Russian Naval Construction Plans and Numbers

The money of the Mistrals may not be enough, but would be a good basis for the first stages of the three projects. And this is the part where the works for the shipyards are done. To use the money of the Mistrals by this way would mean to use the money of the Mistral project assuring that Russia has shipyards for the biggest warships in the future. And later these shipyards would be compatible for other types of big warships if needed.

The campaign in Syria is showing two things related:

- The weaknesses of the Naval Aviation (basically in form of accidents).
- The weaknesses of the current manned combat helicopters as a military concept (basically in form of warfare damaged and destroyed by the enemy).

The question of the accidents of the Naval Aviation is of different nature and surely would require some organizational change. I tend to think that the Naval Aviation needs to reach the standards of the Aerospace Forces (training, standards for the aircraft and helicopter fleet,...), and for it, the most logical option would be a merge of structures, of pilots, of training procedures, of aircraft and helicopter fleets, of maintenance programs, of procurement and decommission standards,...

The difference that we see in Syria between combat helicopters and aircrafts would exist also between naval helicopters and naval aircrafts. Like the combat way of the helicopters is more dangerous and are easier to hit, the helicopters will likely go unmanned, but with it, their weakness to enemy hits likely will continue, if not increase, because unmanned weapons can take even more risks.

As military concept, the difference between an aircraft carrier and an helicopter carrier, is that while the first can operate with both, the second only can operate with helicopters and small VTOL. The problem is that changes on combat helicopters are coming, and today an helicopter carrier can not be designed to operate only with a type of combat helicopters that is going to decline. A modern helicopter carrier must be designed for the new type of small unmanned combat helicopters and VTOL aircrafts that is likely to emerge in the next 10-15 years. But we know not today the exact form of these aircrafts, then it is difficult to design now an effective helicopter carrier for the next 50 years. The timing to begin with a project of helicopter carrier now is difficult, is not right.

The alone reasons to consider that Russia must not order in the short term the first unit of some of the three cited projects:

- Project 23000 E of new aircraft carrier.
- Project 23560 of new destroyer/cruiser.
- Project 21956 of new destroyer.

would be two:

- to continue with the reduction of the fleet without a replacement of the oldest ships of these cathegories (project 61/01090 destroyer and project 1134B cruiser).
- to think that Russia need not these types of ships in the future, and as consequence the current biggest ships must be retired without replacement.

Looking at the construction of new ships it is necessary to take into account the model that Russia is adopting for its Navy.

At this point, Russia reduced its fleet, but has not eliminated no-one of the biggest types of ships. When Russia is finnishing the reduction of the fleet, is unlikely they eliminate totally the aircraft carriers, the cruisers or the destroyers of its fleet, because these types of ships remain actual as military concept. It means Russia will likely go forward with the new projects for these types of ships.

Roughly, not the exact numbers, Russia is going to a model with 250 active ships, including warships, minesweepers, amphibious ships, submarines and well armed boats (missile boats). Also the trend is toward an aditional 25% of ships in the reserve. Like 62 ships. For a total of a 20% of the fleet in the reserve. This reserve with the oldest ships likely will become an aditional mobile fleet for operations like this of Syria.

In terms of ship replacement and construction, for a complete cycle of reposition of around 50 years, it means the ships would be like 40 years in active service plus 10 more in the reserve. A stable rythm to build this amount of ships would be in 62-63 ships of these types by decade, which means 6 ships by year, with 7 some year. Taking into account the list of ships of thses types in construction in Russia today, it means that Russia has ships in construction for a decade (likely some of the list will go to export), and more taking into account the low retirement rate of ships expected until 2025.

In terms of geographical distribution of the fleet, Russia is going roughly to a model of 100 active combat ships in the Artic Ocean, 50 in the Pacific, 50 in the Baltic and 50 in the Black+Caspian seas. The aditional 62 reserve ships would be likely equally divided between the Pacific and the Black+Caspian seas, with 31 each because they are the closest places to the likely scenarios for operations outside the Russian borders like the operation in Syria.

