Russian Tanks ERA and APS

Did K6 or Kaktus doubled the performance figures of K5 or Kontact ? Do we have some basic performance figures for both ?

Where does NERA stand in the over all picture along with ERA ? Do Russians have any development happening on NERA , read its effective against Tandem warhead.

Can they place two tiles over each other like NERA + ERA ? The first one takes care of Tandem Warhead while the ERA takes care of KE and HEAT type ?

Thanks

Austin wrote:Did K6 or Kaktus doubled the performance figures of K5 or Kontact ? Do we have some basic performance figures for both ?

Where does NERA stand in the over all picture along with ERA ? Do Russians have any development happening on NERA , read its effective against Tandem warhead.

Can they place two tiles over each other like NERA + ERA ? The first one takes care of Tandem Warhead while the ERA takes care of KE and HEAT type ?

Thanks

NERA is long ago integrated in both T-80U/T-90/T-72B.

I was looking at Shotra-1 EO/IR Jammer and I found some weak areas to it that perhaps needs to be addressed.

For one Shotra is provided on frontal side of the gun , which means its jamming capability is complete on the frontal arc but tanks are vulnerable on the back and side ways , that does not make sense to me , because it leaves a big area vulnerable.

Second is for a system that uses passive systems and uses F&F missile that uses MMW/IIR seeker , Shotra will not be aware of the missile approaching it , which makes me believe Shotra-1 has to be ON all the time , which is not ideal and defeats the purpose.

Any thoughts ?

The Shtora system has Laser warning sensors so it knows when it's being painted by say, a Hellfire missile. The system will then automatically turn the turret to face the missile, Shtora activates, and the missile goes nuts and blows up some dirt and makes a nice sandbox for the kids to play in later.

Although admittedly, an independent station where Shtora can turn by itself while leaving the turret to do what it wants would be more effective, but it won't give T-90's their signature "Red eyes"

Shtora is pretty much crap when a Fire and forget missile that uses MMW and IIR seekers are used. Only hope then is to fire your smoke grenades (which are controlled by Shtora) and move away and hope for the best.

Shtora is on all the time anyways, because if you're not expecting an Ambush, then you should prepare for it all the time.

The news i have found most surprising in this beginning of Nizhniy Tagil arms expo are the declarations of the NII Stali's President Valeriy Grigoryan.

After having exposed briefly the truly outstanding capabilities of Relikt ( among which capability to defeat multiple EFP and tandem warhead in an ERA with double the effciency of actual K-5 tiles !!) it calmly add :


"For us, Relikt is something in the past.Completely new systems that do not utilize explosives are arriving. We are using completely new energy substances that are much more effective and much safer than explosives,"

I ask to myself if Armata heavy platform ,in its tank incarnation ,will see the integration of those revolutionary not explosive reactive armor much more effective (...for not say totally immune to multi warhead missiles ,virtually without limits for multiple hit and perfectly integrable in the main armor ...) than even the actual outstanding Relikt ERA.


I am also in search of any news on Shtora-2 ,someone has some info on the system in question ?

Thanks for all pics guys, the new tank looks good

Mindstorm wrote:The news i have found most surprising in this beginning of Nizhniy Tagil arms expo are the declarations of the NII Stali's President Valeriy Grigoryan.

After having exposed briefly the truly outstanding capabilities of Relikt ( among which capability to defeat multiple EFP and tandem warhead in an ERA with double the effciency of actual K-5 tiles !!) it calmly add :


"For us, Relikt is something in the past.Completely new systems that do not utilize explosives are arriving. We are using completely new energy substances that are much more effective and much safer than explosives,"

I ask to myself if Armata heavy platform ,in its tank incarnation ,will see the integration of those revolutionary not explosive reactive armor much more effective (...for not say totally immune to multi warhead missiles ,virtually without limits for multiple hit and perfectly integrable in the main armor ...) than even the actual outstanding Relikt ERA.

Interesting news....like you said, it's likely that we'll see this new armour on the new Armata tank.

I am also in search of any news on Shtora-2 ,someone has some info on the system in question ?

Not much public info on it. There's speculation that it provides a counter to F&F type weapons.

