Topol-M (SS-27):

RT-2UTTH - Topol-M
SS-27
The single-warhead RT-2UTTH Topol-M is an advanced version of the silo-based and mobile Topol intercontinental ballistic missile. While the SS-25 Topol is generally similar to the American Minuteman-2, the more sophisticated SS-27 Topol-M is comparable to the American Minuteman-3. The Topol-M is 22.7 meters (75 feet) long and has a diameter of 1.95 meters (6 feet 3 inches). The missile weighs 47.2 metric tons and has a range of 11,000 kilometers (6,900 miles). The solid-propellant three-stage Topol-M missile complex, with a standardized (silo and mobile) missile, is to become the foundation of the Russian strategic nuclear forces in the 21st century. It is planned to accommodate Topol-M both on self-propelled launchers as well as in silos. High survivability of the mobile complex is achieved by the capability of off-road movement, comprising of continuous change in location and of a missile launch from any point along the movement route.

The Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering (MIT) State Enterprise is the only plant in Russia building these missiles today. The modernized 45-ton Topol-M is the first strategic missile to be built by Russia without the participation of Ukraine or other CIS countries. The first test firing of a Topol-M took place on December 20, 1994. The flight and design testing of the Topol-M was successfully completed by 1995, and joint flight-testing is continuing, leading to a decision to commence series production. All the launches have been successful, but large-scale serial production has not started due the acute capital shortfalls experienced by the Russian government. In July 1997 the fourth launch successful of a Topol-M ICBM was made from the Strategic Missile Forces' Plesetsk State Test Site. By September 1999 the eighth test of the Topol-M missile had been taken place. The missile was launched from Plesetsk, north of Moscow, and landed at the Kura testing site on Kamchatka. On February 10th 2000, Russia successfully completed the tenth test flight of the Topol-M. The missile was launched from the Plesetsk cosmodrome to a target to a military base in Kura on the Kamchatka peninsula in the Russian Far East approximately 8,000 kilometers away. In September of 2000, Russia test-fired another Topol-M rocket. The SS-27 was fired from Plesetsk Arctic base in northern Russia to its target in the Russian Far East approximately 4,000 km away. In this 12th test, the missile was fired from a mobile launcher, rather than from a silo.

As previously stated, the state of the Russian economic has had serious effects on Russian military expenditures. As a result, work on the new Topol-M ICBM is lagging seriously behind its initial timetable. Russian defense financing has reportedly provided that some 250-300 Topol-M missiles would be in service by 2003. A total of 1.5 trillion rubles (at that time the exchange rate approximately 6000 rubles to the dollar) were included in the 1997 budget for the development of the Topol-M missile complexes. Under START II Russian Missile Troops are permitted to have 300 Topol RS-12M mobile missiles and the RVSN may acquire two Topol-M regiments annually up to 2001, which will cost 3.7 billion new rubles. The Strategic Missile Force plans to deploy mobile Topol-M missile systems at the end of 2002 or early in 2003. A total of R700 billion would be required to place 450 Topol-M missiles in service by 2005 to maintain parity under START II. But the present 55 percent funding will only permit production of, at the most, 10-15 missiles at this facility each year. As a result, Strategic Missile Troops will likely only have approximately 350-400 ICBM warheads, not the 800-900 which are permited within the framework of the START II Treaty. On 15 April 1998 Acting Prime Minister Sergey Kiriyenko approved a schedule of monthly budget appropriations for the Topol-M, which he noted would make up the core of Russia's strategic nuclear forces.

In December 1997 after four test launches, the first two Topol-M systems were put on a trial alert with the Tatischevo Taman Division in the Saratov region. By late July 1998 two more Topol-M launch sites had been completed and were awaiting acceptance trials. Russia put a regiment of 10 Topol-M missiles on duty in 1998 by which the Strategic Rocket Forces had carried out 6 successful test launches. A second regiment of another 10 missiles entered service in December 1999. A third regiment, of 10 Topol-M missiles was deployed in 2000. On October 2002 strategic missile troops also fired an SS-27 land-based missile from the Plesetsk training launch site. That missile landed at the Kamchatka impact range.

The Topol-M missile system is still being commissioned in the Russian strategic nuclear forces' grouping regardless of whether heavy missiles stand down from combat alert duty or not. The Topol-M ICBM grouping is intended to will comprise an equal number of mobile and silo-launched missiles. Some 90 of the 360 launch silos vacated by the RS-20 ICBM's, which will stand down from combat alert, need to be converted for the Topol-M. Apart from Saratov Oblast the Topol-M systems will be deployed in Valday, the southern Urals, and the Altay.

