Russian Gun Artillery Thread

@Franco

I know you have a tendency to not do this, but can I please have a source on the 575,000 rounds per month claim?

Another video of Russian artillerists pumping and dumping:


The hasty and lazy camo looks goofy but it just works.
The Soviets had these guns built ford tough - it would take a direct clean hit to destroy a D-20 or a 2A19. Most counterbattery radars can only barely bracket the area of the shooter; good enough for MLRS, not so much howitzers  without UAV fire correction. And unless you already have a drone in the immediate vicinity you're not catching these guns before they have been hidden and their crews below rock solid shelter.

This is why I laugh at people who say towed guns especially the D-20 are obsolete. Like with just a handful of men, a small truck of shells, a Chinese drone, and a WW2 era howitzer in each firing unit you can reliably seed the frontline with enough firepower to give your troops artillery fire support on tap almost everywhere and anytime of day.

That's fucking insane. And they're just the first responders - Russia would have mobile arty, and aviation on standby ready to respond at any further calls for firepower.

And that's how you inflict close to 10-1 K/D on the the 2nd Army and their proxy. Scratch that, Third Army, since NATO is bleeding itself dry to try to keep its proxy in the fight through material and to a slight extent manpower infusions.

@Franco

I know you have a tendency to not do this, but can I please have a source on the 575,000 rounds per month claim?

Sorry cannot remember where and I read some many different articles, but it was someone reporting that production would soon be or was at 6,900,000 a year.

How to win without shells?

The projectile theme that stirred up the airwaves performed by Prigozhin and the Wagner company really made a lot of noise. But what to do if Prigogine is a very skilled leader and can not only competently organize the conduct of the war, but do the same on the information front.

However, who can lose to our Ministry of Defense in the information battle? To be honest, I can't think of any candidates. So everything turned out quite naturally: Putin had to “resolve” the conflict, the shells seemed to go.

The question is to whom and how much. And this question is very important. The answer to it is also important, more precisely, the understanding of the strategic perspective. That is, from where the legs generally grow from shell hunger and how dangerous it is in the current situation.

It is clear that the lack of shells is sad, one can recall the numerous memoirs from the Germans during the First and Second World Wars. Our factories are not bombed or shelled, so the situation in Russia is a little better. Again, the question is how much?

"Wagner" and shells

In general, the irregular supply of Wagner detachments became the key to their success. Yes, PMCs already have many advantages over the regular army in the form of equipment (especially communications), training, they have a faster command structure. Sadly, the vast majority of the formations of the Russian army are inferior to the detachments of the Wagner PMC in this regard.

This is well understood in the Ministry of Defense and they prefer "point-blank" not to notice the detachments that do all the hard work near Bakhmut and Soledar. At best, we are talking about some kind of "volunteer assault squads."

The case when the country is bleeding from the nose, but should not know its heroes, no matter what they are.

Therefore, on Frunzenskaya Embankment, they are trying with all their might to “not notice” the successes of Wagner. More precisely, they notice and sometimes very shyly, but appropriate. True, then honest guys in blue berets say that they were not there nearby, but who cares at the top that the airborne troops have honor and conscience, don't they?

And today it is worth recognizing that former prisoners under the leadership of experienced Wagner PMC fighters operate much more efficiently than regular army units. The Wagnerites carry out the tasks assigned to them, the only question is at what cost. We all know perfectly well that the price is sometimes high.

And here lies the answer to the question about the beginning of the scandal between Prigozhin and the Russian Defense Ministry.

The fewer shells the artillerymen have in the war, the greater the losses of the infantry. It has been proven since the First World War. Prigogine was forced to make a fuss in order to be able to keep winning. No matter how his campaign in the networks and the press looks, Prigogine is right, because he did it to save the lives of his fighters, who, when compared with the Russian army, are generally minuscule.

What happened, happened. Another important question is why this happened. If you carefully consider everything that happens in chronological order, then the situation will turn out to be very specific.

At first, the Wagner had more than enough shells. At that time, Surovikin commanded the SVO, the Wagnerites received everything they needed and went forward, fulfilling all the combat missions assigned to them.

I think (and many also support this opinion) that General Surovikin, who spent a lot of time in Syria, was well aware of the capabilities of the PMC fighters. And then he made the right predictions and sent PMC detachments to the forefront of attacks, supplying them with everything he could.

And Surovikin's opportunities were such that other commanders of the Second World War did not dream of.

