Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decomissions

eehnie wrote:I have been reading with interest the forum by some days/weeks before registering. It is very interesting. There are multiple posts about the new warfare designed in Russia, as everyone would expect, but I'm missing in the forum a talk about the older warfare that is last part of their active life for a modern war in the Russian European and Asian environment, and about the future decommissions that can come in the short-mid term.

Obviously, the War in the Donbas is becoming at this point a real test for the Russian designed warfare, for the older warfare, in an environment where more modern small arms and ammunitions are used too. From what I see, some aged designs are performing well still and keep being useful. The artillery systems and the surface-air and surface-surface missile systems are performing well still.

Also the T-72 seems to be performing better than the T-64 proving that the recent decommission of the T-64 in Russia was right.

And finally, I see, without being an expert, that the armored vehicles under 15 tons are performing also weakly in therms of protection to the crew, and in terms of destruction rate. All the warfare used in this war as APC and IFV seems to be weakly armored in relation to the ammunition and small arms used against them. I would say that this is a trouble that appeared too for the US in other recent wars as the War in Irak and the War in Afghanistan.

Analyzing the loses of both sides in the War of Donbas, counted in lostarmour.info, and comparing them with the number of armored vehicles of every class included in sources like globalsecurity.org, we can see how the Ukranian army has lost until today about a 10% of their armored vehicles, but there are some cases with bigger loses, thanks to be very used vehicles, but also thanks to a weak performance in terms of armored protection. This 10% includes not the armored vehicles that the Ukranian ground forces lost in Crimea (it would be very interesting to know their loses in this región in order to know their total loses).

If I'm not wrong this will be the last war for the T-64. With only Ukraine and Uzbekistan having them and with the high destruction rate for them in the War of Donbas, it seems that there is not a future for them after this war. Even I would not be surprised if Uzbekistan sell their T-64 to be used by one of the sides in this war. If I'm not wrong, there are not T-64s in the Russian ground forces, but also some other armored vehicle performing weak in this war, can lead for some new decommission in the Russian Army.

Without include the BM-21 and the SA-13, because they are rocket or missile launchers (performing better in this war), and the newer BMD-4, these are the russian designed armored vehicles under 15 tons that can be in the talk about low performance in therms of protection (despite some of them, 2S23 and BMD-3, seem not to be used in the war):

2S23
BMP-2
BTR-80
BMD-3
BMP-1
MT-LB
BTR-70
BMD-2
2S9
BTR-D
BMD-1
BRDM-2

In every case you can include all the variants under the term.

How do you see the performance of the used armored vehicles in the war (by both sides)? Do you think some conclusions can be useful for close but not used in the war armored vehicles?

Which would be performing better? Which would be performing worst? Do you see some total decommission as consequence of the performance in the war of Donbas or these armored vehicles are performing well enough to have a longer life in the Russian army?

I hope all this can be interesting for you to talk about.

PS: Feel free to add news refered to possible or real decommissions in the sort-term or in the mid-term, related or not with the war in Donbas.

KoTeMoRe wrote:2 points

1. Ukraine has lost more than 10% of its war park. Poroshenko put it at 60/65% of the available resources after August. It did even worse since then with over 1100 AFV's destroyed including 150 or so tanks.  This is a quarter of the Ukrainian T-64 pool. And about Half of the vehicles not in storage.

The available armour for this was 3600 units, tops all AFV involved.

2. We don't know what is performing "better" given the totally inept way, both sides (bar Russian volunteers) are using them. In my opninion it is the survavibility post-hit that makes the 64 puzzling. Some of them seem to take hits and stay put, some of them look like cauliflowers after being hit. WE would have to have a complete typology of the losses in order to say, so and so.