The START II ratified by the Russian Duma in September 2000, calls for Russia to replace its MIRV SS-18 missiles with single warhead, Topol-M type, missiles. Although deployed with a single warhead, the Topol-M could easily be converted into a multiple-warhead missile, which is prohibited within the framework of START II. Based on its throw weight, the Topol-M missiles could be transformed into missiles with multiple reentry vehicles [MIRV's] carrying between 3-6 missiles. The warheads could be taken from some of those ground-based and naval missiles which will be withdrawn from the order of battle in coming years. The Topol-M can carry a maneuverable warhead, which was tested in the summer of 1998. Topol-M also has a shorter engine-burn time, to minimize satellite detection on launch.

Russia deployed the first batch of ten Topol-Ms in December 1998 and deployed 20 other missiles in two batches over the next two years. Due to funding constraints the fourth batch of Topol-Ms were not deployed until 21 December 2003 when ten more missiles were commissioned Tatishchevo missile base in the central Saratov region.

In November 2004 Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that Russia expected to test-fire a mobile version of its Topol-M ballistic missile in 2004, with production of the new weapon to be commissioned in 2005.

As of 01 April 2005 Kommersant reported that the Strategic Missile Force of Russia had 496 ICBMs, including 226 silo-launched (86 heavy missiles R-36MUTTH and R-36M2 Voevoda, 10 medium missiles UR-100NUTTH, and 40 light missiles RS-12M2 Topol-M) and 270 mobile ground-launched missiles RS-12M Topol. By 2010, the Force may have no more than 313 ICBMs, including 154 silo-launched (40 R-36M2 Voevoda, 50 UR-100NUTTH, and 64 RS-12M2 Topol M), and 159 mobile ground-launched missiles (144 RS-12M Topol and 15 RS-12M1 Topol M). The 270 mobile ground-launched solid-fuel missiles RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle in NATO classification) may be slashed to 144 in five years. At the same time, 89 new Topol-M missiles (64 RS-12M2 and 15 RS-12M1) are to be put on combat duty, but this is nearly two times fewer than the number of ICBMs to be slashed (136). The number of warheads on the ICBMs will be reduced from 1,770 to 923. [upon close inspection these numbers don't exactly add up and are internally inconsistent, based on standard warhead loading assumptions]

On 15 December 2006 Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov, commander or Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, said the Force was set to start re-equipping its single-warhead mobile Topol-M (SS-27) intercontinental ballistic missile systems with multiple re-entry vehicles. Solovtsov said: "We will begin to equip the Topol-M mobile missile system with multiple re-entry vehicles in a few years."

By the end of 2006 Russia had five missile regiments equipped with silo-based Topol-M missiles, and one regiment equipped with mobile Topol-M systems. The total number of Topol-M ICBMs, including three silo-based systems to be deployed at the Tatishchevo base, will reach 48 by the end of 2006r, according to the Strategic Missile Forces Command.

President Vladimir Putin has said the deployment of mobile Topol-M systems contributes a great deal to Russia's national security. The first regiment of Topol-M mobile ICBMs was put on active duty in the Ivanovo region in Central Russia in early December 2006. "This is a significant step forward in improving our defense capabilities," he said while inspecting the regiment 14 December 2006. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said in 2006 that Russia was planning to purchase 69 silo-based and mobile Topol-M ballistic missile systems in the next decade.


http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/rt-2pmu.htm

This is from "Lightning Bolts" by William Yengest

It has some good information on the RV of Topol-M here is what William has to say

In the above figure solid line is for Topol-M MRV and dashed line for BM trajectory

Careful consideration of the figures trajectory revels that powered flight follows a ballistic path and ejects MRV onto a Hypersonic-Glide path similar to BGRV trajectory . However the terminal phase of flight shows a distinct dive to low altitude and ram jet sustained low-level-run-in ( LLRI ) maneuver to the target. This is remarkable but not unexpected, maneuver designed to penetrate enemy defenses at altitudes below radar detection horizons.

The Russian Space Forces test launched a Topol RS-12M intercontinental ballistic missile on Thursday, the Defense Ministry said.

It was launched at 10:45 a.m. Moscow time [06:45 GMT] from the Plesetsk Space Center and hit a designated target on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

“The launch was designed to test the stability of the basic specifications of this class of missiles as their service life has been extended to 24 years,” the ministry said.

The tested missile was built in 1987 and was on alert duty until July 2007, where which it was placed in storage.

SMF chief Lt. Gen. Sergei Karakayev said recently the service life of Topol mobile ballistic missile systems could be extended until 2019.

The RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle), a single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile, entered service in 1985.

It has a maximum range of 10,000 km (6,125 miles) and can carry a nuclear warhead with a yield of up to 550 kilotons.

http://www.en.ria.ru/mlitary_news/20111103/168385053.html

launch of Topol

GarryB wrote:Amazing to think you could drive that vehicle into an An-124 and pretty much fly it to anywhere you want and then launch a missile to destroy pretty much anywhere you want.

