PAK FA, T-50: News #1

Everybody looking for SCUDs in DESERT STORM wasn't a B-2 and they didn't have the sensor fit the B-2 had.

I agree perfectly with your assertion SOC....but not in the way you intend.

The area coverage and data processing ability of the sensor suit of the entire B2's fleet don't match, by a very large margin, even only those of one of the several E-8 J-STARs that was committed to the Scud hunting roles in Gulf War , for not say the fleets of SAR equipped F-15E, "Lantirn" equipped F-18s and F-16s and several Uk's SAS, US's Commandos and Israeli Shaldag special forces squad used purposely as ground scout and target designators .....all of that in a very limited kill-box area of South West Iraq.

Wanting to provide a rough ratio between the area coverage and data processing capabilities between the sensors of entire B-2's fleet and those of the aircraft and ground forces operating in this limited area of Iraq hunting for Scud's TEL we would obtain probably something on the range of several hundreds to one.

That was just smart mission planning. We had the EW/SEAD assets available, so we used them.

Obviously not.
When, in 1991,USAF was sure to be capable to avoid completely the potential (...and reduced thanks to low-observability) area of detection of its F-117 by part of Iraqi air defense,thanks to pre-mission-computable flight's routes accounting for the well- known position of each enemy FIXED SA-2 and SA-3 battery and the altitude limits of the mobile export SA-6 batteries [/b], mandatorily employed F-117 Nighthawk's squadrons in STRICT SOLITARY missions just to preserve theirs security.

In Kosovo War the solitary initiative of the commander of a single battery of SA-3 represented the unexpected variable contributing to the departure from this well established CONOPs for stealth bombers.

The "home-made" modifications executed by this Serbian SAM battery's commander -Col. Zoltan Dani- ,a true passionate of its work ,that had procured for himself a rich, restricted technical literature about latest evolutions in SAM's design and theirs tactically employment in a modern environment, had rendered its export and largely downgraded battery of antediluvian SA-3 (that was ,anyhow, the unique SAM system in the theatre with the ceiling to engage NATO aircraft flying at medium-to-high altitude) a battery much more similar to a relatively modern SAM of its times, capable to:
- Travel off road at increased speed
- Shorten the deployment/un-deployment cycle to dozen of minutes instead of an hour
- Increase of several times the original 24 W/MHz jamming signal rejection of SNR-125 radar
- Increase range of detection and tracking of “low observable” targets (anyhow very far from the laughable metropolitan legends circulating on this subject)
- Reduce significantly time of reaction of the battery
- Increase fuse’s sensibility for better missile's Pk in near-misses detonations

Z. Dani’s battery so modified ( in spite of ,obviously, showing performances and operative parameters anyhow dozens of times inferior to true up-to-date SAM systems of the time and being capable to engage only a single target for battery) ,also thanks to the good proficiency of its crew , became quickly a true killer battery ,unique of its kind ,on the top list of the most “wanted” Serbian SAM batteries by part of NATO’s J-Stars and SEAD/DEAD groups.
It was capable to down one F-117 (and heavily damage another ), down an F-16 , damage two A-10s without suffering a single life or equipment loss in the entire Air-Missile NATO Campaign !

Among the effects that the achievements of this SINGLE well manned battery of a largely downgraded export version of an antediluvian SAM system ,modified with totally “home-made” measures to achieve a scarce surrogate of a part of the capabilities in possession of modern SAM systems of the time, was to FORCE NATO planners to commit escort EA-6B Prowler jamming aircraft F-16s (for HARM delivery ) and F-15s to provide air coverage from eventual enemy interceptors for this “high-observable” strike group.

From Lessons of Kosovo: More B-2 Bombers? by Chris Hellman, Weekly Defense Monitor, Volume 3, Issue No. 24

Stealth technology did not bring about the anticipated reduction in support aircraft needed for combat operations.
After the March 27 crash of an F-117A "Stealth" fighter, both the F-117As and B-2s begin flying with escorts of Navy EA-6B radar jamming aircraft.

The Air Force decided to retire its fleet of radar-jamming EF-111 "Ravens" in 1991 primarily because it envisioned a fleet of stealthy F-117As, B-2s and F-22 fighters operating without the jamming support needed by conventional aircraft.

The Pentagon's reversal on the need for radar-jammers left the Navy's fleet of fleet of 91 EA-6B "Prowlers," -- 30 of which were used to support air operations in Kosovo -- overburdened by the unexpected new requirements to escort F-117As and B-2s. As a result, the Navy has stated it will need at least 50 additional jammer aircraft.

