US Navy ships and weapon systems

The Navy will christen the newest Arleigh Burke class guided-missile destroyer, Jason Dunham, Aug. 1, 2009, during a 10 a.m. EDT ceremony at Bath Iron Works, Bath, Maine.

Designated DDG 109, the new destroyer honors Cpl. Jason L. Dunham, the first Marine awarded the Medal of Honor for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Dunham was born in Scio, N.Y., Nov. 10, 1981, sharing the same birthday as the U.S. Marine Corps.

On April 14, 2004, Dunham’s squad was conducting a reconnaissance mission in Karabilah, Iraq, when his battalion commander’s convoy was ambushed. When Dunham’s squad approached to provide fire support, an Iraqi insurgent leapt out of a vehicle and attacked Dunham. As Dunham wrestled the insurgent to the ground, he noticed that the enemy fighter had a grenade in his hand and immediately alerted his fellow Marines. When the enemy dropped the live grenade, Dunham took off his Kevlar helmet, covered the grenade, and threw himself on top to smother the blast. In an ultimate selfless act of courage, in which he was mortally wounded, he saved the lives of two fellow Marines.

Retired Gen. Michael W. Hagee, former commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, will deliver the ceremony's principal address. Debra Dunham will serve as sponsor of the ship named for her late son. In accordance with Navy tradition, she will break a bottle of champagne across the ship’s bow and christen the ship.

Jason Dunham, the 59th Arleigh Burke class destroyer, will be able to conduct a variety of operations, from peacetime presence and crisis management to sea control and power projection. Jason Dunham will be capable of fighting air, surface and subsurface battles simultaneously and contains a myriad of offensive and defensive weapons designed to support maritime warfare in keeping with “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” the new maritime strategy that postures the sea services to apply maritime power to protect U.S. vital interests in an increasingly interconnected and uncertain world.

Cmdr. M. Scott Sciretta, born in South Amboy, N.J., is the prospective commanding officer of the ship and will lead the crew of 276 officers and enlisted personnel. The 9,200-ton Jason Dunham is being built by Bath Iron Works, a General Dynamics company. The ship is 509 feet in length, has a waterline beam of 59 feet, and a navigational draft of 31 feet. Four gas turbine engines will power the ship to speeds in excess of 30 knots.

Additional information on Arleigh Burke class destroyers is available online at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=900&ct=4.

 



http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=12854

The Navy will christen and launch the dry cargo/ammunition ship USNS Matthew Perry, Sunday, Aug. 16, 2009, during a 5 p.m. PDT ceremony at the General Dynamics NASSCO shipyard in San Diego, Calif.

Continuing the Lewis and Clark-class (T-AKE) tradition of honoring legendary pioneers and explorers, the Navy’s newest underway replenishment ship recognizes Navy Commodore Matthew C. Perry (1794-1858) who led a squadron of ships to Japan in 1853 with the aim of opening that nation to trade. He served during the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War, and was sent to suppress piracy and the slave trade in the West Indies.

Vice Adm. Richard Hunt, commander, 3rd Fleet, will deliver the ceremony’s principal address. Hester Evans, descendant of the ship’s namesake, will serve as ship’s sponsor. The ceremony will include the time-honored Navy tradition of the sponsor breaking a bottle of champagne across the bow to formally christen the ship.

Designated T-AKE 9, Matthew Perry is the ninth ship of the class, a program of up to 14 ships, the first 11 of which will serve as combat logistics force ships and the last three of which are expected to be part of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future). As a combat logistics force ship, Matthew Perry will help the Navy maintain a worldwide forward presence by delivering ammunition, food, fuel, and other dry cargo to U.S. and allied ships at sea.

As part of Military Sealift Command’s Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force, Matthew Perry is designated as a United States Naval Ship (USNS) and will be crewed by 124 civil service mariners and 11 Navy sailors. The ship is designed to operate independently for extended periods at sea and can carry two helicopters. The ship is 689 feet in length, has an overall beam of 106 feet, has a navigational draft of 30 feet, displaces approximately 42,000 tons, and is capable of reaching a speed of 20 knots using a single-shaft, diesel-electric propulsion system.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2009/08/mil-090812-dod03.htm

Navy to Commission Energy-Efficient Amphibious Assault Ship Makin Island

The Navy will commission the amphibious assault ship Makin Island, Saturday, Oct. 24, during a 10 a.m. PDT ceremony at North Island Naval Air Station, Coronado, Calif.

