Russian Integrated Air Defence Systems

Mindstorm , indeed for vityaz increasing other performance parameters as you have listed is of more importance then simple raw range and altitude.

The way they are designing Morfei and Vityaz where there is exponential increase in the number of interceptor carried makes me believe that russians believe in future saturation attack with PGM and Decoys will be the norm then an exception. Hence multiple missile with multiple track/engage capability

The way they are designing Morfei and Vityaz where there is exponential increase in the number of interceptor carried makes me believe that russians believe in future saturation attack with PGM and Decoys will be the norm then an exception. Hence multiple missile with multiple track/engage capability

Confident neutralization of saturating attacks with stand-off PGM and, even more, cruise missiles is indeed a top priority for any modern IADS and any modern strategist consider this factor if consider a full scale conventional war scenario against a very advanced enemy.
The reason for that is very simple : if you have an extensive IADS capable to neutralize saturation attacks by part of stand-off weapons (or render them practically impossible to realize or too costly/time-expensive) and your enemy has no a similar capability your can employ your stand-off offensive means to degrade progressively and exponentially faster the military capabilities your enemy literally dismembering its most important assets (C4 centers, Airfields, Radar stations, production facilities etc...) in th first days of conflict ; a similar IADS become very quickly ,by far, the most important deciding factor for achieve victory in a simialr conventional war scenario.

Note : Employment of decoys,instead, represents still a notable problem only for outdated SAM systems or legacy IADS ; in a modern IADS the enormous amount of angle of illumination of each enemy target, the different radar band of those tracking systems illuminating them ,the extensive presence of optronic/IR tracking systems ,the enormous data processign capabilities of the command vehicles (capable to precisely analyse kinematic and manoeuvring patterns and limits of each object in the air space and even reaction to SAMs in potential interception trajectories with them )and capability the share in real time positional data of the decoys and real aircraft , render an effcient employment of air delivered decoys completely impossible to realize.

I would like to ask about one important segment of IADS, which is not represented in medias. It's about visual observation posts, which network is active in war time. In the past visual observation post was manned by two or small group of soldiers, equipped with a par of binoculars and a field telephone or radio station to report to command post. Is Russian air force equip air defense units with more sophisticated day/night optical observation devices with laser range finders and with data link to automated command posts to automatically send target position to CP. This one could be similar to those which artillery use.

Mindstorm wrote:Note : Employment of decoys,instead, represents still a notable problem only for outdated SAM systems or legacy IADS ; in a modern IADS the enormous amount of angle of illumination of each enemy target, the different radar band of those tracking systems illuminating them ,the extensive presence of optronic/IR tracking systems ,the enormous data processign capabilities of the command vehicles (capable to precisely analyse kinematic and manoeuvring patterns and limits of each object in the air space and even reaction to SAMs in potential interception trajectories with them )and capability the share in real time positional data of the decoys and real aircraft , render an effcient employment of air delivered decoys completely impossible to realize.

Actually my idea of decoy was like Israel Delilah system , the idea being to saturate the AD with cheap decoys that is nothing but cruise missile but lacks the warhead and expensive sensor that make up cruise missile and can emmulate various flying targets like fighter or others in terms of RCS , making way for expensive fighter and cruise missile to get in while AD keeps engaging decoys.

http://www.iaf.org.il/5642-35312-en/IAF.aspx

The thing is that dumb cruise missile like decoys even if they have the RCS signature of a fighter can be destroyed with old legasy missiles... in the case of Russia all those SA-3s... they have thousands.

Plus friendly aircraft can engage with old stock IR guided AAMs and guns as an outer ring of defence with other SAMs and guns offering layers of defence... plus the launch sites of the decoys can be quickly determined and dealt with... even a fake cruise missile needs a platform large enough to carry and launch a cruise missile.

The question i wanted to ask is how would you know a target approaching you is a dumb decoy or smart cruise missile , the radars wont tell you its its dumb or smart , the only way to find out is to fly an aircraft and check its visually for decoy or cruise missile.

So a system like Vityaz would take all threat approaching at it as a smart cruise missile and hit it with volley of missile , now consider this you fire 10 smart cruise missile with 30 dumb decoy , you still have 40 targets to deal with.

BTW do they still use SA-3 and SA-2 in russia or a modernised variant of it ?

Actually my idea of decoy was like Israel Delilah system , the idea being to saturate the AD with cheap decoys that is nothing but cruise missile but lacks the warhead and expensive sensor that make up cruise missile

Austin.... Deliah ? This is your idea of an efficient air launched decoy ? May be i was not clear enough , i don't talk of an attack against '60 years SAM systems of a third world nation i was taking into examination what are the real menaces of a modern extensive multilayered IAD of a world level powerful nation.
Some point on the subject :

1) Deliah ,obviously, against a multispectral multi overlapping modern IAD could at maximum be employed as a cruise missile decoy ,but also in this role it would result ridiculously inefficient (see down).

