Iran Air Defense Systems

I find this news suspicious. I doubt if Iran has the capability to reverse engineer a S-300 system. And I most definitely doubt if they have received something from Belarus or Ukraine.

The DPRK also does not have or is known to operate the S-300, and China would not help Iran copy one.

Have to give props to Farce News, they always have some great story like DEBKA.

Any body can make a copy of anything, but there are copies and there are copies.

The Chinese have a copy of the S-300, but it is not an exact copy and while cheaper than the original it doesn't seem to be selling better so one would expect it is not a good copy.

This Iranian "copy", if it really exists will likely not be as good as the Chinese copy let alone the original, and that is not a slur against the Iranians.

The Chinese had the advantage of having lots of Russian S-300s in service so they at least had something in their possession to actually copy.

In comparison the Iranians have spec sheets and photos they might have taken when examining the system when they made their initial order.

If they really could make S-300s as good as the original why would they waste money trying to buy the original? Why would they complain and take Russia to court when the sale was blocked by UN sanction?

I don't think the HQ-9 has been in a lot of export competitions, so saying that it isn't as good as an S-300P because it doesn't have the order book is a bit of a stretch. OK, yeah, it probably isn't as good as a PMU-2 or S-400, but I'd expect it to be on par electroncially with at least a late model S-300PS. Besides, people buying S-300s seem to be doing so as part of large arms packages these days, perhaps making the sticker price more palatable when available offsets are taken into account. Maybe they also get a bulk discount, who knows. But given China's rapid advancement through different radar and missile technologies since the 90's I wouldn't be so quick to write off the HQ-9.

The Iranians though, they make me laugh. Their "stealth flying boat" looks to have the RCS of my house, and be powered by a similar engine as my lawnmower. Their "S-300P type TEL" is a bunch of oil drums welded together. Their "advanced fighter aircraft" is a twin-tailed F-5, or a Mukhamedov design imported from Russia. At least their military's PR machine is world-clas, because nothing about their air defense capability is (OK, except for the Tor-M1Es, but they're largely irrelevant from a strategic AD standpoint). If they'd just STFU and import a bunch of HQ-9 batteries, or if Russia would stop being stupid and export the S-300PMU-2s, they'd see a quantum leap in capability.

SOC wrote:I don't think the HQ-9 has been in a lot of export competitions, so saying that it isn't as good as an S-300P because it doesn't have the order book is a bit of a stretch. OK, yeah, it probably isn't as good as a PMU-2 or S-400, but I'd expect it to be on par electroncially with at least a late model S-300PS. Besides, people buying S-300s seem to be doing so as part of large arms packages these days, perhaps making the sticker price more palatable when available offsets are taken into account. Maybe they also get a bulk discount, who knows. But given China's rapid advancement through different radar and missile technologies since the 90's I wouldn't be so quick to write off the HQ-9.

HQ-9 was in the running in Turkey and rejected as soon as it hit the competition. The fact China bought more S-300 well after it was in production says alot. The fact Pakistan hasn't moved on it says even more. Even the HHQ-9 on their supposed AEGIS destroyers were supplanted with S-300 Rif on the next line of DDGs. I have seen a few rare clips of it and know a few things in comparing to S-300.

A) it is hot launch, not cold
B) much slower acceleration and speed
C) much less range

We have no idea how well their tracking and acquisition radar came out, but by its lack of interest must be inferior to even S-300PMU.

Vladimir79 wrote:HQ-9 was in the running in Turkey and rejected as soon as it hit the competition. The fact China bought more S-300 well after it was in production says alot. The fact Pakistan hasn't moved on it says even more. Even the HHQ-9 on their supposed AEGIS destroyers were supplanted with S-300 Rif on the next line of DDGs. I have seen a few rare clips of it and know a few things in comparing to S-300.

A) it is hot launch, not cold
B) much slower acceleration and speed
C) much less range

We have no idea how well their tracking and acquisition radar came out, but by its lack of interest must be inferior to even S-300PMU.

