Tank Warfare: Russian Armour vs Western Armour

1) Standard ammunition for M551 was HEAT, not HE.

The gun was terribly inefficient in design because it was designed for the missile and the adapted for other ammo types.

2) Americans tested DU also against more modern Soviet (T-80U) and Ukrainian (T-84), this means that they know how to better penetrate them, this not mean that more modern vehicles (T-90A, T-84M) will be as easy to penetrate, but AMericans have overall idea how to more effectively defeat their protection.

You are assuming that Russian armour development will take the same direction as the Ukrainian T-84. What if they made different choices... knowing as they do that the US has had its hands on the T-80U and T-84 and also knowing the US uses DU rounds perhaps their efforts will be optimised to stop such rounds.

The Americans have an idea how to penetrate T-84s, but Russia neither has any T-84s nor intends to buy any.

It is like saying the Russians got their hands on a complete Valkyrie bomber and have developed their SAMs and radars to defeat it... big deal... the Valkyrie is not in US service and never will be... being able to shoot it down will do the Russians no good... in fact it might make them over confident.

3) Americans developed several types of guided munitions for MBT's, STAFF, X-Rod and finally MRM series that are planned for fielding.

Yeah. The Russians are now designing UAVs too, what is your point?

How many T-90AM's will be in service, the answer is none, because MoD do not want them.

They will not enter service soon, but in 5 years time when Armata is ready, if it costs 8 million per tank then the T-90AM will likely go into production as the cheap but capable tank... likely with an Armata chassis to improve commonality.

More importantly the T-90AM is a RUSSIAN design so it is far more relevant to future Russian tank armour structures than the Ukrainian T-84.... or will US acquisition of a new Chinese tank design also make it easier for US tank ammo designers develop ammo to defeat Russian tanks too?

Armata is still only project with uncertain future, we will see what will happen with it, it can be fielded or will end like Object 195. Of course if Armata will be fielded, it will be superior to anything designed up to this day.

Armata is what the Russian Army ordered. What UVZ produces to meet those requirements will be called Armata and it will go into service.

It is like PAK FA... whether made by Mig or Sukhoi or Tupolev, it would go into service, because the alternative is nothing, which is not an option for a rearming military.

I think You still do not understand, You can put there even 100mm RHA plate to separate crew from autoloader, it will not change much, because if ammunition will be ignited, whole that energy need to escape somewhere, and the most easy way is just the classic turret pop up.

You clearly don't understand explosives.

Explosives take the line of least resistance.

That is how blow out panels work... they fail first and direct the explosion.
To ignite the ammo under floor you have to hit the ammo under floor, which turns out to be very rare in real combat... in comparison a turret bustle is easy to aim for.

If the underfloor armoured ammo cassette is hit then with the correct design of armour the force and energy of the explosion can be directed downwards and out of the tank instead of up and into the crew compartment.

Ehhh, this is why some wise man designed blow off panels...

And such panels can only be fitted to a turret bustle?

Not to mention that ammunition do not explode like IED, it rather burn in very spectacular way.

Yeah, cause burning ammo will remove a multi ton turret from its ring when it "burns".

HE does burn with ignited, but propellent stubs burn very rapidly and in a confined space rapid burning can accelerate out of control as the pressure builds.

Damian i want to split mine interventions in two posts : the first ,in two points, aimed at put a gravestone on some open questions, and the second post for respond to some interesting subject at which you have made reference ,ok?


1 ) I want ,before anything, finish with the question of the staged pics.



I employed about a bit less than a pair of minutes to realize theirs falseness (....fields experts ,of the level of V. Murakhovsky or S. Mirkov, would have likely employed no more than 30-40 seconds for that...) already from the first pic .

Naturally ,like any person with even a minimum knowledge in the field , to ascertain the plausibility of those photos ,i have not observed even only for a second the meter and the "virtual" measure.

What has ,instead, immediately "punched" in my eyes (even before note the comical geometrical incongruities at which i have already make reference) was the very strange ,almost unnatural, position of the guy measuring the "virtual turret"; any person at world ,in fact, in the same instance wanting to measure the interested armor block placing the meter in the point of the turret showed in the pic, would have done that, standing on the front of the turret and not at contrary in this twisted position standing over the gun mask area ,at this point my attention was ,obviously, immediately captured by .... the shadow.

Shadows have the great quality to allow, to the observer, to realize accurately the deepness of a three-dimensional object pictured in a mostly two-dimensional way.

In this pic the shadow under the hand and under the meter over the length of the "virtual" LEO-2A4's turret armor block allow to realize precisely the height from the surface on which this supposed turret should stand : few centimeters !!!

(....that is naturally the funny motivation for the twisted position of the "measurer" )





Moreover the shadow projection under the "virtual" turret's surface allow to realize clearly also that the piece in question is obviously a plane metal piece , nothing more than a plate.

This is a disassembled Leo-2A4s' turret ,for reference (also if i believe that this action would result even offensive ,because even a kid would be capable to realize,at this point, the laughable clumsiness of this stage's operation ).






Is possible,now, to continue with the handle (moreover clearly welded just under the surface of the plate used to simulate the turret's armor block ) employed ,probably, to pathetically attempt to mimic a turrett structural element placed several dozen of centimeters lower !!

Or the shoe's track just to the right of the filler's area with a "familiar" colour (the funny chap author has not even given attention to avoid to stain itself with the same grey paint used on the plate ).
Or the complete lack of the downward inclination of the turret's side armor block cavity (an unlucky occurrence ,unavoidable when you employ for the simulation an unique plate. ).
If you want we can continue with the analysis of this one and of the other two pics, but i am sure that also you can easily realize that,at this point, this operation would result even pointlessly demeaning.

Instead i am more interested in a question at which i hope you will respond with sincerity, Damian, ok ?

Wanting to exclude totally , absolutely, from the very beginning, that you ,and likely also militarysta, has been deceived for more than a pair of minutes by those very low level staged pics (because imaging the contrary ,moreover for persons with specific interests/knowledges, would postulate an IQ halfway between proto-lemurs and high-invertebrated ...and it appear to don't be absolutely the case )i want to ask to you this question (i recommend to you sincerity ,ok?) :

"What is the rationale behind that operation ?"

- Disinformation ? I don't belive that ; is absolutely clear that none of you,in fact, are placed in a position in the sector to gain any advantage from that .
- Have fun for some months and after reveal the thing ? Possible, but that would render,obviously, any further analysis or note by your parts much less credible (a persons that ,for a joke, expend so much intellectual resources and ,even more, time is seen as not more serious enough or reliable at this point) .
- Attempt to hit ,indirectly, in a subreptitious way ,the name of Andrey Tarasenko ? Also that is possible ,but both of you was perfectly aware from the beginning that this operation, aimed at amateurs and naives wouldn't have even scratched or tarnished in any way its prestige in the field ,among insiders (without even take in consideration the possibility that crossing A. Tarasenko ,with the mental disposition at losing some time, in one of those secondary forums would have exposed yourselves to a very,very horrible poor showing ; it would have litterally eaten both of you alive).

Therefore i am sincerely puzzled for the possible rationale behind all this story , in particular for you Damian ,having a reputation of bright, knowledgeable, equilibrated person to defend.....



2) I want to disperse another argument used often by militarysta , the question of Paul Lakowski citing similar figures in the past for LOS of the same left of turret armou block area.