2) Deliah lack the range -300 km at best, in the dubious declarations of some IAF officials- for an efficient employment not against an up to date but even only a '80 year IAD. For comparison first version of ADM-160 ,which had a range of 465 km, was refused in 2001 by USAF for lack of sufficient range for an efficient employment against even an outdated IAD of the time (in fact any early warning or long range surveillance radar would have get the aircraft carrying ADM-160A much before their release at useful range for loiter in the intended area , with the result that the any unit in the IAD would have marked all the "new" radar tracks originating from the original aircraft and remaining in coherent formation with them as decoys, engaging only the original aircraft.

3) Deliah lack the speed not only for employment as a credible aircraft's decoy against anything except antediluvian '60 and '70 years export SAM systems (with an average speed of Mach 0,45 it cannot match intruding air squadron speed becoming practically not usable ...unless your intention is to attack an air spaces defended mostly by export versions of SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 ,like for Israel's instance...), but also for match the cruise speed of the slower subsonic cruise missiles operative worldwide since '80 years.

4) The previously mentioned very low speed of Deliath and its linked high travelling time to target - about 38 minutes for reach a distance of 330 km - render it also an horribly inefficient and very "frail" cruise missile. A similar low speed, in fact, allow enemy Air Force's aircraft (and here i don't talk of highly supersonic specialized interceptor platforms ,such as Mig-31, but literally any legacy fighter aircraft in the class of a F-15/Mig-29/Mirage2000/F-16 etc..) to get all the time of this world to reach an optimal interception's point for the group of Deliah missiles and destroy them quietly with missiles and even gun. Moreover this speed don't only allow even legacy SPAAG systems ,such as Tunguska-M,or not optimized weapons for the task (as Igla-S MANPAD or the new Kornet-M or even a Vikhr on an helicopter) to engage them with Pk next to 1 -100%- ,but give also the chance to IAD's mobile elements (practically ALL in a modern IAD) to reach the best position to destroy them and to IAD's Electronic Warfare mobile elements ,such as R330-T,R-338-AM ,SPN-30, 1L245 etc.., to have more than the double the time of that at disposition against a typical subsonic cruise missile, to jam or deceive Deliah's uplink and/or guidance .

5) Deliah weight -more than 5 times that of a ADM-160 !!- and volume -it occupy virtually the same space of a typical cruise missile- is too high to be employed as an aerial delivered decoy useful for channel saturation of modern SAM batteries of an up-to-date IAD. Those SAM are capable to engage contemporaneously 2-4 targets for each TELAR present in the battery, therefore 16-32 targets enaged by each single battery of the IAD before an another group of 16-32 are engaged among those survived to Air Forces, EW divisions and not specialized assets positioned in theirs flight pact .
The point is always the same :if your intended enemy's AD is composed mostly by export version of SA-3 and SA-6 batteries capable to engage a single target for battery Deliah offer wonderful capabilities

6) Its warhead is only...30 kg (Jane's indentify Deliah as a light tactical missile) therefore its very poor destructive potential rule completely out its employment against large majority of military assets normally assigned to cruise missiles ; for a weapon which occupy practically the same slot on the delivering aircraft of a "standard" air delivered cruise missiles, faster ,with greater range, more ECM resilient and with warheads of.....several hundreds Kg, this is a big shortcoming .



Austin i was talking of inefficiency against state of the art modern IAD by part of the best air delivered decoys at world , not of a redesigned MQM-74 decoy further adapted by Israeli in ’90 years as very light cruise missile for its specific tactical needs against its neighbour opponents (in particular Syria) .
What is necessary to stress out is that what is good or efficient for Israel in its specific theatre of operation, against its intended enemies and considering the actual force equilibrium in the Middle east maintained artificially “frozen” in the region by major nations through control of type of weapons exported to the players ,become absurd or even comical if inserted in a large scale conventional conflict scenario between world level powers .

Just for let you figure image that : if Syria would be equipped with a very high number of up to date cruise missiles and ballistic missiles (even export versions limited by INF Treaty considering that with 300 Km range you could attack virtually the whole Israeli territory from Syria) even the viability of Air Force’s employment would become questionable ; employing saturating cruise missile attack or ballistic missiles with mixed cluster and penetrating HE warheads would be possible from Syria literally pulverize any single airfield in Israel in a matter of .....MINUTES !!!
For this reason even imaging that Israel,in this "alternative" Middle East ,would be capable to employ its aircraft at least for an initial surprise attack (not identified in time by its enemy from the frantic preparations in the israeli airfields) Israel should capitalize any open slot on its aircraft to carry real cruise missiles ,not decoy (and preferably cruise missiles with the maximum speed and destructive power possible).

Mindstorm while i understand what you are putting across on Deliah , let me ask you this.

1 ) What constitute Decoys in modern terms which any future IAD will have to face ?

2 ) Can a modern IAD like S-400,Vityaz has the capability to differentiate a modern decoy against modern cruise missile , PGM or Aircraft.