The HHQ-9 on the Type 052C...they're still building 052Cs, while only two of the 051Cs with the S-300FM were built. China apparently bought more S-300Ps as the HQ-9 underwent some sort of reworking. That's not too suprising, given that this was China's first serious SAM design. I've heard the in-service weapon described as "HQ-9A". As far as I can find the HQ-9 is still in the running for T-LORAMDIS, but NATO is pressuring Turkey not to buy a Chinese or Russian system. As if a NATO nation offers anything better?!? Here's the story:

Turkey refuses to expel Russia, China from defense competition

I can buy the possibility of reduced acceleration and reduced range. The HQ-9 most likely tops out around 125-150 km, putting it well short of the 48N6E2 (200 km, S-300PMU-2) or 48N6DM (250 km, S-400). Given that they've apparently xeroxed the 48N6 airframe for the most part, I'd think that the top end acceleration and velocity figures aren't far enough removed from the 48N6 to make too much of a difference. Patriot doesn't move along much faster than Mach 5 anyway, and it does fine with a veolcity lesser than that of the 48N6. I've seen Mach 4.2 quoted for the HQ-9, which is perfectly fine for a long-range strategic SAM. Any additional velocity is going to be primarily related to an ATBM capability anyway. Maybe that's the reason for a lack of interest?

This is an HHQ-9 launch from a Type 052C, by the way...and that's a cold launch.

At least their military's PR machine is world-clas, because nothing about their air defense capability is (OK, except for the Tor-M1Es, but they're largely irrelevant from a strategic AD standpoint). If they'd just STFU and import a bunch of HQ-9 batteries, or if Russia would stop being stupid and export the S-300PMU-2s, they'd see a quantum leap in capability.

The problem for Russia is that she is not the world dominant superpower that simply does what she likes and to hell with all the rules they expect everyone else to follow to the letter otherwise they will punish them... know who I am talking about...

Very simply the Russians are abiding by the UN sanctions... if Iran simply bites the bullet and lets US spies to find coordinates and precise targeting information for their publicly revealed nuclear technology facilities those sanctions will be lifted and they can buy the air defence system they need to defend their facilities from US and Israeli attack.

The biggest shame in the matter is that France has not gone in and given them nuclear weapons technology like they did for the Israelis.

The main problem in the EU is that Germany is a dominant force and still feels guilt over WWII and its treatment of the Jews... and the problem with that is that Israeli jews are the zionist extremist nutters and should not be taken to represent all jewish people on anything, just like extremist christians don't speak for christianity, extremist muslims... etc etc etc.

GarryB wrote:The problem for Russia is that she is not the world dominant superpower that simply does what she likes and to hell with all the rules they expect everyone else to follow to the letter otherwise they will punish them... know who I am talking about...

I know! Those damn Kiwis! Always getting into everything!

GarryB wrote:Very simply the Russians are abiding by the UN sanctions...

No they aren't (or, yes they are, but they're taking it out of context). UNSCR 1929 specifies that weapons defined under the UN Register of Conventional Arms are banned from sale, and states are to "exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel." Vigilance and restraint does not equate to you cannot sell.

From the UN website:

VII. Missiles and missile launchers
(a) Guided or unguided rockets, ballistic or cruise missiles capable of delivering a warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25 kilometres, and means designed or modified specifically for launching such missiles or rockets, if not covered by categories I through VI. For the purpose of the Register, this sub-category includes remotely piloted vehicles with the characteristics for missiles as defined above but does not include ground-to-air missiles.

(b) Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS).

So an SA-20 is permissible, but an SA-18 is not, probably in an effort to use the UN RCA to defeat sales to places who'll just hand the things over to insurgent or terrorist groups.

GarryB wrote:if Iran simply bites the bullet and lets US spies to find coordinates and precise targeting information for their publicly revealed nuclear technology facilities those sanctions will be lifted and they can buy the air defence system they need to defend their facilities from US and Israeli attack.

Iran did sign the NPT. If it wants to take away the world's legal leg to stand on, simply withdraw. Or, I don't know, comply with it's treaty obligations.

GarryB wrote:The biggest shame in the matter is that France has not gone in and given them nuclear weapons technology like they did for the Israelis.

Wait...does that mean the US has to let Iran "steal" plutonium?

No, that isn't an HHQ-9. It is S-300 Rif.

HQ-9 hot launch...

No they aren't (or, yes they are, but they're taking it out of context).

How dare they! That is soo NATO of them!!

I believe the Iranians are taking the Russians to the UN world court over this, but I also read that the Russians have refunded Iranian money, so even if they get the go ahead to sell they might not sign a new contract.

