Bulava SLBM Thread:

Moscow. 16th of May. Interfax-AVN - Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) sea-based "Bulava" in the next two or three years will be upgraded under the nuclear submarine strategic improved Project 955-A, told the general designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MIT), Yuri Solomonov.

"In the next two to three years will be released next, a fourth body (nuclear submarine 955-A project" Prince Vladimir ") And in relation to this new generation of submarines and missile system." Bulava "will also be modernized," - said Yu Solomonov.

According to him, it will be a modernization, "which will increase the efficiency of this complex in relation to the possibility of operating as a part of modernized missile cruisers".

He recalled that the "Bulava" was created for 10-12 years. "And came the natural process of updating the design and technical solutions" - said Yu.Solomonov.

At the end of May 2012 the Russian Defense Ministry and defense companies have signed three contracts on upgraded strategic missile submarine 955-A project with power nuclear arms. With CDB for Marine Engineering "Rubin" signed a contract for the design of the head of the modernized "Boreas", now "Sevmash" - for its construction, with the United Shipbuilding Corporation - for the construction of four modernized production "Boreas".

P30 3M30 "Bulava" (RSM-56 - for use in international treaties, SS-NX-30 - according to NATO classification) - Russia's newest three-stage solid-fuel missile, designed for arming prospective nuclear-powered strategic missile project "Northwind".

The missile is capable of carrying multiple independently targetable hypersonic nuclear blocks. "Bulava" will be the basis of a promising group of Russia's strategic nuclear forces to 2040-2045 years

testing of upgraded Bulava missile — source

Russian nuclear missile shield is cracking because of the "Bulava"
Strategic Pacific Fleet turns into a lame duck
Going to the Pacific Fleet (PF) of a new ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), "Vladimir Monomakh" again postponed until the end of the year. The reason - the inability of the main weapons of the cruiser, missile "Bulava", guaranteed to hit the target.
Make a rocket in the same place, "Topol" and "Yarsy". They have no complaints. So, the problem is not in production, which refers to the developer - Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MIT), and in the structural shortcomings of the weapon. For ground missiles used by the transport and launch container (TPK). It rocket rides to the start of it, it starts. Sea rockets were loaded into the mine submarine without TPK, his role was mine. It was not until as long as there was no "Bulava". For her, realized the special scheme: the mine began shipping missiles in TPK. It is difficult to find a logical explanation for this decision.
In order not to lose too much in diameter rockets, the developer provided clearance between the inner wall of the container and rocket several times smaller than the gap between the shaft and the inner wall of a missile. Americans, for example, the gap between the container and the missile is less than 20 mm. We and the Americans, this gap is determined by the placement of the horizontal cushioning needed to ensure the safety of the rocket during the underwater explosion at a safe distance to the boat. For the "Bulava" This problem is solved by the depreciation allocated in the gap between the transport and launch container and mine. Therefore, the gap between the missile and the container can actually be less. But it should be enough for loading missiles in transport-launch canister and secure the rocket launch. Here and there are questions.
In the manufacture of the working of the drawing indicates the designer is not only a linear dimension of the details, but admission to the size of (plus / minus). Tolerances are determined mainly precise, factory machines, presses and other equipment. For this reason, they can never be zero. It controls the size of the control devices. If the size of admission, the item is checked. Here it should be noted that the control devices themselves have errors.
It is much more difficult with the definition of assembly units dimensions. Their dimensions and tolerances on these dimensions are determined by calculations on complex techniques of dimensional chains already are probability values. How it affects the inner diameter of the transport and launch container and the outer diameter of the rocket? The container is made on a bending mill with subsequent welding of the longitudinal seam. The shell stage of the rocket - a winding cocoon, which is a machined on the outside diameter is not exposed. It is clear that in view of such technologies tolerances on these diameters will be far from zero. And they are difficult to control, given the length of the container and rocket. Plus the inevitable curvature container and rockets both in length and circumference. In addition, there are to be perpendicularity mating surfaces of steps to the theoretical axis of the rocket and the temperature changes of dimensional parameters missiles and transport and launch container due to changes in temperature in the mine submarine.
Thus, the rocket is a jointed-composite object with a deviation of all measurements specified above, which is hosted and launched from the transport and launch container, which is also not an ideal cylinder. The majority of the most important dimensions are not measured directly, but is calculated and probability.
The only substantive criterion missiles compatibility and the container is the fact that "climbed" the rocket in TPK or not ... but delayed the rocket into a container with a low speed. Rocket, without being absolutely rigid object, "adapted" to the container without large transverse accelerations. Other business start. In this case, the velocity of the rocket in the container is very high, and all the twists rocket accompanied by a high transverse accelerations. However, they are not constant over the length of the rocket and the increase in those areas where the degree of deformation increases. If some parts of the transverse overload exceeds allowable located in these areas, have the right to fail, separate rocket units.
Thus, it can be explained in this model why cracks occur in different nodes "mace" missiles and substantially not repeated. But sometimes the rocket flies. Obviously, in this case, the selected gap between the transport and launch container and rocket appeared commensurate with the technological tolerances.
How all this can be "treated"? The best thing - to throw out the transport and launch container from the mine and start designing a rocket from the ground. In this case, we arrive at the project "Bulava-45", proposed in the early 2000s. If the container is to leave, it is necessary to increase the gap by reducing the diameter of the missile. But in this case it is necessary to design a rocket from the ground. You can also consider options to increase the diameter of the missile silos, but what has made submarines? You will also need to redesign the transport and launch container and work out a way to start.
MIT, not recognizing his mistake in the design, however, must not repeat it in the "Bulava-M", the development of which is already underway. Apparently, the upcoming alterations rockets decided to continue the service at least until 2020 heavy missile submarine "Dmitry Donskoy", which is used as a test platform. This Tass source in the Russian military-industrial complex. You can assume that the new missile can not be expected before. And until that time a strategic component of the Pacific Fleet, in which all hopes were on the SSBN Project 995 and 995A, becomes a "lame duck." After all, there is no guarantee that the "Bulava" will be able to reach the intended purpose.

