Russian Imports of Israeli UAVs
Mikhail Barabanov
Israeli-made unmanned aerial vehicles were the first major weapons system Russia began to import from the West in the late-2000s after a long pause that had lasted since 1945. Before Russia signed a contract for two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships with France in 2011, imports of Israeli UAVs were the main symbol of the Russian MoD’s new readiness to source its weapons from foreign suppliers.
The first contracts for Israeli drones attracted a lot of attention from the media and the expert community. But, unlike the MoD’s subsequent decisions to buy ships from France or Iveco LMV armored vehicles from Italy, they did not cause much controversy. Russia’s own defense industry is obviously lagging behind Western competitors in the UAV segment. That is why very few people questioned the rationale for importing such systems in order to gain access to the latest technologies and to start building up Russian expertise in operating this new weapons type.
The Russian armed forces already have some solid experience with large jet-engine UAVs; that experience dates back to Soviet times, when such systems were designed by the Tupolev Bureau. In the 1980s the Soviet armed forces also began to roll out light tactical drones (such as the Pchela UAV, a Yakovlev bureau design). But by the time the Soviet Union began to break up, its defense industry was already lagging well behind in the new miniaturized UAV segment. In the subsequent years Russia was in the throes of a deep economic crisis, and all defense procurement programs were put on hold for a decade and a half. During those years the Russian armed forces simply could not afford any new weapons, let alone radically new systems requiring expensive R&D. That period coincided with rapid progress in Western UAV technologies, which have made a veritable breakthrough over the past two decades.
As a result, by the time Russia had emerged from the economic crisis in the mid-2000s, a large gap separated it from the world leaders in building and operating UAVs. After 2000 the Russian defense industry made attempts to close that gap, but to no great avail. That industry itself was in decline; to make matters worse, several strategic errors were made in the planning of UAV programs. In particular, for a long time the government was trying to get the necessary results in the UAV segment from the existing design bureaus which specialized in large aircraft (Tupolev, Sukhoi, and Yakovlev), or from the old Soviet makers of electronics, which had no experience at all with such products. For example, at one point the government designated the Vega electronics concern as the lead Russian designer of UAVs. Also, there was no clear understanding that the success of any UAV design depends primarily on the control and payload systems, not on the airframe. The Russian MoD was initially wary of using commercially available or imported payload solutions, and tried to use indigenously made electronics, which were manifestly obsolete.
Meanwhile, one of the main difficulties faced by the military was a total lack of experience in operating modern drones; neither was there a clear understanding of what that technology is actually capable of. As a result the MoD was finding it difficult even to formulate its own requirements to UAVs. It did not really know how that technology can be used, what role it can be assigned in the armed forces, what to do with the UAV-generated reconnaissance data, etc. In other words, the military did not understand what drones are for, and what to do with them.
In such a situation, buying modern commercially available UAVs seemed like the quickest and the most obvious solution to the problem. After all, that is exactly what many other countries are doing. By receiving small batches of modern foreign-made drones, the armed forces can assess their capability and gain some initial experience in their use, determine the role they can play in the military strategies, assess the various available technologies, train personnel, and lay the ground for future training programs.
When Russia was choosing the supplier of UAV technology, there were two clear world leaders in that segment, the United States and Israel. Approaching the United States was unthinkable for political reasons, so Israel was the natural choice. The decision was made easier by a significant improvement in Russian-Israeli relations saw in almost every area throughout the 2000s.
First experience with Aeronautics Defense Systems
Some individual Russian companies attempted to take the initiative and establish cooperation in UAV technology with Israeli suppliers as far back as the early 2000s. In 2002 the Irkut corporation signed a cooperation agreement with Aeronautics Defense Systems, a small Israeli defense company. Under the terms of the deal, ADS-designed Aerostar tactical drones (which have a range of up to 250km) were to be used in conjunction with the Be-200ChS aircraft by the Russian Emergencies Ministry. Irkut wanted to buy them as part of a ministry-commissioned project called “Aerial robotic monitoring and liquidation of emergency situations”, and use them to detect forest fires. The project was advertized by Irkut at the MAKS-2003 air show.