It all started when Surovikin was moved a little, and the command of the NMD was assigned to Gerasimov. This is where the gradual bringing of PMCs to the norms of supplying the Russian army began. Here, of course, it would be worth considering separately in what mossy years these norms were adopted and approved, but this is very difficult to do.

In general, weapons and ammunition in a war are never at least enough.

So who and how determined these norms, as they say, is an open question. And there is no answer to it. However, it is also clear that sluggish counter-battery fire during positional standing is one thing, and active offensive operations are quite another. "Wagner" led precisely offensive operations, and therefore the reduction in the supply of ammunition for PMCs was like death.

And here a flurry of criticism began, first personally from Prigozhin, and then all possible media resources went into action and appeals from PMC fighters began.

The logic of the Ministry of Defense is clear: if you play on their field and according to their rules, then nothing more. It is clear that when Prigozhin began to protest against the fact that the Ministry of Defense appropriates the merits of his fighters, moreover, openly and without hesitation. This is where the screw tightening began. Either settlements take units of the Ministry of Defense, or Prigozhin's detachments receive the necessary allowances.

And as a result, the name "Wagner" almost completely disappeared from the state and near-state media and bloggers. Some kind of "assault detachments of volunteers" - and nothing more.

How incorrect was the media assault, arranged by Prigogine, is difficult to assess. On the one hand, he nevertheless gave shells to Wagner, on the other hand, he gave rise to many reasons for media battles.

Everyone can draw a conclusion for himself what is the least attractive - to arrange a showdown in the media sphere or to appropriate the merits of others. Moreover, when these merits are paid for with blood.
This is a matter of memory and respect for the dead, and not an opportunity to get new stars on shoulder straps.

Everyone must work to win. And the victory will not belong to Gerasimov or anyone else. It will belong to the fighters on the front line and the entire country that worked for them.

But back to ammunition.

When the showdown between Wagner and the RF Ministry of Defense was just beginning, it became, in principle, clear how the matter would end. The fact that the Wagner was supplied in excess has more than once caused dissatisfaction with the army, since it is clear that with such allowance, the army units could at least show no worse results.

However, opinions are opinions, and for some reason the Wagners succeed in liberating settlements, and all attempts by the army command to portray at least something meaningful end with Ugledar.

It seems to me that the mutual hostility between the top leadership of the Ministry of Defense and Wagner, which has blossomed in Syria, has not gone away.

In fact, the “Wagners” were not removed from allowances, they definitely were not given a “shell hunger” in full, but simply began to be supplied according to army standards, like everyone else. And it immediately became clear that it was becoming problematic to give the same results. The problem with Wagner was not that they were lowered to army standards, but that these standards did not allow them to produce results. An enemy not suppressed by artillery fire is the key to an unsuccessful offensive.

Who generally develops these norms? I spoke with the participants of the "old" campaigns, sorry, but there were never enough shells along the way. The first and second Chechen, Georgian, and even in Syria, the shells were not so hot. Well, in Syria, logistics was the weak link.

Why until now these norms remain at the same level - this I do not understand. How the Ministry of Defense claims and on the basis of what these norms, with which nothing really can be done, and why so far no one has been puzzled by the revision, although it is clear that without this there will be no normal war - questions to which there will be no answers.

But there is an answer to the topic of how soon we should expect the next shell scandals. They will, and not only thanks to the standards of our Ministry of Defense. But more on that below.

In general, I repeat once again that this whole mess will continue to delight us with its growth as long as the system that has been established over the past 10-15 years exists in our army.

Why does Wagner have such indicators? "Corpses filled"? Yeah of course. Let's do without fairy tales, especially considering that Prigozhin was cut off the source of replenishment from the colonies. But let's admit that the success of the actions of PMCs in very specific types of combat is not just that, and it did not fall from the ceiling.

PMCs are not an army. The PMC is completely devoid of a huge and frankly stupid army bureaucracy. And personnel too. Everything is much easier there. The principles of elevation and career growth are very simple - your personal contribution to the common cause. And there is no need to curry favor with the higher authorities, who can wipe their feet on you, because they came from the district itself.

Well, plus, as far as I was able to find out, the "conductors" in Wagner are former career officers who left the army after the start of Serdyukov's reforms. Or who are gone. Established people with experience and a certain view of things.

And these people, in fact, created Wagner. In which there is no place for such sweet and familiar military phenomena as a young and not very sharp-minded person in a command position, who received it solely because dad is in the district or the Ministry of Defense. There is no place for "peacetime careerists" in PMCs. True, it should be noted that their number in the army also dropped sharply. Still dangerous in the army during the war, whatever one may say.