COMMENTS (3)
0
 Vladimir Stepanov 16:47 07/01/2016
Nuclear submarine of project 955 is only part of our submarine fleet ballistic missile is still new and small. Sami strategic missile again only a part of the strategic nuclear forces, where the main RVSN. Correct is that low crop production Votkinsk, who without the "Bulava" work more than their capabilities, complicating the commissioning of "Bulava". Hang all responsibility for this in the constructors illiterate and just bad. Detailed arguments in this article are not 100% proof of Responsibility

0
 Vladimir Stepanov 16:53 07/01/2016
for failure spine starts exactly with the container structure. The idea of ​​winning, and talk of "arthropod" designed to not versed in missile technology. Finally, you can use a well established and we have, it is true for a particular class of missiles, technology "mortar start". This is an additional and easy task, but it allows you to get away from the problem of improving the quality of the ill-fated container. Pumping is not necessary, the Pacific Fleet - a formidable force, and not a "lame duck."

2
 Abdullaevskiy Artur 21:41 2.7.2016
All right, all 100%. MIT has climbed to where give money, just promise with three boxes about a unified missile, but in the end turned out that should not have happened ... "Shark" cut, in which it would be possible to install anything .. And in the 955 project, too, "Bark" was supposed to stand. All decided to pull, rather than the mind.

Three myths about the "Bulava"
Vladimir Gundarov Deputy. managing editor of the "Independent Military Review" About the Author: Vladimir Gundarov - Reserve Captain 1st Rank.

