Russian Nuclear Submarine Force: Discussion

Tsavo Lion wrote:

Borei subs were designed to be quiet and to operate from ice-free oceans unlike previous soviet subs which had to hide under the ice thus limiting their area of operations

wrong: even if they r less noisy, the combined Western ASW assets will still find & sink them in ice-free oceans, esp. since they'll need to navigate choke points & lack surface ships to oppose the adversary's ASW ops.

They can fire from their homeport at any nuclear armed country. Their operating zone in case of war would probably be in russian territorial weapon.

SSBN were never meant to participate to a conventional war.

wrong: even if they r less noisy, the combined Western ASW assets will still find & sink them in ice-free oceans, esp. since they'll need to navigate choke points & lack surface ships to oppose the adversary's ASW ops.

I suspect western ASW assets wont be that effective, for a couple of serious reasons... first the improvement in Russian sub performance meaning active sonar becomes important for long range detection... which is problematic... But it also has the problem that with the expansion of Russian air power into the arctic and the increase in receding ice cover that operations in the north or just friendly waters would be enough considering the range of the missiles these subs carry.

Another factor is that in times of tension those navigable choke points can be sailed through before anyones starts launching missiles... once they are through then they have an enormous area to hide in with little chance of being detected by western ASW forces... just disappear like smoke and find places to hide waiting for launch orders.

Modern Russian SSBNs could launch their entire compliment of missiles in less time than a NATO force could find them, get permission to attack them and launch that attack.

..operations in the north or just friendly waters would be enough considering the range of the missiles these subs carry.
Another factor is that in times of tension those navigable choke points can be sailed through before anyones starts launching missiles... once they are through then they have an enormous area to hide in with little chance of being detected by western ASW forces...

Yes, the Western ASW means r less effective in the Arctic, even in the ice free areas- within easy reach of land based Russian aviation & Caliber armed ships/subs.
The Arctic Ocean & the Okhotsk Sea r enormous enough & have better protected bastion areas- there's no need to risk going through GIUK gap+SOSUS there for the N. Fleet SSBNs & straight the into USN, RN & FN SSBN operating areas in the N. & Mid. Atlantic.
Just 10 years ago, British & French SSBNs collided there: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/world/europe/17submarine.html

In the Pacific, as in the Atlantic, at least 2 USN SSBNs r on patrol 24/7, & American CSGs/MEUs regularly exercise & transit there- why go in harm's way to risk a collision or detection?

Yes, the Western ASW means r less effective in the Arctic, e

Well that is true but I was meaning that ASW technology is very very expensive and that funding has been greatly reduced since the end of the cold war and ASW and indeed mine countermeasures were easy areas to cut a lot of spending... not that they used to spend a lot on mine countermeasures...

The SOSUS system and related underwater listening systems for the US have been dramatically scaled back via absence of funding.

Even if they get funding back they will need to amplify funding for a decade or so because the problem is an order of magnitude harder now.

In the Pacific, as in the Atlantic, at least 2 USN SSBNs r on patrol 24/7, & American CSGs/MEUs regularly exercise & transit there- why go in harm's way to risk a collision or detection?

They are colliding because they can't see each other... they can't see each other because they are not expecting Russian subs so they are not looking... obviously this makes sending SSBNs to those waters a good idea because it is an enormous area they can use to hide in, and they also have enemy SSBNs to hide amongst too... so when they have launched their SLBMs they can use some torpedos hunting enemy SSBNs.

BTW a few depressed trajectory SLBMs fired from a Russian pier to detonate underwater would eliminate any hydrophone array... probably permanently... suddenly no gap.....

Well here's some interesting information from "a source close to the main headquarters of the Navy" which addresses a big concern in the article posted:

Russian submarines can fire a Bulava rocket only from west to east

GarryB wrote:..this makes sending SSBNs to those waters a good idea because it is an enormous area they can use to hide in, and they also have enemy SSBNs to hide amongst too... so when they have launched their SLBMs they can use some torpedos hunting enemy SSBNs.

IMO, it's still not worth it. The USN, RN, FN can send a few SSN/Ks to patrol the GIUK & SSN escorts to guard SSBNs; 4 US SSGNs r also being deployed around Eurasia & can detect them. Safer to sit on the bottom under the ice cover & occasionally sail to drag an antenna to get messages- the ice won't stop the ELF signals from their HQ.
Also SAR assets won't have to go to far to save crews & the subs.