If RCS of all 3 are reduced suffeciently and all end up with low RCS , how would a radar of S-400 or Vityaz differentiate decoys against real threat , you might end up dealing with decoys with the same expensive missile that you do for real threat.

So can modern IADS differentiate to the extent that they know which target needs to be engaged with Vityaz say if its F-22 versus decoy that does not need to be engaged or engaged with say a SA-3 ?

I think Mindstorm said it pretty plainly that the two major faults of the decoys is that their range is so short they will need to be deployed within range of the enemy air defence system... which like using a ski mask for a bank robbery... but not putting it on till after you get to the teller and start demanding money.

The second is that their size and cost approaches that of the weapons they are supposed to be simulating... so they actually wont be able to be used in "enormous numbers" without putting a larger percentage of the attacking forces air fleet at risk of being targeted before they launch their missiles.

Another issue is that Pantsir-S1 uses extremely cheap missiles, as does TOR, so any attempt to financially cripple the target is going to be expensive and time consuming... it also assumes that while your aircraft are tied up delivering decoys that your enemy is not gathering his fighters to give your aircraft a reception they wont forget...

Air delivered decoys has found its "window" of maximum popularity in Middle East at beginning of '80 years in particular with the Israeli and American efforts to find a quick solution to the problems posed by the penetrations of export models of '70 years Soviet SAMs in the theatre ( the Yom Kippur conflict was practically the first instance where Air Forces had confronted SAM systems of the same "generation" and all of us know what was the effect of the few batteries of Kvadrat -export SA-6- in this conflict : 75 IAF's aircraft downed in few days on 95 missiles deployed !!!

The solution found , applied a decade later in the 1982 conflict in the Beeka Valley ,also capitalizing the very limited area of action, was to saturate the single engagement channel of SA-6 and possibly also SA-3 batteries , employing in a different way (different at example from the US employment of Teledyne Ryan BQM-34 in Vietnam) theirs pilotless air vehicles decoys -Scout and Mastiff in 1982 - to mantain the SAM crews of the whole air defence of Beeka valley under continual pressure because unable either to share each with the others the data on the air tracks indentified as decoys ,assign theirs engagement to aircrafts or to destroy quickly several of those considered of "dubious nature" ; all of that allowed Israelis to gain the time necessary to avoid or suppress the menaces of the mobile Kwadrat employing very fast reaction suppression weapons - above any others the Israeli surface to surface missile "Wolf" which, contrarely to popular beliefs ,was by far the deadliest weapon against Syrian SAM batteries in the Beeka Valley .


This tactic in particular capitalized at maximum that the export version of the command vehicles of those Kvadrat batteries had a very very limited target's angle-rate signal processing capability and obviously no capability to data sharing with other unities present both in the Air Defence divisions or in Air Force squadrons.

The main Kvadrat's vulnerability anyhow remained above all the single engagement channel as brightly identified by the same Klub designer Ardalion Rastov already in.....1971 !!! in its survey on the two Kvadrat's regiments in Egypt !!!
Practically ,in spite two years later those two incomplete regiments of export versions -Kvadrat- ,anyhow vastly inferior to theirs Soviet domestic version, was capable to inflict in few days almost crippling losses to IAF , Phazotron was already developing BUK completed in 1977 and introduced into service an year later ,showing : TELARs allowing to engage contemporaneously one target for each launcher in the battery,almost half of SA-6's reaction time, greatly increased range and altitude limits, over four time the SA-6's jamming rejection factor and enormously better signal processing capabilities.

Outside this particular time window, the efficiency of decoys against air defence begun progressively to shrink dramatically following the introduction of modern radars showing not only signal processing capabilities several order of magnitude greater than those present in the "golden age" of decoy's employment ,but also capability to share and cross-validate in real times the information's flow coming from early warning radars, AWACS, Interceptor's, ELS, SAM's Optronic/IR tracking assets and SAM radars covering the air space from dozen of different emission angles and recently also in different bands , elements that ,at the end of the day, quickly came to the point to render physically impossible to design an air delivered decoy capable to mimic an aircraft against similar modern IAD.

I repeat myself ,the point is that at today the bulk of the air defence systems operated by the typical nation attacked by NATO and its allies is still composed at 99% by export downgraded versions of '60 and '70 URSS Air defence systems therefore for western nations is important to retain those cost-efficient counters against theirs most likely opponents and update them periodically in response to the adjournment programs carried-out on those outdated systems by theirs operators.

Sujoy wrote:
Integrated air defense is an extremely expensive proposition which on this date only the US has  with  Russia and China taking steps towards it . Here in Asia apart from China only Singapore is working towards a limited integrated air defense.

Russia taking steps towards integrated air-defense ?!?        This is blasphemy.

Russia basically invented air-defense integration and first applied it in combat. It`s level of integration of air-defense is simply

none comparable with any other nation in the world including US and China.

Viktor wrote:Russia taking steps towards integrated air-defense ?!? This is blasphemy.