Makin Island is named for the daring raid carried out by Marine Corps Companies Alpha and Bravo, Second Raider Battalion, on the Japanese-held Makin Island, in the Gilbert Islands, on Aug. 17-18, 1942. The raid was launched from the submarines USS Nautilus and USS Argonaut and succeeded in routing the enemy forces based there, gaining valuable intelligence. Twenty-three Navy Crosses were awarded for actions during the raid, including to the raid’s leader, Marine Corps Lt. Col. Evans Carlson, and executive officer, Marine Corps Maj. James Roosevelt (son of President Franklin Roosevelt). Marine Corps Sgt. Clyde Thomason was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for heroism during the raid and was the first enlisted Marine to be so honored during World War II. One previous ship, a Casablanca-class escort aircraft carrier (1944-1946), has borne the name Makin Island, and received five battle stars for World War II service.

Adm. Patrick Walsh, commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, will deliver the ceremony's principal address. Silke Hagee, wife of former commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Michael Hagee, will serve as ship's sponsor. In the time honored Navy tradition, she will give the first order to "man our ship and bring her to life!"

Makin Island is the eighth Wasp-class amphibious assault ship. Second only to an aircraft carrier in size, LHDs embark, transport, deploy, command and fully support an expeditionary unit of 2,000 Marines. Makin Island can accommodate three landing craft air cushion, a squadron of AV-8B Harrier II aircraft, and a full range of Navy/Marine Corps helicopters and amphibious vehicles to perform sea control and limited power projection missions.

Makin Island is the first Navy amphibious assault ship to replace steam boilers with gas turbines, and the first Navy surface ship to be equipped with both gas turbines and an auxiliary propulsion system. By using this unique propulsion system, the Navy expects over the course of the ship’s lifecycle to see fuel savings of more than $250 million, further demonstrating the Navy’s commitment to energy awareness and conservation.

Makin Island is fully equipped with command, control, communication, computers and intelligence systems for flagship command duty. The afloat capability of Makin Island’s medical facility is second only to the Navy's hospital ships. The ship is armed with two NATO Sea Sparrow surface missile systems for anti-air warfare protection, two rolling airframe missile systems and two Phalanx close-in-weapons systems mounts to counter threats from low flying aircraft. Six missile decoy launchers augment the anti-ship missile defenses.

Capt. Robert Kopas, born in Cleveland and raised in Phoenix, is the ship’s commanding officer. Built by Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Ingalls Operations in Pascagoula, Miss., the ship is 844 feet in length with a 106-foot beam, and has living areas for nearly 3,200 crewmembers and embarked forces.

Upon commissioning, the ship becomes a member of U.S. Pacific Fleet as part of Amphibious Group Five and will be home ported in San Diego.

Media may direct queries to the Navy Office of Information at 703-697-5342. For more information visit the ship's Web site at http://www.makin-island.navy.mil/default.htm.

http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13066

Navy short and medium term with the large surface warships important changes:
Abandon the use of future air defense and missile defense cruisers CG (X).
Burke-class destroyers to extend the production line. 2016 financial year to purchase an upgrade Burke, using the next generation of air defense and missile defense radar (AMDR), AMDR is the successor to the Aegis-type bar. As a result, after 2016, made of Burke, is no longer a multi-purpose destroyers in nature, but rather anti-aircraft and anti-missile destroyers. In addition to ship outside the AMDR will configure the next-generation air defense and anti-missile missile systems (Standard -6, standard-3II).
Fiscal year 2011 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have added a new item: arc (ArcLight), this is a new agility in the global fight against the conventional (PGS-C) demonstration projects. It uses the standard-3II missile body and high-speed gliders loading, only 90 kg warhead with a range of up to 3600 kilometers, the direct use of the Navy VLS Vertical Launching System.

Cracks Continue To Plague U.S. Cruisers
By CHRISTOPHER P. CAVAS
Published: 9 Dec 2010 21:36


Barely a year after the U.S. Navy spent $40 million to fix the cruiser Port Royal after an embarrassing grounding, the ship is again out of action, back in a shipyard at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. But this time it's not a damaged hull that's the problem. Rather, it's an issue that is plaguing all 22 cruisers in service: cracks in the aluminum superstructure.
The U.S. Navy cruiser Port Royal being refloated at Pearl Harbor in September 2009 after repairs from a grounding. The ship is back in the shipyard because of a new series of cracks in its superstructure. (Marshall Fukuki / U.S. Navy)

The Port Royal was operating in the Pacific Northwest in September when sailors discovered new cracks in the superstructure, including an eight-crack on the 06 level, one of the highest decks in the ship. Most of the cracks that appear on the Ticonderoga-class cruisers are being repaired during regular overhauls, but in this case the damage was enough to send the ship home to Pearl Harbor for yet another extended repair period.