The question borned the 26 January 2006, here:

http://208.84.116.223/forums/index.php?showtopic=14200&st=440


With this statement :

"The Leopard 2 diagram is incorrect. OTMH the front cover thickness is about 5cm LOS While the cavity is > 60cm LOS and the rear plate ~ 13cm LOS ...All together about 83cm LOS thickness."

- Note that the LOS figures for the interested area depicted in all A. Tarasenko drawings (65-70 cm) are ,obviously, perfectly in line with the up cited figures (and obviously, if would be even possible, render even more comical the staged pic measurement of the LOS of this armour cavity)all the difference is constituted by the existence of this phantomatical rear plate of more than 13 cms in LOS)


Naturally A. Tarasenko procede to show the total inconsistency of that claim , citing also a figure previously claimed by P. Lakowski of...... more than 1000 mmm LOS !!!
The response of Paul Lakowski is that ( 27 January 2006 same page )

Not sure what your refering to since I have never written an article for Armor mag...not yet atleast

The 1100- 1300mm figures must be from very old work we did back in 1999? :unsure:
The 830mm comes from two independant measurements made by two Leopard 2 tankers of their own tanks. When I get home I will post an interesting picture of Leopard 2 tank under construction showing the cavities, with markers reporting where the inner armor wall is plus scale drawing done to further illustrate the armor thickness.

Naturally , A. Tarasenko wait this famous in scale drawing from P. Lakowski...claimed to be from Leopard2A4 's tankers...
And the drawing arrive (at the following page 24 ,5th post ) ....this one







Please ,Damian, fix in your mind this drawing (very badly made and evidently conceived by someone that has never seen in its whole life, even only for few seconds, the internal configuration of a LEO-2A4 MBT ...today exist a good 3D panoramic view to prove the total inconsistency of this 13 cm "rear plate" existency hipothesis ) and what was necesaary to Paul Lakowski to attempt to justify its new claim of 83 cm...after that of the 1100 mm of the last time

The question end..... at least in this thread.....with this exchange of blows between A. Tarasenko and Paul Lakowski

http://208.84.116.223/forums/index.php?showtopic=14200&st=480

Lakowski -post 484-:

"Harkonnen your wasting your breath. As I already pointed out , these images and the scale drawings came from a LEOPARD-2 tanker who is much better placed to know the thickness of the armor of his turret. I have no trouble knowing whos data is more reliable....but go ahead and keep banging your head against a brick wall if you like "

Tarasenko -post 500-

"After the numerous distortions in your estimations of armor it is hard to trust you. So let me waste my breath and let others trust your estimates, not me.
Your scale drawings are incorrect, as most of your other data. The percent of correct guess is statistical."

But the question do not finish here !!!
About ten days later -5 February- in another thread ( Tank turrets T vs M Russian and western approach to turrets ) Exel ,a real former Leopard-2A4's operator ,which has more time provided very useful and detailed information on Leopard-2 questions, say -at post 70-:

"Harkonnen's numbers for the Leo2 turret are accurate. The only way to get more accurate than that is from factory blueprints or fact sheets, which I think none of us has access to."

http://208.84.116.223/forums/index.php?showtopic=14592&st=60


Two page later, at post 104 ,it add :

"The LOS thickness of the Leo front armor configuration is closer to 60cm than 80cm. That's my estimate from having served in the vehicle. Never measured it with a ruler though."

Like you can see ,citing this figure of 83 cm for LOS of left frontal turret armour's block, from Paul Lakowski (after its more than 1000 mm pasted claim...) reveal itself as a clamorous autogol.
In fact to even justify a similar figure someone should postulate and accept,(like do P. Lakowski and its phantomatical tanker's drawing ) the existence of a ridiculous 13-15 cm wide rear plate over the interested armour cavity's internal wall as showed in the P. Lakowski drawing : a total, pantagruelic idiocy.
while refusing ,contestually ,LOS figures not only compatible with the ratio with any other LEO-2A4's structural elements (and with the same figures provided by the same P. Lakowsky for those LOS) but confirmed in first person (no misty ,phantomatic and ..suspect third part claims) assertions by a real operator of this MBT.


I hope to have contributed, with direct links to all the interested statements and figures involved in the querelle, to extricate ,one time for all, the nodes on this pasted question ,often twisted up to its precise contrary of its content.

There is a difference in internal volume and crew survivability. And smaller size of vehicle in age of modern FCS is no more advantage, as we seen smaller T-72's were not harder to hit for coalition tanks in 1991 and 2003.

Damian i have choosed this point because this one represent a misconception very spreaded (included the wronged example of Gulf War ...where ,over what i will say down here would be also be interesting for you to read " Warhead Hit Distribution On Main Battle Tanks In The Gulf War" by M. Held )

This is a response i have writed some time ago in this same thread ,with some additions, explaining in the most simple way possible, the real, physical terms of the question at which you refere here.



- The ever open question of Probability to Hit of a MBT equipped with a modern FCS and importance -or lack of it - of target's surface area for this crucial parameter



An advanced, modern FCS ,provided with all the necessary chrono-spatial and environmental informations (precise range from target ,accurate measure of its motion's vector, overall environmental temperature, wind speed, specific humidity, barrel level of thermal expansion and its level of structural fatigue etc..etc..)can effectively allow a modern MBT to find a fire solution and reliably hit a relatively small target -smaller than the frontal projection of a MBT- at long range (in the right conditions even more than 3000-3500 meters), but what is almost always, strangely, "forgotten" is that ,at medium/medium-long range (2000 m and over) considering actual HEAT and APFSDS rounds ,all that remain true only against stationary/near-stationary targets or those changing theirs motion vector in a proportional linear way .

Image an engagement attempt against a target at 2200 meters moving at 36 Km/h (10 meter/second), for simplicity we can image this target moving perfectly perpendicular to the barrel's axis of the shooting tank (choosing therefore a very mvery unlikely and most advantageous geometry for the shooter); from the processed data and the precise instant of the found fire solution to the moment of the APFSDS arrival on the computed point of interception, taking into account: gun collimation ,fire initialization, velocity and gravity drop of the round and travelling time long the parabolic trajectory to this point 2200 m far, elapse about 2 seconds for a round like M829A3 (1540 m/s at barrell exit).
Now any change of the target motion from the vector computed by the FCS ,at the instant of the fire solution found, capable to modify the actual spatial position of the silhouette's centre of a measure superior to its semi-projection (half of the projection of its target area at the shooting point) will cause an assured miss; anyone can easily realize as a variation as small as +/-15 Km/h in the target speed or a simply turn ,even of only few degrees, or even the effect of some terrain morphology is more than sufficient for a tank with an average silhouette to cause a miss by part of the named round at this range.

What is very important to point-out is that what now expressed remain totally valid independently from the FCS's sophistication (unless someone will manage to create a future-reading FCS ) because those variations of target's vector in the mentioned time window are totally arbitrary ,therefore completely out of the computing capabilities of any data processing system in the past ,in the present or in the future.
The unique factors, conversely, capable to influence a similar engagement sequence against a target randomly changing its motion's parameters are : round's speed, distance from target, target capability to quickly change its motion vector, round average dispersion at this date range, and size of the target actual aspect projection at the shooting point.