Any where yes but within Russian Territory , As per New Start Strategic Missile cannot be located outside ones own National Territory.

US Needs 5-7 GBIs to Intercept One Topol ICBM

The United States will need between five and seven Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) to intercept one Russian Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile, a Russian military expert said on Tuesday.

“From my contacts with the director of the [US Department of Defense’s] Missile Defense Agency, I have learned that the Americans will need five to seven interceptors to engage one Topol-M missile,” retired Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, former chief of staff at Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces (1994-1996), told a news conference hosted by RIA Novosti.

He did not elaborate on the nature of his contacts with the MDA head or when he had received the information.

The US has deployed 30 GBIs, Yesin said – “26 in Alaska and four in California,” adding that the effectiveness of the US countermissiles is “somewhat limited.”

He also said missile defense negotiations with the United States will produce no positive results, and that development in that area will continue.

Who Doesn't Like the Topol Missile System and Why?
The Arguments of Enemies of the Most Important Component of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces Sin with Nonprofessionalism

A Response to Enemies of Topol

In generalizing the negative statements with respect to the Topol (Topol-M) complex, it is advisable to dwell on the following ones:

a. The complex has poor concealment, in connection with which it is detected by space assets with high reliability and can be destroyed at the desired moment using conventional or nuclear weapons.

Counterargument. The level of survivability of the mobile land-based missile complex depends to a determining extent, as we know, on the following two factors: reliability of identification (and not simply detection) in alert duty areas, and the number of square kilometers of area (with specific properties) per launcher.

Poor reliability of identification of the mobile land- based missile complex (i.e., reliability based on which it is inadvisable to make a decision to deliver strikes against presumed points where launchers are located) has been confirmed in several stages:

by experimental studies using mockups of terrain and hardware of the complexes;

by many years of full-scale experiments using full- scale equipment and aviation and space reconnaissance assets (research topic "Mishen" [Target], fulfilled in the 1970's and 1980's);

in a combat situation (in 1991 during the war in Iraq the Americans had an accuracy of the reconnaissance field which seemingly left no chance for the mobile Scud complexes supplied to Iraq at one time by the Soviet Union.

As is well known, however, the Iraqis were launching the missiles right up to the very armistice, and arguments go on to this day about the number of complexes destroyed on the ground).

Creation of such a reconnaissance field density over the territory of Russia (if of course it is not reduced through efforts of well-wishers to the territory of the Moscow-Suzdal Principality) is a fantastic task. And here is the very time to recall requirements imposed by the Americans with respect to a ban on the Temp-2S complex, the ban on means of reloading launchers, and the ban on basing combat subunits (in so-called peacetime) in an area with a radius of more than 10 km--eloquent requirements, the meaning of which showed up well based on results of the Iraqi campaign!

Our faultfinders' assertions about limited capabilities for basing the mobile land-based missile complexes and for their road movement are unfounded. At one time the USSR Ministry of Defense together with industrial organizations analyzed and selected position areas on the country's territory capable of holding hundreds of mobile launchers, should it be required, without detriment to national economic activity. The capability for movement of the hardware of a complex over roads of various categories and off the roads has been confirmed by performance tests extending for many thousands of kilometers. The service life of the multiple-axle chassis supports the necessary frequency of position change during the time set for the operating life of the complex. The launcher's independence has been taken to such a level where it is capable of performing a combat mission independently, and not as part of that "herd" of vehicles which was required 30 years ago. Based on decisions of the military-industrial complex, work was done simultaneously to work out the methods and means of increasing the nonidentifiableness of complexes at field positions (dummy activity, camouflage nets) and to ensure necessary levels of resistance of systems and hardware to the damage-producing elements of a nuclear burst.

Finally, Chief Designer documentation provides for quite specific regimes of operation of the complex ensuring its concealment. A violation of documentation requirements (for example, constantly being in bases in light shelters) already is in the area of the Law of Criminal Procedure. So reliable destruction of Topol complexes is possible only on condition of the entire expanse of position areas being covered with a specific overpressure. But this requires detonating such a number of nuclear weapons that the act becomes senseless for the attacking side--the consequences of radioactive contamination will be global.

b. Mobile land-based complexes are highly vulnerable to actions of saboteurs.