Advertising is known to progress engine. It has always been around the world. In addition to Russia. Here in sea rocket heavily advertised ... regression. Or, if you call things by their words, propaganda substitute for advertising. Moreover, promotion of non-existent sverhdostoinstv new "Bulava" intercontinental ballistic missile clearly exceeds the limit - either because of incompetence of educators themselves, or because of underestimation of competence of those in whose address it is directed. In the near future should appear in the media about massive stuffing another victory "Mace" - is expected to "volley fire from a depth of 50 m on the move at sea state 6-7."
The first and only volley full ammunition - 16 liquid-fuel missiles RSM-54 - carried out 15 years ago ballistic missile submarine "Novomoskovsk". The tests were conducted to verify the "behavior" of the cruiser after it for 90 seconds, available from almost 645 tons of "reactive" cargo substituted with seawater. And cruiser acted for five-plus, and all the weight and size dummy warheads successfully "hit the" conditional goal. This shooting has become a global military-technical record of Soviet submariners. American divers on board the boat "Ohio" dare to release only four rockets "Trident-2" total weight of slightly more than 236 tons. Prior to the August events in Moscow and followed them after the collapse of the USSR was 12 days. Today, the Navy launched two missiles Russia is considered a "gulp".
But back to the "Bulava". Who still believes in its victory - a move from the reader system! These notes are not for you.
The first myth: "Bulava" will replace "blue stain" and "LINER"
"Vladimir Monomakh" Let's start with information about the failed launches of two "Bulava" missiles at the end of 2015 with the submarine. This means that established by the Minister of Defense of Russia (in 2013), the condition of holding five successful launches of "Bulava" missile, which must precede the adoption of their adopted, not performed. This fact makes the premature discussion of the full-scale burst shooting. In general discussion about the martial virtues of "Bulava". To smooth the negative impression of her failed test, former generals who have become venerable military experts, as it shows all modulo: nakos, take a bite, at the RSM-54 was even more unsuccessful test launches than the "Bulava", and for the credibility of result fantastic figures. The reality is:
RSM-54: the number of test launches from the ground stand and submarine - 58, including 17 unsuccessful (29.3%).
RSM-54 ( "Sineva" and "liner"), five test launches, which were carried out after the resumption of serial production of missiles RSM-54 in Russian conditions, all successful start-ups.
"Mace": 25 starts, including 11 unsuccessful (44%).
It is appropriate to note that if the resumption of production of missiles RSM-54 is not realized, and the creation of the "Bulava" missile corresponds to today's reality, then within a few years, Russia does have lacked the naval strategic nuclear forces.
11 years ago this writer in his article titled "Project 2020: a country without rockets" predicted "Bulava" long and hard way to create. Alas, the most dire predictions come true. Today we know that submarines 667BDRM project, RSM-54 armed with missiles, can carry on combat duty until 2025-2030 as part of the North-West group of naval strategic forces. And the existence of the North-eastern group from will depend on the actual completion of the missile "Bulava" from 2016.
Next, we should consider the approval of the (forecast) "fathers" of "Bulava" that liquid ICBM can not compete with solid "or for the duration of the active site, either in the complex survivability in a retaliatory strike or in resistance to the active site to the effects of damaging factors missile defense. " This, to put it mildly, very misleading.
The treaty process on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons as the main controlled missile parameters were adopted: the number of deployed missiles, the number of warheads on a missile and throw-weight rocket delivered to the stipulated firing range or demonstrate a real start. This throw-weight advanced missiles with multiple warheads is defined as the weight of the final stage of the rocket, which delivers warheads (warheads, warheads) to different aiming points. The throw-weight include: warhead, counter means (overcoming) ballistic missile defense, propulsion, machinery control systems and structural components, which are not separated from the latter (often called - Battle) stage of the rocket.
"Novomoskovsk" is still the world record holder for the salvo firing ballistic missiles.
"Novomoskovsk" is still the world record holder for the salvo firing ballistic missiles.
Throw-weight is the most important parameter characterizing the combat effectiveness of missiles, as well as its energy potential. The ratio of throw-weight missiles, delivered to the firing range of 10 thousand. Km, to the starting weight of the cross-sectoral documents missiles (in the USSR and Russia) called technical level of the rocket.
To launch a "bus scheme" serial dilution warheads for points aiming weight (mass) dilution system, the onboard control system is determined by the design and for the particular missile can be assumed constant. In this connection, the problem is reduced to the definition of a rational weight (capacity), and warhead weight management countermeasures for a breakthrough on missile defense. It is clear that for a limited missile throw-weight will have to find a rational combination of power and weight of the warhead countermeasures. A realization of a stronger response to such missiles leads to either reduce the number of warheads, or to reduce their power and weight.