There is a Shtora-M (TShU-117M) available with increased capabilities

http://www.zavodstella.ru/catalog/Zaschita_nazem/55

"For us, Relikt is something in the past.Completely new systems that do not utilize explosives are arriving. We are using completely new energy substances that are much more effective and much safer than explosives,"

That is NERA. or Non Explosive Reactive Armour.

Austin posted a link to a magazine that mentioned it as a solution to protecting light armoured vehicles and ERA often did damage to the light vehicle structure.

I wonder if NERA and ERA could be used in combination on heavy armoured vehicles?

I would assume NERA didn't throw out metal plates so putting ERA on top of it wouldn't effect its ability to work properly.

Regarding Shtora-M I would expect something they would have tried to fix was its range of effect... the old Shtora only worked in a range of something like -5 and +25 degrees, which of course would not cover diving top attack weapons like Spike and Javelin.

What should of course be kept in mind is that despite the introduction of Spike and Javelin the vast majority of ATGMs out there are AT-3 and Milan and TOW like weapons and SHTORA offers good protection against these for a minor increase in weight.

Edit: http://igorrgroup.blogspot.com/2010/06/russian-nxra-for-lavs.html

For info on Russian NERA.

Mindstorm awaiting your response , couple of questions to you , its some real learning experince.

1> i saw your post on beam rider in kornet thread ,so tank say T-90 can you get the same function with beam rider as you get with kornet-em , considering auto-tracker is a function with MS , hope they could get top attack capability with reflex missile.

2> Are you aware of new developments in field of tank MG launched missile , I mean something beyond reflex.

3> i hear kontact-5 was well tested in 1993 by German and US round and they developed something that could defeat K-5 based on those test ,but i assume K-5 development is not static since 93 and must have moved on , can you confirm that K-5 has many variants to it ?

4> Also awaiting your reply from previous post , when ever you get the time.

Thanks

Why wasnt Shotra-1 system ( with Arena hard kill and Softkill system ) mass deployed in Russian tank forces , did it have any inherent weakness or drawbacks that prevented its mass induction.

but i assume K-5 development is not static since 93 and must have moved on

Relikt, and Kaktus have both been developed since, plus whatever was developed for the T-95.

Why wasnt Shotra-1 system ( with Arena hard kill and Softkill system ) mass deployed in Russian tank forces , did it have any inherent weakness or drawbacks that prevented its mass induction.

Shtora was a passive defence suite that included laser sensors and smoke grenade launchers and IR lamps designed to deal with second generation ATGMs like TOW and HOT and Milan and AT-3/-4/-5 and Metis. It had an angle of effective use that meant it would not work on Javelin or Spike in their top attack modes.

ARENA was an active protection system that would work on most conventional anti tank weapons, guided or unguided, but not diving top attack weapons. It would work on weapons like BILL2 that flew over targets and fired their warheads down as they overflew the target, but not Javelin and Spike.

Why didn't they enter mass service?

Why didn't every T-72 and T-90 get full upgrades?

These two systems might be incorporated in the T-72 upgrades, or their replacements might.

They no doubt developed hard and soft active protection systems for the T-95 and these will likely be used in the Armata.

If effective then they might be retro fitted to older tanks too... things like active defence systems and ERA were often fitted to older tanks like the T-55AD which was a test tank for the Drodz system that was tested and used by naval infantry tanks in Afghanistan, where it proved effective against RPG attack.

Considering the number of RPGs in the world compared with the number of Javelins Russian tanks are likely to come up against I think both systems are well worth while as they compliment each other and the other protection measures on the tanks.

GarryB wrote:Relikt, and Kaktus have both been developed since, plus whatever was developed for the T-95.

No my point was Kaktus development would not have remained since 1993 , I am sure K-5 would have evolved. Relikt is a new development and it would also evolve and get better with time

Shtora was a passive defence suite that included laser sensors and smoke grenade launchers and IR lamps designed to deal with second generation ATGMs like TOW and HOT and Milan and AT-3/-4/-5 and Metis. It had an angle of effective use that meant it would not work on Javelin or Spike in their top attack modes.

I think Shotra-1 includes both sensor , passive system and active system.

I was wondering if Shotra-1 could jam Kornet low power laser I suppose it could

I was wondering if Shotra-1 could jam Kornet low power laser I suppose it could

Very unlikely.