Now anyone can easily realize too as even small variations in a MBT's area projection (in the order of some dozen of cm ) produce an enormous, disproportionate effect in the related PtH -Probability to Hit- parameter for engagements at 2000-2500 m or over, between randomly moving opposing MBTs not employing guided ammunitions, because those features allow both to increase the time window useful for initialize a motion variation capable to cause a miss and/or mitigate the "required" entity of the same motion's variable.
In particular is demonstrable that considering the process's function of those discrete and aleatory variables in a stocastic model, we have that the projection of potential hit distribution tend to be concentrated in a non-limear way long the peripheral aerea of target area silhouette ( in particular ,for obvious reasons, in the turret's area ).


You can easily realize why,before the new Soviet military doctrine of 1987, Soviet tank crews in service in the spearhead armored divisions stationed in East Germany and planneed for transition over Rasdorf





areas around Geisa





to overcome NATO resistance long the Fulda Gap,





was instructed ,at the beginning of the offensive, to employ all theirs GLATGM (against armored vehicles as priority targets and ,in second instance, against any low flying target of opportunity) while, when reaching the range of possible counterfire by part of enemy MBT's main guns ,change almost continually and randomly speed and direction of motion (in the training, the conscripts followed the cadences of a brief litany)...in fact, the apparently randomly advancing armoured divisions that is possible to see in some very old videos of Soviet exercices for "STOSS" plan was not the effect of lack of training or vodka, like some laughable ignorant had suggested, but the training for this type of non linear mobile advancement toward enemy defense lines in West Germany.

We must, now, also add that a MBT with a smaller silhouette show, almost always, also a smaller internal volume and a significantly lower inertial mass, elements that don't allow only to maintain a greater armoured-mass-to-surface index but also a far better capability to quickly change direction and speed in the unitary time segment of reference , one of the variables in the Probability to Hit function for medium-long range engagements.
The operational factors previously described wouldn't be simply important but literally crucial in any major MBT's engagements between peer opponents employing armoured brigades ,both in offensive and in defensive missions, in theirs classical CONOPS and even more considering modern concepts of adaptive ground maneuvering warfare.

Naturally, one more time, Gulf War, with Iraqi ground forces employing theirs MBT as....fixed pillbox/field artillery pieces ....have generated a lot of low level platitudes (among which capability to engage enemy MBT with APFSDS or HEAT at 3 km or over “thanks to advanced FCS” )very difficult to eradicate from low level common imaginary and completely irreconcilables not only with physical reality but with what would actually happen ,or would have happened, for example, in the highly mobile engagement in the Thar Desert between India and Pakistan armored forces (or, in the past,in the Fulda Gap and in the Nothern German Plain and between URSS and NATO forces) where the heavy effects of lower probably to hit triggered by lower target area and lower inertial mass of some of the MBTs involved would generate an huge impact on the final attrition ratio .

Mindstorm wrote:

There is a difference in internal volume and crew survivability. And smaller size of vehicle in age of modern FCS is no more advantage, as we seen smaller T-72's were not harder to hit for coalition tanks in 1991 and 2003.

We must, now, also add that a MBT with a smaller silhouette show, almost always, also a smaller internal volume and a significantly lower inertial mass, elements that don't allow only to maintain a greater armoured-mass-to-surface index but also a far better capability to quickly change direction and speed in the unitary time segment of reference , one of the variables in the Probability to Hit function for medium-long range engagements.
The operational factors previously described wouldn't be simply important but literally crucial in any major MBT's engagements between peer opponents employing armoured brigades ,both in offensive and in defensive missions, in theirs classical CONOPS and even more considering modern concepts of adaptive ground maneuvering warfare.

the heavy effects of lower probably to hit triggered by lower target area and lower inertial mass of some of the MBTs involved would generate an huge impact on the final attrition ratio .[/b]

I disagree.

From what i have read from the WW2, and the loses of tanks, the size wasnt that important. Yes, even the STUG`s where taken out. They had a very low silhuette and were harder to hit, but, as they didnt have any turret, they had considerably disadvantage when in motion or to retarget.

MBT`s of today are Very accurate, and speed of APFSDS is very high. Advanced computing almost always ensures a hit, unless target range is very high, or target is somewhat concealed by terrain obstecales.

Although a smaller target is somewhat harder to hit even today, and thanks to range/terrain, its by no means crucial.
What is crucial, is to fire first ie to hit first, and ármor, size and shape.
And last but the most important, an effective battlefield management system in each tank, to allow to share info of enemy threats and your own forces!

If you think back, the most important reason the German tanks were so succesful in the beginning of WW2, was their use of radio equipment, which led to an effective battlefield management.

If modern fire control systems are so gosh darn wonderful and ensure a hit, then could one not argue that the extra size and armour on western designs is doubly wasted as the extra armour protecting empty space does not therefore reduce the chance of personnal injury as the crew positions and ammo positions could be directly targeted.

Equally because of the larger volume penetrators like DU which burn like incendiary rounds would fill the crew compartment with radioactive dust and do damage to crews even if they don't strike them directly.

EDIT:

I would add that German tank success had rather as much to do with the crew roles and tank layout as it did communication between tanks and tactics.

Western and Eastern tanks were often undermanned. French Char tanks had excellent armour but with a crew of two there was a driver and a commander/gunner/loader. Even in the most basic German tank that was to be used as a tank (ie not a command vehicle) the commander directed the driver from his position in the turret and also directed the gunner, but was free to look for new targets and threats to the vehicle.
In many ways it was this situational awareness that is so important... for tanks as it is for fighter planes.
Add to that communication so you worked as a team instead of as a group of individuals and add successful tactics and that was the secret to their success.
Ironically they probably developed most of their ideas for armoured warfare on the Eastern Front during WWI as there was little trench warfare and mobility was the key.
When the Brits introduced the tank on the western front they found the key they needed to make mobility mechanised.

Advanced computing almost always ensures a hit, unless target range is very high, or target is somewhat concealed by terrain obstecales.

Please....please... runaway read attentively what i have writed in mine previous post,it aim exactly at debunk this completely wronged platitude !!

If something is not enough clear ,say to me ,i will attempt to explain another time that in other terms ,ok ?

I agree with Mindstorm... even the most precise FCS firing UNGUIDED rounds cannot accurately predict the real position of a moving target... it can estimate, but a target making random speed and direction changes would be near impossible to hit.

For the same reason small fast animals are hunted with shotguns rather than rifles...

GarryB wrote:as the crew positions and ammo positions could be directly targeted.

EDIT:

I would add that German tank success had rather as much to do with the crew roles and tank layout as it did communication between tanks and tactics.

Western and Eastern tanks were often undermanned. French Char tanks had excellent armour but with a crew of two there was a driver and a commander/gunner/loader. Even in the most basic German tank that was to be used as a tank (ie not a command vehicle) the commander directed the driver from his position in the turret and also directed the gunner, but was free to look for new targets and threats to the vehicle.
In many ways it was this situational awareness that is so important... for tanks as it is for fighter planes.
Add to that communication so you worked as a team instead of as a group of individuals and add successful tactics and that was the secret to their success.
Ironically they probably developed most of their ideas for armoured warfare on the Eastern Front during WWI as there was little trench warfare and mobility was the key.
When the Brits introduced the tank on the western front they found the key they needed to make mobility mechanised.