BTW a few depressed trajectory SLBMs fired from a Russian pier to detonate underwater would eliminate any hydrophone array... probably permanently... suddenly no gap...

if they can hit water at that speed, they can hit & break ice at much slower speed.

IMO, it's still not worth it. The USN, RN, FN can send a few SSN/Ks to patrol the GIUK & SSN escorts to guard SSBNs; 4 US SSGNs r also being deployed around Eurasia & can detect them. Safer to sit on the bottom under the ice cover & occasionally sail to drag an antenna to get messages- the ice won't stop the ELF signals from their HQ.
Also SAR assets won't have to go to far to save crews & the subs.

I love your confidence... we are talking about very quiet vessels they will have serious problems detecting and tracking them... they could follow a cargo ship or LNG carrier and hide in its shadow making them even harder to detect...

And SAR assets to save crews... what are you smoking?

Even assuming they get out of the sub alive what are their chances realistically in the arctic waters? 20 minutes maybe? No chance sorry.

Near the equator in the Pacific or Atlantic they could last much longer...

if they can hit water at that speed, they can hit & break ice at much slower speed.

Most of the underwater nuclear detonations you see pictures of are maybe 2Kt or less... a 400KT nuke could detonate at the surface and do enormous damage to hydrophones...

Sweet Jesus, who writes this shit?

Ballistic missiles travel across the North Pole, they move neither Eastward nor Westward

Did moron who wrote that this ever hear about Earth being round?

I think what he is saying is that they have one range set up for SLBMs to be tested so the fact that Bulava is only launched in one direction during exercises is for this reason... if they couldn't launch the missiles from the Northern or Pacific Fleet general locations then they wouldn't base their subs there.

The are fully operational and able to attack their designated targets, but to launch their missiles during tests and collect meaningful data on the results they have to launch in one direction at one target range.

I love your confidence... we are talking about very quiet vessels they will have serious problems detecting and tracking them... they could follow a cargo ship or LNG carrier and hide in its shadow making them even harder to detect...

SSNs/drones, with MPA help, will follow them as soon as they leave their bases &/ enter GIUK gap. The USN re-established 2nd Fleet will start sending CVNs to the N. Atlantic; more ASW helos could be added to their AWs.
https://navaltoday.com/2019/10/04/after-reviving-the-2nd-fleet-us-navy-reestablishes-submarine-group-2/

Their SLBMs have enough range to hit most/all of N. America, W. Europe, Hawaii, Guam, & E. Asia from the Arctic & Okhotsk Seas. Besides, adding transit times will add operating/repair costs + time at sea & reduce reactors' lifetime.

Even assuming they get out of the sub alive what are their chances realistically in the arctic waters? 20 minutes maybe? No chance sorry.

not if they surface in rescue capsules &/ use rubber rafts.
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/04/world/rescue-capsule-saved-only-1-on-sinking-soviet-submarine.html

On ice/nearby islands, they could kill polar bears/birds/seals & eat their meat if need be. SAR aircraft will reach them from restored & new bases in a matter of hours at worse.

Even assuming they get out of the sub alive what are their chances realistically in the arctic waters? 20 minutes maybe? No chance sorry.

You guys really think that anyone will care about them during a nuclear war. They won't have nowhere to come back. The safest place would be on the north pole in a research center with solar power and some fishing tools.

They may have accidents in peacetime- & it happened many times with dufferent subs before.
1 BM sub sunk off Hawaii in 1968, & 1 off Bermuda in 1986: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Azorian
https://www.thevintagenews.com/2018/09/01/k219/

Tsavo Lion wrote:They may have accidents in peacetime- & it happened many times before. 1 sunk off Bermuda in 1986: https://www.thevintagenews.com/2018/09/01/k219/

In peacetime any ship/boat sailing around will have to look for the crew. It is an internationnal law to be oblige to help a ship if you are close to. In war time they will be use only for nuclear strikes so WW3 scenario.

They would be transiting & patrolling away from all traffic, & wouldn't want to depend on others to hide under & be rescued. Why risk losing subs, sailors, secrets & prestige?
Russian SSGNs & SSNs with tactical nukes or conventional CMs that can hit coastal NPPs now patrol off the US anyway- no need to send SSBNs outside their bastions.
Besides, the Poseidons r not long in coming into service; their subs won't be going too far either.

PapaDragon wrote:

GarryB wrote:......
I think what he is saying is that they have one range set up for SLBMs to be tested so the fact that Bulava is only launched in one direction during exercises is for this reason... if they couldn't launch the missiles from the Northern or Pacific Fleet general locations then they wouldn't base their subs there.