And in terms of types of ships, Russia is going roughly to a model with 70+18 (25% aditional in the reserve) warships, 50+12 minesweepers, 50+12 amphibious ships, 55+14 submarines, 25+6 missile boats. In this case it is possible to see in the future missile boats replaced by bigger warships (corvettes or frigates).

Finally it is likely that the 7 ships of these types captured to Ukraine that Russia has, be included in this scheme in the future.

This is roughly the model of Navy that Russia is adopting today. To understand the model of fleet that Russia is adopting today is necessary to understand the plans of construction of new ships, because the construction plans will be in agreement with the model. I expect very few new projects that are not in construction today adopted by Russia before 2025. I expect very few new order of ships of these types in the next 5-7 years. Basically I only expect to be ordered the first unit of the Project 23000 of new aircraft carrier, the first unit of the Project 23560 of new cruiser/destroyer, and the first unit of the Project 21956 of new destroyer.

Auxiliary ships, including low armed patrol boats, would be appart of this overview. For them, I think the reduction process is not finnished, and the Syrian campaign will help to see the real needs of the Russian Navy today.

GarryB wrote:The Ka-52Ks would probably be much better than any naval model Yak in a viable operational context.

With AESA radar and R-77s they would be quite interesting... though I think the low speed low altitude launch limitations would mean R-27E models or even R-37M might be warranted to get a useful range performance.

AA missiles from helicopters would have very, very poor performance and i very much doubt any kind of wide scale deployment of such. At best they will keep carrying as they always did Strela/Igla/Verba etc derivates.

Obviously they wont be replacing MiG-29Ks any time soon... but they will have the capability to carry R-73s and R-77s which would be effective to 20-30km or so at medium altitude.

This would be sufficient to protect a small group of ships from some anti ship threats.

There is however an obvious need for a helicopter carrier to support naval infantry forces and also a fixed wing carrier type to support all other naval vessels when beyond the reach of land based support.

I think they will be clever and make these vessels multi purpose ships to increase their flexibility with the limits on fleet size and production capacity.

I think their new fixed wing carriers will have a lot of UAVs for patrol and other missions that don't require pilots on board to increase their capabilities.

Apparently the Zelenodorsk shipyard has received an order for an additional 3 BUYAN missile ships.
That will increase the total for this class to 12.

Add to that the 18 KARAKURTs building/on order and you have some nice firepower.

eehnie wrote:With the money of the Mistrals, it would be very interesting for Russia to order the first unit of the 3 projects:

- Project 23000 E of new aircraft carrier.
- Project 23560 of new destroyer/cruiser.
- Project 21956 of new destroyer.

building the necessary infrastructure for it.

Interesting links with specifications of the projects:

http://www.deagel.com/Carrier-and-Landing-Ships/Project-23000E_a003273001.aspx
http://www.deagel.com/Destroyers-and-Cruisers/Project-23560_a003082001.aspx
http://www.deagel.com/Destroyers-and-Cruisers/Project-21956_a002084001.aspx

PapaDragon wrote:

TheArmenian wrote:Apparently the Zelenodorsk shipyard has received an order for an additional 3 BUYAN missile ships.
That will increase the total for this class to 12.

Add to that the 18 KARAKURTs building/on order and you have some nice firepower.

Okay, I definitely did not see that one coming.

So how does this relate to engine snafu?

Is it possible that they were satisfied enough with Chinese engines to resume production of this type?

I commented on this ages ago said they will be building 15 buyan's in total.

Also They will be building more than 18 Karakuts, from what data I have seen it's.

18 In pella alone, Three in Sea and another five built by ZVD.

PapaDragon wrote:

SeigSoloyvov wrote:
Also They will be building more than 18 Karakuts, from what data I have seen it's.