Shtora works by defeating the missile tracking IR goniometer in ATGMs, and by firing smoke grenades... Kornet doesn't have an IR goniometer because the launch platform doesn't track the missile, it just tracks the target. The missile doesn't look at the target tank, it looks back at the laser beam coming from the launch platform and "flys down it".

The auto tracker in the Kornet-EM uses digital video and thermal sights, so if Shtora can jam Kornet EM it would need to be able to jam thermal imagers... and it can't.

In good weather on a clear day the Kornet EM would likely use the day time video channel to track the target and the only defence against such a thing would be to fire smoke.

The problem for the target however is that the very low power laser beam requires a very sensitive detection setting and would result in smoke being fired a lot. In fact reflections from the targets own laser range finder could set the smoke launchers off...

No my point was Kaktus development would not have remained since 1993 , I am sure K-5 would have evolved. Relikt is a new development and it would also evolve and get better with time

Kaktus was developed for the Black Eagle AFAIK and was developed by the tank company that made the T-80 that went bust. The intellectual property of that company along with the engineers were transfered to UVZ which might have continued their work or might not have.

They have already publicly stated they are working on new NERA and NxRA armours that work even better than Relikt, which I would presume are intended for the Armata.

Garry and every one check this site for details of Reflex missile

http://www.kotsch88.de/f_9k119.htm

Its a german site so use translation , Please check the site in details has very good and detailed information on many Russian tank and systems

Shotra-1

http://www.kotsch88.de/al_shtora-1.htm

Just thinking over the 21 guranteed shot from 22 rounds that Gur Khan mentioned was possible with new Kalina FCS , that should give it 38 round of hits with the 40 that she carries so its quite good.

Garry I am not sure when Kaktus was developed as even lately they were exporting K-5 which I am sure has evolved over time and is quite good.

How do these Thermal and IR opaque scree works as Mindstorm was mentioning in one of his post , I would assume the top attack missile while using IIR seeker would try to dive on the target tank turret the smoke launches would launch its smoke grenade and that would create a opaque screen , the missile seeker does not see any thing so it just continues to dive along the path without making any correction and the target tank takes this few seconds to speed up and go away from the path , when the missile is out of the smoke it does not find the target tank there but is also too low and fast to require it or perhaps even out of FOV of seeker

If it was a human guiding the weapon manually when the smoke screen is deployed the human will try to guide the missile to the last position they knew there was a tank.

With fire and forget guidance the weapon is likely to simply go ballistic if it is unable to reacquire its target after launch.

Russian and Ukranian sources claim the K-5 is resistant to the M829A2 round and anything in it's class. It's believed the M829A3 can defeat K-5.

The Relict EAR is of modular design. The reactive element within the outer casing can be changed as better ones become available. Even now there is an export and domestic variant with slightly different elements.

I saved some info from a discussion I took part in a few years ago in which an interesting test was discussed which had been mentioned in 'Tehnika i Vooruzheniye' by A. Tarasenko and Lt Col S. Tupitsyn titled "The Situation in Domestic Tank Manufacturing: Turth and Fantasy". The test was undertaken during the negotiations for the purchase of the T-90 by the Indian Army back in the 1990's

"High-tensile ceramic fillers and armour with 'baffle plates', which are regarded as the semi-active type, are employed as fillers in domestically-produced tanks. An improved filler is being employed on the new welded turret, which is being installed on the latest versions of the T-90 and its export modifcation the T-90S. The tests that were conducted in the presence of an Indian delegation with shelling using the latest foreign munitions (the M829A2 APFSDS projectile) showed the turret's invulnerability even without the installation of built-in reactive armour. The shelling was conducted from minimal distances (250 metres)."

A 120mm tank gun and APFSDS rounds had been obtained clandestinely from a Middle Eastern country (believed to be Egypt). But since the export Abrams don't receive DU tipped M829A2 rounds it's most likely that that the round used in the test was KEW-A2 with a tungsten penetrator.

__________


On the Shtora - Kornet question....

I think the smoke dischargers fire a multi spectral smoke screen which would block the guidance of the Kornet

I think the smoke dischargers fire a multi spectral smoke screen which would block the guidance of the Kornet

The question is how thick is the smoke, how quickly can it deploy, will the low power beam trip the automatic defence system, and how far does it deploy from the tank.