Well, against a moving target, its hard to target specific areas of a tank. From a non moving tank to hit another non moving tank, the possebilities are quite high to hit specific target areas.

Agree with you that tank layout and crew positions in WW2, played as a large part as radio in the succes.

Ironicle, after WW1, the french thought tanks were clumsy and hard to maintain, a bit of a trouble. As they lacked the experience of being Attacked by tanks, they resorted more to horse warfare..

Mindstorm wrote:
Please....please... runaway read attentively what i have writed in mine previous post,it aim exactly at debunk this completely wronged platitude !!

If something is not enough clear ,say to me ,i will attempt to explain another time that in other terms ,ok ?

Ok, please explain simplier to a non native English speaking.

Modern FCS systems are good, but hitting moving targets at combat ranges of say, 2,000 meters is still an iffy thing. Has to do with the environment.

IronsightSniper wrote:Modern FCS systems are good, but hitting moving targets at combat ranges of say, 2,000 meters is still an iffy thing. Has to do with the environment.

It has to do almost nothing with environment , it has to do, instead , almost anything with arbitrary variations in the vector of motion of the intended target (completely not computable by any FCS ,indipendently from theirs sophistication) in the time required to the unguided ammunition to reach the interception point , since the instant of the found fire solution .

Thanks Garry but Weight is also a function on how big the tank is , so if you wanted a bigger tank translated to bigger internal volume then you ended with bigger tank and more Armour used that got translated to higher weight.

Russian tanks has the same armour protection which is to say similar armour to volume ratio but since the tanks were small that translated to smaller internal volume.

A bigger tank is like a heavier tank.

It is not an attractive feature either.

Some next gen tank designs seem to shift the crew into the tank hull and change the gun position into an external gun mount to reduce vehicle size and weight.

Improvements in firepower will likely be aimed at new propellents achieving much higher muzzle velocities... perhaps with smaller and lighter projectiles. More efficient power generation and storage are key to EM guns and perhaps electric armour.

A tank is merely a big gun mounted on a tracked chassis for mobility... no future designs I have seen in the last few decades wants a bigger heavier vehicle... they all seem to focus on smaller and lighter... even if they aren't getting that.
Upgrades for existing vehicles often lead to heavier and more complex and slightly larger vehicles, but all the new designs start out small and light... and get bigger.

Mindstorm , good to see you back from your busy schedule

1 ) What do you make out of the issue associated with free ammo inside the T-90 turret compared to cannister ammo inside the Western Tank , Isnt free ammo more dangerous to keep specially near the crew ? Why havent they designed a cannister for ammo atleast that would have tanken care of issue like burning spall ?

I have read that lot of T-72 turret just blew up due to free ammo being hit and catching fire and since they dont have blow off panels there was no way to release pressure and turret blew off ?

2 ) How safe is underfloor loader in T-90 ?

3 ) Is T-90 designed more aggresively for manouvering warfare ? becuase if you see the frontal of the turret of T-90 and say a western tank , you cant hit the side which is weak spot on T-90 from 30-40 degree while a western turret even if it moves 10-15 degree from say frontal arc you can hit the sides.

Thanks.

I realise you didn't ask me, but here are my replies to your questions.

Most of their (Russian) experience with exploding turrets came in Chechnia, in Desert Storm because the T-72s were so downgraded their performance when hit could not really be applied to the Soviet or Russian fleet... separate ammo would make little sense in that case as US rounds were penetrating these vehicles completely so there was no safe space to store ammo.

By finding the problem during the first chechen conflict there was the immediate solution... don't carry loose ammo in the crew compartment and just have ammo in the underfloor armoured ammo cassette... which worked for the T-72 and later T-90, but not for the T-80 because the vertical arrangement of the propellent stubs left them exposed to sparks or flame in the case of a penetration.

The design solution came soon after and included Black Eagle where all ammo was moved to the turret bustle in the T-80, and in the T-72 and T-90 the Burlak moved all loose ammo to a turret bustle autoloader and kept the proven underfloor T-72 type autoloader cassette.

It seems however the military didn't like ammo in the turret bustle as if it burns out it can destroy the vehicle.

Blow off panels make little sense unless the exploding ammo is separate from the crew compartment. In many ways the turret roof hatches would act as blow out panels, but very simply when the whole ammo load of propellent charges and also the HE charges all go off the crew will all be killed anyway... add up 40 rounds worth of propellent charges and 24 odd rounds of HE and HEAT and that is an IED big enough to take out an ABRAMs.

By actually detonating it INSIDE the tank you make it 100 times more lethal because the armour contains the explosion and the explosion blast waves will be reflected back into the vehicle... the result will be like that fake Javelin video.

The US solution is to move ammo out of the crew area to an external location at the rear of the turret.

The temporary Russian solution was to only load the protected autoloader. The next step was the Burlak which was similar to the US solution but the Russian army rejected it as making the ammo to vulnerable to attack, so the real solution is the T-90AM with loose rounds in a separate turret bustle position, but the final solution will be the Armata with an unmanned turret with ammo stored below the turret ring, with the crew under the frontal heavy hull armour and separated from the turret by an armoured bulkhead.

The underfloor autoloader in the T-90 and T-72 is proven in combat to be safe.

The Russian tank designers have improved the protection of the T-90 turret by thinking about angles as well as armour and they have designed a turret that makes it harder to hit the sides and rear of the turret without having to make the turret heavier or the armour thicker.

We haven't seen the T-90AM, but I suspect it will have ERA on its sides and if not in its rear then rail or slat armour at least.

I would also suspect that the T-90AM will have active self protection systems.

They will have been working hard on something for the T-95 before it was cancelled, so it is likely this or something based on it will be designed and fitted to Armata too at the least and possibly the T-90AM too.

Garry you can always respond to any questions i put up and its always nice to read your views.

The reason i specifically ask Mindstorm is being a Russian he would have access to Russian literature that is not available to us , most good things are all stuffed up in Russian language and English speaking world just gets Western opinion of Russian system. Mindstorm bring new prespective because of this knowledge.

Coming back to this point of safety , I think in wars so far Abrams has been quite safe as far as ammo safetly goes , All ammo in Abrams are well insulated from crew with bulkhead and blow off panels and crew was able to get out of tank with burning ammo and were safe.

Even T-90MS has 10 ammo inside the turret but in cannister , so that makes it as good or bad as western tank ,I think a cannister has its own limitation and may not withstand a molten metal , Splinters or Heat JET from Top Attack.

I think no matter how much you isolate , there are no gurantees , for example a T-90MS might have ammo in bolted turret with blow up panels but there is no gurantee a HE round might blow side ways blowing side turret , you can just hope that the blow up panels does it job and works but one cannot gurantee safety in all scenerios.

Austin wrote:Mindstorm , good to see you back from your busy schedule

1 ) What do you make out of the issue associated with free ammo inside the T-90 turret compared to cannister ammo inside the Western Tank , Isnt free ammo more dangerous to keep specially near the crew ? Why havent they designed a cannister for ammo atleast that would have tanken care of issue like burning spall ?

I have read that lot of T-72 turret just blew up due to free ammo being hit and catching fire and since they dont have blow off panels there was no way to release pressure and turret blew off ?2 ) How safe is underfloor loader in T-90 ?