So far, the Navy has awarded $14 million to BAE Systems in Pearl to fix the Port Royal. The work package will include repairs to the bulkheads and deck around two gas turbine intakes; fuel oil storage tank top repairs; superstructure crack repairs; and removal and replacement of aluminum decking and plating. The work is expected to be finished in February.

"We are dealing with a class-wide issue of superstructure structural issues," said Cmdr. Jason Salata, a spokesman for Naval Surface Forces in San Diego. "These are things we're seeing on other ships of this class."

The Port Royal situation might be the worst case to date.

"Most of the issues are being dealt with when the ships come in for a regular availability," or overhaul, said one source familiar with the situation. "This is the first one I know of where we specifically went in for repairs." The work is necessary, the source added, "to restore structural integrity of the ship."

The problem, according to the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), is the aluminum alloy used in the superstructure of the cruisers, which have steel hulls.

"There have been various degrees of crack repair on every CG [guided-missile cruiser] in the past year," said Chris Johnson, a NAVSEA spokesman in Washington. "The decking is the most prevalent cracking area due to exposure to elevated temperatures caused by solar absorption and exhaust temperatures."

More than 3,000 cracks have been found so far across the entire Ticonderoga class, which originally numbered 27 ships. Twenty-two of the ships remain in service, and Port Royal, commissioned in 1994, is the newest.

Their superstructures are made of aluminum alloy 5456, a material used on numerous U.S. warships since 1958. The alloy, according to NAVSEA, relies on approximately 5 percent magnesium as an alloying element to develop strength. Over time, the magnesium leaches out of the material and forms a film, susceptible to stress-corrosion cracking in a marine environment.

NAVSEA has developed more than 17 alterations to deal with the cracks. In late 2008, the service began evaluating a different welding technique called Ultrasonic Impact Treatment (UIT). The Port Royal was one of the test ships for the new technique, Johnson said, and the UIT procedure was applied to specific areas of the ship in 2009.

"With the current state of the technology, it is only practical to use UIT in small areas," Johnson said in a written statement. "We believe it has potential, and are evaluating it as part of CG Aluminum Superstructure Task Force for future use."

The task force was set up this year by NAVSEA - at the fleet's request - to develop and assess technically viable options, Johnson said. Results from the group's work are expected to appear next spring.

Many sailors who have served on a Ticonderoga-class cruiser have stories to tell about the cracks, ranging from descriptions of cracked masts to leaking fuel tanks next to high-wattage electrical equipment. Solving the issue is a key element in making sure the ships remain effective and safe to operate to the end of their planned 35- to 40-year service lives.

NAVSEA noted that the aluminum alloys used on the cruisers are not on the new littoral combat ships, which are built with commercial alloys 5083 and 6082.

"While the Navy has no current experience with this alloy, it is in wide use on commercial craft," Johnson said.

The Port Royal has seen little service since returning from its last deployment in June 2008. On Feb. 5, 2009, just after completing a three-month overhaul, the ship ran up on a reef just off the Honolulu airport, in clear sight of every aircraft taking off and landing at the airport, and visible from the beaches at Waikiki. The cruiser was refloated after three-and-a-half days on the reef and towed back to Pearl Harbor, where the commanding officer was relieved of his duties.

The Port Royal's hull, propellers and sonar dome received severe damage, and shipyard repairs continued into this year. After visiting Seattle in early August for Seafair, the cruiser caused a public relations stir when its wake washed up oysters on shore while operating near the Hood Canal.

Despite these problems, the ship apparently has not missed a deployment.

"Port Royal has not missed a scheduled deployment as a result of these repairs," Salata said. "She will continue her training and deploy in 2011."

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5202926&c=AME&s=SEA

Pentagon to Send Floating Base to Mideast - Paper

The Pentagon is going to send a large floating base to the Middle East, The Washington Post said.

The plan comes amid rising tensions with Iran, al Qaeda in Yemen and Somali pirates.

The USS Ponce, an amphibious transport docking ship that was scheduled to be decommissioned, will be retrofitted as a makeshift staging base for Navy SEALs, the paper said.

Navy officials told the Post the service is rushing to complete the retrofit and wants the Ponce in place by summer.

http://www.en.ria.ru/mlitary_news/20120128/170999566.html

Best destroyer in the world and most numerous. US should better opt for more Burks than those few DDG-1000.