Not really because in the modern battlefield C4ISR is very much an integral part of air defense . This is where work is still in progress in both Russia & China .

Sujoy wrote:
Not really because in the modern battlefield C4ISR is very much an integral part of air defense . This is where work is still in progress in both Russia & China .

Modern battlefield when talking air-defense system is defined by Russia.

Its level of integration is unmatched by any other country. Even China vastly surpasses US in its integrated air-defense system

simply because it is mostly based on Russian one although they have long way to start closing on, on Russia

Well, US has basically no land based SAM network, so hard to say it has an integrated AD system.

Viktor wrote:Modern battlefield when talking air-defense system is defined by Russia.

Its level of integration is unmatched by any other country. Even China vastly surpasses US in its integrated air-defense system

simply because it is mostly based on Russian one although they have long way to start closing on, on Russia

As you would imagine that as a foreign national I do not have an opinion on this as I don't have the right to . I can only go by ground reality . Now not sure if I am being short-sighted but the " Serdyukov reforms" pertaining to network centric warfare (NCW) was never implemented . It could be that Russian interpretation of setetsentricheskaia voina(NCW) is dramatically different from Western interpretation.

Nikolai Makarov’s speech at the General Assembly of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences made some important revelations :

Makarov pointed out - (1)

that currently, if the staff is prepared, it takes 5-6 hours for a brigade commander to make a plan on how to conduct combat operations and to send out orders to his subordinates. It then takes another 5 hours for the field officers to make their decisions on the basis of these orders and pass them on to their subordinates. Using digital technology and modern information management systems, he argued that it takes Chinese commanders just 20 minutes to do what Russian commanders require 10 hours to accomplish.

Now,carefully observe his reference to China . Generally Russia has compared it's military preparedness to advanced forces of NATO but comparing to China clearly reflects the lack of progress in NCW made by Russia.


(2)

The Russian military is going to get serious about shifting to high-tech network centric warfare, it’s going to need to have soldiers and officers that have the know-how to make use of such technology

(3)

Russian enthusiasm for NCW is further questioned by recent military spending suggesting that platform-centric operations remain prioritised

Nikolai Makarov, stated in July 2010 that the defense ministry planned to switch to the “network-centric principle” of command and control (C2) by 2015.

As regards command and control systems, the current situation is fairly thin on the ground. We are doing
extensive work to ensure that all (military) districts have digital equipment

Viktor wrote:Even China vastly surpasses US in its integrated air-defense system

In terms of overlapping layers of SAM systems yes , it is the most dense today .

However, China is pursuing asymmetric network-centric capabilities vis-à-vis the US and in all likelihood will do the same with Russia.

Sujoy you are clompletely wrong on each and every point. But as I have job now I will post my explaination to you this night when Im back, what does Russian integrated air defense mean in comparison with childish understanding of the same for other countries. @Garry this should go to S-400/500 theme.

Viktor wrote:Sujoy you are clompletely wrong on each and every point.

Just to clarify that none of the above points that I made in my last posts are mine in case my description was ambiguous . These observations were made by Nikolai Makarov . I was just quoting him . My understanding of Russian integrated air defense is something like this(picture) albeit with more modern weapon systems .

Viktor wrote:what does Russian integrated air defense mean in comparison with childish understanding of the same for other countries.

"childish understanding of the same" - Sorry , didn't get this part .

Makarov is talking about ground forces, not AD.

How is AD NOT networked, it has always been leading that edge.

I don't see what advantage American AD has over Russian in networking.

Also, Makarov is an idiot.

TR1 wrote:How is AD NOT networked, it has always been leading that edge.

Of course AD is networked . I have highlighted that with the image above .

The point that I am making is about C4ISR , not AD per se . In other words as the "Serdyukov reforms" has highlighted that there is an urgent need in Russia to establish C4ISR . Which in short would mean greater network integration between the Army , AF , Navy and the Strategic Forces .

TR1 wrote:I don't see what advantage American AD has over Russian in networking.

Again AD doesn't but C4ISR does , primarily because they started earlier .

russia needs to come out and support countries it calls allies ..or it will keep losing allies like syria ... america sells what it wants to any1 they want ... russia needs to do the same ...

I think you are being a little unfair... Assad was doing more business with the west than he was with Russia, and although Russia has a port in Syria you could not call Syria best buddies with Russia. The same could be said with Libya as they were trying to woo the west as well when the west turned on them.

By the time such countries realise how dangerous the west it (regime change and all) it is usually too late to arm up and prepare. Iran for example had a decade where it could have bought Flankers and Foxhounds to replace Tomcats and Phantoms... and admittedly they didn't have tons of cash to blow on toys like the real dictatorships of the middle east they could certainly have spent more on defence to improve their positions.

At the end of the day Russia intervening to save all the countries of the world would not be helpful... actually it would be very expensive and not guaranteed to succeed either... and it would make them no better than the west that likes to intervene internationally to get its way.

BTW – How does one build a door when there are no walls ? Just curious .