18 In pella alone, Three in Sea and another five built by ZVD.

Agreed. Came to same number a while back when looking at number of AK-176MA guns ordered so far:

https://www.russiadefence.net/t1032p475-naval-weapon-systems-technology#190009

Karakurts being built now are just first batch. This will definitely be very numerous ship class.

SeigSoloyvov wrote:I commented on this ages ago said they will be building 15 buyan's in total.

Good catch. What I can't figure out is how they dealt with engine problem. It was described as deal breaker back in the day. Whole class was put on hold and they have two ships still waiting for engines in Zelenodolsk and clogging up space.  

So what exactly happened? Did they find local replacement, decided to stick with Chinese engines for rest of the series or did several original German-made engines somehow got ''accidentally'' delivered to them?  

They always planned to build this many, that said chinese engines from what intel I have seen. The deal was never "off" just delayed,

Not much of a catch tho, I merely exist in a place in the military where I can get access to such data of the Russians. That said I got a Dam and some ISIS guyts to "play" with soon peace for weeks!

Flurry of naval shipbuilding activity in Russia these days:

Ivan Papanin armed icebreaker (pr. 23550)has been laid down yesterday.
Vladimir Emelyanov minesweeper (pr. 12700) has just been laid down today.
Grad missile ship (pr. 21631 Buyan-M) will be laid down on the 24th.

Also upcoming this spring/summer:

Gremyashy corvette (pr. 20385) will be launched
Sovershenny corvette (pr. 20380) will be commissioned
Admiral Makarov frigate(pr. 11536) will be commissioned
Admiral Gorshkov frigate will be commisioned
Ivan Gren landing ship will be commissioned

TheArmenian wrote:Also upcoming this spring/summer

Gremyashy corvette (pr. 20385) will be launched
Sovershenny corvette (pr. 20380) will be commissioned
Admiral Makarov frigate(pr. 11536) will be commissioned
Admiral Gorshkov frigate will be commisioned
Ivan Gren landing ship will be commissioned

Also, 2 improved kilos for pacific fleet will be laid down this year.
Vyshniy Volochek [BUYAN-M] will be commisioned for caspian or black sea fleet this year.
Maybe first project 22160 Vasily Bykov also in 2017.

Btw does anyone know if the last two improved kilos for bsf will stay in the baltic or will be transferred later.

A Whole Navy is Being Built



To be exact, 52 ships and submarines are under various stages of construction .
In my list below, I am not including vessels that are:
- under 500T displacement. I am also not including tankers, resupply ships, spy ship etc.
- going to be laid down later on this year (such as the 7th Yasen, etc.)
- under sea trial (Adm. Gorshkov, Adm. Makarov, Ivan Gren, Sovershenny etc.)
- reserve vessels that are being modernized to be brought back to service (Adm. Nakhimov etc.)
- intended for the coast guard

Here is the breakdown of what is under construction:

5 Project 995 Borei class strategic submarines (all building)
5 Project 885 Yasen class attack submarines (1 launched, 4 building)
1 Project 09852 Belgorod special submarine(building)
1 Project 09851 Khabarovsk special submarine (building)
2 Project 667 Lada class submarines (building)
3 Project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov class frigates (1 launched, 2 building)
3 Project 11536 class Admiral Grigorovich class frigates (1 launched, 2 building)
1 Project 20386 Drezki class corvette (building)
2 Project 20385 Gremyashy class corvettes (building)
5 Project 20380 Steregushy class corvettes (building)
5 Project 22160 Vasily Bykov class patrol ships (building)
5 Project 21631 Buyan-M class missile ships (1 launched, 4 building)
7 Project 22800 Karakurt class missile ships (building)
2 Project 12421 Tarantul class missile ships (building)
1 Project 11711 class landing ship (buiding)
1 Project 23550 Ivan Papanin class artic patrol ship (building)
3 Project 12700 Alexandrit class Minesweepers (building)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
52 in total.