Maj. Gen. Dennis G. Haines, Air Combat Command's director of combat operations, acknowledged the significance of the Air Force's lack of a jamming capability. At a conference on June 24, the General said, "stealth reduces the signature of an aircraft but it does not make it invisible. We have really neglected [electronic warfare]."

This ability to operate autonomously has long been a big selling point used by B-2 supporters. Repeatedly the Air Force stated how the B-2 dramatically cut operational costs by reducing support requirements. In a now famous chart, two B-2s with a combined crew of four armed with smart munitions were shown to be capable of performing the same mission that would normally require 55 aircraft of all types and over 100 aircrew.

Yet in practice, the B-2 did not operate alone during Operation Allied Force.
Flying out of Whiteman AFB in pairs, B-2s required mid-air refuelings for each leg of the 30 hour round trip mission.
Over the target area, B-2s were escorted by F-15s which provided air cover, F-16s to provide fire suppression against enemy anti-aircraft systems, as well as support from airborne air traffic controllers and systems which monitored enemy communications, as well as their "Prowler" escort. In all, often more than a dozen aircraft supported B-2 missions.

And it can do that over denied airspace when required.

I think that after having seen after what circumstances the jamming ,SEAD and DCA escort package became a requirement for B-2s strike groups in THIS operational environment i am sure that also you will agree that this hypothesis appear completely out of line.

1. Yup, they changed from high to low altitude penetration as it was far safer once craploads of S-300s started appearing.

SOC with me is not necessary to hide behind a finger.

S-300's introduction was indeed the main catalyzing factor for changing main mission flight's profile of B-2 Spirit to low altitude terrain following profile and the simple reason for that was that all modeled projections of intrusion missions in URSS's airspace ,accounting for the REAL range of detection and tracking of B-2 by part of Soviet IAD's elements of the times ,shown that it was NOT SURVIVABLE traveling at high altitude.
After that, it was opted to completely discontinue the program at only 21 airframes completed, also in reason of the fact that its true mission – deliver from relative close range high precision tactical nuclear bombs to stop the quickly shifting Soviet front’s advancement in Europe , a mission that was not possible to carry-on with stand-off cruise missiles – had effectively vanished after URSS’s collapse.

B-2 fleet was NEVER intended do go to the hunt of Soviet mobile ICBM launchers (a task for which, taking also into account the immense landmass , time to the selected enemy sector from NORAD, presence of inflatable/self-propelled decoys, redeploying underground tunnels and ,even the area coverage and processing capability of the whole NATO’s ISR fleet would result totally insufficient even to track a single TEL) ; the info-war operative responsible for the conceiving and spreading of this shoddy notion should truly receive a price for the phantasy and the…courage .

Russian radars will now be being designed to not reject insect sized targets that fly more than 50km/h because such an insect is clearly not an insect and is certainly not noise.

GarryB ,luckily, no known insect is even only near to the size of the real radar returns of such aircraft.
Now THAT would represent a true danger for the world .

antediluvian SA-3

Mindstorm,

I won't stand for this ...insulting descriptions of what is probably the most successful Soviet PVO system ever. It can still hold it's ground and is still being sold today in it's S-125 2M (and similar) version.

At least SOC is not being called SOM anymore

I wanted to reply to SOC but couldnt have argued better than Mindstorm , Good Post Mindstorm and Good Post All of them.

I read the reason why the F-117 was partially damaged or slightly is becase the Firecontrol Radar could not guide the SA-3 close enough for the Proximity Fuse and Warhead to do enough damage , The F-117 stealth was still working good enough in the band where SA-3 FC radar had problems tracking and guiding accurately to the target.

So even though the SA-3 reached close to F-117 and the warhead exploded it was not close enough to cripple the aircraft.

Although they claim that computing power means curved aerodynamic effecient surface was possible without compromising stealth but I feel F-117 had the best All Aspect Stealth of all LO aircraft even though it was just a flying brick.

Austin wrote:I wanted to reply to SOC but couldnt have argued better than Mindstorm , Good Post Mindstorm and Good Post All of them.

I read the reason why the F-117 was partially damaged or slightly is becase the Firecontrol Radar could not guide the SA-3 close enough for the Proximity Fuse and Warhead to do enough damage , The F-117 stealth was still working good enough in the band where SA-3 FC radar had problems tracking and guiding accurately to the target.

So even though the SA-3 reached close to F-117 and the warhead exploded it was not close enough to cripple the aircraft.

