timely formation (after a year and a half) seems quite real.

Considering the increased complexity and novelty of some of the components of the OCD (such as a catapult, an RLDN airplane, and the “numbing” of the Su-57), its first stage (conceptual design) may be delayed. However, if the current GPV does indeed (as they say) provide for R&D, the approval of the technical project before the end of 2027 and the laying of the lead ship at the beginning of the next GPV are not in doubt (for reference: from the issue of TTZ on pr. 11437 to the Ulyanovsk bookmark) four years have passed).


11437

The use in the design process of a promising aircraft carrier of technical solutions adopted in the TAVKR technical project, pr. 11437, will greatly simplify and accelerate the course of business. Of course, building a new ship entirely according to the old drawings will not work - radio electronics, radio engineering, nuclear power, and many other areas of science and technology have gone too far in more than 30 years. At the same time, the laws of hydrodynamics and ship theory, sopromat and the strength of the ship have not been canceled. It must be assumed that the strength characteristics of shipbuilding steels and the standard sizes of rolled metal also did not undergo fundamental changes.

According to reports, a decision was made on the optimal displacement of the new AB - from 65,000 to 70,000 tons (Ref. 5). Dstandard and Dnorm pr. 11437 fit almost perfectly into this range (Dstandard / Dfull: A. Pavlov 65800/74900; Yu. Apalkov 65800/75000; S. Balakin and V. Zablotsky 62600/73400; Dnorm it turns out 70350, 70400, 68000). If, in calculating the mass load of the preliminary design, the displacement is close to that of the seventh Soviet TAVKR, and the general arrangement does not require an increase in the main dimensions (due to the greater compactness of modern equipment), it will be possible to leave the theoretical drawing and the calculation of the overall strength as it is, and together with them - a great many studies done in due time.

Despite this, of course, you will have to double-check and re-issue all the old calculations and drawings, carry out control tests in the experimental pool of the KSCC, but this will not be at all what to do all over again from scratch. Simplifying a little, we can say that in addition to the “island”, design will come down mainly to re-arranging rooms inside an impenetrable volume by rearranging longitudinal and transverse bulkheads, partitions, placing new equipment within these rooms, laying pipelines and cable routes.


NPKB

As a result of the collapse of the USSR, Nevskoye suffered the most from all shipbuilding design bureaus. In contrast to the priority nuclear submarine, the once great sea power was unable to build surface combat ships above rank 2 - frigates and BDKs (it seems that FR pr. 22350 with a norm of 4950 tons were ranked rank 1 - ref. 6 - mainly due to market considerations ) NPKB, focused on the design of large displacement BNK and remaining almost without government contracts (with the exception of technical support for repairs 11435 and endless improvements 11711), was forced to survive due to military technical cooperation. The number of employees, in this case, decreased to 370 people (against 780 in the Northern PKB).

Nevertheless, cooperation with the Indian customer allowed the bureau to maintain its competencies, attract and train young high-level specialists. The project of deep modernization of the TAVKR Project 11434, completed by the Nevsky Design Bureau, is well described by the formula “new ship in the old hull” and even goes beyond it, since the hull itself was modified due to the installation of the springboard. In addition to rejuvenating personnel during the creation of Vikramaditya (Project 11430), long-forgotten specific aircraft carrier production was restored, including production cooperation. In addition to 11430, within the framework of the military-technical cooperation, the NPKB developed the Indian Thread project and carried out the technical design of the complex of aircraft technical equipment for the ship (ATSK) for AV Av. 71 under construction in India (Ref. 7).

In 2016, before the Kuznetsova’s KAG hike to the Syrian coast, the company developed a missile defense system to ensure that MiG-29K fighter-bomber bases are based on TAVKR — primarily through ATSC and racks for new types of aviation ammunition (ABZ) (Ref. .

Currently, within the framework of the state defense order (excluding the military-technical cooperation), the Nevsky Design Bureau is loaded with the following works: 1) (most important) development of the design documentation (working design documentation) and studies on the terms of reference for the VTG with OMR (restoration of technical readiness with separate modernization works) TAVKR pr. 11435; 2) technical support of VTG with OMP 11435; 3) designing the BDK pr. 11711 mod. II (manager No. 303 and 304 were laid at the Yantar Shipyard last year); 4) technical support for the construction (testing) of the BDK pr. 11711 mod. I "Peter Morgunov" (manager No. 302); 5) initiative design work on the main theme of the bureau - elaboration of options for a promising aircraft carrier and UDC (investment expenses from own funds for 2016-2018 with a prospect for 2019, including some civil work, amounted to half a billion rubles. - Annual reports link 11).

As you can see, the rumors about the incapacity (*) of the Nevsky Design Bureau, to put it mildly, do not correspond to reality.