It is mainly a surface strike vessel, Harpoon launchers have been removed and 60% of Mk 41 cells are fitted with Tomahawk LACM.

George1 wrote:It is mainly a surface strike vessel, Harpoon launchers have been removed and 60% of Mk 41 cells are fitted with Tomahawk LACM.

Its all around vessel. Two Mk 41 allowed it to launch variety of missiles for different purposes. Tomahawk is just one of them.

SM-2 for PGM/fighter/(even civilian ones) , SM-3 for ASAT/ballistic missiles, ESSM for point defence, ASROC for dealing with subs and offcourse Tomahawk for dealing with inland objectives.

Those ships are basically cruisers, calling them destroyers is funny at this point.


Their anti ship weaponry is still pretty weak though .

TR1 wrote:Those ships are basically cruisers, calling them destroyers is funny at this point.


Their anti ship weaponry is still pretty weak though .

Same as Type45, or Kuznjecov classification as cruiser LOL.

Yes US Harpoon is subsonic non stealth missile but on the other hand there is not much need of USN to fight other navies up to a point.

By far the greatest challenge that the Russian navy will face is in the EW domain because the following US EW systems do NOT have any shortcomings that can be exploited .

AN/WLR-1H(V)
AN/SLQ-32
AN/SSX-1
AN/SLQ-49 Chaff Buoy Decoy System

Why are you so convinced they have zero shortcomings?


No system is perfect.
Russian ships have always traditionally been heavy on the EW as well.

Sujoy wrote:By far the greatest challenge that the Russian navy will face is in the EW domain because the following US EW systems do NOT have any shortcomings that can be exploited .

AN/WLR-1H(V)
AN/SLQ-32
AN/SSX-1
AN/SLQ-49 Chaff Buoy Decoy System

If any, EW department is by far the most strickened area of US Navy's surface ships defensive structure ; the strong point of this structure is absolutely not in the EW capabilities, neither in the quality of the interceptors, but almsot exclusively in the very high quality of the integrated fleet level detection and tracking architecture (AEGIS) allowing a very efficient threat's detection, discrimination and assignation to each defensive system present on the networked ships ,obtaining so an holistic increase of perfomances.


AN/WLR-1H(V) is ridiculously outdated ,AN/SSX-1 is a stand alone system of AN/SLQ-32 Block 1B's spiral enhancement program (SEWIP program) adding Specific Emitter Identification -SEI- to the system ; image that Soviet planners don't even wasted a minute trying to compute theirs impact on possibility to hit of theirs most advanced ASCM against CBG ,so crushing was the advantages enjoyed by the data-sharing, swarm attacking salvos of P-500, P-700 or P-1000 on this defensive layer, you can figure by yourself what is the situation with today domestic "Kalibr" or "Oniks".


AN-SLQ-49 has been almost completely replaced by Nulka and both of them are ,obviously, almost completely useless against any high supersonic ASCM with in-built processor target discrimination algorithms, for not say swarm-attacking missiles exchanging target's data resultant from radar irradiation from very different angle of incidence


Also US Navy is perfectly aware that cannot count on those weak EW defensive solutions against any except the less sophisticated enemies and instead invest enormous resources to mantain high the level of its ship based integrated survellaince and tracking systems and of the related interceptors elements.

Mindstorm wrote:
Also US Navy is perfectly aware that cannot count on those weak EW defensive solutions against any except the less sophisticated enemies and instead invest enormous resources to mantain high the level of its ship based integrated survellaince and tracking systems and of the related interceptors elements.

All valid points . However, fact remains that only a saturation strike by employing ‘swarm’ tactics will possibly be able to overwhelm these air-defences . For example the Soviet naval doctrine envisaged that at least 24 supersonic ASCMs need to be fired to overwhelm these US EW systems.

As on this date Russia can and to a lesser extent China can overwhelm these EW systems. That said, this is a very cost prohibitive tactic. A better approach is to find out the technical shortcomings of these systems and exploit them . As on this date NO such technical countermeasures to these EW systems exist .

Soviet naval doctrine envisaged that at least 24 supersonic ASCMs need to be fired to overwhelm these US EW systems.

I don't know where you get this information ,but it is totally false (i have even read comical figures of 100-120 missiles on some media ).

The entire salvo of a single Pr. 1144 (20 3M45, for three missiles groups) ,by end of '80 years, was computed capable to destoy all by itself an entire CBG with a probability superior to 85% ,with one probable surviving dameged ship among the escort piquet.