Although they claim that computing power means curved aerodynamic effecient surface was possible without compromising stealth but I feel F-117 had the best All Aspect Stealth of all LO aircraft even though it was just a flying brick.

Don't forget, that missiles were old and now they are even older. If proximity fuse work and activate warhead, that FC radar bring missile close enough, in opposite it wouldn't work and warhead will not be activated (target missed). Problem could be also in old warhead, that id didn't explode properly and send enough fragments to the plane. In that case plane was damaged, but not shot down.

Mindstorm wrote:I think that after having seen after what circumstances the jamming ,SEAD and DCA escort package became a requirement for B-2s strike groups in THIS operational environment i am sure that also you will agree that this hypothesis appear completely out of line.

The US constantly evaluates the jamming possibility in every single theater . We have dedicated centers that carry out assessment of electromagnetic threats . Such centers are un matched anywhere in the world.

http://www.arl.army.mil/www/default.cfm?page=1557&goback=%2Egmp_3665454%2Egde_3665454_member_202326728

There was no need for any escort jammers for the B2s or F 117s . The F117 got shot down in Kosovo because the Serbs got lucky . We were following the same flight path day in day out and therefore became targets .

If they were lucky then then they need good amount of skills and planning to be that lucky.

Every one needs luck one can argue the second F-117 was lucky to just return home damaged they could have easily fallen down to the SAM and Zoltan Dani shot other aircraft too and damaged few other.

He and his SAM team must have been the most luckiest people in Balkan Conflict , I am sure they must have been the Darling of NATO Aerial Bombardement and getting back alive and hearty is indeed very lucky

Austin wrote:If they were lucky then then they need good amount of skills and planning to be that lucky.

ROFLMAO Your sense of humor is contagious . Is this something quintessential Indian ? If you are lucky what's the f***ing need for skills and planning ?

I see there is another Indian member in this forum who in another thread has described how 2 MIG 29 fought and won against 4 F 16s in some test of manhood fight with ....guess who Pakistan . Guess that guy needs serious medication .


Indians here in the US have made a name for themselves in comedy ... not hard to find out why .

Well what you look at it as plain luck , I look at it as Skills , Persistance , Patience and Planning with a fair bit of luck .....I am sure the air defence folks of iraq were not that lucky nor were other SAM units in Balkans

I am sure Zoltan Dani had a fair bit of creative imagination , skills along with some luck ......I am sure so did the other F-117 guy who came back to base with his bird he was lucky too

Austin wrote:I am sure Zoltan Dani had a fair bit of creative imagination , skills along with some luck

Of course ...coz of which our friend Zoltan Dani managed to shoot just 1 aircraft in his entire lifetime .

Austin stop replying to this tard. Not worth it.

War&Peace wrote:

Austin wrote:I am sure Zoltan Dani had a fair bit of creative imagination , skills along with some luck

Of course ...coz of which our friend Zoltan Dani managed to shoot just 1 aircraft in his entire lifetime .

And NATO managed to blow up 15 decoys. Good job.

The F-117 took one on the nose, admit it.

War&Peace wrote:

Austin wrote:If they were lucky then then they need good amount of skills and planning to be that lucky.

ROFLMAO Your sense of humor is contagious . Is this something quintessential Indian ? If you are lucky what's the f***ing need for skills and planning ?

Why don't you aquatint yourself with the operation of such a complex as old as the S-125, in a very hostile environment with serious enemy air power, and then get back to use about it just being luck?

After over two months of completely unhindered operations, not just the US but all of NATO could not defeat the Serbian air defence network... it was just as dangerous on the first day as it was on the last. The result was a lot of wasted ordinance, height limits for all aircraft that resulted in a lot of collateral damage including Albanian tractors being mistaken for Serbian tanks.

Yeah... must have been luck.

There was no need for any escort jammers for the B2s or F 117s . The F117 got shot down in Kosovo because the Serbs got lucky .

Obviously you are entitled of an opinion ,but with equal obviousness, is important that you remember that this was NOT the opinion of USAF Command when them ordered URGENTLY all F-117 and B-2, in strike missions, to be escorted by HARM equipped F-16s, F-15 in DCA and EA-6B jammers (to the point that the 30 deployed initially found themselves quickly overburdened )


About luck , the Commander of the 3 battery of 250th Air Defense Missile Brigade -Col. Zoltan Dani- should have had a truly legendary one, taking into account that its battery:

- Heavily damaged another F-117
- Downed an F-16
- Damaged very heavily one A-10 and lightly another one
- not suffered a single life or material loss in the entire campaign (in spite being the most wanted SAM battery in the theatre and that all JSTAR and SEAD/DEAD squadrons conducted literally hundreds of missions purposely aimed against him).