At the end of the day, just like in the desert, it comes down to force multipliers and tactics. This isn't "older" warfre, this is second line warfare after in hypothetical peer'contest, both sides have been bogged down to an attrition game. This kind of warfare, is bound to become the future if big players go against eachother.

eehnie wrote:

KoTeMoRe wrote:2 points

1. Ukraine has lost more than 10% of its war park. Poroshenko put it at 60/65% of the available resources after August. It did even worse since then with over 1100 AFV's destroyed including 150 or so tanks.  This is a quarter of the Ukrainian T-64 pool. And about Half of the vehicles not in storage.

The available armour for this was 3600 units, tops all AFV involved.

2. We don't know what is performing "better" given the totally inept way, both sides (bar Russian volunteers) are using them. In my opninion it is the survavibility post-hit that makes the 64 puzzling. Some of them seem to take hits and stay put, some of them look like cauliflowers after being hit. WE would have to have a complete typology of the losses in order to say, so and so.

At the end of the day, just like in the desert, it comes down to force multipliers and tactics. This isn't "older" warfre, this is second line warfare after in hypothetical peer'contest, both sides have been bogged down to an attrition game. This kind of warfare, is bound to become the future if big players go against eachother.

I agree about the bad use of the of armament by the Ukranian side. Even it seems so obvious to me, despite being not an expert, how the militia is doing better in terms of military strategy, tactics and in the use of the warfare. Being realistic, the words of P Poroshenko are not credible at all. If a 60/65% would have been destroyed after august, today they would have nothing in the front line because January and February have been months of heavy loses for the Ukranian ground forces. I take these comments of Poroshenko as part of his calls to the NATO for more warfare.

But I agree that the real loses are higher than this 10%. This number is like a mínimum for their loses, like a count of certified loses, including not the loses in Crimea and including not the warfare that can not be used at this point and need some reparation before to be combat ready. And still a 10% of the total number of armored vehicles of the country is very high. and it only can go to worse.

I think the complete analysis of the performance of the warfare in the War of Donbas will be done with more time. At this point for me it is difficult to advance on it, despite I try. I hope we can advance on it.

Despite the bad use of warfare in this war, that would not be improved by other low experienced armies in other wars around the world, it seems possible to reach some conclusions. As example, in the good side, it seems that mid size aged armored vehicles (roughly between 15 and 30 tons), most of them artillery, air defense and surface-surface rocket and missile launchers can have still a future, and can be attractive for a number of countries. Even the most aged ones seems to have a place today with improved ammunitions. It would not be rare to think about some of them even returning to production for export. I mean not all the conclusions of the war will be negative.

KoTeMoRe wrote:The problem again is what you read in that Porohenko statement. I read that 60% of the available armament for the ATO at that time was KO. Which isn't surprising at all. Between failures, mission kills and outright destruction the losses on the UA side were well in the threshold of 60%.

Then you have the pictures themselves. In Kiev and Kharkov you had at least a couple of hundred of decaying tanks. The change in IFV's too was noticeable. While from June to Octobre the BMP-2 was ubiquitous, from November onwards more and more BMP-1 were making apparitions. Worse, UA started using T-64A's and had to  sequester Congos 64BV1M1. These are tell tale signs that Ukraine has issues keeping up with reconditioning of its old stocks and that many machines were lost and had issues cannibalizing more for the ATO. One of the great inputs of the Russian help (Nay sayers be damned) is the persistent targeting of war materiel. It is typical, Russia wants to show Ukraine, war is futile, by knee capping it.

On the assets, doesn't mean much, often decried Soviet legacy tanks are showing good enough in Syria and in Ukraine. This goes to show that preparation and tactical awareness is still the most important asset on the battlefield. Experience comes handy, but both sides were novices (including Russian input).

You can use pretty effectively all the Ukrainian armament, if you have the required C2/C3 and troops whose indoctrination and formation doesn't limit to hold this, pew pew, march etc.

One thing that I've observed from the most proficient NAF units, is the rather large inner-unit autonomy (we're not speaking about Sparta or Somali that IMO are distraction and irregular warfare units). But I'm speaking about those units that in the peak of Illovaisk took it to the chin and hold the line. In Debaltsevo the uneven performance was a direct result of people with different agendas trying to do everything but the essential. IE close the cauldron, shut the side paths and bomb the hell out of UA henchmen.