3 ) Is T-90 designed more aggresively for manouvering warfare ? becuase if you see the frontal of the turret of T-90 and say a western tank , you cant hit the side which is weak spot on T-90 from 30-40 degree while a western turret even if it moves 10-15 degree from say frontal arc you can hit the sides.

Thanks.

What i think ? I think that ,from a strict design's optimization for great scale conflicts against world level opponents , this argument is ,by far, the most ridiculous myth ever conceived to attempt to meanly bash eastern MBT's construction philosophy.
The three questions are linked one to the others therefore i will attempt to respond to all of them in an unitary way.

The ammo storage in Eastern tanks ,already since Soviet times, are placed in the area by far less exposed to enemy LOS adn indirect fire in great scale ,mobile, open battlefield engagements between peer opponents ,but paradoxically even for "unorthodox" type of engagements,like in Gulf War, with iraqi MBTs employed literally like fixed pillbox /artillery pieces (as well demonstrated by Manfred Held in its after conflict survey : "Warhead Hit Distribution On Main Battle Tanks In The Gulf War"...naturally that cannot save few hundreds of horribly downgraded model export model of early T-72M employed, in a suicide way, by some of the most inept operators on this planet from the combined efforts of the three branchs of the whole NATO Coalition) .

A MBT's design is ,in fact,the resultant of the multi-componential requirements dictated by its specific CONOPS, therefore the departure from a design solutions greatly optimized for great scale conventional conflicts can be conceived only postulating a significant shift from this strategical big picture and from the specific niches occupied by this MBT in it - like asymmetrical regional conflicts against immensely inferior enemies or ,even more, the COIN operations characterizing the last decade and half.
Wanting to swim upstream up to the outfall of the question, is possible to note that ,in this regard, while URSS ,aware of its wide conventional advantage over NATO ,particularly in the continental theatre, had foreseen and prepared itself for a titanic full scale conventional offensive operation in Europe with a very big role played just by armoured spearhead divisions, NATO ,conversely, had conceived its armoured forces mostly as defensive interposing forces, the strategic task of which would have been simply to slow and "canalize" Soviet forces for a more efficient, extensive employment of...tactical nuclear weapons , stimed by NATO's analysts of the time as the only credible response to the Warsaw Pact's crushing conventional superiority in the hypothetical conflict in Europe.

The displacement of ammo storage in areas of the MBT's structure (very often much, much, much more exposed to typical battlefield angle of enemy incoming fire) allowing the implementation of round's compartimentation and blow-off panels can become an acceptable ,or even a good, design compromise only presupposing at its basic rationale ,type of engagements allowing to those solutions to produce a tactically significative reduction of tank crew's losses; that can have surely a sense for a sudden "hit and run" RPG attack in a low intensity COIN operation in a village of Middle East against poor equiped insurgents or in a small scale regional conflict against an insulated ,immensely inferior, enemy (where engagements are so brief and onesided that the crew of the few tank losses involved would be capable to exit from the vehicle and be reabsorbed by frieldly forces in an almost safe way).
To the contrary the crew of an M1A1 Abrams with exploded blow-off panels and ammo storage and half tank into flame in the centre of an infernal battle against...Soviet Forces....in the middle of Fulda Gap, or,wanting to talk of more near, possible war's scenarios, an Indian Arjun's crew attempting to exit from its tank after blow-off panels out for an ammo storage detonation at..... 1500-2000 meters from PLA Army's front!!... litterally in the middle of the hell, would be 99 times out of 100 simply other KIA few seconds after -or ,even worse ,wounded or mutilated POW in the hands of enemy -and the same could be said on the Pakistan front ;in this type of high intensity conflict the displacement of ammo storage in hull/turret section,more "exposed" to enemy fire but allowing implementation of blow-off panels represent a design solution not only don't bringing to its side any type of operationally valuable result, but represent an absolutely disadvantageous compromise.
Is the type of conflict expected to be likely fought by a particular Army in the close and middle term and the main lines of its Tactical Doctrine at shape the design solutions in its weapon system ,never the opposite .

The root of those "programed" and videly spreaded misconceptions and myths reside mostly in the PR war ,fought in public accessible media by part of mercenary information operators founded around two strongholds : 1) performance in Gulf War of the entire NATO coalition Ground and Air Forces against iraqi.....Type59 ,T-55 ,T-62 and monkey models of T-72M ,that i have already previously mentioned, meanly selled as example of representative of Eastern-built products 2) Performance of Russian MBTs in first Chechnyan War in urban environments against organized enemy anti-tank squads immensely better equiped and trained than Iraqi or Afghani insurgents.
Those media operators employ those false "arguments" in a way ,very often, so horribly and plainly biased and twisted to result even comical

For render "plausible" the second argument on the supposed wrong design philosophy in Eastern MBTs become ,obviously, crucial to reiterate like mantras any instance in which eastern-built MBTs suffered losses in urban combat (naturally passing under total silence the operational environment and conditions in which them happened) to attempt to circumvent critical thinking and let them to be accepted as neutral facts and in those twisted terms while , contemporaneously, attempt to hide or dismiss in any way the enormous losses suffered in the same urban environment by western MBTs against enemies dozen and dozen of times less proficient and worse equiped !! .


Austin i have choosed for show just to you a clear example of this perverse mechanism an Indian "analyst" : Ajai Shukla

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2008/08/t-72-vulnerability-again-illustrated-in.html

or

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2008/08/more-pictures-from-georgia-of-t-72-and.html

On a side note i can say that i truly hope for it that has been USA dollars at having corrupted so deeply its discernment's capabilities ,because if it is truly so horribly incompetent to be uncapable to even only recognize that no T-90 (a MBT that it should know recognize blindfolded ) is present in any of those photos the best action it has done for its Nation is to leave Indian Army.

I would truly enjoy to see it write an article on M1A1/A2's design and its survivability (against immensely inferior enemies ),following the same criterion of this article where two photos of Georgiam T-72s destroyed was considered valid proofs of a wroged design, observing the images contained in this video (some images from 7:10 are interesting for those that are still uncertain on the operational implications of a design of over 60 tons of weight).

Important note: Is crucial to observe objectively only the images (like for a pasted video on the attack on an Abrams with a RPG-29) like neutral, empyrical facts useful at conduct a more informed analysis .
I want to render absolutely clear that,obviously, i don't not share neither support any idea or agenda by part of the makers ,it has the same value of series of photos of destroyed T-80s in Grozny showing details of the damages maked by Chechen guerrilla.



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8q_dnTVFIL0

Mindstorm , I have read US lost about 100 Abrams in recent Iraq conflict due to Jihadis but not much is documented , well we mostly get to see from Jihadi video which is sad.

Israel has been more open during Lebanon campaign loss

http://sayaredefenceworld.blogspot.com/

Even if ammo is not in LOS what happens post penetration , there will be burning spall , molten metal and splinters , they still can reach the loose ammo and blast.

Btw I think even a a blow off panel as its limitation ,i think its good as long as the ammo dont catch fire and blast , if it just catches fire then the blow off panel depening whats on fire might just blow off the weak area.But say if its a HEAT round then the ammo will simply blow off and explosive blow off in a circular fashion , so the impact will be all direction , ofcourse blow off might take most or half of the full impact but still there will be impact and if there are many heat rounds kept near by and there is sympathetic detonation then all bets are off regarding crew or tank safety , we are talking of 20 kg of explosive each shell.