All of that while all other Air defense batteries, in spite of hundreds of SAMs shots, was uncapable to down any aircraft (but only some BGM-109s).


If you are in search of an explanation for those "very strange" events more serious than the action of an....superhuman selective luck , i can aid you pointing out a thing or two about organization of Air Campaign against those immensely inferior enemies that NATO so much love to attack.

The immensely outdated IADs (Iraqi KARI was the same) of nations attacked by NATO in the latest conflicts was all structured around
1) A bulk of high-altitude FIXED air defense SAM batteries –mostly represented by export and vastly downgraded versions of antediluvian S-75 and S-125 [SA-2 and SA-3 NATO]
2) A layer of middle-altitude MOBILE air defense SAM batteries - mostly composed by 2K12E “Kvadrat” (downgraded export version of first model of 2K12 “Kub” [SA-6 NATO]
3) A most “internal” low-altitude and point defense layer – composed mostly by 9K31E and ZSU-23-4

You will easily realize as the main task for NATO Air Forces, in those conflicts, was merely to acquire the exact position of the fixed high altitude batteries and attack theirs positions with barrages of stand-off cruise missiles and long range PGMs (none of theirs Air defense was effectively capable to engage air munitions) to attempt to destroy or suppress them or at least create the conditions for the strike squadrons to plan their mission flight’s pact to avoid completely the zone of engagement footprint of those fixed SAM.
In general ,for the better protected positions of enemy SAMs in need to be attacked, anyhow, for the presence of a strategically important target, NATO strike groups widely employed stand-off jamming , massive HARM’s delivery and engagement radar target’s oversaturation to eliminate or ,at least enormously diminish, the danger that them posed.

The tactics and measures just mentioned was possible, in particular, for the effect of the interaction of several technical parameters typical of those downgraded export versions of early S-125s.
Them was ,in facts, capable to engage only a single air target for each battery , had a jamming signal density’s rejection threshold of 24 W/MHz at 100 km (for comparison the 1993 modernized export "Pechora-2T” had, at the same conditions, a rejection threshold of 2700 W/MHz !!) , had time of reaction widely surpassing the minute !!!

All the SEAD and strike group of aircraft , at this point can simply fly long the upper altitude limits of engagement of the 2K12E “Kvadrat” for conduct theirs missions in relative safety, in the instance an SA-6’s shot was detected were sufficient few second to literally exit outside theirs engagement reach rendering the SAM’s shot inefficient.

In substance the home-made measures implemented by Col. Z. Dani rendered the unique type of SAM in the theatre with the ceiling to engage any NATO aircraft in theirs mission (S-125), a SAM much more similar (even if, likely ,still several dozen of times inferior ) to an up-to-date SAM system of the time and rendered its position impossible to know in advance for NATO planners.
This was sufficient for “transform” its battery in a true killer, moreover impervious to almost any concerted attempt ,by part of all the NATO’s SEAD/DEAD groups to destroy or incapacitate him.

As you can see now neither NATO aircraft high survivability neither the lethality of Zoltan Dani’s “unique” S-125 battery have anything to do with luck, but simply with the exploitation, by part of NATO aircraft, of strict TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS of the antediluvian SAM systems them confronted and by part of Col. Dani of variation to CONOPS and TECHNICAL MODIFICATIONS aimed at render inefficient or less efficient several technical and tactical solutions used by NATO Air Forces.

Mindstorm wrote:
About luck , the Commander of the 3 battery of 250th Air Defense Missile Brigade -Col. Zoltan Dani- should have had a truly legendary one, taking into account that its battery:

- Heavily damaged another F-117
- Downed an F-16
- Damaged very heavily one A-10 and lightly another one
- not suffered a single life or material loss in the entire campaign (in spite being the most wanted SAM battery in the theatre and that all JSTAR and SEAD/DEAD squadrons conducted literally hundreds of missions purposely aimed against him).

You know this debate is getting more & more hilarious by the hour . Zoltan Dani according to you was such a larger than life soldier that he carried out all the above mentioned impossible tasks all by himself .