Personally I'm in awe at the devilish precision (relatively) of a dumb system like the BM-21. The strike on Krammatorsk airfield (despite the civilian casualties) was also a hell of a shot. This has clearly opened the eyes of many people who were used to send the super duper bombers, sit back and go after to thrash the 3rd world country of the moment.

One of the things also is that in this war people know eachother by heart. Russians know everything Ukraine can throw at them. Ukrainians generally as well, off course this parity in intelligence is broken by the shape of both armies, but this fratricide just shows that you don't engage in wars you can't win, you just bend over and take it.

eehnie wrote:

KoTeMoRe wrote:The problem again is what you read in that Porohenko statement. I read that 60% of the available armament for the ATO at that time was KO. Which isn't surprising at all. Between failures, mission kills and outright destruction the losses on the UA side were well in the threshold of 60%.

Then you have the pictures themselves. In Kiev and Kharkov you had at least a couple of hundred of decaying tanks. The change in IFV's too was noticeable. While from June to Octobre the BMP-2 was ubiquitous, from November onwards more and more BMP-1 were making apparitions. Worse, UA started using T-64A's and had to  sequester Congos 64BV1M1. These are tell tale signs that Ukraine has issues keeping up with reconditioning of its old stocks and that many machines were lost and had issues cannibalizing more for the ATO. One of the great inputs of the Russian help (Nay sayers be damned) is the persistent targeting of war materiel. It is typical, Russia wants to show Ukraine, war is futile, by knee capping it.

On the assets, doesn't mean much, often decried Soviet legacy tanks are showing good enough in Syria and in Ukraine. This goes to show that preparation and tactical awareness is still the most important asset on the battlefield. Experience comes handy, but both sides were novices (including Russian input).

You can use pretty effectively all the Ukrainian armament, if you have the required C2/C3 and troops whose indoctrination and formation doesn't limit to hold this, pew pew, march etc.

One thing that I've observed from the most proficient NAF units, is the rather large inner-unit autonomy (we're not speaking about Sparta or Somali that IMO are distraction and irregular warfare units). But I'm speaking about those units that in the peak of Illovaisk took it to the chin and hold the line. In Debaltsevo the uneven performance was a direct result of people with different agendas trying to do everything but the essential. IE close the cauldron, shut the side paths and bomb the hell out of UA henchmen.

Personally I'm in awe at the devilish precision (relatively) of a dumb system like the BM-21. The strike on Krammatorsk airfield (despite the civilian casualties) was also a hell of a shot. This has clearly opened the eyes of many people who were used to send the super duper bombers, sit back and go after to thrash the 3rd world country of the moment.

One of the things also is that in this war people know eachother by heart. Russians know everything Ukraine can throw at them. Ukrainians generally as well, off course this parity in intelligence is broken by the shape of both armies, but this fratricide just shows that you don't engage in wars you can't win, you just bend over and take it.

Then you read it as the 60-65% of the total warfare of the country being not ready to be used, or being destroyed. It would mean that Ukraine had after August about 3500-4000 armored vehicles ready to use. Maybe. Even it would be higher than my estimation.

For me, most of the warfare that need reparation is off only temporarily. It is question of money (not many) and time to put most of these stocks in the road for the war in better or worse condition (surely with lower quality standards still). Only the scrapped material has not a solution, the rest can have at least a bad solution. And I think they will do it. Also I think they will find every piece of Russian warfare remaining in the countries to the west of Ukraine, but surely all it will not make a difference in the result of the war. They tried with their best warfare in the first months of the war being unsuccesful.

In the case of the militia, it is very positive for them to see how they are keeping the loses under the level of the captured warfare to the Ukraine armed forces. No doubt, it is a merit.