Iran did sign the NPT. If it wants to take away the world's legal leg to stand on, simply withdraw. Or, I don't know, comply with it's treaty obligations.

The problem is that only the US and Israel claim they are not complying with their obligations.

It seems accusations and suspicions are sufficient for some countries.

Withdrawing from the NPT means they cannot openly have Russian assistance with civilian reactor production and support.

Wait...does that mean the US has to let Iran "steal" plutonium?

Yeah... they need to send agents pretending to be Israelis to get it and the US would give it to them and pretend to look the other way...

Vladimir79 wrote:No, that isn't an HHQ-9. It is S-300 Rif.

HQ-9 hot launch...

That's an HQ-16. Look at the launcher, it's got six tubes vs. the S-300P/HQ-9's four. The image I posted is most definitely an HHQ-9 launch from a Type 052C, the Type 051C fitted with the S-300FM has a different layout at the bow.

GarryB wrote:The problem is that only the US and Israel claim they are not complying with their obligations.

Anything Israel has to say should be ignored until it also signs the NPT if you ask me. Otherwise it has no real business being in an NPT-related discussion. Also, it isn't just the US and Israel complaining. The IAEA has complained constantly, and so have other nations (although less vocally). It only seems like a US vs. Iran issue because of the overwhelming coverage given to the latest crap dropping out of the mouths of our politicians. I personally think Iran is trending towards nuclear weapons, but that the rest of the world has no leg to stand on unless it can actually prove it.

Anything Israel has to say should be ignored until it also signs the NPT if you ask me. Otherwise it has no real business being in an NPT-related discussion.

I totally agree, but that doesn't stop them digging their oar in when the US says something.

I personally think Iran is trending towards nuclear weapons, but that the rest of the world has no leg to stand on unless it can actually prove it.

I think the US is pushing them into a corner every chance they get, so why wouldn't they want a get out of jail free card that is a nuclear weapon?

Israel has constantly said it only needs nukes in case its neighbours get nukes, so Israel should not actually care if Iran gets nukes.

The US should not care either as it has rather more nukes than Iran will ever have, and much more importantly it has the means to deliver them anywhere it wants.

If Israel and the US want Iran to renounce nuclear weapons why don't they do the same?

Perhaps if the US didn't practise regime chance and have troops in countries all around Iran then Iran might not feel so threatened and might have some faith in the UN.

Unfortunately the UN is a tool used by the US to rubber stamp its invasions when it is convenient, and an org it completely ignores at other times when it suits.

It is amusing when the US criticises the UN as being useless... when its actions make it so.

[quote="SOC"]

Vladimir79 wrote:
That's an HQ-16. Look at the launcher, it's got six tubes vs. the S-300P/HQ-9's four. The image I posted is most definitely an HHQ-9 launch from a Type 052C, the Type 051C fitted with the S-300FM has a different layout at the bow.

Hold on a minute, I am making a video proving the difference.

...except your "S-300FM" launch video is clearly the exact same launch my HHQ-9 image was taken from! That is NOT an S-300FM, it's an HHQ-9 fired from the bow of a Type 052C. 051C has two launch cells at the bow for the S-300FM, one located behind the other. 052C has six, two adjacent rows of three. At the very least, the HHQ-9 is therefore a cold-launched SAM system, which makes good sense for a naval application. The HQ-9 video...can't make out the TEL, so I can't say for sure. It could easily be an HQ-16 TEL, which apparently is a hot-launch system.

Iran does not need a City Defence SAM like S-300 , if any thing else its a liability for them to procure small numbers of S-300 , as if S-300 is some magic solution to all ills that aid their Air Defense.

What Iran needs is a large number of bread and butter mobile sam like SA-11/17 , deployed in large numbers it has decent range and altitude and can take out range of targets from SRBM to PGM. Plus mobility is the key to deal with advanced adversary like Israel or others as Kosovo has shown so effectively.

I really do not know why Iran Military Commanders act so dumb not to understand this basic fact , they would have been much better shape today if they had gone for lic production model of SA-11 or 17 then the magic S-300 system that eventually never came till the end.

Austin wrote:Iran does not need a City Defence SAM like S-300 , if any thing else its a liability for them to procure small numbers of S-300 , as if S-300 is some magic solution to all ills that aid their Air Defense.