MYTH TWO: OVERCOMING THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY PRO

Let's see how to solve the problem is solved or equipping of modern Russia's strategic missile means to counter missile defense.
For marine liquid propellant missiles "Sineva" and "liner" with a predicted service life of up to 2030 possible to retrofit on the number of warheads from the four middle-class power with the means to counter missile defense to 8-10 small class power with different sets of countermeasures (false purposes). Throw-weight (mass) of these missiles around 2 thousand. Kg.
For modern solid-sea missile "Bulava", the beginning of combat duty which was to take place in 2014-2015 (in fact, in 2016-2017), the projected service life - up to 2050-2060 years. It is expected of the modernization works, including their means of resistance. This upgrade options will be limited to the value of throw-weight (weight) - 1150 kg, and the possibility of its increase. Most likely, this means that an increase in breakthrough qualities will only be possible by reducing the number of nuclear warheads, as already used small power class warhead.
For today's liquid-propellant rockets land - "Voivod" with the throw-weight of 8800 kg and "Stiletto" with the throw-weight of 4,350 kg - the projected life of the years 2020-2022. In this context, it should not be carried out any work on the modernization of combat equipment of these missiles.
For solid ground missiles with a single warhead "Topol M" and the "yars" with multiple warhead provided modern means of resistance. However, the implementation of a more effective response to missile defense in subsequent upgrades will be limited to a small throw-weight (mass) - about 1200-1300 kg and lead either to a reduction in the number of small class power warheads, or to the use (in monoblock version) middle-class power unit.
Heavy missile silo-based "Sarmat" (such as "Voivod") with 8-ton, for example, throw-weight can provide effective protection against missile defense, provided from 2 to 4 tons of throw-weight to be allocated to 10 warheads protection of high or medium power classes.
The main results of these discussions are summarized in the table "Data on the strategic nuclear forces of deterrence."
The above circumstances lead to the conclusion that in the long term guaranteed strategic deterrence can be achieved if there is a part of the strategic nuclear forces of rockets with an increased throw-weight. Such missiles are able to adequately counter the projected missile defense options. The persistence of such missiles in the form of a stationary home before the start can be ensured by double fortification increase resistance when upgrading existing stationary mines, as well as missile defense starting positions and positional areas of existing or known means.
With regard to the rolling ground-based strategic deterrent, the possibility of countering missile defense is less due to the small throw-weight of solid propellant missiles (less than 1.5 tonnes). This may require additional costs for the deployment of missiles and exit from the process of treaty limitations on strategic offensive arms.
In this connection, realized the transition to solid-sea missile has a drawback associated with a decrease in throw-weight, which is illustrated by the following table features Russian and American naval missiles.
The main and very sad conclusion from this table is the fact that the backlog of the Russian solid-sea missile from the US almost 40 years, which follows from a comparison of rockets "Trident-1" and "Bulava", which have comparable performance characteristics and almost the same conventional technical level , inferior to the modern American technological level ( "Trident-2") by approximately 20%, and domestic liquid rocket sea RSM-54 (including the "Sineva" and "liner" versions) - and a half times.

MYTH THREE: Advantages of solid propellant missiles

Next stop on the statement about the advantages of solid-fuel missiles in the duration of the active site, in a retaliatory strike survivability, persistence in an active plot. Most likely such a statement is designed for professionals who are not related to rocket science. There is no doubt that the length of the active area of ​​solid propellant missiles have traditionally been lower than that of the liquid. But when this factor can be decisive? For example, after the appearance of the cosmic levels of missile defense ( "Star Wars"). However, in this case, the liquid rocket can fend off the "space" traps, for example, by the dashed paths (Disabled - Enabled boosters), by maneuvering in any direction trajectories, as well as the reduction of the active portion of the time in the new design.
As for the resistance of the active phase to the damaging factors, but today all the requirements of the customer are accepted and implemented by developers. If these requirements are demonstrably increase, the increased energy liquid-propellant rockets will implement them.