Counterargument. A single act of sabotage is absurd in its essence from a state standpoint (that of a potential enemy). The following is interesting with respect to large- scale sabotage (on a national scale) coordinated in time: sabotage teams (obviously, disguised as mushroom hunters, surveyors, hunters, foresters and so on) constantly must seek and accompany the launchers, and on bicycles or motorized sledges as a minimum, otherwise you won't keep up. They naturally have to live under field conditions--in the rain, intense heat, severe cold. Of course, this theme could be continued in the presence of a situation of total muddle in our counterintelligence structures, but to no avail. The potential enemy isn't up to organizing such an operation, which that very same experience of the war with Iraq again showed clearly.

c. Mobile land-based missile complexes are predisposed to accidents and so carry a threat to the environment, especially in connection with the presence of solid propellant in missile engines.

Counterargument. No more than a dozen overturns of launchers and transporter-reloader units with missiles occurred over many years of operating the Pioner and Topol complexes, and all instances were in the first years of mastering the new equipment. No explosion of solid- propellant charges occurred in a single one of the accidents. Moreover, all missiles (or their engines) were used successfully for experimental purposes after a preventive maintenance inspection.

In addition, those familiar with properties of fuel components of liquid-propellant combat missiles from more than hearsay do not have to be told what will happen if, for example, a mobile launcher with such a missile falls from a bridge into a river or even a stream.

d. Mobile land-based missile complexes have the highest cost of deployment and upkeep.

Counterargument. Comparative assessments of cost indicators of missile complexes with different forms of basing, made regularly within the scope of integrated research (for example, Vekha, Vekha-2, Perspektiva-2010), indicate that this is not so. It was research that showed that the cost of a round as part of a grouping of complexes of a specific type and the cost of this grouping's performance of a conditional combat mission in a retaliatory strike are the most objective indicators in comparing the tactical-technical-economic effectiveness of different strategic missile complexes. This approach means in particular that the cost of the infrastructure which services combat missile complexes (and only them) also must pertain to the cost of a round, i.e., for example, if there needs to be a system of air defense of basing facilities to ensure survivability of missile-armed naval ships in those facilities, then its cost must be included in the cost of a round as part of the grouping of naval nuclear forces, exactly as this indicator also must include the cost of tunnels [shtolnya] on shore filled with a so-called second salvo (even if everyone understands that a second salvo is a chimera).

Sometimes one may run across speculative assessments where expenditures as part of the grouping [gruppirovka] pertain to one warhead. The incorrectness is that the grouping [kuchnost] of warheads (of each one separately) may differ greatly for different missiles. And if particular specific characteristics are used, then in a number of cases it would be correct to relate expenditures to the unit area destroyed (with a certain overpressure) in a retaliatory strike. With respect to the Topol type of mobile land-based missile complex, this incorrectness also lies in the fact, for example, that in the opinion of some specialists the Topol-M missile can be fitted with several warheads if necessary. One also should not forget that a new intermediate-range complex with a wide gamut of combat outfitting can be created quickly (again if necessary) based on the Topol (Topol-M) complex with relatively small expenditures.

e. Topol missile complexes have lower effectiveness not only compared with naval, but also with silo complexes.

Counterargument. That this is not so generally already follows from what was said earlier. We will note only the following.

With respect to silo complexes, the assertion of their higher effectiveness is most likely the product of hallucinations or of some kind of special kind of thinking, since it is enough to constantly remember the television broadcast from aboard an American precision cruise missile flying down the ventilation shaft of a superhardened underground shelter in Baghdad. Everything is said with this graphic aid, and no theoretical logomachy is necessary.

With respect to domestic sea-based complexes, it must be borne in mind that despite many flaws of their basing system, they are a necessary component of the grouping of strategic nuclear forces as a whole. In 1970 the U.S. Congress held thorough hearings on the subject of why America needs a strategic nuclear triad. As a result it was admitted that this is necessary inasmuch as if one has only one component, the enemy will get an opportunity to concentrate his resources on countering it. Probably for the foreseeable future it is possible to agree with the conclusion of the Americans (at the very least with respect to a diad--ground and naval components of the strategic nuclear forces), who even now are in no hurry to reject a triad.

The U.S. position with respect to its own land-based mobile complexes is explained simply. First of all, America is foreordained by geography itself (natural conditions above all) to have a strategic sea-based missile system. At the very least they do not have to boast that they are able to break open the ice in order to fire (an activity, by the way, accompanied by very strong acoustic noise). Secondly, their powerful naval component essentially is not threatened by anything now and for long years ahead. New capital expenditures simply would be foolish in that situation. And thirdly and finally, there is a reason about which they prefer not to speak loudly. Studies of 20 and 30 years ago showed that the deployment of mobile land-based complexes on U.S. territory is fraught with considerable organizational/legal and financial problems dictated by the large-scale privately owned land and transportation infrastructure.

We will encounter these problems immediately as soon as we transfer land and roads to the hands of private capital on a mass basis.

In conclusion, attention must be directed to two points.

First. The extremely serious discussion (wherever it occurs) of questions of future organizational development of the country's strategic nuclear forces should not be carried out without the involvement of professionals from organizations that developed the missile complexes.