I dont agree. S-300 is a perfect system being able to cover vast areas.

If Israel decides to attack Iran its fighters will need to fly high in order to reach its targets and this is where S-300 is best suitable.

In given moment Iran EW alerts S-300 in standby mode witch light up its radar and
all the hell breaks off in the skies with Israel F-15/16 and swarm of missiles from conceal S-300 batteries. Thats the idea besides hold your ground tactics.

I agree that mobile Tor-M2/Pancir-S1/BUK-M2 are also ideal for its ability to shot the shooter and its PGM defending the sites.

Perhaps Im mistaken but I think remember reading somewhere in Shean blog post about Iranian idea of storing S-300 missiles in ground based VLS, correct me if Im wrong.

BUK can take care of any aircraft threat at range and altitude of 45 and 25 km , Unless Israel can fly higher then that.

There was a famous russian proverb mentioned by some Admiral (Gorshkov) or a great gun designer ( Mikhail kalashnikov ) "Best is the Enemy of Good Enough" that so well applies to Iran , in the hope of getting the best they forgot what was good enough for them

Austin wrote:
I really do not know why Iran Military Commanders act so dumb not to understand this basic fact , they would have been much better shape today if they had gone for lic production model of SA-11 or 17 then the magic S-300 system that eventually never came till the end.

Iran ordered in 90ies wast amount of weapon equipment of all class.
Tanks/IFV/ships/Subs/plans in great numbers. American pressure on Russia ended all deliveries and those Russia equipment that is in Iran arsenal right now is just small fraction of that big deal.

What is also interesting is that Russia offered Iran layered defense that would cover ALL country. Iran was interested and deal was closing in for signing but that same US pressure relived Iran of any credible defense.

Years had to pass since Russia regained Irans trust and that Tor-M1/Pechora-2A upgrade was the first contract signed after Russia fiasko.

Austin wrote:Iran does not need a City Defence SAM like S-300 , if any thing else its a liability for them to procure small numbers of S-300 , as if S-300 is some magic solution to all ills that aid their Air Defense.

What Iran needs is a large number of bread and butter mobile sam like SA-11/17 , deployed in large numbers it has decent range and altitude and can take out range of targets from SRBM to PGM. Plus mobility is the key to deal with advanced adversary like Israel or others as Kosovo has shown so effectively.

I really do not know why Iran Military Commanders act so dumb not to understand this basic fact , they would have been much better shape today if they had gone for lic production model of SA-11 or 17 then the magic S-300 system that eventually never came till the end.

A mobile SAM is fine, but the S-300PS/PM variants are all highly mobile as well. Set-up/tear-down times are as little as five minutes. You lose out in some off-road capability, obviously. All Kosovo showed was that a mobile system can be survivable through continuous relocation.

The S-300 isn't a "city defense" SAM, it's a strategic SAM system. The footprint it defends makes it capable of performing either point (city, military complex, etc) defense or barrier air defense of a coastline or border region. From a tactics standpoint, you want long-range strategic SAMs in your arsenal. Placed along your borders, they force ISR and support platforms to operate further back from the potential front lines. Their long range also provides them with a greater re-attack capability against a target missed with the first shot. And their larger radar systems provide more power throughput useful for defeating certain kinds of ECM, more onboard computing power for more advanced ECCM logic, and increased ability for picking out lower RCS targets at greater ranges. By all means, back these up with tactical SAMs like the Buk-M2E or Tor-M1E in a point-defense role, also capable of defending the strategic system against PGM or ARM shots.

The point isn't so much that they must have the S-300 or something roughly analogous like the HQ-9, it's that they need something modern, period. Nothing they currently possess represents a credible defense against someone like Israel who is very well versed in EW and SEAD tactics, save for the limited numbers of Tor-M1E systems, systems that are restricted by their altitude reach and can be overflown.

they're apparently too stupid to try and order the HQ-9 from the Chinese.

Or perhaps they have tried it and it isn't as good as what the Russians are offering?

Iran does not need a City Defence SAM like S-300 , if any thing else its a liability for them to procure small numbers of S-300 , as if S-300 is some magic solution to all ills that aid their Air Defense.