OPINION OF MARSHAL

The resumption of serial production of modernized missiles RSM-54 helped to keep the combat potential of Russian SSBNs.  Photo from the official site of the Russian Ministry of Defense
The resumption of serial production of modernized missiles RSM-54 helped to keep the combat potential of Russian SSBNs. Photo from the official site of the Russian Ministry of Defense
In conclusion, your notes will turn for support to the unquestionable authority of a single "Marshal of the industry" among the defense ministers Dmitry Ustinov. In 2013, the publishing house "Metropolitan Encyclopedia" published the book "Stories of Russian rockets." In 2005, the Assistant Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov Igor V. Illarionov told the author of the book the following story. "Shortly before his death Ustinova Illarionov visited him in the hospital. They talked about current affairs. Suddenly, the minister said:

- You know, and after Victor was right.

- Are you talking about, Dmitri? - I asked in surprise Illarionov.

- I say, Victor Makeev was right when resisted with all his strength and did not want to build a solid-fuel car. I am here in the House a lot better of it. We then bent his cool. And in vain ...

Ustinov thought. Illarionov broke the silence.

- But why, Dmitri? You always believed in the solid-technique!

- I still believe that. Just before the Americans we do not grow. And there was nothing to push. Our destiny - liquid fuel. With our capabilities can not do anything better.

Ustinov again reflected.

- And we're tverdotoplivnikov, Igor, chased in vain. They almost overstrained. Victor and Mike Yangel excellent machine made. And for the industry, and for the army, and for the fleet ... "

FORECAST AND REALITY

Creating a rocket RT-2 (under START - MS-12, according to NATO classification -. The SS-13 mod 1 Savage), was held at the Strategic Missile Forces arsenal from 1969 to 1994, resulted in an increase of transported weights. Liquid rocket then transported to the starting position without fuel and refueled after loading into the mine. RT-2 rocket (RT-2P) to combat the starting position delivered separately: in one container the first stage (the weight of about 35 tons), and in another - docked second and third stages. Technical solutions have been found question, but for delivery to the required starting position and improved road appropriate transport units.
Creating marine solid-fuel missile R-39 (under START - RSM-52, according to NATO classification - SS-N-20 Sturgeon) with a starting weight of 90 t require the construction of a new home system, go to the "wheel" to "rail" transporting rockets, new crane equipment for loading heavy missiles and much more. The work dragged on and were not completed during the Soviet era. In the period of the Russian R-39 missiles prematurely discontinued operation and its carriers - five heavy submarines of Project 941 "Typhoon" system - recycled or prepared for recycling, another, "Dmitry Donskoy", converted by the test platform for the "Bulava".
Of course, all the problems of exploitation, and marine and terrestrial, fixed and mobile solid-fuel missiles solved by domestic developers, but demanded and increased costs, and extend the life of creation. One of the conclusions of the first domestic developer of intercontinental ballistic missiles, is to ensure that the solid rocket motor - is a luxury available only to the wealthy countries with highly developed science and economy. But here's the trick, even a rich country like the US, Russia buys from its liquid rocket engines and install them on your vehicle.
Recently, at a hearing in Congress, US Assistant Secretary of Defense Procurement and Technology Frank Kendall has warned that a premature US rejection of the use of the Russian rocket engine RD-180 will cost the Pentagon more than $ 1 billion., And its own engine, US companies will be able to create not before 2021 . So if we have to chase the American fashion for solid rocket if our liquid is not worse, and in some cases even better? The question, of course, rhetorical also because the government has invested billions of rubles in the development of the "Bulava" and creating for her support - strategic submarines of Project 955 "Borey".
We can say that today there are different opinions in Russia, different approaches, different opportunities, but unfortunately, there is a competent, fair and not engaged arbitrator on strategic missile.

Why the "Bulava", when there is a "Sineva"?
The new missile submarines can go without missiles
Michael Kardashev  About the Author: Michael Kardashev - independent expert, more than 20 years in the Engineering Research Institute, led the research sector in the system Research Center.