The Kornet flys at 300m/s so an engagement of a tank at max range of 8.5km would require almost 30 seconds flight time, but the laser beam is so weak that it is rather unlikely to give any warning of attack.

If the smoke is less than 100m thick one could make assumptions about the missile penetrating several metres before it can no longer see its guidance beam, and so for the remaining 90m or so does it continue on a ballistic path or dive into the ground?

Using an offset laser could delay any warning at all to the very last few seconds making an attack more effective... equally a target that obscures itself with smoke might lead to the operator selecting a new target nearby so all vehicles in the group would need to fire smoke to be safe.
All this smoke will make things difficult for operations as thermal imagers will not work through such smoke either.

[quote="Cyberspec"]

"High-tensile ceramic fillers and armour with 'baffle plates', which are regarded as the semi-active type, are employed as fillers in domestically-produced tanks. An improved filler is being employed on the new welded turret, which is being installed on the latest versions of the T-90 and its export modifcation the T-90S. The tests that were conducted in the presence of an Indian delegation with shelling using the latest foreign munitions (the M829A2 APFSDS projectile) showed the turret's invulnerability even without the installation of built-in reactive armour. The shelling was conducted from minimal distances (250 metres)."

Thats good info

Is there any information available about domestic T-90A armour and export variant of it ? As in how much degradation of armour do they do for export compared to domestic ?

A 120mm tank gun and APFSDS rounds had been obtained clandestinely from a Middle Eastern country (believed to be Egypt). But since the export Abrams don't receive DU tipped M829A2 rounds it's most likely that that the round used in the test was KEW-A2 with a tungsten penetrator.

Interesting , It wont be difficult for them to find out DU rounds penetration for M829A2 round if they know penetration capability of tungsten round , atleast they can get good estimates if they have reference for similar rounds using different metal.

Finally i have a bit of work-free time to write something. Let start :

1) The ever open question of Probability to Hit of a MBT equipped with a modern FCS and importance -or lack of it - of target's surface area for this crucial parameter

An advanced, modern FCS ,provided with all the necessary chrono-spatial and environmental information (precise range from target ,accurate measure of its motion's vector, overall environmental temperature, wind speed, specific humidity, barrel level of thermal expansion and its level of structural fatigue etc..etc..)can effectively allow a modern MBT to find a fire solution and reliably hit a relatively small target -smaller than the frontal projection of a MBT- at long range (in the right conditions even more than 3000-3500 meters), but what is almost always, strangely, "forgotten" is that ,at medium-long range (2000 m and over) considering actual HEAT and APFSDS rounds ,all that remain true only against stationary/near-stationary targets or those changing theirs motion vector in a proportional way .

Image an engagement attempt against a target at 2200 meters moving at 36 Km/h (10 meter/second), for simplicity we can image this target moving perfectly perpendicular to the barrel's axis of the shooting tank (choosing therefore the most advantageous geometry for the shooter); from the processed data and the precise instant of the found fire solution to the moment of the APFSDS arrival on the computed point of interception, taking into account: gun collimation ,fire initialization, velocity and gravity drop of the round and travelling time long the parabolic trajectory to this point 2200 m far, elapse about 2 seconds for a round like M829A3 (1540 m/s at gun exit).
Now any change of the target motion from the vector computed by the FCS at the instant of fire solution capable to modify the actual spatial position of the silhouette's centre of a distance superior to its semi-projection (half of the projection of its target area at the shooting point) will cause an assured miss, anyone can easily realize as a variation as small as +/-15 Km/h in the target speed or a simply turn ,even of only few degrees, or even the effect of some terrain morphology is more than sufficient for a tank with an average silhouette to cause a miss by part of the named round at this range.

What is very important to point-out is that what now expressed remain totally valid independently from the FCS's sophistication (unless someone will manage to create a future-reading FCS ) because those variations of target's vector in the mentioned time window are totally arbitrary ,therefore completely out of the computing capabilities of any data processing system in the past ,in the present or in the future.
The unique factors, conversely, capable to influence a similar engagement sequence against a target randomly changing its motion's parameters are : round's speed, distance from target, target capability to quickly change its motion vector, round average dispersion at this date range, and size of the target actual aspect projection from the shooting point.