A door can simply be put in a door frame nailed to the foundations with no walls or ceiling or framework.

Most countries have the components of an air defence network... SAMs, interceptor aircraft, radars. Integrating them into a dedicated air defence network is not rocket science... Britain did it for the Battle of Britain. The main point is communication and infrastructure... the Russians had the PVO and now have the VKO, while the US probably only has the space component looking for BMs the reality is that the communications and sensors and interceptors needed are very similar even if the actual SAMs are different and it just makes sense to combine them both because a IAD is far more useful than an ABM system mainly because an enemy is more likely to launch aircraft and missiles against you than it is to fire BMs.

Sale of Brahmos does not violate the MTCR regime as the range of the Brahmos has been set at 290kms .

It was set purposely not to violate the MTCR... do you not think the S-400 could be similar adapted? Onyx has a much greater range...

Not really because in the modern battlefield C4ISR is very much an integral part of air defense . This is where work is still in progress in both Russia & China .

Technically Britain had an IAD during the Battle of Britain... you just need radars and communications and in their case interceptor aircraft. In the case of Russia they have an enormous number of radar feeding data to a central command with SAMs and Interceptors ready to intercept detected threats.

Now,carefully observe his reference to China . Generally Russia has compared it's military preparedness to advanced forces of NATO but comparing to China clearly reflects the lack of progress in NCW made by Russia.

You are confusing battle management plans with air defence plans. Planning and ordering an attack is totally different from reacting to an airborne threat.

The US relies mainly on its Air Force for air defence.

Again AD doesn't but C4ISR does , primarily because they started earlier .

You are confusing the Russian Armys ability to find and attack targets with the Russian Air Force and Aerospace Defence forces ability to detect and intercept airborne threats over Russia and near Russia.

The VKO takes the Space defence systems including ground, air, and space based sensors with the radars and aircraft and SAMs of the PVO and using the built in infrastructure and comms centres to create a combined picture of the airspace and space above Russia.

No other country in the world even attempts that, and none would come close to the coverage and range of systems the Russians already have let alone are about to introduce.

IAD is about getting information from the smallest units (guy with MANPADS) right through to major radar stations to be able to pass information about the current air situation above them to the higher ups so they can order aircraft interceptions to evaluate the threat and to deal with it.

Considering cessnas with drugs regularly penetrate the US from north and south I would say the US system doesn't exist.

Sujoy wrote:Not really because in the modern battlefield C4ISR is very much an integral part of air defense . This is where work is still in progress in both Russia & China .

Thing is Sujoy that you view Russia and China (two countries with by far most formidable air-defenses in the world) through the prism of

US way of military thinking and perhaps even LM C4I propaganda papers that circulate something like spam all over the internet.

USA can not be accounted for in this game as it has not even close comparable integrated ground air defense system very much like the

west as a whole, which during entire cold war and afterwards did not protect its military installations, command centers, powerplants,

airfields, cities etc from any kind of attack by fighter/cruise/ballistic missiles. Isn`t that nice?

So instead I suggest you first try to understand how does Russian integrated air defense work and then, try to compare it with the

other ones. Only than you will managed to realize the word "childish" related to the air defense systems of the other countries

Sujoy wrote:

Viktor wrote:what does Russian integrated air defense mean in comparison with childish understanding of the same for other countries.

"childish understanding of the same" - Sorry , didn't get this part .

Sujoy wrote:

Viktor wrote:Even China vastly surpasses US in its integrated air-defense system

In terms of overlapping layers of SAM systems yes , it is the most dense today .

Dense was the word describing Bagdad air defense mainly consistent of artillery air defense shooting blindly into the sky .

Best integrated air-defense systems for numerous reasons are the one in Russia, followed by China and than nothing nothing nothing ...

Just in term of numbers China air-defense is 3 times smaller than the one in Russia and that number will only increase with each

passing year in terms of quality, numbers, ability, integration etc.

Sujoy wrote:

Viktor wrote:Even China vastly surpasses US in its integrated air-defense system

However, China is pursuing asymmetric network-centric capabilities vis-à-vis the US and in all likelihood will do the same with Russia.

Im not really sure what do you mean here "asymmetric" but if you refer to air defense I can assure you, those networks are designed to

withstand full blow of NATO aviation, not play hide and seek with them.

Sujoy wrote: I can only go by ground reality

ž

I would rather you don`t go by ground reality, because integrated air-defense system in Russia function as part of an

aviation not ground forces and as such have nothing in common with ground forces and their level of integration but on the opposite

everything in common with the aviation and radar coverage based on country topography level of integration.

So If you want to stick to the subject I suggest we stick to the air-defense and air-force and radar systems. Ok?

Sujoy wrote:Just to clarify that none of the above points that I made in my last posts are mine in case my description was ambiguous . These observations were made by Nikolai Makarov . I was just quoting him . My understanding of Russian integrated air defense is something like this(picture) albeit with more modern weapon systems .