S-300 can be used to defend a city, but there is little difference between a system that can defend a city and one that can defend an underground nuclear complex, or an above ground civilian nuclear reactor.

What Iran needs is a large number of bread and butter mobile sam like SA-11/17 , deployed in large numbers it has decent range and altitude and can take out range of targets from SRBM to PGM. Plus mobility is the key to deal with advanced adversary like Israel or others as Kosovo has shown so effectively.

An Israeli attack will be over a long range and will compose a large number of strike aircraft and a lot of escort fighters to protect those strike aircraft. Other support assets will likely include inflight refueling aircraft and jammers/SEAD aircraft.

With S-300 the job of the Jammers and SEAD aircraft suddenly becomes much bigger, so instead of 4-5, they will need 10-20, which means more fighters to cover them and more inflight refueling aircraft.

The point is that the presence of the S-300 might make the force required too big to be worth using and they might have to change tactics.

Deeply buried targets means cruise missiles launched from subs will be useless, though they could be coordinated as part of the attack to try to weaken the air defence before the strike package gets there... at the cost of alerting them. Of course an attack in a particular area might distract more than it alerts.

S-300 is like an aircraft carrier for a group of ships... it means that you can reach out and get the missile launchers as well as shoot down the missiles... it is not just missiles that can fly 200km to hit targets, it is radar and support equipment that can detect targets and threats at that range...

I really do not know why Iran Military Commanders act so dumb not to understand this basic fact , they would have been much better shape today if they had gone for lic production model of SA-11 or 17 then the magic S-300 system that eventually never came till the end.

Keep in mind Irans history... Russia has invaded Iran, and is not really best buddies, though they appear to be a supporter at the moment.

Also I am sure Iran wants to spend money on infrastructure like civilian NPP to improve growth and development rather than weapons.

I would have thought that the Su-35 would be an ideal replacement for the Irainian F-14s and Mig-29SMTs for the F-4s, and even Yak-130s for F-5s.

Of the countries of the world that are threatened by cruise missiles I would think Iran would be an ideal export customer for Mig-31BMs as well... even if they only buy a dozen and use them to direct Mig-29SMTs to intercept incoming cruise missile threats.

Licence produce Kornets and Igla-S...and more importantly get Russia to build them an oil refinery so they can produce their own fuels instead of exporting crude oil and importing petrol and diesel and other fuels.

Perhaps Im mistaken but I think remember reading somewhere in Shean blog post about Iranian idea of storing S-300 missiles in ground based VLS, correct me if Im wrong.

Now that is something I didn't think about. If you have a fixed site you want to defend you can certainly adapt SAMs and systems for the role.

Most ARMs rely on the fact that SAMs and radar antennas are soft vulnerable targets, so they don't have to be precisely accurate. The AS-11 for example has a 150kg HE Frag warhead so even if it doesn't directly hit the targets antenna the force of the blast and the fragments should blow it over and break multiple components.

If the target is buried deep in a mountain range then protecting your vertical launch SAMs in vertical silos would be a simple and cheap way to ensure they are protected. More importantly you could build a large underground complex that includes a reload facility for the SAMs so 50-60 launch silos might be visible, but you could have hundreds of missiles ready to fire or load and fire and have a few dummy systems on the surface to distract the enemy and also to explain the radar and communications sources.

You could mount radar antennas in cliff faces with an array of decoys 200m further down the face.

Another advantage is that the initial excavation at the site will reveal the original lab or facility being defended, but building SAM launch and sensor positions all over the place will make determining where the actual target is much harder. Traffic of people and supplies and missiles to the SAM locations will help mask supplies and people traffic to the target.

Remember even the best bunker buster conventional weapon still has to be aimed at the bunker itself, and under dozens or hundreds of metres of granite you can't just find its precise location from a satellite... you will find entrances and ventilation shafts, but to prevent weapons, or indeed blast entering the facility all those shafts will never be straight and you really don't know how long they will be either.

BUK can take care of any aircraft threat at range and altitude of 45 and 25 km , Unless Israel can fly higher then that.

But that is the problem... the aircraft will be using weapons with flight ranges of more than 45km so it will not be engaging the aircraft... it will be engaging the weapons released by the aircraft.

Not suggesting BUK is bad... especially if it is operating in optics mode using data from other systems, but BUK is part of the puzzle... and S-300 is another piece that makes an air defence much more capable.

