Arjun Tank News Thread

Austin wrote:An interesting write up , since the author has acquaintance with Arjun program , commanded the T-72 regiment and was also involved with T-90 procurement

The Arjun Saga

http://www.geopolitics.in/june2012.aspx

Mindstorm wrote:

Austin wrote:An interesting write up , since the author has acquaintance with Arjun program , commanded the T-72 regiment and was also involved with T-90 procurement

The Arjun Saga

http://www.geopolitics.in/june2012.aspx

I would be very glad to see ,only one time, an official involved in weapon selection program for MBTs ,so deeply different in design concept, getting the courage to produce a comparison taking coldly into account EFFECT ON THE BATTLEFIELD and, above all, at THE SAME RESOURCES (material and human) employed ,of the selection of one of the other.



Fact 1 : With the same crew's unit with which you can man 900 Arjun MK-I/II (or similar western-like "heavy" MBT ) you can man 1200 T-90S/MS


Fact 2 : With the same financial resources necessary to procure Arjun MK-I/II you can procure from 1,4 to 1,9 times as much T-90S/MS


Fact 3 : For unavoidable volumetric and weight factors, the same strategic ferry-asset capable to transport or sustain an Arjun MK-I/II (or similar western-like "heavy" MBT) can transport/sustain 1,5 to 2 times how much T-90S/MS


Fact 4 : With the same fuel necessary to move 3 Arjun MK-I/II for 100 km you can move of the same distance about 4,2/4,6 T-90M/MS


Fact 5 : Target area offered to enemy direct fire by part of Arjun MKI/II (or similar western-like "heavy" MBT) is much greater than that offered by T-90S/MS


Fact 6 : Cost and time to repair hull/turret damages to a T90S/MS is immeasurably lower than that to conduct the same repair on Arjun MKI/II (or similar western-like "heavy" MBT)



Now, if someone would attempt to establish the best investment for tax money in MBTs it should take into account the same resources employed and the operative capabilities obtained with it.


Do you want to establish what public Indian money expenditure, between Arjun and T-90S, is more efficient in achieving the best target hit percentage in unitary time?

Well, place 36 Arjun MKI/II and 48 T-90S/MS (same number of Indian tank crew and Indian tax-money taken into account) at a shooting range and measure the time necessary to hit 100 target for the former group and the latter.


Do you want to establish what public Indian money expenditure, between Arjun and T-90S, offer the best strategic mobility and sector Armored Force's density in unitary time?
Well, set a time and a strategic ferry asset (air-lift, ship-transport , rail transport or all of the three together) and measure how much Arjun MKI/II or T-90S/MS was present on the target sector at the same distance when the set time elapse.


Do you want to establish the overall exchange ratio and PHit of a direct fire engagements between the two design, involving the same public Indian money expenditure and Indian lives taken into account ?
Well, put 36 Arjun MKI/II and 48 T-90S/MS in the Rajasthan desert and let those two group shoot one against the other in mobile engagement with training rounds (or, even better, better colored powder ones) and measure the number and placement of hit for each MBT -....the result of this test ,also with same number of tanks, would be obviously equally one-sided in T-90’s favour-.

And so on with: logistic burden and length, average time and cost for battle damages repair, tactical mobility, mobilization times etc.... or even better COMBINE all the up-mentioned trials : transport the three equivalent groups of Arjun and T-90S, with theirs necessary logistic vehicles, with three different strategic ferry asset in a sector ; after leave them proceed for 200-300 km long local road and off-road environment, leave each group engage the "opposing" one with the actual number of MBT present in the intended sector, collect "damaged" vehicles and repair them allowing to return in the battles in the subsequent days.
The result would be simply CRUSHING.



Now THIS, is a serious , analytical approach to military value assessment of two different systems with the same role, the problem is that a similar ,cold , strictly parametrical procedure for comparative trials would represent an enormous danger for some industrial interests.

Reality is much more simple : India , as a quickly rising power, need to develop a domestic military heavy industry's base and ,within it, a critical MBT's design capability.
Arjun is a good choice to develop a scientific and production basis for the creation of a modern MBT; but Indian analysts are perfectly aware of the factor's interaction previously mentioned.

It is not a chance that FMBT has way more stringent volumetric limits and target weight of 50 tons

Regular wrote:Holly mantle! No disrespect to indians, but You should rather ditch this tank and start something new from scratch as this tank looks like dead end.