Second. It would be exceptionally advisable to delve more attentively into restrictions imposed by the Americans with respect to our land-based mobile missile complexes and weigh once again the need to retain these restrictions, bearing in mind that the strategic nuclear forces will remain the only persuasive means of ensuring the country's military security for a long time yet.

Russia Test-Fires Topol-M Intercontinental Ballistic Missile: Defense Ministry

do we know if there are going to be produced more Topol-M ICBMs?? Till now we have 78 total silo and mobile

Topol-M deployment in Tatishchevo continues

For a while, it appeared that deployment of Topol-M missiles in silos was discontinued after the number of missiles reached 60 at the end of 2012. Deployment of the last four missiles took more than a year, so it did seem that the program is approaching the end. But no, as it turns out, the deployment continued and a couple of stories today mentioned that there are now seven Topol-M regiments in Tatishchevo and more are probably to come.

There were reports in the fall of last year that there is a quite a bit of new construction at the Tatishchevo maintenance base (below), so we should probably expect that at some point all UR-100NUTTH missiles there will be replaced by Topol-M.

http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/02/topol-m_deployment_in_tatishch.shtml

RT-2PM2 walkaround :

http://walkarounds.scalemodels.ru/v/walkarounds/rockets/rt-2pm2_topol-m/

Topol-M: Missile Defense Penetrator
by Michal Fiszer

The most promising missile in the Russian inventory is the RT-2PM2 (also called RT-2PMU; 15Zh62 according to the GRAU designation system) Topol-M, known in NATO as the SS-27. The Topol-M has a weight of 47.1 tons, a length of 22.7 m, and a diameter of 1.86 m. The system also has very high accuracy: 180-m side error and 230-m error in distance. In 2006 there are to be 50 such missiles in service, and it was also recently announced that first regiment (10 missiles) will be issued the mobile version of the missile. It is planned that 220 Topol-M missiles will be deployed through 2012, while older types (SS-18 and SS-19) will be withdrawn.

Development of the Topol-M began in 1991 at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology and was officially confirmed by a decree from President Boris Yeltsin in February 1993. The design team was headed by Boris Lagutin and Yuri Solomonov. The first launch test took place on Dec. 20, 1994. The first test of the mobile launcher (and the 15th overall test) took place on April 20, 2004. Production at GPO "Votkinsky Zavod" in Votkinsk got underway in 1998. The first missile was declared ready on Dec. 27, 1998, and the system was officially accepted into service on April 28, 2000.

The Topol-M has three stages, with the first stage having three rocket motors developed by the Soyuz Federal Center for Dual-Use Technologies in Moscow. This gives the missile a much higher acceleration than other ICBM types. It enables the missile to accelerate to the speed of 7,320 m/sec. and to travel a flatter trajectory to distances of up to 10,000 km. The missile carries a single warhead but has a high throw weight: about 1,200 kg. This enables three warheads to be fitted, when necessary. Presently, the capability is used to carry realistic decoys that have the same weight and radar cross-section as the actual warhead. These decoys reenter the atmosphere at the same speed and with a similar thermal signature as the actual warhead. Unlike "balloon" and "reflector" decoys, the mock reentry vehicles are not stripped away by the atmosphere and remain effective through the terminal phase. Also, the decoys are probably able to maneuver, as the actual warhead can. The warhead and decoys are all covered with radar-absorbing materials (RAM) to reduce their signatures.

Reportedly, the warhead and decoys are also equipped with active-deception jamming systems, triggered as soon as the thermal cover is dropped after decelerating in the atmosphere. The missile was developed to overcome the eventual defense system under development by the US, but not all of the details have been unveiled. Nevertheless, if the Topol-M works as described, it will be able to overcome many of the discriminator and hit-to-kill technologies being developed for the US NMD. According to a statement by Sergei Ivanov, the Russian minister of defense, each Topol-M will have an 87% chance of penetrating the GMD system.

My Article on Topol-M written in 2006 for an Indian Aerospace Magazine

Topol-M ICBM [SS-27 'Sickle'/'Sickle-M']

Topol-M [SS-27 ‘Sickle’]


The Russian SS-27, or Topol-M, is an Intercontinental-Range, land-based, solid propellant/fuel ballistic missile, It is a “Fifth Generation” ICBM developed by the Russian’s. It represents the “epitome” of Russia's ballistic missile technology, incorporating modern fuel and warhead designs, as well as capable of being launched from both “Missile Silos” and “Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL)” vehicles. Among other features described below in detail the SS-27 [Topol-M] is invulnerable to any modern Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defenses deployed, under-development and/or testing like the US National Missile Defence Programme (NMD).