Yes, this is mighty Panorama in conjunction with Neman, Prostor and Poljana-S. Belarus systems of automation only recently surpassed

by its Russian counterparts. It has not been disclosed in media on type and numbers involved, but those are the systems Venezuela decided

to buy to integrate its air-defense systems, aviation, EW and other

This picture of Panorama area air-defense network is only as an a idea presenting what it can do but on the other hand you could

argue that does not represent high level of integration it really achieves as for that you would need a much larger paper to show

area defense network integration and the real mining of it and as such on this presentation you can get only glimpse of what it really

means.

But while talking about area defense network here is presentation of the same Belarus Panorama zonal air-defense scheme and some of

its possibilities.



You can easily see that on the picture you posted above Panorama TsM AD makes only one small wheal in the much larger air-defense integration of the country.

Viktor wrote: Thing is Sujoy that you view Russia and China (two countries with by far most formidable air-defenses in the world) through the prism of

US way of military thinking and perhaps even LM C4I propaganda papers that circulate something like spam all over the internet

This is Presumptuous .

I view Russia & China as two separate countries .

How the US views Russia & China is not the kind of information they share with me but if you are telling me that the US views Russia & China through just one prism then they are short –sighted .

FYI , I have spent my formative years on the state/s bordering China and the survival of these states depends on predicting China’s next move .

Viktor wrote: So instead I suggest you first try to understand how does Russian integrated air defense work and then, try to compare it with the

other ones. Only than you will managed to realize the word "childish" related to the air defense systems of the other countries

But then I never said that Russian AD is obsolete or incompetent , so why compare it with others ? I said that C4ISR is not pre-eminent in the Russian scheme of things according to the " Serdyukov reforms".

So it's Anatoliy Serdyukov , who in his capacity as the Russian Defence Mininster made these observations and not your's truly .

Viktor wrote: Dense was the word describing Bagdad air defense mainly consistent of artillery air defense shooting blindly into the sky .

Certainly not . There were enough searchlights to lit up the entire area . More importantly , it was overwhelmed by a force which was several times larger and was able to use their Apache helos to take out short wave / long wave radar stations thus enabling the F 117s to destroy SAM units from stand off range .

Viktor wrote: Best integrated air-defense systems for numerous reasons are the one in Russia, followed by China and than nothing nothing nothing ...

Viktor , regardless of whether I read “internet spams” circulated by the US you are probably , albeit inadvertently, neck deep in internet spams circulated by the Chinese .

Chinese AD is extensive but that’s about it . Nothing to write home about any other aspect .

Creating a false sense of security for their citizens comes very naturally to the Chinese leadership.

Realizing fully well how incompetent their AD is against India’s AF , they have moved their AD assets deep inside Tibet and have instead send in numerous battalions of NLOS BM and MLRS to counter India . Essential to bear in mind that India’s AD integration capability is at least half a decade behind NATO .

There much hyped AD is basically a smoke screen much like North Korea's nuclear tests .

Viktor wrote: Just in term of numbers China air-defense is 3 times smaller than the one in Russia

The USSR was 3 times the size of China .

Viktor wrote:and that number will only increase with each

passing year in terms of quality, numbers, ability, integration etc.

Depends how you define the words "quality" and "ability" . Why do you think that the Chinese are all of a sudden planning to buy S 400 or SU 35? They have realized that after years of reverse engineering they cannot produce anything of quality.

They have two sources of hi tech weaponry ...Russia and Israel . The latter cannot sell everything coz of US pressure and Russia only sells export versions.

Sujoy wrote:This is Presumptuous .

I view Russia & China as two separate countries .

How the US views Russia & China is not the kind of information they share with me but if you are telling me that the US views Russia & China through just one prism then they are short –sighted .

FYI , I have spent my formative years on the state/s bordering China and the survival of these states depends on predicting China’s next move .

I express myself wrongly. I wanted to say that such level of thinking of the size and level of Russian AD can be generally

seen on each and every US nationality forum member and much wider that completely lacks any understanding of its functioning.

Thats why we have even now questions like that one on keypub forum where one member thinks Russia AD by the end of 80ies consisted

of 80 S-300 launchers

If he only knew, I bet he would get a hart attack.

Sujoy wrote:
But then I never said that Russian AD is obsolete or incompetent , so why compare it with others ? I said that C4ISR is not pre-eminent in the Russian scheme of things according to the " Serdyukov reforms".

So it's Anatoliy Serdyukov , who in his capacity as the Russian Defence Mininster made these observations and not your's truly .

You said:

Sujoy wrote:Integrated air defense is an extremely expensive proposition which on this date only the US has with Russia and China taking steps towards it .

Which is completely wrong as Russia has the most integrated AD network by far in the world.

Than you continued with Russian ground C4ISR about what we are not talking here and is not a subject here

as it has no related points with AD. That`s why I think If you want to discuss ground network that is another topic for which I

don`t understand how it got over here.

Sujoy wrote:Certainly not . There were enough searchlights to lit up the entire area . More importantly

You are completely wrong. Searchlights, really?