I also see the BM-21 performing well in military terms. After this war I think it would be still a decent number of governments interested about to buy them, even used ones. Also I think more aged warfare in line with the BM-21 or a little better like the SA-13, 2S1, 2S34, SA-8, 2S25, SS-21, 2S31, SA-6, BM-27, ZSU-23-4, SS-C-1B, SS-23, 2S3, 2S4, 2S5, SA-4, T-72 and BM-30, plus the newer BTR-90, BMP-3 and BMD-4 would be interesting for many countries. I would not be surprised if some are recovered for production and export with modern ammunition. In the age of drones (most of them easier to destroy than aircrafts), every air defense system can be more demanded, plus other launcher systems (artillery, rocket launchers).

GarryB wrote:Let me put the BMD in perspective...



The BMD is all about mobility...

GarryB wrote:Let me put the BMD in perspective...



The BMD is all about mobility...

Werewolf wrote:

GarryB wrote:Let me put the BMD in perspective...



The BMD is all about mobility...

From when and where was this picture taken?

GarryB wrote: Not really.

the mix for armoured vehicles is mobility, protection, and fire power, and armoured vehicles are a combination of these... ie heavy protection effects mobility... a good vehicle generally has good features in all three areas... the T-34 is a good example for its time... good armour, good protection, good gun power. Each area can be broken down further of course... mobility includes speed and ability to ford and climb obstacles or operate on soft ground and indeed how reliable the vehicle is and how far it can drive on one tank of fuel. Protection includes how it copes with contemporary enemy weapons and how well it protects the crew. Fire power is fairly broad too... can you see well enough to find targets before they shoot at you, do you have the weapon types available to do the job at hand etc etc.

Modern BMDs are not super heavy protected vehicles because they have to be dropped from an aircraft... drop a Bradley from an aircraft and spend two weeks digging it out of the hole it creates.

BMDs score well for mobility and fire power, but low for protection because they are designed to be dropped in the middle of no where well behind enemy lines and to engage poorly defended rear area installations... nuclear weapons, airfields, HQs, centres of communications... things that would be useful to capture rather than just destroy with air power.

Compared to the western equivalents (ie trucks) the BMD is well protected, well armed, and mobile... fully amphibious and protected from small arms and shell splinters.

Barin1 (from the article) wrote:As announced recently, Russia is about to retire its arsenal of D-30 howitzers, that were widely used in Soviet and later in Russian Army for about 50 years.Production was stopped in first half of 1990s, it was a hard time for all military production. Due to this fact, the barrels were detoriating without possibility of replacement, so it is more or less expected that most of 5000 of D-30 will be moved to artillery bases for inspection, some will be scrapped some might be sold somewhere as M-30 in 80s.
Those in good conditions will still be used in VDV and the brigades, deployed in the south. Pretty sure there's still plenty of shells left.
I have a soft spot for this howitzer, as I was trained as operator, took part in many drills in heat and cold and really liked it.
It was widely produced, sold to some countries where it was mounted on older tanks chassis (Syria nd Egypt), it was also licensed to some countries (Yugoslavia, Iraq).
General idea is that it will be replaced by self-propelled guns and 152 mm howitzers…another cold war warrior is gone, but I will remember it.

eehnie wrote:
Has been the D-30 towed howitzer decommissioned?

Looking more closely to the situation of the towed artillery in the Russian armed forces, I find these days some reference to the retirement of the active service in the Russian armed forces of the 2A18M D-30 howitzer.

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BA_%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D1%81%D1%83%D1%85%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%83%D1%82%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85_%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B9_%D0%A4%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8#.D0.90.D1.80.D1.82.D0.B8.D0.BB.D0.BB.D0.B5.D1.80.D0.B8.D1.8F

http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=298028

Both metion a posible retirement of the D-30 in 2013.

I have been trying to find more references unsuccesfully, but being not Russian speaker I can not extend my research to Russian sources. Maybe someone can help checking more about this info in Russian language sources.

The case of the Russian Wikipedia seems based on The Military Balance.