Looking in detail the developmental history of “Topol-M” and its implication on the Future of Russia’s Land Based Nuclear Detterent. For sake of simplicity and understanding we will categorise and divide this article in four parts, the order being


> Development History
> Production and Deployment
> Topol-M Described
> Conclusion

Development History

The RT-2PM2 Topol-M ICBM [NATO designation SS-27 'Sickle'] is a single-warhead, solid-fuel missile capable of being deployed in silos as well as on mobile launchers. It is a follow-on and a replacement for an earlier road-mobile capable, single-warhead solid-fuel “RT-2PM Topol ICBM [NATO designation SS-25 'Sickle']”, The Topol-M is the only new ICBM currently under production and development and is intended to become the backbone in the coming years of the land “arm” of Russia’s nuclear triad.

Development of the Topol-M began in the late 1980s under the designation “Universal” (RT-2PM2)” and as a joint project of the Moscow based “Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT)” and “Yuzhnoye Design Bureau” in Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine. The designation “Universal” was intended to convey the dual-role mode of the future missile: a task that reflected the desire of the then Soviet military to optimize the ICBM force by reducing the number of missile’s types in deployment. Apparently, MITT was responsible for the mobile version of the new missile while Yuzhnoye was responsible for the silo-based version. By the end of 1991, the first missile was scheduled for transfer to the “Plesetsk testing range”. Work on Universal was terminated as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and in March-April 1992 Yuzhnoye Design Bureau was relieved of its task in the program and all documentation concerning Topol-M was transferred to MITT.

The Russian government after 1992, undertook an unprecedented effort to remove all non-Russian firms from the strategic missile component supplier’s network, and the Topol-M became the first ICBM to be wholly designed and produced by Russian firms. Altogether, the MITT- led Topol-M production consortium, consists of some 500 Russian firms; final assembly is conducted by the Votkinsk Mechanical Plant at Vladivostok

The R&D program was launched afresh by Russia in February 1993, which gave the task to MITT. MITT is a leading design bureau with a rich experience of work on solid-fuel ballistic missiles. In the late 70's MITT designed the Temp-2S ICBM, which was prohibited by the SALT II agreement in 1979, the missile was never deployed and all already produced missiles were eliminated, Also the intermediate-range Ballistic missile, “Pioner” [NATO designation SS-20 ‘Saber’] was developed by MIIT .In the 1980s MITT also was responsible in designing the Topol-M's predecessor, the mobile RT-2PM Topol ICBM ( SS-25 )

Testing on Topol-M began on December 20,1994. In July 1997, only after four flight tests, the missile entered the “evaluative” deployment stage, i.e., without warheads being mated. The testing program was unusually short: only six tests were planned before the evaluative stage and even fewer i.e. four were actually conducted. After the first test, reports indicated that, even more than six tests might be necessary; the decision on evaluative deployment remained under question as late as after the third test, since the missile apparently demonstrated flaws in the cooling system, but according to the official Russian military, All four tests were successful. The successful fourth test, however, paved the way to the deployment decision.

For comparison, a typical Soviet Ballistic Missile program entailed some 15-20 test launches before a missile is considered a prototype and 20 launches before it begins to count as a deployed missile. Lack of funding was clearly one of the reason’s behind the short testing program for Topol-M, as both designers and the military sought to save money and use available funds more effectively. The fact that the Topol-M shares many components and designs with the earlier and already thoroughly tested Topol ICBM [SS-25] apparently played a role in speedening up the process of testing. In addition, the testing routine was drastically changed as well: The missile was always tested as one unit this is in contrast to the Soviet practice of first testing individual components of a new design. Ground checks were more thorough and conducted at the testing range instead of the assembly plant, giving the military greater confidence in the new system.

The testing program continued after the missile entered the deployment phase. By the end of 2000, the number of flight tests reached 11 for the silo-based version of Topol-M and one for the mobile version. Additional tests have been conducted since the missile entered evaluative service in December 1997, and by November 2000 the number of flight tests reached 12, the entire test were a complete success except for the fifth one which was conducted in October 1998.

The reason for accelerated test for the Topol-M program was apparently the need for early replacement of aging types of ICBMs in the inventory, practically all of which are scheduled for retirement by 2010 or earlier, even taking into account extensions of their service lives. The Topol-M was officially accepted for deployment in the end of September 2000.