Furthermore, that number is going to increase by a few more units that are going to be laid down later this year (2 Project 636 Kilo class, the second Papanin, more Karakurts, etc.).
By the beginning of 2018 the number of ships under various stages of construction will be in excess of 60.
None of the above ships will enter service this year. They will be commissioned starting next year onwards.  Starting with 2019, we should expect a commissioning rate of minimum 10 per year for the foreseeable future.

The recon. (spy) ship IVAN KHURS has been launched today at your favourite shipyard (Severnaya Werf)

https://sdelanounas.ru/blogs/93530/

https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20170516/1494383689.html

This is the second ship of the project 18280.

It will enter service before end 2017 together with the Admiral Gorshkov frigate and the supply ship Elbrus, all built at the same shipyard.

The project 20385 Gremyashy corvettes should be launched during this summer too.

I will let you guess what ships will be laid down at Severnaya later on this year.

PapaDragon wrote:

TheArmenian wrote:..............
This is the second ship of the project 18280.
It will enter service before end 2017 together with the Admiral Gorshkov frigate and the supply ship Elbrus, all built at the same shipyard.
The project 20385 Gremyashy corvettes should be launched during this summer too.

I will let you guess what ships will be laid down at Severnaya later on this year.

OK, you know I suck at naval topics and I am curious as hell. So which on will be laid down next???

Your guess is as good (or bad) as mine.

My guess:
One more Project 18280 spy ship will be laid down (they are planning to have 4 of these ships) plus one Project 20386 (Derzky) class frigate.
When the third Gorshkov class is launched towards the end of the year, they will lay down the first super-Gorshkov. The Navy will suffice itself with 4 Gorshkovs only. Super-Gorshkov is what they are looking forward to.

But I could be wrong

Vympel shipyard in Rybinsk (Yaroslavl region) is being modernized.
This shipyard produces a number of types of civilian and military ships (including the MANGUST class craft).

Currently it is completing the construction of the last two TARANTUL (Molniya) class missile corvettes fro the Russian Navy. These two are expected to enter service next year.

https://sdelanounas.ru/blogs/93643/

Since the War in Donbass, emerged for Russia a problem with sanctions to foreign contries. It has been a problem of limited impact for Russia, because the country always has been working its defense industry, leaving little room to dependence of foreign imports.

In the refered to the Russian Navy, there is some impact on components (like engines,...), that Russia is working to eliminate, but only a few complete ships are of foreign origin, and all are auxiliary ships, not combat ships. Obviously the position of these ships of foreign origin is under question. Likely these ships will be out of the Russian Navy in the short term, but the question is what to do with them? Also we can give an opinion here, using one of the tools of this forum, the polls.

It is necessary to note what is considered a foreign ship. Ships of Sovietic/Russian design are not considered foreign ships, despite to be built sometimes outside of Russia or even out of the Soviet Union, in countries that were in good terms with Russia and the Soviet Union at the time.

In the other side, foreign designs are considered foreign ships, because it would be more problem for repairs and to have spare parts, even in the case of partial production in Russia or the Soviet Union.

Also it is necessary to note that shipborne boats and midget submarines are not considered independent ships, are considered components of a bigger unit. If they are of foreign origin, they are treated as foreign components.

Taking it into account, the list of foreign ships in the Russian Navy is low today. 41 of the 1025 ships of the Russian Navy (including the 18 combat and auxiliary ships captured to Ukraine and the 13 combat ships of the Russian Coast Guard). It means only a 4.00% of the total fleet of the Russian Navy.