The article by Vladimir Dvorkin "Like a rocket raketchiku┘" ( "IEE" number 6, 2009) touched upon the cessation of work on the creation of the marine missile complex D-19UTTH and choice of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MIT) as the lead developer of the new sea missile system.
Instead of deep, comprehensive and objective analysis of the serious problems of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces of our country's readers of the newspaper received a volume of material in the whole band, whose main purpose is to justify the erroneous decisions made in the late 1990s in the choice of ways of development of the strategic missile Navy ballistic missiles.
But this issue needs serious discussion, so talk of "Bulava" demands should continue.

CAUSES - SURFACE

The main reason for stopping the development of missile complex D-19UTTH Vladimir Dvorkin says "fatal problem of the so-called dimension and SLBM missile submarine." Sending a job to create a marine missile system Moscow Institute of Thermal explains the said "problem with the dimension of" disguised "a number of other reasons," as well as the fact that MIT "had the most experience in the Soviet Union and Russia in the development of high-reliability solid-fuel missiles."
It should be noted that at the time the decision to terminate the development of the D-19UTTH no problem, the more fatal, with the "so-called dimension and SLBM missile submarine" did not exist. All technical questions, including the most complex, related to the establishment and operation of a unique software missile submarine Project 941 "Akula" and SLBMs with a launch weight of 90 tons, was successfully resolved in the course of development in the period 1973-1983's missile complex D-19 RSM-39. shore-based system for submarines was established. All units are ground equipment with a traditional wheel were transferred to rail move. Flow of missiles from the factory to the submarine provided with Ros overload unit to unit. For loading missiles on submarines was constructed a new building with a crane lifting capacity increased, new piers have appeared in places of basing, missiles and other equipment storage.
The construction and deployment of the six submarines of Project 941 was completed in 1989. At the same time in 1988, it was adopted for an improved missile complex D-19U. No one denies the complexity of the operation of the submarine project 941 "Shark" with missile complex D-19. However, complexes of this type operated trouble-free in the Navy for almost twenty years. SLBM R-39 and R-39U equipped with ten warheads and their ammunition at the project 941 boats was 20 units. Thus, only one submarine missiles housed 200 warheads, and the potential of all groups of this type of missile was 1,200 warheads.
It is based on high-output characteristics of the missile complex of D-19, defining the combat effectiveness (intercontinental range, the number and power of warheads, accuracy, size of area of ​​breeding warheads and others.) That makes a significant contribution to group submarines of Project 941 in potential retaliation strategic nuclear forces of the country and its naval component. Developing a set of D-19UTTH ( "Bark") had improved compared to the complex D-19U characteristics and had to replace it with a missile-carriers of the project 941. At the technical level, and combat capabilities of the missile R-39UTTH not inferior to the American SLBM "Trident-2".
However, in 1998 at the stage of flight tests, it was decided to terminate work on a range D-19UTTH, technical readiness which at that time was 73%, and instead develop a new missile complex "Bulava-30." The feasibility of such a move was justified by the possibility of creating interspecific missiles for the Navy and the Strategic Missile Forces and thus significant cost savings. In connection with the conclusion of the 1993 START-2 Treaty, does not allow the production and flight ICBM test ground-based, for which more than one warhead, and also because of the problematic creation of missiles, meeting the requirements of land and sea-based, it turned out that developed rocket RVSN not needed.
Later, "Bulava" missile Yuri Solomonov, general designer admitted that "of interspecies rocket too early to say." "It is a question, perhaps several decades (! -" IEE ")." Thus, the basic idea to create interspecific missiles, due to which the work was begun on the missile complex "Bulava-30", was declared insolvent and rejected by the Defense Ministry. In these circumstances, the logical and the public interest was the decision to transfer the development of the now purely maritime missile complex GRC Academician VP Makeyev as a leading developer of all accepted into service with SLBM missile systems, with the exception of the country's first SLBM R-11FM ( " child "Korolev OKB-1).
Contrary to common sense, the main developer of the marine missile complex was appointed the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, does not specialize in designing SLBMs. MIT doing land-based ICBMs and solid-because, of course, had no experience in the development of solid-fuel SLBM, which had GRC Academician VP Makeyev, which account for - solid fuel SLBM R-39 and R-39U with flight reliability of 0.96, similar American SLBM "Trident-2". In addition, the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, which was headed by Vladimir Dvorkin, was appointed head of Military-scientific support of development, although such issues in terms of maritime defense systems ever studied the profile of the 28th Research Institute of Ministry of Defense (Institute of Navy weapons).
The reasons inexplicable from the standpoint of ordinary logic solutions lie on the surface. Defence Minister at that time was Igor Sergeyev, until then commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, which were armed with "Topol" missiles mitovskie. And the 4th Central Research Institute of the Defense Ministry, then headed by Vladimir Dvorkin, conducted research mainly in the interests of the Strategic Missile Forces. MIT and the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense Igor Sergeyev was much "closer" than GRC Academician VP Makeyev and the 28th Research Institute of Ministry of Defense. In making the above decisions, took part at the time headed the Ministry of Economy Yakov Urinson, maintains close ties with MIT who led Yuri Solomonov.