Production and Deployment

The first two Topol-Ms were placed on experimental combat alert i.e. without their nuclear warheads in December 1997. By the end of 1998 their number was increased to Ten (10), and on 17 December 1998 Strategic Rocket Forces Commander General Yakovlev announced that the first Topol-M-equipped missile regiment, under the “Tamanskaya Missile Division” near Tatishchevo (Saratov Oblast) (Fig 2), was placed on regular combat alert duty. Ten (10) more Topol-Ms became operational in December 1999, with another regiment of the Tamanskaya Missile Division



Fig 2. Tamanskaya Missile Division near Tatishchevo

In April 2000 Ministry of Defense announced that the Topol-M had been formally accepted into service by a state commission. Plans were to deploy additional missiles at a rate of 10 per year were delayed by budget constraints. None were deployed since 2000, and the most recent batch consists of only six (6) missiles. Recently in December 2004 Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces formally deployed a new regiment of six (6) silo-based Topol-M (SS-27) intercontinental ballistic missiles, armed with a single warhead each. The deployment supplements three additional regiments at the Tatishchevo(Fig 2 ) base, bringing the total number of operationally deployed Topol-M missiles between 36 and 40 .Tatishchevo(Fig 2 ) is located in the Saratov region, in the southwest part of Russia, next to Kazakhstan.

The Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces Nikolai Solovtsov told reporters. "I can tell you that another regiment armed with Topol-M silo-based missiles has been put on full alert,” he said and added that each regiment had 10 missile systems. The Strategic Missile Force as of December 2004 has 40 silo-based missile systems on alert.

Also a new Rail mobile version of the SS-27—useful because difficult to target in advance—will be made operational , According to the head of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov. This mobile version would also have Multiple Independently Targetable Warheads (MIRVs)—from three to six in numbers. Apart from Saratov Oblast the Topol-M systems will be deployed in Valday, the southern Urals, and the Altay.Some 90 of the 360 launch silos vacated by the RS-20 ICBM's, which are being stood down from combat alert duty, need to be converted to the Topol-M


Topol-M Described

As described earlier the Topol-M is an intercontinental-range, ground-based, solid propellant ballistic missile, According to Yuriy Solomonov, director of the “Moscow Institute of Heat Technology” and designer-general of the Topol family of missiles, has stated that the SS-27 will be the foundation of the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal by 2015.


Road Mobile Topol-M Ready for Launch

The Topol-M is a 3-stage solid-fuel missile with a length of 17.9m (not including the 3.3m forward section which contains the payload), a diameter of 1.90m, and launch weight of 47.2 metric tons. Like the majority of Soviet missiles, it was designed to be deployed and maintained in a launch canister. Both the silo-based and mobile variants have been designed for cold launch. It has a maximum range is of 11,000km.

The Topol-M is reputed to have the highest accuracy of any Russian ICBM. which indicates that its "maximum deviation" ,defined as the radius in which over 99% of all warheads will impact and estimated to be 2.3 times larger than the missile's Circular Error Probable, is less than 300 meters, According to Solomonov,the warhead is equipped with self-targeting mechanism that activates when warhead is approaching its target. It probably means that warhead is equipped with either radar or the optical guidance system. That means that Topol-M probably can achieve circular error of 50 meters and less.

The missile's accuracy is ensured by an autonomous Inertial Guidance System and there are reports that it may be aided by a satellite navigation system. The missile is capable of rapid (just 2 minutes) launch preparation. One of the service life-extending characteristics of this missile is that its guidance gyroscopes do not need to be switched on until immediately after the launch. The Topol-M carries a single warhead developed by the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF) in Sarov (formerly famously known as Arzamas-16) its confirmed single 550 kT warhead is sufficient for the depopulation of cities, which combined with its survivability, makes it an ideal retaliatory weapon. The SS-27 enables Russia to guarantee a successful nuclear response.


Spectacular Launch of Topol-M

One of the Main Characteristics of Topol-M is the missile is capable of making evasive maneuvers as it approaches its target, enabling it to evade any terminal phase interceptors. It almost certainly also carries countermeasures and decoys to decrease the chances of a successful targeting. According to estimates, it carries more decoys and penetration aids than the 10-warhead US Peacekeeper (MX)(ICBM) missile and is equipped with a hardened warhead invulnerable to all but direct hits by ABM interceptors.

The missile is shielded against radiation, electromagnetic interference and physical disturbance; previous missiles could be disabled by detonating a nuclear warhead within ten kilometers. This vulnerability is the basis behind the use of nuclear ground-based and orbital interceptors, to detonate or damage the missile before it reaches its target. However, the SS-27 is designed to be able to withstand nuclear blasts closer than 500 m, a difficult interception when combined with the terminal phase speed and maneuverability.

While the boost phase is the most vulnerable time for the SS-27, thanks to its powerful first-stage boosters, the Topol-M has a short-duration boost phase shorter by a factor of 4.5 than boost phases of older ICBMs such as the SS-18, which has a five-minute boost phase, which reduces its vulnerability to Boost-Phase Intercept weapons. The missile's greater acceleration also allows it to assume a Flatter Trajectory and it remains protected. Infact the seventh Topol-M test launch, conducted on 3 June 1999, featured a "Lateral Anti-missile Maneuver", with the warhead reportedly being guided to its destination by a Glonass-based "Terminator" satellite navigation system.