If this was 1945 I would say you are completely off the track as even than Russia had highly primitive but still mechanical

"computers" for divisional artillery air-defense

Sujoy wrote:it was overwhelmed by a force which was several times larger and was able to use their Apache helos to take out short wave / long wave radar stations thus enabling the F 117s to destroy SAM units from stand off range .

That French designed Kari network for the whole country was much less efficient than a regimental AD in Russia at the time, with

the survivability chance against US at 0%. It was moderate in its efficiency even compared against air forces of surrounding countries

no matter the numbers because it is the integration that especially for the older AD systems increases its efficiency to an acceptable

level. Second thing you should understand is that only Russian and maybe China AD stand a chance to take on a full blow of NATO forces.

Every other AD is either not done properly or some of the mayor part for its operability is missing or is simply designed to

take on air forces of much lesser magnitude usually the ones of surrounding countries.

Sujoy wrote:Viktor , regardless of whether I read “internet spams” circulated by the US you are probably , albeit inadvertently, neck deep in internet spams circulated by the Chinese .

Chinese AD is extensive but that’s about it . Nothing to write home about any other aspect .

Creating a false sense of security for their citizens comes very naturally to the Chinese leadership.

You may be surprised by I am well familiar with the spam they are able to create but when it comes to AD network they did at the time

what`s best could be done and that was buying huge amounts of Russian S-300/BUK/TOR systems/technology on later which they

where able to make their own. No one has anything similar of the level except offcours Russia. China as Im familiar was one of the rare

countries that bought Russian command post like brigade level command post Sanezh and even possibly Baikal-1.

They have exploit Russian technology to make HQ-9 and VLS Buk/Hq-16 and Tor-M1(dont know if they copied it), and KS-1A (which Russia

had finished for them). So practically all of their most capable AD systems are of Russian origin or of have Russian blood. China

mindset in designing AD networks is similar to Russian ones although lesser in comparison. China AD is like a Russian AD little brother.

Sujoy wrote:Realizing fully well how incompetent their AD is against India’s AF , they have moved their AD assets deep inside Tibet and have instead send in numerous battalions of NLOS BM and MLRS to counter India . Essential to bear in mind that India’s AD integration capability is at least half a decade behind NATO .

China has every potential to develop and deploy extremely strong AD than it is now but even if they do it that will still be

oriented mostly toward US bases in pacific surrounding China. I don`t see you point with China deploying BM and MLRS together AD.

Sujoy wrote:There much hyped AD is basically a smoke screen much like North Korea's nuclear tests .

Dont bet on it.

Sujoy wrote:

Viktor wrote: Just in term of numbers China air-defense is 3 times smaller than the one in Russia

The USSR was 3 times the size of China .

I was speaking as of now. During the Soviet Union, China AD was none existent and SSSR was 3 time larger than it is now although

now is few times more efficient. and with each passing year is getting more boost.

Sujoy wrote:

Viktor wrote:and that number will only increase with each

passing year in terms of quality, numbers, ability, integration etc.

Depends how you define the words "quality" and "ability" . Why do you think that the Chinese are all of a sudden planning to buy S 400 or SU 35? They have realized that after years of reverse engineering they cannot produce anything of quality.

Well I haven`t seen anything new from China about big AD systems except long time copied HQ-9 that from now and than incorporates

some new seeker or thanks to bigger processing power implemented in comparison with export version PMU manages to achieve something

bigger range. But nothing spectacular although it is still a capable system. But look in 5 year time Russia intends to

pop out 5 new AD systems that will bring new capabilities to the table with changing desing of integrated AD at the same time and

adjusting it to present and future day NATO capabilities. If China does not manage to keep up with development it will have to buy

unless it risk falling behind. Thats why I think it will buy.

Sujoy wrote:They have two sources of hi tech weaponry ...Russia and Israel . The latter cannot sell everything coz of US pressure and Russia only sells export versions.

Russian export versions are still extremely capable, in fact those same export models are still most capable out there and best buy

if you count in the price. Of course Russian ones are of different level and has substantionaly higher requirements.

Indian AD network and systems are none existent and as such prone to sudden attack on its for example airfields which would totally

devastate its capability to fight on in short time continuation or be left totally unprotected in case of high fighter attrition.

For its functionality AD network needs to have 3 crucial element

- Strong air-force
- AD system
- Radar coverage

India only has as of now strong air-force that will in time be even much stronger but objectively it only satisfies one out of three

requirements for strong AD. AD systems and radar coverage is something that basically lacks.

Simply priceless

Here is some piece I have been digging up for quite a while now. This is a huge subject and I will write as I find material and gather info and time

and of course all help is welcomed.

This thing is about Russian Territorial radar command post (Army PVO has their own radar

command posts of completely different type), that are being replaced now with radar command post of newer generation of Fundament type.

This is "Base-1" radar regimental command post of the Territorial PVO.