Now coming to Arjun , it has part of ammo inside the turret in container without blow off panel and part in turret bustle with blow off panel .

Coming back to this point of safety , I think in wars so far Abrams has been quite safe as far as ammo safetly goes , All ammo in Abrams are well insulated from crew with bulkhead and blow off panels and crew was able to get out of tank with burning ammo and were safe.

The cold war ended because the Soviet Union collapsed, and at the time I believe the US president of the time said something along the lines of how can we say the Russians lost the cold war when they are freed from the shackles of communism... how can we say they have lost when they have changed from Communism to democracy and freedom.

Of course the next election they couldn't resist and they bollocked on about winning the cold war and all that...

WTF am I talking about?

The west didn't win because it was right, it "won" because it has a propaganda machine that has no equal in the world. They have the advantage of operating for centuries as the colonial west has been doing terrible things in its own interests for hundreds of years, and their secret to success is to spin their crimes to make them sound morally justified.

A bit part of that propaganda machine is a compliant media... during the chechen campaign western media constantly filmed body bags with Russian soldiers, plus the injured and dead whereever they could. They started doing the same with western dead till it suddenly became taboo to show your own dead.

I think you will find there were rather more Abrams damaged or destroyed than you might think.

It is also important to remember that these Abrams were not up against Kornets and Krisantema... the vast majority of weapons used were plain HE and obsolete model RPG-7 rockets.

You also need to take into consideration that the Chechens had access to the latest Soviet anti tank weapons taken directly from weapon stores in Chechnia, and more importantly with conscription most of them were fully trained by the army they were fighting and were familiar with the internal layout of the tanks they were targeting.

They knew where the ammo and fuel was stored, and they knew the weak points of the armour.

The Iraqis and Afghans had no idea.

Even T-90MS has 10 ammo inside the turret but in cannister , so that makes it as good or bad as western tank ,I think a cannister has its own limitation and may not withstand a molten metal , Splinters or Heat JET from Top Attack.

The 8 rounds stored between the turret ring and engine will be in an armoured container designed to prevent sparks or flame or molten material contacting the combustible ammo propellent stubs.

HE shells are not directly the problem... you can throw a blob of HE into a raging fire and all it will do is burn. Throw 40 propellent stubs in and they will explode.... and throw 40 shells with either HE or HEAT or an AP round with extra propellent and the exploding propellent will set off the explosive and you will get a huge explosion.

The problem is the cardboard impregnated with propellent.

The Sheridan has exactly the same problem because it uses combustible shells too.

I think no matter how much you isolate , there are no gurantees , for example a T-90MS might have ammo in bolted turret with blow up panels but there is no gurantee a HE round might blow side ways blowing side turret , you can just hope that the blow up panels does it job and works but one cannot gurantee safety in all scenerios.

Explosives are enormously predictable. They explode in all directions at once till they hit something. When they hit something like a loose stone that stone is picked up and blasted outwards by the force of the blast wave and becomes like shrapnel.
If the something is a wall and that wall is paper thin, then that wall will be shattered and pieces of it will become shrapnel.
If the wall is thick steel that the blast wave cannot break or move then the blast wave will be reflected back on itself.

Now think about a charge in the centre of a box. The blast will be perfectly spherical and push out in all directions with equal force till it hits the walls. When it fails to move or break the walls the shockwave is reflected back and passes through the place where the explosion occured and through a shockwave reflecting off the opposite wall till it hits that opposite wall itself.

The point is that that the walls will suffer the repeated impacts of ever diminishing shockwaves of high pressure.

A blast panel is simple a weakness in the walls, whether it is in the top or bottom or side of the box when the pressure increases and the shockwave hits it will fail and the pressure will be released which takes away the power of the explosion.
A closed up tank is not a perfect box, so some surfaces will get hit by the shockwave first... if you put the explosive in the bottom of the box then the top of the box will get hit by the main shockwave and then a reflected shockwave almost instantly afterwards, which will greatly increase the force on the top surface.

Think of it in terms of a rifle. The chamber and bolt of the rifle are the solid walls of the box. The bullet is sitting on the powder charge. As the powder charge burns the pressure builds to the point where something has to move. The weakest link is the bullet as it is just sitting there, so it moves first and once it is gone out the end of the barrel there is suddenly a large exit for gas pressure and the pressure drops down again.

Smokeless powder explodes slowly and is said to burn rather than explode because of this.

Replace smokeless powder with HE and a detonator and the pressure in the chamber would rise so rapidly the bolt and chamber would shatter before the bullet would move.

Drop a live round of ammunition into a raging fire and after a few seconds you will hear a pop... in a chamber the powder gets time to build up pressure and the bullet is accelerated down a barrel to lethal speeds... take away the chamber and barrel and just ignite the powder and the bullet will move a few milimetres but as soon as it has moved clear of the cartridge case the burning powder will escape and the pressure will not build and there will no longer be a force pushing the bullet.

Ammo dumps exploding are a real problem, but the threat is propellent setting off HE... an exploding round not in a chamber or barrel is a propellent explosion... the projectiles will not rip around like shot from a rifle, the only danger is artillery shells that might explode, where the explosion will accelerate metal items to dangerous speeds.

A rifle round is perfectly safe in a fire. A 20kg 125mm HE FRAG shell on the other hand with another 14kgs of propellent is not so safe inside a tank.

Needless to say a blow out panel should work fine for a propellent explosion. In a HE explosion however it depends on the size of the blast. Explosions always take the line of least resistance, so an open armoured door into a rear turret bustle will direct the explosion into the crew compartment even if blast panels are present.

Even if ammo is not in LOS what happens post penetration , there will be burning spall , molten metal and splinters , they still can reach the loose ammo and blast.

Why do you ask? You know the Russian solution was to not carry more than the 22 rounds in the autoloader... in which those burning spall, molten metal and splinters cannot reach the 22 rounds in armoured autoloader. In the T-90MS there are 8 rounds between the turret ring and engine that are in a container that will protect from spall and fragments etc, and the 10 further rounds in the turret bustle that is totally separate from the crew compartment.

Btw I think even a a blow off panel as its limitation ,i think its good as long as the ammo dont catch fire and blast , if it just catches fire then the blow off panel depening whats on fire might just blow off the weak area.

Lets use the turret bustle of the T-90SM as an example... load it with 4 x AP shells with extra propellent increments, plus 4 HEAT shells, and the remaining 2 shells can be HE Frag.

First of all HE burns in a fire... it needs an explosion to detonate. Second with blow out panels pressure will not build up on its own, so the propellent will burn vigorously, but not explode. and thirdly HEAT rounds need to be set off precisely from a specific location... a HEAT shaped charge that you set fire to will burn... if the detonator catches fire it will detonate but by then a lot of the HE charge will also have burned away making it rather ineffective.

But say if its a HEAT round then the ammo will simply blow off and explosive blow off in a circular fashion , so the impact will be all direction , ofcourse blow off might take most or half of the full impact but still there will be impact and if there are many heat rounds kept near by and there is sympathetic detonation then all bets are off regarding crew or tank safety , we are talking of 20 kg of explosive each shell.

So you are saying the Abrams is not actually safe... A detonation of HE inside the turret bustle would set off all the rounds at once and the sliding door would shatter... as would the blow out panels and the sides and rear and bottom of the turret bustle.