There was a famous russian proverb mentioned by some Admiral (Gorshkov) or a great gun designer ( Mikhail kalashnikov ) "Best is the Enemy of Good Enough" that so well applies to Iran , in the hope of getting the best they forgot what was good enough for them

I think the better proverb for this situation is "Don't put all your eggs in one basket".

A layered air defence system is rather better than one that relies on one system or another.

The combination of long, medium, and short range systems in addition to aircraft is always the best solution.

BUK could replace the HAWK, and S-300 could replace S-200...

Years had to pass since Russia regained Irans trust and that Tor-M1/Pechora-2A upgrade was the first contract signed after Russia fiasko.

With the US being so pig headed about the European ABM system I think Russia... under Putin, will be less likely to bow to US and Israeli pressure.

The promise of Israeli toys is pretty moot when they only offer old and obsolete UAVs, and the US promise of a reset is clearly only to reform Russians actions to suit the US and not vice versa.

The point isn't so much that they must have the S-300 or something roughly analogous like the HQ-9, it's that they need something modern, period.

Exactly. Their older systems had limited numbers of guidance channels and could only handle one or two engagements at a time. To defeat an old SAM system just fire four cruise missiles against it at once and at least one or two will get through because the system will be tied up engaging the other missiles.

That is not so easy with S-300, and with the S-300s extra range it greatly reduces your options as regards to stand off weapons, so either you put your planes at risk, or you use heavier, larger longer ranged weapons... which are more expensive and require larger and more expensive launch platforms.

In other words attacks become harder and more expensive and less likely to succeed.

A mobile SAM is fine, but the S-300PS/PM variants are all highly mobile as well. Set-up/tear-down times are as little as five minutes. You lose out in some off-road capability, obviously. All Kosovo showed was that a mobile system can be survivable through continuous relocation.

The S-300 isn't a "city defense" SAM, it's a strategic SAM system. The footprint it defends makes it capable of performing either point (city, military complex, etc) defense or barrier air defense of a coastline or border region. From a tactics standpoint, you want long-range strategic SAMs in your arsenal. Placed along your borders, they force ISR and support platforms to operate further back from the potential front lines. Their long range also provides them with a greater re-attack capability against a target missed with the first shot. And their larger radar systems provide more power throughput useful for defeating certain kinds of ECM, more onboard computing power for more advanced ECCM logic, and increased ability for picking out lower RCS targets at greater ranges. By all means, back these up with tactical SAMs like the Buk-M2E or Tor-M1E in a point-defense role, also capable of defending the strategic system against PGM or ARM shots.

The point isn't so much that they must have the S-300 or something roughly analogous like the HQ-9, it's that they need something modern, period. Nothing they currently possess represents a credible defense against someone like Israel who is very well versed in EW and SEAD tactics, save for the limited numbers of Tor-M1E systems, systems that are restricted by their altitude reach and can be overflown.

This is, in my opinion, the most objective and well centered analysis on the actual situation pertaining the organization ,composition and real capabilities of Iranian IAD network (....if it is correct to even only employ a similar term for describe Iranian Air Defense structure).

But, leaving firm what rightfully said on the undeniable backwardness of Iranian IAD, i would point out some key elements and/or options that are strangely omitted in majority of public analysis on this subject.