Has he ever explained why he chose NOT to share such best practices with his other Serbian brothers so that they could have shot down B2s & F 117s left , right & center

He hasn't .... coz he can't ....coz he knows there ain't any . Soon after retiring from the army our friend Zoltan Dani writes a book which was advertised by him as a step by step guide on shooting down stealth aircrafts

However, Dani ( Holy be his name ) could NOT sell any copies of this great literary work in Europe . So Dani swims across the pond and arrives in the Land of the Free , Home of the Brave to resurrect his rotten luck .

But the content of his work was so sub standard that he found no luck in the US either . When asked how he manged to shoot down our F 117 he says he brought about certain changes to the warhead which is classified . No wonder this moron never manged to sell his book . I will be surprised to know that he has found any kind of work since then .

You know this debate is getting more & more hilarious by the hour .

Exactly !
And what is even more hilarious is that you ,even unawarely, are the true comic star of the show

Zoltan Dani according to you was such a larger than life soldier that he carried out all the above mentioned impossible tasks all by himself .

Exactly ,to the letter.

Note : Naturally "by himself" include also the high professionalism and strict adherence to the revisited S-125's concept of operation by part of all the crew manning its battery ; crew that it had purposely selected and trained just for the operational cycles and fire discipline for its "two missile/semi-mobile" S-125 battery.

Has he ever explained why he chose NOT to share such best practices with his other Serbian brothers so that they could have shot down B2s & F 117s left , right & center

Oh my....

Ok, try to significantly modify the CONOPS and technical design of some critical components of a system fruit of an US's R&D programs and test and validation phase several years long ,moreover even pretending to force theirs adoption by part of an entire branch of Armed Forces and i strongly suspect that you will be incriminated on the spot for dangerous tampering of Federal assets and intentional aggravated attack to US's security by military authorities

Naturally acting in a totally independent and not-authorized way, you could manage to execute some important modifications, for example, to the seekers of the AIM-120 C7s mounted on the F-15C's squadron you lead (because you received some info on some enemy ECM purposely designed to suppress or seduce the original AIM-120C7's digital seeker) ; after, in a conflict of just some 70 days, you discover ,on the field, that while the F-15Cs of all other squadron are literally decimated because their AIM-120C7 are systematically neutralized/seduced, the F-15Cs of your squadrons continue to obtain very good results ,against any odd, even against crushingly superior outnumbering enemies.

After 14 years a guy appear on internet and ask why ,"if those modifications to AIM-120C7 was so efficient, all F-15s was not equipped with them".....

Simply PRICELESS !!

LOl, someone sounds angry that that "moron" took down a supposedly stealth aircraft with an ancient missile system.

Once again, aquatint yourself with S-125 operations before calling it luck.

The second F-117 has been reported by several US sources as well... but depending on what the agenda is they either downplay or exaggerate it's significance.

Riccioni, Colonel Everest E:

Note: This event, which occurred during the Kosovo conflict on 27 March, was a major blow to the US Air Force. The aircraft was special: an F-117 Nighthawk stealth bomber that should have been all but invisible to the Serbian air defences.

And this certainly wasn't a fluke—a few nights later, Serb missiles damaged a second F-117.


The advocates of stealth have never understood that it isn’t design to stealth that makes aircraft unsensed by the enemy. It is the cost of design to stealth that reduces the operational force to the point that it will seldom be in operation. Proof — we possess only 21 stealthy B–2 bombers instead of the 135 that the fully funded program was to buy! Can one win a war against a powerful country with 21 bombers that fly at half the frequency of the B-52 Stratobomber? Of course not. We can only fight small, very weak nations like Somalia, Serbia, Vietnam, Panama, Afghanistan, Iraq, and teeny Grenada — so we do. They fight us asymmetrically — making our expensive preparations for war fruitless. We win these campaigns about half the time. And even after winning, we sometimes lose the war.


Of the three aircraft shot down during our incursion into Serbia, one was an F–16 flown by a pilot doing other than he was directed to do, and two were the most stealthy F–117 Night Hawks, one of which staggered back to its home base never to fly again, so it is seldom counted. With our extensive use of Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) ordinary aircraft survive just as well as the stealthy ones. Some claim that the Raptor has the signature of a bird. True, but only in the forward quarter, co altitude, and only to enemy fighter radars. It is quite visible to ground based radars.

Source:
Colonel Riccioni, Everest E. "Description of our Failing Defence Acquisition System." Project on government oversight, 8 March 2005

There was an interesting discussion on the MyCity-Military Forum (http://www.mycity-military.com/) a few years ago on this topic. Some of the posters there are ex radar operators and a some took part in the war.