The Russian company viewed cooperation with ADS as a way of entering the UAV market before launching independent R&D projects in this segment, including the development of drones for military applications. In October 2003 Irkut president A. Fedorov had this to say: «The new project of Irkut corporation, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, is a very promising segment of military and civilian aerospace technology. Our first experience here is a small drone which we are working on for the Emergencies Ministry. We expect that this drone will work in tandem with the Be-200 amphibious aircraft to deal with fires and other emergencies. This is a very competitive market, and Russia is lagging well behind the world leaders such as Israel, the United States and EADS. That is why Ikrut has taken an unusual step: rather than trying to develop out first UAV independently, we are doing it in cooperation with foreign partners. We have chosen a foreign company which has a lot of experience in this area, a small privately-owned Israeli company which is making a lot of progress and strengthening its positions in this market segment. We will work together to develop this drone and win a share of the market for small UAVs.»1
The actual contract for a batch of Aerostar UAVs, worth «several million dollars», was signed by Irkut and ADS in September 2004.2 But the Israeli company then walked out of the deal, saying that it could not obtain the necessary permissions from the Israeli defense ministry. Relations between Irkut and ADS were broken off.3
It is known, however, that at about the same time the Russian Federal Security Service, the FSB, bought from ADS several Skystar aerostat observation systems. They were used to provide security during the G8 summit in St Petersburg in 2006.4
In early 2010 the Kommersant newspaper reported that the FSB was in talks with ADS to buy at least five Orbiter-series mini-UAVs, which have a range of 15 to 100 km. The report was denied by the FSB press service,5 but unofficial sources insist that the deal has in fact been signed.
Contracts with Israel Aerospace Industries
Contacts between the Russian MoD and Israel to discuss the purchase of military UAVs are thought to have begun soon after the appointment of Anatoliy Serdyukov as defense minister in early 2007. Russian interest in Israeli-made drones was spurred by the fact that Georgia used such drones (primarily the Hermes 450 UAVs bought from Elbit Systems) during a confrontation with Russian forces in Abkhazia in the spring of 2008 and during the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008. According to official reports, five Georgian Hermes 450 drones were shot down by Russian and Abkhaz air defenses during the stand-off in Abkhazia. The fact that Elbit Systems had sold its UAVs to Georgia made it politically impossible for Moscow to approach the company. That is why Russia chose another leading Israeli drone maker, the state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).
Lengthy talks with the Israelis initially ran into opposition by the United States, which did not want advanced Israeli technology to fall into the hands of the Russians. But American objections to the proposed deal were lifted following the arrival of the Obama administration, which announced its Reset policy on Russia. Nevertheless, for reasons which probably included American pressure, Israel refused to sell its MALE-class, long-range IAI Heron UAVs. But it did approve the sale of shorter-range drones, including the IAI Bird-Eye mini-UAV (up to 10km range), and two tactical drones, the IAI I-View Mk 150 (up to 100km range) and the Searcher Mk II (up to 250km range). At a later point Russia decided against buying the I-View Mk 150, in an apparent belief that the drone had already become obsolete.
In April 2009 Rosoboronexport and IAI signed an historic contract for a batch of various reconnaissance drones worth 53m dollars, to be delivered to the Russian MoD. Under the terms of the deal, IAI supplied an undisclosed number of Bird-Eye 400 and Searcher Mk II UAV sets, with three drones in each set. Final deliveries under the contract were made in late 2010.
That same year Russia placed an order for an additional batch of the IAI Bird-Eye 400 and IAI Searcher Mk II UAVs worth about 50m dollars, bringing the overall value of the contracts with IAI to an estimated 100m dollars.6
The drones were delivered to the Russian Defense Ministry’s R&D centers and the 1327th UAV Combat Training Center in Kolomna, Moscow Region (created in 2009 from the former 924th center in Yegoryevsk). Later in 2011 the Bird-Eye 400 mini-UAVs were transferred from the Kolomna center to Army reconnaissance units.7 Several Searcher Mr II drones were assigned to two special reconnaissance brigades which were formed in the North Caucasus in the past few years (there are plans for a total of 10 such Army brigades). The Russian operators of the IAI drones were trained by Israeli instructors at the Kubinka testing range near Moscow.8
In addition to extensive testing, the Israeli drones were used in a number of large Army maneuvers in 2010-2012.
In October 2010 the OPK Oboronprom corporation (a sister company of Rosoboronexport and part of the Rostekhnologii group) signed a 400m-dollar contract with IAI to assemble the Searcher Mk II and the Bird-Eye 400 tactical UAVs in Russia for the Ministry of Defense. The two drone models were given the local designations Forpost and Zastava, respectively. Russia initially chose the Kazan Helicopter Plant to host the new venture, but in 2011 that choice was changed in favor of the Urals Civil Aviation Plant (UZGA), an Oboronprom affiliate in Yekaterinburg.9 Some 10m dollars has been invested in the venture at UZGA. Tests of the first Forpost and Zastava drones assembled from Israeli components in Yekaterinburg were scheduled to begin in October-November 2012.10
In 2011 the MoD placed an order with UZGA for a total of 27 Zastava sets (worth 1.329bn roubles) and 10 Forpost sets (worth 9.006bn roubles), for delivery in 2012-2014.11
The size of the contract indicates that the Searcher Mk II and the Bird-Eye 400 will form the core of the Russian armed forces’ UAV fleet in their respective segments (tactical and mini-UAVs) for the coming decade. The Israeli technology will be dominant over that period, even though the MoD has also signed several contracts to develop indigenous Russian UAVs.