Now coming to Arjun , it has part of ammo inside the turret in container without blow off panel and part in turret bustle with blow off panel .

Statistical analysis shows the turret is the most likely hit part of the tank in combat, so it has all its ammo in the most exposed part of the tank. The blow out panels and turret bustle location minimise the threat to the crew in case of a hit, but increase the vulnerability of the vehicle to being knocked out... remember in combat with a tank driving forward a flank attack is a common tactic and when the turret turns to that flank it exposes its rear to the opposite flank.

Combat basic 101 don't attack from the front, and when you can attack from multiple directions. If you can attack from the front then attacking from the sides is the easiest option... attacking from the rear requires high mobility, but attacking from one side and then when the force turns to engage the threat you attack with your full force from what is now their rear is a fairly standard military tactic.

The first flank attack could be your armour with the opposite flank attack being largely ATGMs like Kornet-EM hitting the vulnerable rear of the tanks. You will have to split your forces or take heavy losses...

GarryB wrote:
The 8 rounds stored between the turret ring and engine will be in an armoured container designed to prevent sparks or flame or molten material contacting the combustible ammo propellent stubs.

Such rounds also exist in Western Tank which are containerised but that do not prevent the Western Tanks blowing up , because those container cant stop every molten metal , splinters and burning spall that hits them , it may be safe against burning spall and would prevent some instant detonation compared to free round but not against the rest specially if these have enough energy.

Its always dangerous to have ammo near crew no matter if its containerised , you could still get hit by CE from Top and that blows up your container.

Not to mention they dont have blow up panel to release the pressure.Not that its going to help greatly when you have sympathetic detonation from so many ammo.

HE shells are not directly the problem... you can throw a blob of HE into a raging fire and all it will do is burn. Throw 40 propellent stubs in and they will explode.... and throw 40 shells with either HE or HEAT or an AP round with extra propellent and the exploding propellent will set off the explosive and you will get a huge explosion.

HE shells have raw 20 kg explosive in it , and you call it not a problem Propellent stub is ofcourse also a problem.

Explosives are enormously predictable. They explode in all directions at once till they hit something. When they hit something like a loose stone that stone is picked up and blasted outwards by the force of the blast wave and becomes like shrapnel.
If the something is a wall and that wall is paper thin, then that wall will be shattered and pieces of it will become shrapnel.
If the wall is thick steel that the blast wave cannot break or move then the blast wave will be reflected back on itself.

The only time explosive is predictable is when you have some smart fuse that makes it work in a smart way like directional charges , just the ammmo will simply bust in speherical direction.

Now think about a charge in the centre of a box. The blast will be perfectly spherical and push out in all directions with equal force till it hits the walls. When it fails to move or break the walls the shockwave is reflected back and passes through the place where the explosion occured and through a shockwave reflecting off the opposite wall till it hits that opposite wall itself.

The only time such a thing would work is when you have some propellent burning and the Blow up panel release the pressure , if you have 20 Kg explosive burning along with propellent and then you have many such 20 kg HEAT round besides then no amout of Blow Up panel will save your day , it will simply explode the tank and the crew in there.

Blow Up panel will work in some scenerios assumuming when the explosive do burn it does not generate enough impace to blow your side armour , every thing is conditional.

So you are saying the Abrams is not actually safe... A detonation of HE inside the turret bustle would set off all the rounds at once and the sliding door would shatter... as would the blow out panels and the sides and rear and bottom of the turret bustle.

yes if a HEAT round explodes in the turret bustle then nothing can save an Abrams from certain destruction not even the blow off panel , I have seem images of crew getting off abrams but in that case the fire was just with some propellent and the blow off panel did the job of not keeping the pressure building , its not a hit at some HE round.


Talking of T-72 tanks , DRDO did some basic upgrade on T-72 tank called CIA Combat Inproved Ajeya which added ERA times and other basic stuff and they have praised the T-72 a lot , compared to the indirect war of words it had via few journalist and bloggers.

Check this details of upgrade http://www.scribd.com/doc/57197412/DRDO-Tech-Focus
( page 6 )

High Power to Weight Ratio ( 18hp/T )
Excellent Crew Comfort
Superior Strategic and Tactical Mobility

And many others you can read that , only after doing some basic upgrade on the T-72M ,prior to that they were bashing the T-72 and T-90

I would suggest they should do some basic upgrade on T-90 Bheeshma and then you will see DRDO praising it

So, given that the army has stopped T-90 buys, apparently the interim between T-90A and Armata is a contract for 330/3years T-72BA2 (not an official designation, just to differentiate from the first BA series upgraded over the last decade) for Tagil.

I rather suspect the way things will work out is that for now they will be upgrading T-72s as this is cheaper than buying the T-90AM... they seem to be happy with the turret of the T-90AM, but reports suggest they have problems with the chassis, but when the Armata becomes available they will need to make a choice.

It all depends on how expensive Armata is... if it is 10 million dollars a tank then they might produce T-90AM2s and Armatas so their final tank force consists of Armatas as the high tech tank and the T-90s as the numbers tank... the T-80s and upgraded T-72s scrapped when they are worn out or written off.

The other possibility is that the Armata is comparable in cost to the T-90AM2 so they just skip it and go for an all Armata fleet and reap the benefits of unified chassis and vehicle families sooner.

Such rounds also exist in Western Tank which are containerised but that do not prevent the Western Tanks blowing up , because those container cant stop every molten metal , splinters and burning spall that hits them , it may be safe against burning spall and would prevent some instant detonation compared to free round but not against the rest specially if these have enough energy.

In tank combat a lethal hit that causes the crew to bail out but does not explode immediately will normally burn for 2-5 minutes before the fire reaches fuel or ammo, and also a temperature high enough to detonate that fuel or ammo rather than just make it burn more. As long as you carry ammo and fuel in a tank there will always be a risk of an explosion, and short of putting all the main gun ammo on a trailer behind the vehicle, here is nothing that can be done about it.

The separate container in the T-90AM will be positioned where it is unlikely an enemy round will hit it directly, which means if those rounds explode from the heat of a fire the crew has already left the vehicle or are dead from the heat.

BTW blow out panels don't have to face upwards... it could have downward facing blow out panels below it to direct any explosion out of the vehicle. It actually wouldn't be that hard to design panels that are pressure and penetration resistant in one direction and blow out panels in another direction.

Its always dangerous to have ammo near crew no matter if its containerised , you could still get hit by CE from Top and that blows up your container.

Really? Because on the Abrams there are less than 10cms of sliding door between the turret crew and all that ammo stored in the turret bustle, and there are normally another 8 rounds stored in the hull front next to the driver... I guess the crew would be almost always killed in the event of a penetration...

Not to mention they dont have blow up panel to release the pressure.Not that its going to help greatly when you have sympathetic detonation from so many ammo.

But that is the point... if the enemy never hit the container directly it will only ever explode after the tank burns for 5 minutes so it is not threat to the crew as they are either already out, or already dead.

As found in the second chechen conflict T-72s are actually hard to make explode when they only carry ammo in the turret floor autoloader... positioned in front of the engine, the extra ammo in the T-90AM is quite safe too, for the same reasons... they have plenty of data, and experience, and know what they are doing.

The Russian military have said crew safety is a priority and they have made changes to reflect that. Remember 15 minutes into combat operations they can pause and transfer the 8 rounds in the internal container into the auto loader and then carry on with the battle.