The are fully operational and able to attack their designated targets, but to launch their missiles during tests and collect meaningful data on the results they have to launch in one direction at one target range.

So title has nothing to with content

Problem was simply lack of targeting range in west of the county and not any issue with missiles

https://web.archive.org/web/20191101100540/https://twitter.com/baklitskiy/status/1189697949544206338?lang=ro

Interesting factoid, small thread: all Russian SLBM tests as of lately were from West to East. 1) makes sense to test SSBNs closer to production facilities, 2) western testing ground Chizha (Archangelsk region) needs serious modernization to receive all test control equipment 1/2

That’s why there were no test launches by two Borei class SSBNs since they were transferred to the Far East in 2013-14. This is compensated by the rotation of SSBN crews between Northern and Pacific fleets. But at some point Chizha will have to be modernized 2/2

So we are now going back to that idiotic article which claimed that two Borei subs in the Pacific are not operational because their missiles are not being test fired

And like I sad before it's all BS, subs have been on patrols this whole time

 

Didn't notice this exercise receiving much of the regularly hysterical western media alarm coverage. Significant nonetheless.

The Russian navy in mid-October 2019 sortied eight submarines in the country’s biggest undersea exercise since the Cold War.
Russian subs honing stealth skills in major North Atlantic drill, says Norwegian intel

The previous article posted had raised several issues that subsequent reports like these have served to address. The author drew attention to a number of concerns, however legitimate or not they may appear. There have been statements that respond to some of them, such as the one quoted which explained the lack of updated facilities at the western test site or the MoD's own statement reported here in response to the alleged test launch failure:
Russia’s top brass nixes submarine missile launch over faulty munition during drill

As time goes on hopefully more information may become available that can provide updates/answers to the issues identified.

Tsavo Lion wrote:They would be transiting & patrolling away from all traffic, & wouldn't want to depend on others to hide under & be rescued. Why risk losing subs, sailors, secrets & prestige?
Russian SSGNs & SSNs with tactical nukes or conventional CMs that can hit coastal NPPs now patrol off the US anyway- no need to send SSBNs outside their bastions.
Besides, the Poseidons r not long in coming into service; their subs won't be going too far either.

I tend to agree that it makes sense to remain close to the safety of shore and sea based defences as well as under the additional cover of ice in the Arctic and probably the Sea of Okhotsk too. No need to expose oneself to unnecessary and unwanted attention. It's known anyhow that bases' exits are under continuous surveillance. Once out at sea it all becomes a risky cat and mouse game scenario, where modern stealth and technologies seek to enable these doomsday behemoths to perform their disappearing tricks and evade the enemy.

https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2020/january/7985-russian-submarines-to-get-unguided-shells-to-break-ice.html

Russian submarines to get unguided shells to break ice

Isos wrote:https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2020/january/7985-russian-submarines-to-get-unguided-shells-to-break-ice.html

Russian submarines to get unguided shells to break ice

Of course the Pr 941 Akula boomers were designed to simply surface under the pack ice, breaking it with its reinforced hull thru sheer buoyancy force, then use its missile hatch covers to push the blocks of ice out of the way.

Sometime you just had to admire Soviet engineering.

Well actually scramjet technology raises some interesting possibilities.... a scramjet powered missile is really only limited by heat technology, so in theory the Zircon land attack and anti ship missile could, over time get bigger and faster and much longer ranged to the point where it is moving at such high speeds it is skimming across the top of the atmosphere with range potential of 10,000km or more at say mach 25 plus and you have to say that when it gets to that point... how is it any different from a SLBM?

The idea of a future sub having SLBMs and antiship/land attack missiles might become reality when missiles that can do both jobs and more become available.

You might think I am crazy, but the work they are doing on nuclear powered ramjets... if you think of a ramjet in very basic terms it is a tube where air is sucked in one end and fuel is burned and the tube narrows to compress and further heat the air which accelerates out the back of the tube faster than it went in overcoming the drag of the aircraft itself and generating thrust to maintain speed or even accelerate. A scramjet engine is just really the same thing but there is no limit on the speed of the air going through the engine so it can operate at much higher speeds and produce rather more thrust.

A ramjet needs subsonic air going through the hot section where the fuel burns because like any other normal jet engine it can't burn the fuel at supersonic airflow (through the engine) speeds. A MiG-25 can fly at Mach-2.5 with its engines operating, but while on take off those engine intakes are open wide maximising the amount of air flowing into the engine to create thrust, at Mach 2.5 the intake will be closed down to a minimum reducing the amount of air going into the engine so it can be slowed down to subsonic speeds before it gets to the hot section where fuel is added and burned.