Austin wrote:Arjun Mk2 Official Specs ( via Defexpo 2014 )

https://i.imgur.com/GbORxM2.jpg

TR1 wrote:68 tons!

By Lt Gen Dalip Bhardwaj (Retd)
(The writer is former Director General Mechanised Forces)
Quote:
Current Status-Armour
The current holding of tanks exceed 3000 comprising the T-72M1 which is the mainstay of the Armoured Corps, a number of regiments of the state-of-the-art T-90S and the indigenous Arjun tanks. An AFV once inducted is expected to be in service for 34 years before being declared obsolete. Hence, after a tank has been in service for a decade, a comprehensive modernisation package is initiated which is expected to be implemented within a span of five years, so as to ensure that the tank holds its own in the battlefield for the balance second half of its life in service.

As a plethora of vendors are involved in modernising various sub-systems, the package is never introduced as a whole, hence, slippages occur and the tank is not available to the user for protracted periods. Ideally, the modernisation package must be implemented when the tank is withdrawn for its mid-life overhaul, however, this is only on paper as the schedule of overhaul and the modernisation package never coincide leading to a disjointed effort and wasteful expenditure.

Tank T-72 M1: The tank was inducted into service in the early Eighties and after three decades the tanks issued to the first few regiments are being withdrawn from service without any major modernisation scheme being implemented. The modernisation programme includes:

• Mobility: Uprating the engine to 1000 HP to ensure that the power to weight ratio is maintained despite having added additional weight. Trials for a suitable power pack were initiated a decade ago without success. The most suitable choice is the engine of the T-90 tank duly modified which would also ensure commonality of parts and reduction of the logistic chain.

• Firepower: The most critical scheme is removal of night blindness by introducing the thermal imaging sight and enhancing its accuracy by fitting a modern fire control system. As regards night blindness, the older tanks were to be fitted with a thermal imaging stand alone sight (TISAS) and the newer tanks with a full solution fire control system (TIFCS).

Whereas the TISAS programme has been successfully implemented, the delay has been in introducing the TIFCS. The plan to adopt the T-90 TIFCS was initiated which should have been the ideal solution, however due to issues of non-compliance of electro-magnetic interference/compatibility (EMI/EMC) the project was delayed. It is expected that both systems will be introduced by the end of 2014.

• Protection: To give added protection two projects were initiated. First was the fitment of the explosive reactive armour (ERA) panels against chemical energy ammunition attack and second was the more ambitious Active Protection System (APS). Whereas the ERA panels are cleared and fitment is in progress, the APS which was included later will take time to be implemented due to its complexity and cost.

Tank T-90S: The T-90S tank was first shown in Russia in 1993 and was procured by India in 2002. A total of 657 tanks were imported from Russia with a contract to manufacture 1000 tanks at HVF Avadi. Despite being a tank of recent origin, an upgraded package has already been formalised and would be implemented within the next three-five years. Notwithstanding, by the end of the decade at least 25 Armoured Regiment would be equipped with this state-of-the-art tank. The modernisation projects include:-

• Firepower: The TIFCS has been given dual control with the Commander being able to exercise the same functions as the gunner. The 12.7 mm AD machine gun to be upgraded to a dual axis stabilised remote controlled weapon system. To engage moving targets more effectively, an automatic target tracker (ATT) needs to be fitted. The effectiveness of the Invar missile has to be enhanced to penetrate up to 1000 mm armour thickness.

• Protection: The greatest benefit would be the fitment of the APS to defeat both the CE and KE ammunition. In addition, the ERA panels are to be upgraded to enhance protection by 250 mm, thereby even degrading a KE projectile to a very large extent.

• Miscellaneous: To ensure that electronics in the tank function at peak efficiency even during the peak summer temperatures, an environment control system will be fitted. In addition to ensure that the life of the main engine is conserved an auxiliary power unit to be fitted. For better situational awareness, a battlefield management system will be fitted supported by a software defined radio (SDR).

With the implementation of the above modernisation package, hopefully, within the next three-five years the T-90S will dominate the battlefield till 2030-35.

Austin wrote:Can some one objectively compare the T-90MS with Arjun Mk2 ? ( No nationalism just comparison based on merits , I have posted specs of T-90MS and Arjun Mk2 above )

Even more them would have a very hard time at sell how credible the supposed declarations of the mythical "unnamed indian officials"   on the T-90S shooting performances when in any REAL trial with OFFICIAL declarations by part of authorities (the last one no more than some months ago in the Peru trials ) the results .....strangely...... are always the opposite.