HE shells have raw 20 kg explosive in it , and you call it not a problem Smile Propellent stub is ofcourse also a problem.

20kgs of HE burns like 20kgs of wood, it is the propellent stub that burns much more vigorously, but not contained in a chamber it burns in a flash rather than the explosion you see when a round is fired.

The only time explosive is predictable is when you have some smart fuse that makes it work in a smart way like directional charges , just the ammmo will simply bust in speherical direction.

Smart fuse? If you are referring to the directional explosive warheads of Russian SAMs that direct their blast at the last microsecond towards the target, that is electronic and is very simple to achieve... get a ball of HE and cover its entire surface with detonators and small metal cubes. To create a directional explosion just set off 2-3 detonators on the opposite side of the ball to the direction you want to hit and the explosion will start on the opposite side and blow through the ball of HE... detonating more HE and it blasts through directing the most powerful shockwave towards the target and accelerating the fragments (cubes) facing the target with the entire mass of HE to the highest speed.

Standard HE rounds have detonators with fairly complicated safety systems so even in a fire they will most likely fail rather than set off the round... remember these are things that are accelerated from 0m/s to about 900m/s in the space of 5 metres or so... at that speed the air flowing past them will generate temperatures of more than 400 degrees C with friction alone.

The only time such a thing would work is when you have some propellent burning and the Blow up panel release the pressure , if you have 20 Kg explosive burning along with propellent and then you have many such 20 kg HEAT round besides then no amout of Blow Up panel will save your day , it will simply explode the tank and the crew in there.

Sorry Austin, you are not listening... explosives need an explosion to make them explode. Propellent needs an enclosed place and pressure to explode. A blow out panel the size of an orange is all you need to relieve the pressure and allow the gas to escape and the pressure to not get too high.

As long as it is only burning and not detonating you could have 1,000kgs in a tank turret burning and as long as there is an open hatch to let out the gas and stop an increase in pressure it will not explode... the tank will completely burn out and there will be very little left, but you can hit HE with a hammer and it wont explode... that is what High explosive means... it is a high order explosive... it is stable and needs an explosion to set it off. A low explosive like black powder or nitrogycerine is very easy to set off, and a spark or flame is enough. The propellent is a low explosive too.

(High and Low do not refer to the power of explosive at all, you can have HE that is less powerful than LE).

I would suggest they should do some basic upgrade on T-90 Bheeshma and then you will see DRDO praising it

The T-72 has some minor problems, most of which can easily be corrected... it is perfectly normal for all tanks to receive periodic upgrades and improvements and I would think except for the French thermal imagers, if the cold war had continued that the current in service T-72 would be similar to the T-90AM or better. There has been a gap, but now upgrades are being applied to the T-72 again and further upgrades will be applied to the T-90 in its future no doubt.

Their future plans call for about 8,000 tanks so I would assume that will not be all T-72s with upgrades... 2,000 of those will be T-80s and possibly up to 800 initially be T-90s in various
variants... the question is... will they make 8,000 Armatas, or will they make 2-3,000 Armatas and 5-6,000 T-90s like they were planning to do with the T-95. If the Armata is not too expensive they might just go for Armatas and upgraded T-72s till they can make enough Armatas to replace all the upgraded T-72s.

Mindstorm , I have read US lost about 100 Abrams in recent Iraq conflict due to Jihadis but not much is documented , well we mostly get to see from Jihadi video which is sad.

Austin this figure is several times lower than the real figure of the M1A1/A2 losses in Iraq .
To let you figure how the numbers of M1 losses are mantained how low as possible in open media image that already at January of 2005, less than two years from end of Second Gulf War, how clearly explained by the same US Army Major General Terry Tucker -see "Army Times" issue of February 2005- 80 very heavily damaged Abrams ,but not totally destroyed, were shipped back to USA , where 63 of which would have undergo total reapair schedule and 17 scrapped for spare parts, naturally that figure account only for the knocked-out Abrams not totally destroyed ,like those completely burned out or dismembered/warped well beyond any repair and with no recycling value (that like you know must be handled by RADCOM -Radiation Containment- eqipes of AMCCOM -Us'Army Armament Munition and Chemical Command - and the remains of which are often envoyed in special cargos directly at Barnwell nuclear waste site).

Naturally after the turmoil for this information leack US Army becomed ,successively, practically sealed in providing any type information on the Abrams losses : "We have been very cautious about giving out information," with the words of Jan Finegan, spokeswoman for US Army Materiel Command.

Therefore the often cited loss figure of 80 M1A1/A2 Abrams MBT refere only to a part of the losses (not catastrophic losses like some of the several visible in the video previosly pointed-out and in other photos ,at theirs own times reprsenting only a fraction of the losses for which no photografic evedency exist) suffered by US Army against very poorly equiped insurgents in just one year and 9 months since end of the 2003 War !!.
I leave to anyone to figure the figure of the totall M1A1/A2 losses (including the catastrophic ones) at 2010 year......

Even if ammo is not in LOS what happens post penetration , there will be burning spall , molten metal and splinters , they still can reach the loose ammo and blast.

A similar event is very rare ; more that 90% of the T-72 catastrophic losses in result of ammo cook-off (in some instances with the widely publicized subsequent separation of the turret) is the result of spreading blaze originating from the engine compartment and reaching the ammo carousel ; in the wide majority of the cases is all except an istantaneous process ;any MBT at world in those same conditions is history much before reaching the instant of the ultimate end and very often the result is the same






What is important to point out is that blow-off panels are design solutions conceived for and "paying" only in low intensity conflicts or conflicts against very inferior enemies; blow-off panels will likely no save even only a single Indian tank crew life in a war against China and even taking in consideration less hellish scenarios ,such as local engagements in the Thar desert against Pakistan, where them could be successful at save some life, the trade-off for its integration will still be disadvantageous from an operational-efficiency stand point.

Mindstorm wrote:
What is important to point out is that blow-off panels are design solutions conceived for and "paying" only in low intensity conflicts or conflicts against very inferior enemies; blow-off panels will likely no save even only a single Indian tank crew life in a war against China and even taking in consideration less hellish scenarios ,such as local engagements in the Thar desert against Pakistan, where them could be successful at save some life, the trade-off for its integration will still be disadvantageous from an operational-efficiency stand point.

Why is that so ? If the blow up panel of the bustle explodes on Arjun , the crew wouldnt get a chance to leave the Armoured Vehical and go , In Thar Desert in India-Pak Conflict and with China , Actually with China these wont be the classic tank warfare due to mountainous terrain except in area where it is flat , the Indian Army is planning to buy light tank against china.

How do you assess the Strength and Weakness of Arjun verus T-90 ?

I just decided to share this video I stumbled across that tried to make soviet tanks look bad but its so illogical and the poster of the video made dumb statements filled with biased cold war hate

In the comments section you can see that this individual knows almost nothing about russian armor design. However many people seam to believe in him.
I tried to explain that his video showed nothing about the real performance of russian tanks and pointed out some places where western tanks are inferior but the OP just started ridiculing my statements and insulting me like he knew everything. Just look at the statements in the comments section. Damn youtube is filled with various "experts" and knowitalls

This below video shows how ordinary IED's have destroyed Abram Tanks in Iraq.

BTW - If you are in the US or UK this video is probably blocked