It is pretty obvious that if you replace a turbojet with a scramjet the sort of thrust you can deliver at supersonic flight speeds is increased an order of magnitude.

(For those wondering, the SR-71 has a bypass turbojet where air is directed around the outside of the turbojet at top speed so the turbojet is just idling and producing next to no thrust at top speed, while the bypass air is restricted and slowed down and just as it is leaving the rear of the engine fuel is added and burned in the standard after burner, so effectively it acts like a ramjet...)

What I am getting at is that all these types of jet engine produce heat by compressing air... ram in ramjet means compression... then fuel is added and burned generating more heat and thrust/gas velocity... when the heat source is a nuclear reactor there is no combustion so the difference between a Scramjet and a Ramjet become meaningless so in theory a nuclear ramjet should be a nuclear scramjet able to operate at enormous temperatures (internal temperatures) without flame outs... because there is no flame...

Yasen update: https://ria.ru/20200104/1562947152.html?in=t

GarryB wrote:Well actually scramjet technology raises some interesting possibilities.... a scramjet powered missile is really only limited by heat technology, so in theory the Zircon land attack and anti ship missile could, over time get bigger and faster and much longer ranged to the point where it is moving at such high speeds it is skimming across the top of the atmosphere with range potential of 10,000km or more at say mach 25 plus and you have to say that when it gets to that point... how is it any different from a SLBM?

Mach 27 flight vehicle at 100km altitudes, air density becomes even more tougher at lower altitudes. I think right now it is beyond the capabilities of Russia to use those same mach 25 speeds at an altitude of 40kms without breaking apart from the physical stress. The U.S. has barely fielded any air breathable missiles but have some project hopes of scramjets, they lack in the department of sustaining heat stress of hypersonic missiles because of their HTV-2 project which barely accomplished 1/3rd of its flight to its target. So its hard to determine if the U.S. either lacks in the heat physical stress department of hypersonic missiles or making air-breathable engines work properly at high speeds.

Scramjets are very different from SLBMs.

• Lower altitudes with better ability to deal with air density and drag, which makes it a more difficult target to track for ground radars using radar horizon, or satellite systems trying to track it.
  
  1st stage brings it to its flight ceiling, but unlike ballistic missiles where no additional stages are given once they reach their flight ceilings, scramjet missiles use their 2nd stage engines throughout their entire flights meaning they have no slowdowns compared to ballistic missiles.
  
  Lower altitudes and high speeds create plasma density conditions favorable for stealth making the missile a difficult target to track.

https://navalnews.net/russian-developers-to-increase-the-speed-of-zircon-missile-over-10-mach/

Their developers are trying to make the missile reach mach 10, and altitudes of the missiles flight ceiling have been listed at 40kms. So lets see how temperatures and altitudes effect radio waves.




http://www.aerospaceweb.org/design/scripts/atmosphere/

Put mach 10 for velocity, 32 degrees Fahrenheit for temperature increment and 40kms for altitude. Than the 2nd section will tell you that the total temperature for the heat shield is 5630.6759 Kelvin. And such plasma density can effect radio waves all in the fire control range. Such is the intent of why speeds for the Zircon missile for each tests keep on increasing and increasing.



https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19670020821.pdf

As we can also see around 40kms or 130,000ft according to this graph the RCS conditions are favorable for the aluminum sphere being dropped going from -12 to -25 decibels. The effects of frequency wavelength for the RCS of spheres does not apply which is why they are usually used for test objects for radars most of the time. But material of an object is also important regarding RCS because one object of a similar size compared to the other might have a higher RCS because of more radio reflection.

Also the Zircon missile stays cruising at 40km altitudes, it does not drop like the sphere which the plasma conditions are always favorable for the missile. Russia’s physicists have also found a way to still communicate with objects in a high density plasma condition like re-entry vehicles.

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/422292/russian-physicists-solve-radio-black-out-problem-for-re-entering-spacecraft/

Ballistic missiles like SLBMs cannot be compared to scramjets, scramjets are an entirely different animal.

I wonder if they could use the same guidance as kornet atgm with the laser source being a satellite. The back of the missike could fit a laser receiver and would correct the course of the missile. It shouldn't be as hot as the front and they wouldn't have issues with puting electronics there.

Modern satellites can optically follow any ship if they know where it is. They just need enough of them.

Could also work with radio signal.

Enemy sats & EW means could then take it off course.