1) : Among the options opened and playing as advantages for the Iranian Air Defense stand a wise employment of the Air Force component of its Air Defense grid ; with that i refer particularly to the maximum exploitation of the enormous mission range's "burden" that would be present on the IAF intruding units.
This factor lead to two important secondary "penalty" elements for the IAF group : A) A very very narrow spread of selection for IAF strike group both for possible vectors of intrusion in the Iranian airspace and ,even more, for the exit vectors from strike mission on well known and "forced" targets B) The scarce to not existent edge of engine engagement maneuvering power (in particular after burner’s autonomy times) at disposition of the OCA aircraft escorting the strike and EW elements of the IAF mission groups.
The first factor would allow to a wise,proficient deployment and employment of the Iranian interceptor aircraft -and obviously of ground based radar ,SAM equiped with optronic systems and EW elements - to conduct an effective "rear pincer" engagement on the intruding group after having let it to penetrate in the Iranian Air space (in opposition to an early "head-on" interception attempt that would not only help the task for the IAF's escort OCA elements but leave open to the group engaged the option to abort its mission escaping quickly in a foreign air space); moreover a similar tangential vector of engagement by part of Iranian aircraft would put at great risk both the strike and EW elements (usually placed in rear and internal positions of the strike groups) and force them to slow down and deviate enormously from the planned mission route ,in this way allowing other interceptor elements to have the time to add themselves to the engagemnets and fixed Iranian SAM sites excluded by the mission route chosen by IAF planners to return into play .
The second factor would allow,instead, also outdated iranian aircraft (such as F-5 and derivatives) to play an important role in the engagement; as previously mentioned in fact the OCA escort elements would have certainly a very limited -to not existent- afterburner autonomy ,just essential for cover the strike and EW elements from rear hemisphere high speed interception attempt and would have also huge peformance's penalities generated by the huge drag induced by theirs fuel tanks. Theirs role could be to conduct high speed interception attempt from several rear-side angles followed by disengaging U-turns if OCA elements change route detaching from the group for engage them , three or four of those attempts would likely be more than sufficient for the escort OCA aircraft to reach "bingo" limit becoming totally worthless . Naturally F-14's Phoenix adn Mig-29's R27E fired safely from stand off ranges would contribute to this attrition task on the IAF strike group fuel.


2) : As well expressed in several Soviet strategic analysis of NATO structure, when you are not equiped with a strong, dense, modern Air Defense structure capable to quickly degrade the capabilities of enemy Air Forces up to theirs complete neutralization (as for allied but not-Warsaw-Pact nations ), the best option openend to you is to conduct highly concentrated selective attacks on the opponents airfields and Air Force personell structures , or through the employment of stand-off delivery of ballistic/cruise missiles or through high speed low flying intrusions against which ,obviously, the western approach to airspace defence, centered mostly around aircraft scrambling is extremely vulnerable.
All the analysis conducted (included post GW1/2 adn Kosovo war) lead to the conclusion that the window of major vulnerabilities of those vital NATO assets is collocated in the advnaced preparation stages of an air attacks or just while operations of an organic Air campaing was conducted (that for the high concetration of aircraft and fuel deposits in single airfields and the scarce availability of interceptor aircraft and AWACS elements for defence tasks when them are forced to be used for offensive air superiority or escort missions on the offense.
Soviets stimed those type of capabilities to be capable to effectively and very quickly "behead" NATO's air centric structure to the point that in the RS-10 / OTR-23 years Soviets stimed (...at reason) that the only true menace to theirs hypothetical conventional offensive in Europe was merely represented by NATO's extensive employment of tactical nuclear weaponry.
For Iran ,in this meaning, the only credible and dangerous option against Israel would remain the employment of medium range ballistic missiles in a highly concentrated attack (even to the limit of the overkill) on the four main military israeli airfields ,in the weeks ,or even better in the few days, precedent a poossible Israeli attack (when the concentration of aircraft in parking , weapon stocks and fuel storages would be very high), with the best mass produced Iranian missile for the task being represented by Shahab-3B7C with five cluster/bomblet warheads.
A similar attack would be not only truly devastating- with incalculable material losses- for Israeli military capabilities and theirs chances to conduct any type of attack on Iranian facilities for a very long times but would put in question the same Israeli doctrine and force structure basis.
Moreover a similar action ,which could be optionally carried out also immediately after iranian airspoace penetreation by part of Israeli aircraft or when them would be returning to theirs airfields, being an attack exclusively aimed at military targets ,ready, as menaced, to attack Iranian civilian installations, would be justificable ,under a diplomatic point of view, to the contrarry of employment of the same missiles in attacks against Israeli civilan infrastructures .

The 'Ra'ad' looks very similar to the Russian BUK with the exception that launcher vehicle doesn't have radar. There is some speculation that Iran received the missiles via Syria but not the whole system

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/337051.html

...

Nice addition to Iran airdefense.

This thing looks like merger of KUB/BUK system. It TEL that was shown. No search, guidance radar seen.

If system can guide more missiles at the same time and its numbers are significant it could make difference and complicate

air assault. I bet Iranians had some technology input from Belarus, Ukraine or Russia perhaps.

Anyway good going.