Some reference with pictures of the foreign ships:

Dry-cargo ships purchased for the operation in Syria: 1985 Dvinitsa-50 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/54458/
March 31, 2017

Dry-cargo ships purchased for the operation in Syria: 1985 Vologda-50 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/54485/
April 12, 2017

Dry-cargo ships purchased for the operation in Syria: 1996 Kyzyl-60 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/55363/
March 31, 2017

Dry-cargo ships purchased for the operation in Syria: 1987 Kazan-60 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/16128/
March 31, 2017

Type Dora: 1941 Istra http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/6223/ (Captured to Germany in WWII)
October 12, 2017

Type PPEK-30: 19?? PK-16030 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/10295/
March 25, 2013

Type PPEK-30: 1959 PK-103130 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/40785/
January 20, 2017

Type Dubna: 1974 Dubna http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/68854/ http://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:930618/mmsi:-7347471/imo:7347471/vessel:DUBNA
June 20, 2015

Type Dubna: 1975 Irkut http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/26060/
March 12, 2014

Type Dubna: 1979 Pechenga http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/6375/
March 22, 2016

Type Paltus: 1980 PK-1150 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/45784/
November 27, 2014

Project REF-675: 1982 Kama http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/12009/
May 13, 2016 (black ship in the center)

Project REF-675: 1982 Vyazma http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42747/
October 23, 2015

Project D-9030: 1976 PK-119025 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/4926/
September 14, 2015

Project D-9021: 198? PK-33016 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/34964/
June 10, 2018 (floating crane after the ship)

Project SK620: 1978 Belomorets http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/6308/
June 1, 2017

Project SK620: 1980 PSK-405 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/10392/
December 22, 2016

Project SK620: 19?? PSK-2017 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/34799/
November 13, 2011

Project SK620: 19?? PSK-1304 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/44610/
July 30, 2017

Project SK620: 1983 EK-1412 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42817/
July 27, 2017

Project SK620: 1985 PSK-1562 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/56311/
July 12, 2017

Project SK620: 19?? PSK-1556 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/60223/
April 23, 2016

Project SK620: 19?? PSK-302 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/73679/
July 30, 2017

Project REF-100: 1985 GS-525 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/41469/
February 17, 2017

Project REF-100: 1985 GS-526 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/46939/
April 4, 2015

Project N3291: 1988 RB-346 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/1398/
October 4, 2017

Project N3291: 1988 RB-347 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/2053/
August 15, 2009

Project N3291: 1988 RB-348 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/1631/
May 27, 2017

Project R-5757: 1989 Nikolay Chiker http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/29166/
September 18,2015

Project R-5757: 1989 Fotiy Krylov http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/39062/
March 17, 2016

Project UK-3: 1982  UK-115 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/10829/
July 26,2015

Project UK-3: 19??  UK-162 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/10827/
March 5, 2015

Project UK-3: 1983  UK-712 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/6464/
June 6, 2010 (ship 229)

Project UK-3: 1990  UK-164 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/38120/
October 18, 2013 (ship 164)

Project UK-3: 19??  UK-288 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/38121/
October 18, 2013 (ship 288)

Project V92: 1983 Evgenij Gorigledzhan http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/59302/ (Modified in 2016 to a Project 02670 ship)
2016 or 2017

Project V92: 1990 Kalar http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/24461/
March 14, 2016

Project D-9040 V-02: 1989 PK-128035 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/47028/
May 10, 2016

Project V-820: 19?? RB-33 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/26210/
June 22, 2017

Type IC16MII: 2011 P-834 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42778/
May 15, 2017

Type IC16MII: 2011 P-835 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42785/
October 19, 2016

With the problems with foreign material and spare parts, it seems logical that Russia want not to keep these ships in the Armed Forces. An exit would be logical, and taking into account the difference on age and state of the ships, different solutions for them are likely.

In the case of the newest ships and the ships in better condition, an option would be to transfer them to non-military agencies of the gouvernment, that can be related with security issues, but without being part of the Russian Armed Forces. Surely, without being the alone option, the most obvious case would be the Russian Coast Guard, that has itself hundreds of ships of different size and role.