Now anyone can easily realize as even small variations in a MBT's area projection (in the order of some dozen of cm ) produce a disproportionate effect in the related PtH -Probability to Hit- parameter for engagements at 2000-2500 m ,or over, between randomly moving opposing MBTs not employing guided ammunitions, because those features allow both to increase the time window useful for initialize a motion variation capable to cause a miss and/or mitigate the "required" entity of the same motion's variable.
We must also add that a MBT with a smaller silhouette show, almost always, also a smaller internal volume and a significantly lower inertial mass, elements that don't allow only to maintain a greater armoured-mass-to-surface index but also a far better capability to quickly change direction and speed in the unitary time segment of reference , one of the variables in the Probability to Hit function for medium-long range engagements.
The operational factors previously described wouldn't be simply important but literally crucial in any major MBT's engagement between peer opponents employing armoured brigades ,both in offensive and in defensive missions, in theirs classical CONOPS and even more considering modern concepts of adaptive ground manoeuvring warfare.
Naturally, one more time, Gulf War, with Iraqi ground forces employing theirs MBT as....fixed pillbox/field artillery pieces ....have generated a lot of low level platitudes (among which capability to engage enemy MBT with APFSDS or HEAT at 3 km or over “thanks to advanced FCS” )very difficult to eradicate from common immaginary and completely irreconcilables not only with physical reality but with what would actually happen ,or would have happened, for example, in the highly mobile engagement in the Thar Desert between India and Pakistan armoured forces (or, in the past , in the Fulda Gap and the Great European Plain between URSS and NATO) where the heavy effects of lower probably to hit triggered by lower target area and lower inertial mass of some of the MBTs involved would generate an huge impact on the final attrition ratio .

2) The question of K-5 efficiency against various menaces

I want to begin this response pointing out that defeating mechanism of the so called second generation heavy Soviet ERA has obviously variable effects against specific type of menaces at the variation of some of theirs parameters but ,one more time , in way completely different (often even at the exact opposite) from some ridiculous ideas circulating on the subject.
For KE rounds against this type of ERA ,a topic very often debated in open media, main factors involved in deciding the residual penetration power of the rod after ERA action are : penetrator speed, geometry of round incidence, length to diameter ratio of the penetrator (in a paradoxical way) ,speed of the ERA plates in the inducing action (in a paradoxical way) ,ERA plates spatial configuration, KE penetrator’s main mechanical characteristics, critical plastic strain limits and tendency to bend/deform, degrees of the yaw angle .

Among the named variables, experimental emergences have proved that those characteristics of the KE penetrators codifying for a prolonged interaction between ERA plates (in particular rear plates) with the rod increase ,often even dramatically, the efficiency of the defeating mechanism of K5-like type of ERA .

What is interesting and important to point out is that some of those “negative” characteristics of KE penetrators in the interaction with dynamic reactive armours are conversely just those required to increase penetration capabilities against modern ,ever growing, multilayered passive armour of MBTs .
I should still have somewhere the link to a pair of scientific publications on that specific subject in English (two others i own are in paper books in other languages) when i find them if will add here; all what said will appear surely more clear and simple.


Ok , found the first link to one of the scientific publications

www.ciar.org/ttk/mbt/papers/papers.2007-12-21/armor.x.ijie.vol_unk_pp_unk.protection_performance_of_dual_flying_oblique_plates_against_a_yawed_long_rod_penetrator.paik_kim_yoo_lee.2006.pdf


Worth a mention are : the increase of length to diameter ratio : this element increase the interaction time with the ERA plates greatly “aiding” the neutralization capabilities and effectiveness of oblique plate side action of the K-5-like ERA ,the increase of L/D ratio is a forced trend among world KE penetrator’s designer ,induced obviously by the necessity to maintain a certain capability to penetrate at operational useful distances ever growing frontal passive armour level of modern MBT (and not, of course to better defeat heavy ERA ,against which it become effectively even a negative characteristic ! -where increased diameter and shortening length would be the “paying” design choices- ) ; speed of the penetrator: also here we see a clear trend for heavier and longer APFSDS with a contextual loss of speed at barrel exit and an increase of speed drop - one more time a design compromise required by the implementation of characteristics useful at improve performances against fast improving protection levels of modern passive armour but lowering efficiency against dynamic protection systems ; employment of DU core : also here the different level of adiabatic shear band formation, representing an advantage in the tunnelling action against majority of dense materials of multilayered passive armour, is linked, to the other side, to significantly lower threshold for plastic deformation and an higher tendency at tangential particle ablation and mass loss, one more time characteristics “aiding” the defeating mechanism of heavy ERA .