(this is from my notes)

After the first successful detection of a stealth target, the appearance, strength and unique fluctuation of the signal on the radar screen were known. A special code was assigned and was passed on to other units.

The 450th SAM Regiment based near the town of Kraljevo, south from the 125th Brigade, also detected stealth targets on several occasions but was not in a position to engage.

...

I wouldn't rule out the B-2 incident completely either, however unlikely it might seem. There is a report of a damaged B-2 during the war but the official explanation given was that it was an accident during aerial refueling.

this is Almaz-Antey's opinion of the B-2 (3:36) and the F-22 (5:56)

Cyberspec wrote:I wouldn't rule out the B-2 incident completely either, however unlikely it might seem. There is a report of a damaged B-2 during the war but the official explanation given was that it was an accident during aerial refueling.

B-2 stayed completely out of range of SAM using standoff weapons to take out its target.

The B-2 going down is a redhearing chances are even if it got detected as Zoltan mentions he saw something on the radar that had low rcs like F-117 he could have done little to bring it down.

What ever Zoltan did is simply awesome under pressure and when completly blanketed by Enemy Air Superiority and SEAD/DEAD mission to survie itself is a big challenge and to survive and bring down some of assets using 60's AD and Radar system is worth every praise.

I am sure of Zoltan had been Russian citizen he would have received Hero Of Russia Award for his feat.

War&Peace wrote:So Dani swims across the pond and arrives in the Land of the Free , Home of the Brave to resurrect his rotten luck . But the content of his work was so sub standard that he found no luck in the US either .

Unless he has a facination for jumping into troubled waters I don't think he chose to swim .

Col Dani was INVITED to the US by a host of defense contractors who have since then used his expertise to fine tune their own SAM systems . Subsequently his expertise has also been used by leading Chinese defense contractors to help them refine Chinese SAM systems .

Mindstorm can ELINT system like the Russian Vega and Valeria are capable of passively tracking Stealth Aircraft ?

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Warpac-Rus-PLA-ESM.html#mozTocId992026

I recollected reading Czech and Ukranian system called Tamara and Kolchuga were mentioned by AW&ST as capable of tracking stealth fighter based on ELINT ,Triangualation etc

Austin wrote:Mindstorm can ELINT system like the Russian Vega and Valeria are capable of passively tracking Stealth Aircraft ?

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Warpac-Rus-PLA-ESM.html#mozTocId992026

I recollected reading Czech and Ukranian system called Tamara and Kolchuga were mentioned by AW&ST as capable of tracking stealth fighter based on ELINT ,Triangualation etc

Obviously is not possible to respond to this question in absolute terms because probability of a successfull extraction of useful noncooperative radio emissions, along the available spectrum of your receiver, to obtain stable target's positional data is the product of dozen of different variables pertaining both to the emitter - such as radiated power managementg, sidelobes reduction ,frequency hopping, phase modulation techniques ,pulse compression and modulation etc...- and the receiver - such as effective bandwidth ,demodulation potential for single or integrated systems architecture, receiver spatial arrangement, data processing speed/sharing/dissemination , selective pulse/CW cancellation's speed etc...-.


The capability of those systems to detect or track an aircraft, therefore, has nothing to do with its RCS but exclusively with the technical characteristics of enemy radio on-board emitting systems.

For finish ,at second of the year of production, systems falling under some of the names by you mentioned change enormously for performances offered in detecting, classify and triangulate position of the most up-to-date LPI radars and jamming systems, above all if inserted in a well designed IAD.

Some of the radars in past portrayed as "Low Probability to Intercept" aren't so anymore since several years by now ,for strict constructive reasons, and the same can be said for some of the ELS by you mentioned with latest radar products and EW pods.

SOC wrote:

TR1 wrote:

KomissarBojanchev wrote:There are claims that by the time the Su-50 is in service USA will already be testing 6gen fighters. Is this true?

Think about it.

Is the F-35 in service yet?

The F-35 is only loosely defined as a "fighter" anyway. That being said, seeing a demonstrator for "6th generation" technology in the near future wouldn't surprise me. A lot of relevant concepts have in fact already been evaluated on other platforms.

"This is a major breakthrough! Machine broke 7000 km

Rhetoric fail. 7,000 km would be relying on IFR rather than landing twice. They'll get around to making long-endurance test flights eventually I'm sure, but this doesn't count.

So my worst fears are confiremed. Russia would be marginally technologicly equal to the US only if it starts having hundreds of at least 2 types of 5gen fighters in the next 10 years and have working 6gen prototypes at that same time.