Note (*) Rumors went after the publication of the Kazan online publication "Business Online" in favor of "their" (Zelenodolsk) shipbuilding corporation Ak Bars. Based on information received from anonymous sources in the defense industry complex and the opinion of an expert who operates with fictitious facts (1174 “forgot about the location of the helicopter”, 11711 - demagnetizing device, the Northern Design Bureau is “overwhelmed with the work of designing an aircraft carrier”, etc.), the material does the conclusion that the Nevsky Design Bureau has long lost its competence and is on the verge of closure, which is why Zelenodolsk Design Bureau will design the UDC for the Russian Navy (ref. 12). Propagated by popular information resources (link 13, link 14), the news was firmly entrenched in the public mind. In addition, at the beginning of this year Ak Bars presented the UDC project to GDP, which outwardly hardly differs from Mistral (ref. 15, 02:17).

In fact, such castling (NPKB – ZPKB) looks at least strange. NPKB is the only design organization in the country that has the richest (60 years) experience in the design and technical support of the construction and operation of all large aircraft-carrying and landing ships of the Russian Navy (ref. 16, left column). This experience is materialized in the design documentation, adjusted for construction performance (for changes made during construction, delivery and testing of orders) (ref. 17). Against such a background, the ZPKB, the experience of which relates to BNS with permanent-based aircraft, is limited to pr. 11540 (4240 tons full, one Ka-27), and is absent altogether in some of the "paratroopers" (reference 18).

As for the Ak Bars UDC project demonstrated in Crimea, the speed of its creation suggests that the corporation’s management is simply bluffing in an attempt to drag the blanket over itself. In the 2018 Zelenodolsk Design Bureau annual report (ref. 20), as well as in an interview with the General Director of the ZPKB dated November 22, 2019 (ref. 22), there is not a word about UDC. But even if we assume that in 2019 some work in this area was still underway, it should be recognized that one year for the development of a pre-draft and, especially, outline design of a 25,000-ton BNK is clearly not enough for a non-core PCB. But before the laying of two ships in Kerch (after the approval of the technical project) at the time of the presentation of Zelenodolsk "Mistral" there were only four months left. Finally, for reasons of national prestige in appearance, our UDC should not be similar to the French counterpart.

According to Murphy’s law (“everything that can go wrong goes wrong”), ZPKB has a chance to receive an order for the design of UDC. However, apart from 20386, examples of serious insanity in the field of naval construction have not been observed for a long time. Let's hope that the mind will triumph this time too.

https://navy-korabel.livejournal.com/228180.html

Alright, let's see:

1) No aircraft

2) No catapults

3) No escorts

4) No shipyards

5) No personnel

Feel free to add, it will be quite a list

PapaDragon wrote:
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Feel free to add, it will be quite a list

0) no project approved yet

PapaDragon wrote:
Alright, let's see:

1) No aircraft

2) No catapults

3) No escorts

4) No shipyards

5) No personnel

Feel free to add, it will be quite a list

0) no project approved yet, but apparently they are reviewing ulyanovsk projects, updating it for the use of new nuclear plants, electronics, sensors and weapon systems.

Probably it will take 2/3 years from when they agree a preliminary design to when they approve it and they can start cutting metal.


1)As far as aircrafts, they have currenly mig29k (and probably they can all be' brought to mig35 level).
In a few years time they will have also a naval version of the su57, if needed.

What is still missing is instead a naval AWACS aircraft. At the moment they only have the AeW helicopter based on the ka-27.

It it were me, i would restart the Yak-44 project, with modern radars and electronics of course. For the engine, as I wrote already in another thread, instead of the D27 from zaporozhe (the same engine that should have gone to the An-70), they could use a turboprop/propfan derivative of the PD-12V engine (a turboshaft derivative of the PD14, that should replace the Ukrainian engine on the Mi-26 helicopter). I do not know about the status of the PD-12V engine, but once that is ready a turboprop/propfan derivative should not take too much. I believe that there is enough competence to produce a modern aircraft gearbox for such engine. The propellers were already made from the Russian company Aerosila, so no problems there.


2)The catapults are not yet there, i do not know if there is research work based on the development models buing built for ulyanovsk

3) escorts. 3 Gorshkov and gorskov m, supported by maybe one of the kirovs (and maybe an updated Udaloy) and some nuclear subs would be probably be a proper escort group. Hopefully the production speed of Gorshkov and later Gorshkov m will increase, because they can't do like the british navy and occupy all the capable ships from each fleet for carrier escort duty.
This will mean that they need to bring building time of 22350 to 3,max 4 years and of 22350M to 4, max 5 years.
Anyway, since from starting building a carrier to have it operational we can consider at least 8 years in the best hypothesis, there will be all the time to build a decent number of escort ships.