At the end of day we can assert that, at the contrary of what commonly repeated in low level speculations, several features of KE round design implemented in the latest APFSDS rounds show physical capabilities the efficiency of which are at the exact antipodes for interactions with multilayered passive armours or modern ERA dynamic protection systems; therefore the most rational option remaining to the designers remain only to optimize the KE round for the best performances and penetration capabilities against composite and spaced passive armour considering that : ERA tiles never cover the entire surface of a MBT , almost always them work only for a single APFSDS hit in a particular spot and that several MBT don’t employ them at all.


3) K-5’s versions or modernizations and level of protection .

Kontakt-5 ERA has received in the years only secondary modifications (mostly aimed at reduce the required explosive charge , geometry and specific arrangement of the system for a specific platform and a moderate retarding of rear plate reaction sequence ), but the fundamental of the system are remain unchanged .
What is more interesting is point out ,as already exposed in other mine intervention, the substantial difference between the export version of K-5 offered aboard ,with a capability to increase the level of protection of existing passive armour of 1,2 [ 20% ] against Kinetic Energy rounds and 1,7 -1,8 [70 %] against Chemical Energy rounds and ,conversely, the last Russian internal version with claimed capabilities in specialized publications of about 1,5 -1,6 against KE [50-60%] (equal or better than the actual performances of Relikt ERA now offered for export !) and 2 [100%] against Chemical Energy rounds.

For render much clear the actual point make and those previously exposed ,i find that an article from "Tehnika i Voorujenie" of November 2006 by Colonel S. Tupitsyn and A. Tarasenco can be truly enlightening (edit note : appear that Cyber has almost magically mentioned the same article i have pointed out while i was writing ,in any istance with my link you can read it entirely in first person and with it, hundreds of others - )

Please go at this link and download in PDF the issue n 11 of 2006 and open at pag 10-15 (in link format it don't work here : simply copy and paste)



publ.lib.ru/ARCHIVES/T/''Tehnika_i_voorujenie''/_''Tehnika_i_voorujenie''_2006_.html


Some interesting informations from the article on internal russian versions of notorious systems and some westrn ones that someone would find surprising :

1) The gun shooted 9M119M1 has a penetration power of 900 mm RHA against not ERA equiped target , in the computations of the developers more than sufficient for penetrate and destroy modern version od Leopard-2 and Abrams

2) The increase resistance to armour level offered by internal Kontakt-5 ERA is,as previously mentioned, 1,5 - 1,6 against KE penetrators and 2 against CE ammunitions.

3) Is present a table with the velocity drop of several russian and western APDS (3BM42,3BM42M, DM53 from L44 and L55 gun, M829A2 )

4) Protection level of M1 Abrams of 1980 against APDS round was about 350-380 mm of RHA and 500 mm for the M1A1 vesrion

5) APFSDS with a minimum guaranteed penetration level of 300 mm RHA at 60 degrees at 2 km (therefore about 600 mm at usual penetration route length) was already introduced in Russian armoured forces.

6) In a report by L. Mann in "Deutsche Airspace" of 1993 on tests effectuated on T-72M1 resulted a frontal turret armour level of 420-480 mm against the best 105-120 mm Federal Republic of Germany rounds available at the time.

7) An M1 Abrams had a frontal projection more than 25% bigger than a T-72 -5,1m2 against 4 m2- (do you remember the question of PtH in mobile engagement at 2000m + range?)

The level of frontal protection of the Soviet T-72B (likely like those tested by L Ness and M. Held after Germany reunification) was 550 mm RHA against APFSDS increased at more than 750 mm against APFSDS when fitted with K-5 ERA !!

9) Semiactive baffle plates and ceramic layers with high tensile proprieties are employed in T-90. Even more advanced fillers was implemented in the welded turretts of domestic T-90 and on export T-90S for India .