Also there are options that mean to keep not some ships. it would be possible a sale of some ship to some buyer, local or foreign, or even a transfer as aid to some foreign ally. In the case of the oldest ships and the ships in worst condition, a likely option would be decommission and scrapping process.

What would you do? (Interesting to check the photographies in the link to every ship).

The sactions to Russia really had not a big impact. This topic covers the refered to the sea material, but also has been very low in other cases. The most significative case maybe the cancellation of the contract for the 2 Mistral Amphibious ships. Even this case more than a problem, is an opportunity for Russia to build the own capability of developing and constructing of the necessary ships in every segment.

In the current situation, I expect Russia rejects the foreign material present in their own Armed Forces. Doing it Russia would prove that their defense level and standards depend not of foreign material, and would avoid external critizism and propaganda about the damage of the foreign sanctions and about the dependence of their defense industry of foreign supplies.

Those are support ships. They are build and used. It's not important from where they come if they do the job. I don't know who build them but it's probably former USSR countries. I don't think they will sell lot of them to US or NATO so they should be nice to Russian navy because if they don't they will end up like Ukrainians, replaced by local russian production and they will sell 0 more ships.

They are not hard to build but russia is focusing on armed ships. They are just pieces of metal with 0 technology. They needed some of them fast for Syria but if they want to replace them they can easily make them.

Moreover, once you have them you won't depend on the country who sold it to you like it is the case with armed ships which need missiles to be replace or maintenance or electronic upgrade.

In this case no-one of the ships mentioned was produced in Russia or the Soviet Union. It were produced in Finland, Sweden, Germany, Austria, Poland Turkey and China.

To be not Russian designs can create some problems. As example, it makes less likely that Russian spare parts can be compatible, and to produce them specifically for these ships would be more expensive, even too expensive in some case.

As commented in the poll, there is also a chance to keep the cited ships demilitarized, by transference to other gouvernmental agencies. It would mean no economic impact for the Russian treasury. It makes less likely that Russia keeps them in their Armed Forces after 2025. But until now no-one has been taking this option in the poll for no-one of the groups cited (in case of not options selected the system allows not to submit a vote).

I expect Russia continues using foreign material for civil purposes, I agree with you on this, but at this point is not likely that Russia keeps foreign material in the Russian Armed Forces, despite to be auxiliary material, because there countries ready to use it to discredit the Russian Armed Forces. Russia only will be able to make evident (without discussion) their lack of dependence of foreign material just retiring it.

Even US navy uses foreign ships. Sometimes it's better to buy instead of making. If they want to make by themselves they will need to invest money for design and to build and test ... while they can buy Something already proven. I don't think spare parts are a problem for civilian ships. Navy can buy them with a false company in a banana republic if they are under sanctions ... There are lot of companies that are Under African flags to pay less taxes in their own countries, it won't be difficult to do so.

What they should do however is to order them with a plateform to operate the new Tor variant tested on the Grigorovitch. It would give them same air def capabilities as Udaloy destroyer and could protect themselves or a add another line of def to a battlegroup (on a tanker for exemple).

The trend in Russia in the last years is to produce, to replace foreign material by own designs. We can see it clearly in the case of the components. In the case of heavy material there is a lack of orders, and even the cancellation of some order (like in the case of the Mistral ships).

The current foreign ships in the Russian Armed forces, are of the Sovietic period except the last, and are not difficult to replace for Russia, like we can see in the previous list. They are very generic ships in the refered to their role. Even, some of them likely do not need replacement.

With the spare parts it is possible that these ships give some problem. As example, if it is necessary a replacement of the engine, it is possible that a Russian alternative do not meet the dimmensional requirements of the place where it must go, or can not be connected to other parts because differences of design. It is likely that some spare parts for these ships that are not common in Russia must be done (designed and fabricated) for the reparation. Sometimes may be easy, but other times it can become expensive, even too expensive (lack of important spare parts can send some ship to scrapping).