PRICE opportunistic SOLUTIONS

Taken at the time steps have serious negative consequences, affecting both the current state, and the further development of naval strategic nuclear forces of Russia. As a result, in connection with the development of complex "Bulava-30" were unarmed submarines of Project 941, as the production of RSM-39U has been discontinued. In the absence of funds for the missile operation it was possible their temporary preservation. However, three unique submarines of this project butchered for scrap in the funds allocated to the United States. Two submarine derived in reserve - "Severstal" and "Arkhangelsk" - most likely the same fate. Headache submarine "Dmitry Donskoy", which was planned to rearm after factory repair of the complex D-19U, has been transformed and is now used to test "Bulava" missile.
Using a unique, being in working condition for a new submarine missile tests can not be considered justified. This has led to the exclusion of the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the country more than two hundred (!), Modern warheads missile complex D-19U. Usually the test uses special underwater stands and submarines older types. Otherwise, how rout occurred with the group 941 can not be named the submarine project. The development of SLBM "Bulava" has got into a dead end development of domestic marine strategic nuclear forces.
As a result, the "Bulava" Today we do not have any groups submarines of Project 941, nor a flying missile. Initially, the alleged timing of the completion of development of this complex (2005) are long gone. In view of the negative statistics conducted flight tests of the further course of the development of complex terms, the final result and the required volume of financing trudnopredskazuem. Now, without the missile could be the new Project 955 "Borey" missile, which was planned to arm the "Bulava" complex. Headache submarine project "Yury Dolgoruky" a year as launched, built two more missile project - "Alexander Nevsky" and "Vladimir Monomakh".
The missile "Bulava" in their tactical and technical characteristics inferior to the American SLBM "Trident-1" development of thirty years ago, not to mention the SLBM "Trident-2" and new domestic SLBM R-29RMU2 ( "Sineva"). If SLBM "Bulava" finally fly and equip its submarines of Project 955 "Borey", the group, the equivalent of their combat potential liquidated grouping submarine project 941 with a set of D-19U can not be created in the foreseeable future. That is what is the price of erroneous and largely tactical decisions taken in the late 1990s.
The position is currently saves renewed mass production of RSM-29RMU and the adoption in 2007 adopted the R-29RMU2 ( "Sineva"). Otherwise, we risk to remain without any SNF naval component. However, new media under the SLBM "Sineva" is not being built, and existing submarine will be decommissioned in the near future, because they are in the final stage of operation.
Thus, a paradoxical situation in the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces. It is in service with new SLBM "Sineva" with the best indicator energomassovogo excellence among all domestic and foreign ballistic missiles of light class (weight up to 105 tons) of land and sea-based, which will soon be without a carrier. At the same time building new missile project 955 "Borey", which may be left without missile.
In this situation, exacerbated by the economic crisis, it is inappropriate, being armed with SLBMs "Sineva" continue to risk financing to create a new "Bulava" ballistic missile, greatly inferior to the level of the first TTH. The required level of the potential of strategic deterrence naval component of strategic nuclear forces in the long term can be guaranteed to be ensured by weapons modernized Project 955 submarine missiles "Sineva" having high reliability and efficiency. The earlier the corresponding decisions, the faster the domestic naval strategic nuclear forces come out of the impasse.

