Damn.
Or, legalize PMC's and I can be some fatass overpaid security guard.
miketheterrible wrote:I wonder if they are going to go the route and increase the age limit for recruitment. I know when I had the chance to join the army or knock up a chick, I should have chosen the army (although our army sucks and I would probably the trained with a fake wooden gun or the ones that shoot elastic bands). Maybe I should join the Russians, but I'm approaching 30.
Damn.
Or, legalize PMC's and I can be some fatass overpaid security guard.
franco wrote:miketheterrible wrote:I wonder if they are going to go the route and increase the age limit for recruitment. I know when I had the chance to join the army or knock up a chick, I should have chosen the army (although our army sucks and I would probably the trained with a fake wooden gun or the ones that shoot elastic bands). Maybe I should join the Russians, but I'm approaching 30.
Damn.
Or, legalize PMC's and I can be some fatass overpaid security guard.
Maybe contract but not conscript, that would be too political.
Another interesting factor is the new option for conscripts of doing a two year tour instead of the one year conscripted service. They get contractor wages, benefits and other perks for this. Have seen indications that up to 10% are taking this.
eridan wrote:Thanks. Do you think there will be breakdowns for each branch published? Complete with ratio of contract soldiers in every branch?
These figures you mentioned before, 425 thousand contract soldiers and 275 thousand conscripts, that's 700 thousand total. So those number still lack comissioned officers? With officers, grand total would be 850 thousand or so?
Russia recently revealed that its 2015 program to offer para-military training to teenagers had so far gained 350,000 members (and has a goal of one million).
Russia still uses conscription but popular pressure has forced the government to reduce conscript service to one year and because so much of that time has to be spent with training (to turn civilians into useful soldiers) the military gets little practical use out of conscripts.
The damage the one-year conscript service did to the military was never officially admitted until recently because senior officers were told that anyone speaking about this publicly would do serious damage to their careers. But, as officers with knowledge of the extent of the damage retired or resigned from the military, more of them spoke openly of the problem.
Because of the growing demand for troops to serve in eastern Ukraine and Syria, there was more discussion on the Internet of the negative impact one-year conscripts have inflicted. Denials from the government were no longer working and active duty generals and admirals unofficially admitted it was all true, and that it was actually as bad as much of the Internet chatter implied.
It was no secret that the presence of so many ill-trained conscripts in the military discouraged men from joining as volunteers (contract soldiers) and many existing officers and career enlisted men were leaving as well. For years it had been generally believed that the only effective units in the Russian military were the 100,000 or so troops in the Spetsnaz (special operations) and airborne units and even these units took some conscript volunteers and used them for support jobs requiring less training and experience.
Taking ships to sea is increasingly risky when so many of the crew are conscripts who have to be closely supervised and taught the many basic skills warship crewmen require. The air force is unable to maintain aircraft adequately. That means more aircraft, particularly the many older ones still in service, are crashing. Pilots are not able to fly as many hours as needed to retain skills. This situation has been made worse since 2015 because of the air operations in Syria. Those air operations are a priority and since Syria is a combat zone conscripts cannot be sent there. In any event, Syria is no place for anything but the most skilled and experienced maintainers. That means few of these maintainers are available for the air force squadrons back in Russia, which now fly even fewer hours.
The government was eager to keep this conscript crisis quiet because officially admitting it would hamper Russian diplomacy based on threats of large scale military action. East European media openly mocks Russian military threats because of the few effective units Russia actually has.
Government efforts to project the image of a modern, professional and constantly improving armed forces is proving more difficult to sustain. Thus the urgency of making the para-military school program work. During the decades of communist rule, the state had complete control over the media, massive internal security forces and, most importantly, no Internet or smartphones. Those last two items have crippled efforts to persuade Russians and foreigners that Russia was still a major developer and manufacturer of new weapons.
The constant stream of press releases detailing new weapons the Russian forces will be equipped with is undermined by the reality, often documented vis-a-vi smartphone video spread via the Internet. The new weapons often do not work at all and even if they do there is never enough money to produce them in the quantities implied. Russian development and manufacturing efforts are still crippled by shortages of cash and talent. Arms exports are hurt by this...
This poverty of money and talent is very visible with the Russian military efforts in Ukraine (Donbas) and Syria. Both are being carried out on the cheap and with as much discretion as possible because these operations are unpopular with the Russian people. Thus government efforts to mask just how much these operations cost in terms of resources and casualties. Hiding the spending is easier than concealing the number of dead.
The reports from the new Zampolits and official troop opinion polls are not encouraging, but they explain why so many young Russians and their parents are so eager to avoid conscription any way they can.
Morale has not improved but at least the regular use of opinion surveys showed that the troops were well aware of deceptive press releases about nonexistent new equipment.The troops also knew what low budget charades the operations in Donbas and Syria were. While many details of the surveys could be kept secret, the actual attitudes of the troops could not. No wonder why some Russians are nostalgic for the good old days of communist rule.
If you want to see the future, look at China where newly (for the first time in history) modernized Chinese forces are a long-term threat to Russia.
Lacking cash the Russian government is forced to come up with other methods. Many of these new ideas are practices that were widely used during the communist period or even before during czarist times. Para-military training for high school students was used during czarist times when far fewer Russian youngsters got more than eight years of schooling. Teenagers of the aristocracy and wealthy families did attend secondary school and many of these had para-military training. So what is old is new again.
Today General Staff Chief Gerasimov says the Russian MOD's goal for contract enlisted service is now 475,000 personnel by 2025. Not so long ago the goal was 499,000 by 2020.
After watching Shogiu's speech, the 384,000 contractors include:
62,000 warrant officers and 103,000 sergeants