10) In several tests conducted in front of Indian delegation using latest foreign munitions of the M829A2 type conducted from 250 meters against T-90S devoid of the normal built-in reactive armor the turrett resulted completely impentrable !! (that can give an idea of the level of protection reached by modern russian 10 layer composite passive/semiactive armour in the frontal sector and aid us also to avoid to remain surprised in front of the figures for armour level -850 mm against APFSDS and 1200 against CE - provided for frontal sector of the new export T-90MS ).
That absurd resiliency to enemy fire (systematically proved by Russian MBT any time live tests was conducted in the past on any not-monkey model specimen....with good peace of ignorant claims of "tanks not designed to sustain hits" !!! ) resulted ,at the end, as one of the most crucial selling point for T-90S MBT to India.

11) Even only tyhr physical thickness of T-90 turrrett armor is in the range of 70-95 cm ,with 45 cm in the firing port area, a Leopard -2A5 show a physical thickness for the same area of 65 cm and 35 cm in the area of gun mantlet

Good reading

Excelent find

BTW, the link for the T&V archive you posted doesn't work for me...this one does

http://publ.lib.ru/ARCHIVES/T/%27%27Tehnika_i_voorujenie%27%27/

Is there any information available about domestic T-90A armour and export variant of it ? As in how much degradation of armour do they do for export compared to domestic ?

IMO, there isn't any difference between the T-90S and T-90A in armour protection....the welded turret with improved armour for the T-90 was made as a result of the Indian contract

Simply copy and paste the link ; for some strange reason the link format here give some problem.


In any instance good reading .

Mindstorm wrote:Please go at this link and download in PDF the issue n 11 of 2006 and open at pag 10-15 (in link format it don't work here : simply copy and paste)



publ.lib.ru/ARCHIVES/T/''Tehnika_i_voorujenie''/_''Tehnika_i_voorujenie''_2006_.html

Thanks Mindstorm , the whole article is so very interesting with diagrams and tables etc but unfortunately we cannot use translator on the pdf or even cut copy to translate as its just an image of pdf.

Can some one tell me how can we translate the page in English , its is quite comprehensive for it to be missed.

Mindstorm as always good post , My vote for it

You might not like this, but it is treated as an image by Adobe Acrobat Reader... the free reader program.

What you want is the full Adobe Acrobat program which allows many more features.

A while back I bought the CD with Mil Parade issues from 1996 to about 1999 on it and it was very hard to find the interesting bits to be honest.

I got an early copy of Acrobat from a friend and all of a sudden there was full search ability and the CD was much more useful.

Yes Garry I am aware the normal acrobat read just treats it as image making copying pasting of its contents to a translator impossible.

If there was a way to copy paste the contents/word to a translator it would have been very useful and much better an english version of the article becuase it seems to be an excellent write up by military authors

Austin have you gived a look to the first scientifical publication (when i find the link to the second i will add it to mine previous post) i have pointed out on the interaction betweeen long rod penetratrors and ERA defeating mechanism ?

It can be very useful for debunk one time for all the low level ,ignorant claims (mainly triggered by that curse called Wikipedia...) sustaining that the new western KE ammunitions (in particular M829A2 and M829A3),with ever increasing L/D ratio, DU core and lower speed, was conceived to better defeat Russian K-5-like dynamic protections after the famous tests of '90 on the "impenetrable" T-72B : a pure, simply idiocy .

In reality ,how well proved just some week ago by the figures of passive frontal armour protection achieved by the new export T-90MS ,the increase in L/D ratio (anyhow a constant trend present in APFSDS's design from well before the tests of M. Held and L. Ness) is rendered absolutely necessary to match the rapid improvements of passive and semiactive multilayerd armours.

To obtain a KE rod more resistant to heavy ERA defeating mechanism,in fact, would be necessary to significantly increase its diameter and shorten its length; in this way you would obtain both the improvement of penetrator's resistance to side-force-induced plastic deformations and to compress the time of interaction with the ERA's flying plates (other important elements would be augment the speed of the round and not employ DU core rods )
The problem,of course, would be that a similarly constructed rod would be significantly less efficient in penetrate the passive armor behind ERA tiles ; pratically those design solutions are mutually exclusives and anyone can image on what of those solutions falled the choice of KE round's designers.