The missile "Bulava" in their tactical and technical characteristics inferior to the American SLBM "Trident-1" development of thirty years ago, not to mention the SLBM "Trident-2"

Vladimir Monomakh begins transfer to the Pacific
Vladimir Monomakh, the third submarine of the Project 955 class, is said to have left its temporary base in Severomorsk to begin transfer to the Pacific. It is expected to reach its permanent base in Vilyuchinsk in September. There, Vladimir Monomakh will join another Project 955 submarine, Alexander Nevskiy, which completed the transfer in September 2015. Vladimir Monomakh was expected to conduct a salvo launch of Bulava missiles in June 2016, but it has left without launching the missiles. It is possible that it will launch the missiles from the Pacific, but maybe it won’t – at the time Alexander Nevskiy arrived in the Pacific it was reported that it will conduct a launch from there, but it didn’t.

Tsavo Lion wrote:

Vladimir Monomakh begins transfer to the Pacific
Vladimir Monomakh, the third submarine of the Project 955 class, is said to have left its temporary base in Severomorsk to begin transfer to the Pacific. It is expected to reach its permanent base in Vilyuchinsk in September. There, Vladimir Monomakh will join another Project 955 submarine, Alexander Nevskiy, which completed the transfer in September 2015. Vladimir Monomakh was expected to conduct a salvo launch of Bulava missiles in June 2016, but it has left without launching the missiles. It is possible that it will launch the missiles from the Pacific, but maybe it won’t – at the time Alexander Nevskiy arrived in the Pacific it was reported that it will conduct a launch from there, but it didn’t.

Obviously Bulava has some serious problems! Hope they don't cause a terrible accident!

Big_Gazza wrote:

Tsavo Lion wrote:In the event the Bulava project is discontinued and all missiles are removed from service, couldn't their subs be modified for Sineva BMs or to carry SLCMs?

Are you trolling????  Why on earth would Bulava be discontinued or removed from service????  Please desist with the groundless hysteria.

PapaDragon wrote:

sepheronx wrote:What accident with casualties?

Exactly. What causalities?

MARCUS GEE wrote:The K-219 was a ballistic-missile submarine of the outdated Yankee class. It carried 16 nuclear [SS-N-6 liquid-fuel] missiles and a crew of 119. On Oct. 3, 1986, the sub was being shadowed by the USS Augusta, an American hunter-killer sub. To make the American boat show itself, Capt. Igor Britanov executed a maneuver that U.S. submariners call the "Crazy Ivan," a tight, spiraling turn. The stress from the turn aggravated a leak in one of K-219's missile tubes. Seawater mixed with missile fuel and there was a chemical explosion, rupturing the tube and letting in a flood of water and nitric acid. Three seamen died within minutes from the poisoned gas, green foam bubbling from their mouths. ..Though the K-219's crew fought the fire with everything they had, they were forced to retreat, watertight compartment by watertight compartment, through their crippled vessel. Then fire reached the nuclear reactors. That's one of the worst fears of any nuclear-submarine crew because a reactor fire could spread deadly radiation throughout the ship. Worse, it could trigger the launch of the sub's remaining missiles, perhaps starting an accidental nuclear war. Or it could send a plume of radioactivity into the atmosphere, endangering millions of people on the U.S. East Coast. Only the intervention of two heroic Russian sailors prevented an all-out disaster. Donning radiation suits and gas masks, they crawled forward to the burning reactor room and shut down the reactors manually. One of them died. Not long after, the crew abandoned ship for a Russian freighter and K-219 sank to the bottom, where it sits some 16,000 feet down.