And in PMCs, outright boobies in uniform are not needed. Moreover, there is such a possibility to lead the offensive in the operation you invented. So the experience of the "musicians" is not applicable to the military environment, otherwise it will have to be reformed in the bud. Moreover, to reform on the living and backhand. Like in the bad old days of 1941. Reconsider everything: from the parameters for the selection of officers, to their training, promotion up the career ladder and material content.

And army standards are not for PMCs. Especially if you want real results. And until the artillery switches to precision-guided munitions, and drones will destroy what the art lacks-kamikaze, until the enemy's artillery is destroyed by the very first volleys after detection, until all such tasks are solved by thousands of shells fired over the areas - there will be shell hunger.

But the assault infantry, which, in fact, is the Wagner PMC, shells, mines and missiles will have to be issued without rationing. Despite the general shell hunger. Although it should not be, but here we move on to the most difficult moment.

Where to get ammo?

Here, perhaps, it is worth issuing the postulate that the war is waged not by armies, but by states. That is, in the aggregate, the army and the military-industrial complex behind it. The production of everything necessary for the conduct of hostilities is the main factor influencing success in the conduct of war.

The generals in the headquarters can be as brilliant as they want in the development of plans, the commanders can be experienced, and their personnel are well trained, but without equipment, fuel, weapons, ammunition, it is very doubtful that any army will be able to realize its potential.

“There are a lot of planes here, and the pilots are so self-confident that they hunt lone soldiers like hares. For one German aircraft, there are at least five British and American ones. For one hungry and tired German soldier in the trench - five energetic, fresh soldiers in the enemy's trench. For one loaf of German bread - fifty cans of stew from the enemy. We are not defeated, because as soldiers we are better and more experienced; we were simply crushed and thrown back by the multiple superiority of the enemy . Erich Paul Remarque, World War I soldier turned writer. It is hardly possible to find more suitable lines for illustration.

Today we talk a lot about the supply of tanks to Ukraine, self-propelled guns, infantry fighting vehicles and aircraft. We make predictions and reason, but behind all this, for some reason, we do not notice no less important and dangerous events.

The Norwegian-Finnish company Nammo, specializing in the production of ammunition, with subsidiaries in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Austria, USA and Canada, is going to increase the production of artillery shells by 10 (Ten) times. The company's factories produce a wide range of shells with a caliber of 120 and 155 mm, and besides these, also 20, 25, 27 and 30 mm. Mines and shells for MLRS.

And the question is, for whom?

The Czechoslovak Group holding will double the production of 155-mm shells to 100,000 by 2023. To do this, CSG acquired a 70% stake in the Italian ammunition company Fiocchi Munizioni.

The German company Rheinmetall AG has filed a €1.2 billion bid for Spanish ammunition manufacturer Expal Systems SA, which will allow Rheinmetall to increase production of 120 and 150 mm ammunition by at least 40%.

Do you understand what we are talking about? The fact that a very decent number of quite modern enterprises will work for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Statistics show that in 2022 the United States transferred 1,074,000 155-mm shells to Ukraine, this is a huge amount.

It is not known for certain how many other countries transferred, but there is no doubt about what was transferred. And not only 155-mm, generously shared the "unnecessary" Soviet 122-mm and 152-mm. It is clear that these deliveries are from old stocks, it is doubtful that 122 and 152 mm ammunition is produced in Europe due to lack of demand, but there is data on the production of 155 mm shells. The United States produced about 100,000 shells per year, Europe - about 300,000 pieces.

How many shells are produced in Russia - secret data. On the Web, the statements of “sources” are lingering that there will be no shell shortage, because we produce “many times more” shells than in the United States.

Okay, maybe. I would also like to know how many of these "times". And here it is worth noting that the United States does not wage war, and does not fire 50,000 shells a day.

There were attempts to try to estimate the volume of shell production based on the revenue of specialized enterprises, but this is so approximate that I don’t even want to talk about it, because it’s written on the water with a pitchfork. After all, enterprises (for example, JSC Plastmass Plant or JSC NIMI named after V.V. Bakhirev) produce more than one shells. There is a wider range of products, including civilian ones. On its fire extinguishing systems, the Bakhirev plant makes very decent revenue, very well-known products.

So counting from revenue is not very accurate. Some who have considered the maximum figure of 500,000 shells per year. This is indeed many times higher than in the United States.

Plus, there is such an article as the restoration of ammunition from past periods. This is also quite a normal practice, allowing you to replenish stocks.