It has 10 connection which are used as following:

- 5 are used for battery radar command post of "Field-1"

- 1 is be used to connect to other Base-1

- 1 is used to connect to a higher level radar command post of "Niva"  type but also (what is not usually done) to Universal or Proton or even Bastion type zonal

  command post.

- 2 connections are used to independent radar connection of NEBO-U/GAMA-D/DESNA-M type

- 1 connection is used to connect to a regimental PVO command post of S-300PMU2/S-400 type (55K6E2) or brigade level command post of Baikal type

Also Base-1 regimental radar command post is used to control:

- passive radar command posts
- ECM/ECCM radar command post (Mauzer-1 / AKUB-1)
- command post for Territorial PVO aviation (Vozdoh-1 / Rubezh / Schit-1)
- AWACS (A-50)

but still max number of available connections is 10. Here are some pictures of Base-1.




   


Some information about the BASE-1.

- intended for the collection and processing of information from radar stations and posts, other sources and issue it to the consumers in real time
- control of subordinate radar and radar site, the definition of nationality and type of air targets
- training of PVO troopers by simulation by itself and with interaction with other units
- Number of processed targets at the same time - 240
- Readiness after march - 2 hours
- Readiness after deployment - 2 min


- Ability to process targets in
   - distance - 1600km
   - altitude  - 100km
   - speed    - 6000km/h

BASE-1 includes:
- command post
- relay stations truck
- truck with power generators
- truck for repair

Type of targets include:

- military and civil planes of all type
- cruise and ballistic missiles of all type
- helicopters and other low flying targets


This is "Field-1" radar battery command post of the Territorial PVO.





Few facts:
- As mentioned earlier each Base-1 can control up to 5 Field-1 battery radar control post
- Each Field-1 battery radar control post can control up to 3 different radar set of any type
- Each Field-1 battery radar control post can process up to 50 air targets
- Each Field-1 battery radar control post controls three different radar types
- Each Field-1 battery radar control post controls radar types in meter , decimeter and centimeter wavelength
- Each Field-1 battery radar control post controls has assigned radar for low level radar coverage and altimeters  
- Ability to connect directly to regiment or brigade command post of S-300/400 systems (bypassing BASE-1 in case of destruction or whatever other reason)
- Much smaller MTBF time in comparison with Fundament
- Readiness after march - 2 hours
- Readiness after deployment - 2 min


- Ability to process targets in
   - distance - 600km
   - altitude  - 45km
   - speed    - 4500km/h

FIELD -1 includes:
- command post
- relay stations truck
- truck with power generators
- truck for repair



Pictures of FIELD-1



   



NIVA is the third in the vertical configuration of Field-1 -> Base-1 -> Niva and is able to control 2 Base-1 (ability to process 500 targets and connected directly

to PVO brigade level command post - Baikal/Sanez type). Those radar command post are now being replaced with Fundament line of radar command posts so

instead of Field-1 -> Base-1 -> Niva we have Fundament-1 -> Fundament-2 -> Fundament-3

Main reason for replacement of Field-1/Base-1/Niva are:

- Obsolete electronics and replacement with newer generation electronics
- Huge power consumption which is with Fundament type reduced by few orders of magnitude
- Small number of processed targets in the modern battlefield
- Huge weight of all systems and cables and generators which restricted mobility

GarryB wrote:The idea behind the integrated air defence network is to share data and have a layered missile defence arrangement that also includes interceptor aircraft too.
If you have an object detected on radar entering your airspace most of the time you will send aircraft to investigate.

During 1966s Vietnam war three situations became critical in understanding of Russian PVO thought - up to that point S-75 batteries where working independently:

1 case scenario: 6 Russian S-75 batteries spend 12 missiles to shoot down 2 PQM-34 UAV
2 case scenario: 2 Russian S-75 batteries spend 7 missiles to shoot down 1 PQM-34 UAV
3 case scenario: 11 missiles spend to shoot down ECM version of Ryan Model 147 UAV

In both cases investigation revealed that the drones where shoot down by the missile battery who fired the first. The rest where than shooting on UAV wreckage but the really bad thing
was that all of the demasked their positions risking USAF retaliation.

So Russian command draw some conclusions from it:


-  S-75 batteries are not able to effectively engage areal targets whose numbers are higher than 3 (due to the problems with target distribution and communications) without command  
  from the higher echelon so problems of S-75 battery managment where subjected to mathematical modeling and operational testing and when those solutions where implemented the
ASURK-1M command post emerged. Army PVO got Krab command post.
   

Now, Russian mobile command posts are the essence and the basic building blocks of Russian AD concept. They are more powerful than ever before and can simultaneously
integrate, command, distribute targets between SAMs and PVO aviation,analyze data from different and numerous radar system,manage ECM/ECCM systems,manage ELINT system, decoys etc providing target distribution, ECM/ECCM PVO fighter protection and enemy ECM suppression,provide firing solutions,manage ELINT and communication between subordinate and higher echelon command post of same and different command post classes in every situation.




Automated control system "Baikal-1 ME"