4) shipyards. At the moment, the only shipyards big enough are Zvezda and Zaliv. Sevmash could probably build a smaller carrier but that would compromise nuclear sub peoduction (especially if some of the work after fitting out would be done in a floating dry dock, but the latter does not exist yet, since PD-50 dock has bot been replaced). Some of the subs (not the larger strategic ballistic missile carrier, though, could be produced also in Nizhny Novgorod, where they produced also the 8000 tons Project 945 Barrakuda.

In addition in a few years time Nikolaev will repeat what Crimea did and come back to Russia with all of its shipyards...that cannot be taken into accounts in plans anyway, and the yards would require serious investment and a few years time to be able to recover their previous capabilities. I also remember having read that the company nibulon built a large grain terminal where the largest dock of the black sea shipyard (the one where the soviet aircraft carriers where built) was.

5) no personal

You mean sailors or naval shipbuilders and naval engineers?

Rodion_Romanovic wrote:

PapaDragon wrote:
Alright, let's see:

1) No aircraft

2) No catapults

3) No escorts

4) No shipyards

5) No personnel

Feel free to add, it will be quite a list

0) no project approved yet, but apparently  they are reviewing ulyanovsk projects,  updating it for the use of new nuclear plants, electronics, sensors and weapon systems.

Probably it will take 2/3 years from when they agree a preliminary design to when they approve it and they can start cutting metal.


1)As far as aircrafts, they have currenly mig29k (and probably they can all be' brought to mig35 level).
In a few years time they will have also a naval version of the su57, if needed.

What is still missing is instead a naval AWACS aircraft. At the moment they only have the AeW helicopter  based on the ka-27.

It it were me, i would restart the Yak-44 project, with modern radars and electronics of course. For the engine, as I wrote already in another thread, instead of the D27 from zaporozhe (the same engine that should have gone to the An-70), they could use a turboprop/propfan derivative of the PD-12V engine (a turboshaft derivative of the PD14, that should replace the Ukrainian engine on the Mi-26 helicopter). I do not know about the status of the PD-12V engine, but once that is ready a turboprop/propfan derivative should not take too much. I believe that there is enough competence to produce a modern aircraft gearbox for such engine. The propellers were already  made from the Russian company Aerosila,  so no problems there.


2)The catapults are not yet there, i do not know if there is research work based on the development models buing built for ulyanovsk

3) escorts. 3 Gorshkov and gorskov m, supported by maybe one of the kirovs (and maybe an updated Udaloy)  and some nuclear subs would be probably be a proper escort group.  Hopefully the production speed of Gorshkov  and later Gorshkov m will increase, because they can't  do like the british navy and occupy  all the capable ships from each fleet for carrier escort duty.
This will mean that they need to bring building time of 22350 to 3,max 4 years and of 22350M to 4, max 5 years.
Anyway, since from starting building a carrier to have it operational we can consider at least 8 years in the best hypothesis, there will be all the time to build a decent number of escort ships.

4) shipyards. At the moment, the only shipyards big enough are Zvezda and Zaliv. Sevmash could probably  build a smaller carrier but that would compromise  nuclear sub peoduction (especially if some of the work after fitting out would be done in a floating dry dock, but the latter does not exist yet, since PD-50 dock has bot been replaced). Some of the subs (not the larger strategic ballistic missile carrier, though, could be produced also in Nizhny Novgorod, where they produced also the 8000 tons Project 945 Barrakuda.

In addition in a few years time  Nikolaev will repeat what Crimea did and come back to Russia with all of its shipyards...that cannot be taken into accounts in plans  anyway, and the yards would require serious investment and a few years time to be able to recover their  previous capabilities. I also remember having read that the company nibulon built a large grain terminal where the largest dock of the black sea shipyard (the one where the soviet aircraft carriers where built) was.

5) no personal

You mean sailors or naval shipbuilders and naval engineers?

3- Can steam catapults work in the arctic?

Not for long before having maintenance & safety issues. Steam will add moisture on the flight deck leading to ice buildup.

Tsavo Lion wrote:Not for long before having maintenance & safety issues. Steam will add moisture on the flight deck leading to ice buildup.

I would assume so. I don't know how they are going to manage ice build up on critical areas. Perhaps they will need to add a lot of electrical heaters in exposed areas but how effective will it be!

william.boutros wrote:

Tsavo Lion wrote:Not for long before having maintenance & safety issues. Steam will add moisture on the flight deck leading to ice buildup.

I would assume so. Don't know how they manage to to prevent ice build up in critical places when the temperature outside is -40 C. Perhaps they will need to add a lot of electrical heaters in exposed areas but don't know how practical that is going to be.

With a nuclear reactor that shouldn't be difficult to solve. They have operated Kuznetsov and kiev class ships in the north and the ice was never an issue.

US operates its carriers in the atlantic where temperatures are also low and don't have this issue.

The Barents Sea is warmer than the rest of the Arctic; East of it there's nothing for the CVN to do, unless it transits to/from the Pacific under an icebreaker escort & with its planes either parked or flown cross country.