Throughout the talks with the Israelis Russia continued to seek the permission to buy the MALE-class long-range IAI Heron drones, which have a range of 1,000-1,500 km and can stay aloft for 40-50 hours. To the best of our knowledge, however, Israel is refusing to budge - owing perhaps to pressure from the United States. The largest drone the Israeli government has approved for sale to Russia so far is the Searcher Mk II.
Other possible options
The large contracts signed by the Russian MoD with IAI have been a positive signal for other Israeli companies, who are also trying to win a share of the Russian UAV market. Two small Israeli drone makers, BlueBird Aero Systems ?? Innocon, opened their offices in Russia in 2011, although no actual deals have been signed with them, as far as we are aware.12
The Russian military are said to have been slightly underwhelmed by their first experience with the IAI drones, both in terms of the UAVs’ operational capabilities and their ability to withstand the Russian climate.13 In 2012 the MoD was reportedly showing interest in the UAVs made by the already mentioned ADS. In December 2011 the Israeli company hosted a senior delegation from the ministry. The two sides were said to be negotiating a possible contract for Orbiter and Aerostar-series UAVs. In May 2012 these talks were continued on behalf of the MoD by OAO Oboronservis, a company consisting of former military repair plants and still subordinated to the ministry.14 The MoD was reportedly interested in three UAV types: the Orbiter 2 mini-drones, the Aerostar tactical UAVs, and the Skystar light unmanned observation aerostats. It wanted to buy eight drone sets of each type, 24 sets in total, to test them in action; each set includes two or three drones. The proposed contract is estimated at 53m dollars.15
Development of indigenous Russian UAVs is currently one of the MoD’s top R&D spending priorities. Nevertheless, for the next several years the ministry will rely on importing mini-UAVs and tactical drones from Israel. It appears that foreign suppliers won’t sell Russia their large, long-endurance MALE and HALE-class drones for political reasons. In this particular segment the MoD will have to wait for indigenous R&D projects to deliver. Until then the Russian military will have no experience in operating such systems.
It remains unclear whether and to what extent the MoD is satisfied with its relationship with IAI. One likely area of concern is access to advanced UAV technologies. For now, the UZGA plant merely assembles Israeli-designed drones from large components supplied from Israel itself. Some Israeli and Western commentators have expressed concerns that Russia will try to copy or reverse-engineer the drones it buys from Israel. That seems unlikely. Copying foreign technology would run counter to the long-established practices of Russian defense R&D. All the Russian defense technology developers seek to promote their own designs for reasons of prestige and access to financing, even where other approaches would be more effective. In the long run, therefore, Israeli UAVs will be gradually replaced by indigenous Russian technology. The drones currently being imported are meant primarily as demonstration units for Russian UAV developers and for the Russian military.
1. INTERFAX-AVN, October 22, 2003.
2. Yediot Ahronot, 19.09.2004.
3. Haaretz, 12.08.2004.
4. www.prleap.com/pr/46530.
5. bmpd.livejournal.com/229482.html.
6. In Strategic flight // Elspert-Ural, August 27, 2012.
7. twower.livejournal.com/757224.html.
8. Fedutinov D. UAVs: results and trends of 2011 // Natsionalnaya Oborona. No 12, 2011.
9. In September 2012 control of UZGA was transferred from Oboronprom to United Engine Corporation (ODK).
10. Production of UAVs begins in Sverdlovsk Region // Oblastnaya Gazeta (Yekaterinburg), September 6, 2012.
11. 2011 Annual Report of OAO Urals Civil Aviation Plant // www.uwca.ru/about/official.
12. Fedutinov D. UAVs: results and trends of 2011 // Natsionalnaya Oborona. No 12, 2011.
13. shurigin.livejournal.com/349846.html.
14. Ibid.
15. Russia considers buying 50m dollars worth of Israeli UAVs // RIA Novosti, May 15, 2012.
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, but are UAVs, esp. large stealthy, and expensive ones vulnerable to EMP? If this is so then what measures are currently being taken to eliminate this fatal weakness, and how does Russia try to exploit it?