On the whole, estimates of the stocks of shells of the Russian army are very approximate. On the Internet, a figure of 15 million shells at the beginning of the NWO was slipping. It is impossible to confirm or refute these figures, but there is data on shells restored after long-term storage.

In 2014-2017, 1.7 million ammunition and missiles of all types were recovered.
2018 - 550,000 missiles and ammunition recovered.
2020 - 300 thousand ammunition and 20 thousand shells for MLRS were restored.

A slight decrease in rates indirectly indicates that the warehouses were full at the time of the NWO. Quite a possible option.

But here it is worth talking about ammunition costs.

“Now I will not name figures, how many shells we spend per day, say. Those are big numbers."
V.V. Putin

But representatives of the Ukrainian partners, more like their commanders, calculated that the artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on average fired from 2 to 7 thousand rounds per day. In February-March-April, Russian troops fired up to 70 thousand rounds per day, in the summer 40-50 thousand rounds, in January-February 2023 5-20 thousand rounds per day. With such an intensity, the consumption of shells definitely goes into the millions, that is, since the beginning of hostilities, the Russian army has fired from 7 to 10 million shots.

Is it possible to use so many shells without pre-made supplies? Of course not. Meanwhile, the Russian army used precisely the tactics of super-concentration of barrels, which has its own side effects. And this is not a lunar landscape, no. This is the need to equip huge ammunition depots, keeping them out of the eyes of the enemy, who has already shown how the Hymars missiles can cope with insufficiently well-hidden ammo depots.

The second side effect is barrel wear. Any artillery system has a limited barrel resource, which averages several thousand rounds. The larger the caliber and weight of the propellant charge, the less resource. And in the NMD, the parties are trying to take their artillery systems away from the front line and therefore use full charges to fire at the maximum range.

It is worth noting that the last serious successes of the Russian army, namely the capture of Popasnaya, Severodonetsk and Lisichansk, became possible precisely thanks to the overactive artillery actions, as a result of which Popasnaya was wiped off the face of the earth and, as the authorities have already said, they will not restore it.

The most burning question arises: will the Russian military-industrial complex be able to withstand the combined efforts of US and European enterprises? Will the Russian factories be able to provide the army in the same way as the factories of Ukraine's allies will provide the artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine?

The German magazine Der Spiegel recently published information on the Europeans' plans for Ukraine:

- One billion euros to increase the supply of ammunition, mainly 155 mm.
- Purchase by the European Defense Agency EDA of 155-mm caliber ammunition from third-party manufacturers in order to replenish the stocks of EU countries and ensure the supply of shells to Ukraine in the long term.
- Increasing the production of ammunition in Europe itself (as mentioned above) "taking into account the changing security situation."

That is, almost all of Europe and partly the United States will work for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

And what will be able to counter this flow of shells with us?

Especially considering the fact that not so long ago our state corporation Rostec bankrupted and sold the Novosibirsk plant Sibselmash for a penny (500 million). Sold to the company Merkas LLC, which is engaged in the construction of residential complexes in the "liberated territories".

Sibselmash produced 12 million shells a year during the war years. By the forces of women and teenagers mostly.

Whether the plants that remained afloat will be able to produce shells is a question to which we will receive an answer in the very near future. In the spring, when the reserve corps and received "gifts" will be used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

But in Russia there will be someone to blame all the failures. On PMC "Wagner", which consume too many shells.

https://topwar-ru.translate.goog/212153-kak-pobedit-bez-snarjadov.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en

Because it is a spinn off of the 2S1 modernization project that is being carried in Russia for a while. They replace 122mm gun with 120 mm mortar there. Max range of fire is somewhere around 15 km only. 2S34 is the name.

Wonder if this mortar share the Nona feature, that is compatibility with bith Russiqn and NATO 120 mm mines.

The 2S18 Pat-S was supposed to be amphibious as well as being transported in existing cargo planes and possibly even para dropped. The gun itself is the 2А61 Pat-B 152mm gun with a lower recoil due to the distinctive muzzle break. A 155mm version was also developed for the export market. The main drawback was it's very limited range of about 15 km, which was significantly inferior to the 2S3. The Pat-K truck mounted gun, which I mentioned in the Malva threat, was also fitted with the 2A61 gun. None were adopted by the Military.

They should forget about an SP 152mm for the VDV unless they want to revert back to the 2A61 towed gun as an air drop option, but it's probably still not worth it.

I think they should rather get a replacement for the Grad-V. At least that will give them increased firepower. A modular design with thermobaric rockets and mine laying capabilities would be nice as well.