Everybody looking for SCUDs in DESERT STORM wasn't a B-2 and they didn't have the sensor fit the B-2 had.
I agree perfectly with your assertion SOC....but not in the way you intend.
The area coverage and data processing ability of the sensor suit of the entire B2's fleet don't match, by a very large margin, even only those of one of the several E-8 J-STARs that was committed to the Scud hunting roles in Gulf War , for not say the fleets of SAR equipped F-15E, "Lantirn" equipped F-18s and F-16s and several Uk's SAS, US's Commandos and Israeli Shaldag special forces squad used purposely as ground scout and target designators .....all of that in a very limited kill-box area of South West Iraq.
Wanting to provide a rough ratio between the area coverage and data processing capabilities between the sensors of entire B-2's fleet and those of the aircraft and ground forces operating in this limited area of Iraq hunting for Scud's TEL we would obtain probably something on the range of several hundreds to one.
That was just smart mission planning. We had the EW/SEAD assets available, so we used them.
Obviously not.
When, in 1991,USAF was sure to be capable to avoid completely the potential (...and reduced thanks to low-observability) area of detection of its F-117 by part of Iraqi air defense,thanks to pre-mission-computable flight's routes accounting for the well- known position of each enemy FIXED SA-2 and SA-3 battery and the altitude limits of the mobile export SA-6 batteries [/b], mandatorily employed F-117 Nighthawk's squadrons in STRICT SOLITARY missions just to preserve theirs security.
In Kosovo War the solitary initiative of the commander of a single battery of SA-3 represented the unexpected variable contributing to the departure from this well established CONOPs for stealth bombers.
The "home-made" modifications executed by this Serbian SAM battery's commander -Col. Zoltan Dani- ,a true passionate of its work ,that had procured for himself a rich, restricted technical literature about latest evolutions in SAM's design and theirs tactically employment in a modern environment, had rendered its export and largely downgraded battery of antediluvian SA-3 (that was ,anyhow, the unique SAM system in the theatre with the ceiling to engage NATO aircraft flying at medium-to-high altitude) a battery much more similar to a relatively modern SAM of its times, capable to:
- Travel off road at increased speed
- Shorten the deployment/un-deployment cycle to dozen of minutes instead of an hour
- Increase of several times the original 24 W/MHz jamming signal rejection of SNR-125 radar
- Increase range of detection and tracking of “low observable” targets (anyhow very far from the laughable metropolitan legends circulating on this subject)
- Reduce significantly time of reaction of the battery
- Increase fuse’s sensibility for better missile's Pk in near-misses detonations
Z. Dani’s battery so modified ( in spite of ,obviously, showing performances and operative parameters anyhow dozens of times inferior to true up-to-date SAM systems of the time and being capable to engage only a single target for battery) ,also thanks to the good proficiency of its crew , became quickly a true killer battery ,unique of its kind ,on the top list of the most “wanted” Serbian SAM batteries by part of NATO’s J-Stars and SEAD/DEAD groups.
It was capable to down one F-117 (and heavily damage another ), down an F-16 , damage two A-10s without suffering a single life or equipment loss in the entire Air-Missile NATO Campaign !
Among the effects that the achievements of this SINGLE well manned battery of a largely downgraded export version of an antediluvian SAM system ,modified with totally “home-made” measures to achieve a scarce surrogate of a part of the capabilities in possession of modern SAM systems of the time, was to FORCE NATO planners to commit escort EA-6B Prowler jamming aircraft F-16s (for HARM delivery ) and F-15s to provide air coverage from eventual enemy interceptors for this “high-observable” strike group.
From Lessons of Kosovo: More B-2 Bombers? by Chris Hellman, Weekly Defense Monitor, Volume 3, Issue No. 24
Stealth technology did not bring about the anticipated reduction in support aircraft needed for combat operations.
After the March 27 crash of an F-117A "Stealth" fighter, both the F-117As and B-2s begin flying with escorts of Navy EA-6B radar jamming aircraft.
The Air Force decided to retire its fleet of radar-jamming EF-111 "Ravens" in 1991 primarily because it envisioned a fleet of stealthy F-117As, B-2s and F-22 fighters operating without the jamming support needed by conventional aircraft.
The Pentagon's reversal on the need for radar-jammers left the Navy's fleet of fleet of 91 EA-6B "Prowlers," -- 30 of which were used to support air operations in Kosovo -- overburdened by the unexpected new requirements to escort F-117As and B-2s. As a result, the Navy has stated it will need at least 50 additional jammer aircraft.
Maj. Gen. Dennis G. Haines, Air Combat Command's director of combat operations, acknowledged the significance of the Air Force's lack of a jamming capability. At a conference on June 24, the General said, "stealth reduces the signature of an aircraft but it does not make it invisible. We have really neglected [electronic warfare]."
This ability to operate autonomously has long been a big selling point used by B-2 supporters. Repeatedly the Air Force stated how the B-2 dramatically cut operational costs by reducing support requirements. In a now famous chart, two B-2s with a combined crew of four armed with smart munitions were shown to be capable of performing the same mission that would normally require 55 aircraft of all types and over 100 aircrew.
Yet in practice, the B-2 did not operate alone during Operation Allied Force.
Flying out of Whiteman AFB in pairs, B-2s required mid-air refuelings for each leg of the 30 hour round trip mission.
Over the target area, B-2s were escorted by F-15s which provided air cover, F-16s to provide fire suppression against enemy anti-aircraft systems, as well as support from airborne air traffic controllers and systems which monitored enemy communications, as well as their "Prowler" escort. In all, often more than a dozen aircraft supported B-2 missions.
And it can do that over denied airspace when required.
I think that after having seen after what circumstances the jamming ,SEAD and DCA escort package became a requirement for B-2s strike groups in THIS operational environment i am sure that also you will agree that this hypothesis appear completely out of line.
1. Yup, they changed from high to low altitude penetration as it was far safer once craploads of S-300s started appearing.
SOC with me is not necessary to hide behind a finger.
S-300's introduction was indeed the main catalyzing factor for changing main mission flight's profile of B-2 Spirit to low altitude terrain following profile and the simple reason for that was that all modeled projections of intrusion missions in URSS's airspace ,accounting for the REAL range of detection and tracking of B-2 by part of Soviet IAD's elements of the times ,shown that it was NOT SURVIVABLE traveling at high altitude.
After that, it was opted to completely discontinue the program at only 21 airframes completed, also in reason of the fact that its true mission – deliver from relative close range high precision tactical nuclear bombs to stop the quickly shifting Soviet front’s advancement in Europe , a mission that was not possible to carry-on with stand-off cruise missiles – had effectively vanished after URSS’s collapse.
B-2 fleet was NEVER intended do go to the hunt of Soviet mobile ICBM launchers (a task for which, taking also into account the immense landmass , time to the selected enemy sector from NORAD, presence of inflatable/self-propelled decoys, redeploying underground tunnels and ,even the area coverage and processing capability of the whole NATO’s ISR fleet would result totally insufficient even to track a single TEL) ; the info-war operative responsible for the conceiving and spreading of this shoddy notion should truly receive a price for the phantasy and the…courage .
Russian radars will now be being designed to not reject insect sized targets that fly more than 50km/h because such an insect is clearly not an insect and is certainly not noise.
GarryB ,luckily, no known insect is even only near to the size of the real radar returns of such aircraft.
Now THAT would represent a true danger for the world .