Hidden safely within missile silos and mobile launchers, a successful boost-phase interceptor would have to be fired from near or within Russian borders or from space. And the SS-27 is also designed to survive a strike from any laser technology available, rendering any current space-based laser useless.


Road Mobile Topol-M, mounted on MZTKT-16 Wheel TEL

Country: Russian Federation
Alternate Name: Topol-M, RS-12M1/M2
Class: ICBM
Basing: Silo based, Road mobile
Payload: Single warhead
Warhead: Nuclear 550kT/1 MT
Length: 21.90 m (Includes Forward Section with Payload)
Diameter: 1.90 m
Launch Weight: 47,200 kg
Propulsion: 3-stage solid Range: 11,000 km
Status: Operational
In Service: 1997

The SS-27 can currently strike any target within the continental United States. The deployment from hardened silos and hidden TEL vehicles makes it nearly impossible to successfully prevent launch and current ABM technology is insufficient to prevent its successful impact. As a solid propellant design, it can be maintained on alert for prolonged periods of time and can launch within minutes of being given the order.

With a higher accuracy, the single warhead load would be easily sufficient to destroy a missile silo, but the placement of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRV’s) would allow for the destruction of an entire missile groups. The SS-27 design is easily compatible for MIRV warheads, though it must sacrifice its ability to penetrate ABM defense systems. Solomonov has stated openly that the TEL launched SS-27 will carry four to six warheads along with decoys, which implies the same capability for the silo-launched version. Unconfirmed reports suggest a yield of 1 MT for the new Nuclear warhead has been achieved, as well as the placement of up to 4 ~ 6 MIRV warheads. These enhancements is most likely to come at the cost of reducing the shielding around the warhead and removing the decoys, rendering the missile vulnerable to ABM defenses. It uses a Post-Boost Vehicle (PBV) system to deploy its warhead(s) using a digital inertial navigation system with a GLOSNASS (equivalent to Global Position Satellite) receiver.


Mobility & Survivibility Against Current and Future ABM System are Key Features Of Topol-M

The mobile-based Topol-M differs from the silo-based model mainly in modifications to the first stage. It is launched from a special launcher designed at the Titan Central Design Bureau in Volgograd that is mounted on the MZKT-79921 16-wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) designed and manufactured at the Minsk Wheeled Prime Mover Plant in Belarus. The new TEL weighs 40 metric tons when empty, is capable of carrying a payload of 80 metric tons, and its 600 kWt diesel engine gives it a top road speed of 70 km/h.The MZKT-79921 will be equipped with an improved navigation system, allowing it to launch missiles accurately from any level paved or unpaved spot within the missile division's deployment area, an improvement over the older mobile Topol, which could only be launched from a limited number of pre-surveyed paved locations. The TEL's design reportedly incorporates design features intended to reduce its vulnerability to detection by a wide range of space and air-based sensors. The Topol-M has a guaranteed service life of 15-20 years. As is the case with older Russian ICBMs, it can be extended by a modernization programs

Conclusion

It can be safely concluded that Topol-M provides an assured Nuclear Strike capability to Russia should the unthinkable happen, It can be a safe first strike or a second strike weapon, With its very high reliability, mobility, flexibility and accuracy and very little means to stop it by even the most advance adversary, This truly 21st century ICBM on which Russia's “Land Leg” of Nuclear Triad will be built can be regarded as Worlds Best ICBM.

Compiled and Researched by Austin Joseph
Published in Dec-2004

References
1 ) MissileThreat.com
2 )Russia Strategic Nuclear Forces by Pavel Podvig
3 ) Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

Oh wow! I didnt realise that you wrote for indian magazines!

Thanks for the read.

Thanks , Worked as aviation jurno for 2 years

Austin Joseph i saw you talking to Podvig on another blog. and you only discuss Economic News here when it comes to Military stuff you discuss with keypub forum members

We should build up Austins popularity up so much more than it is now, so he can become Indias top think tank, and he can make lots of money and share it with us.

max steel wrote:Austin Joseph i saw you talking to Podvig on another blog. and you only discuss Economic News here when it comes to Military stuff you discuss with keypub forum members

I dont get chance to discuss Economic issue in other forum , this one is the best place to discuss it. Also time is a constrain to discuss everything

sepheronx , Thanks for your kind words but we will never make money out of blogging beyond few dollars at best

I plan to restart my blog with some topics so as and when I get time I can write on it , S-500 and RS-24 ICBM are two topics on my mind to start with in coming week

Good to hear!  If you want any help I'll be more than happy to help if I can.

Keep us updated.