EW systems on those ships was ,at the times and are even more today, almost totally powerless against those kind of highly sophisticated menaces .
Already the previous infinetely less sophisticated P-120 Malakhit had a dual mode terminal seeker (active radar and passive IR) capable of crossing data reference , and P-500 ,P-700 and P-1000 all had not only a dual mode active/passive terminal guidance, heavily armoured components, inbuilt ECM systems, satellites -Legenda- target position reference but was also capable of "swarm" data sharing and correlation to obtain a multisensor and multi incidence picture of target position rendering so (in the same way of several of theris coeval elements of ground based IADS ) totally worthless any kind of decoys and deceptive jamming.

The last element of the high lethality and ECCM reliability of those missiles was represented by the sheer high supersonic speed ; in facts this factor don't only was capable to render, without taking into account the features previously mentioned, theirs intecepton several dozen of times more difficult in respect to a subsonic missile , but render also false ship's positions for the effect of terminal countermeasures employment incompatible with any target vector data previously collected.


This is a video ,with english subtitles, with some informations on those missiles, give to it a look (for you could be interesting the notion that two-three BrahMos are sufficient to sink a modern aircraft carrier ,practically would be sufficient the BrahMos payload of a single Super Su-30MKI penetrating CBG's defence to add ,two-three hours after, a new coral barrier the size of a Nimitz class to the bottom of sea )



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-cm-f2JpiI

Mindstorm wrote:

Soviet naval doctrine envisaged that at least 24 supersonic ASCMs need to be fired to overwhelm these US EW systems.

I don't know where you get this information ,but it is totally false (i have even read comical figures of 100-120 missiles on some media ).

I am referring to a US fleet not a single destroyer or frigate .

Your remaining points are valid , but then as I said this a cost prohibitive exercise . Why ? Because apart part from the EW systems the destroyers , frigates , aircraft carriers will also use their anti cruise missile systems like Sea Sparrow, Phalanx and Sea Ram. Therefore , it makes far more sense to take out the EW systems technically . But then as I have already said "technical countermeasures" against these EW systems do NOT exist.

One possible way could be to use something like "Suter" which uses a data stream filled with algorithms to invade an EW system through its antennas.

Thanks for the video.

TR1 wrote:Why are you so convinced they have zero shortcomings?

I am not convinced and am always delighted to Learn. I do not say there are no shortcomings . There are NO technical shortcomings . You see the difference ? Now if you point out to docile problems of EMI shielding , elimination of dissimilar metals , communication bandwith etc that's a different thing . But overall NO technical shortcomings that can be taken advantage of .

TR1 wrote:No system is perfect.

As I said these systems can be overwhelmed by a barrage of missiles , which is a costly affair.

TR1 wrote:Russian ships have always traditionally been heavy on the EW as well.

But do NOT have TECHNICAL countermeasures against the EW systems I have listed . And the converse is also true that the US does NOT have TECHNICAL countermeasures against the EW systems on board Russian ships.

Sujoy wrote:By far the greatest challenge that the Russian navy will face is in the EW domain because the following US EW systems do NOT have any shortcomings that can be exploited .

AN/WLR-1H(V)
AN/SLQ-32
AN/SSX-1
AN/SLQ-49 Chaff Buoy Decoy System

Yes, these EW systems do NOT have any technology related shortcomings. Only way to destroy them is to overwhelm the system by dozens of stand off missiles.

Mindstorm wrote:
Also US Navy is perfectly aware that cannot count on those weak EW defensive solutions against any except the less sophisticated enemies and instead invest enormous resources to mantain high the level of its ship based integrated survellaince and tracking systems and of the related interceptors elements.

AN SLQ 32 in sufficient numbers ( which we have ) can jam any incoming hostile missile . The EW systems that are on board US ships are more than capable of taking out hostile missiles. The only option is a saturation strike , but that can be said about any aspect of warfare. Even a saturation strikes with ICBMS can make ABMs look obsolete.

I am referring to a US fleet not a single destroyer or frigate .

Single destroyer or frigate ?

I talk of an entire Carrier Battle Group -CVBG - not of a single ship .
Something say to me that you lack a clear picture of what chances have CVBG's defenses against advanced anti ship supersonic missiles.

Maybe some words from the someone of the US Navy's insiders involved will disperse a bit of mist:


http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5LkaU0wj714

But then as I have already said "technical countermeasures" against these EW systems do NOT exist.

Sorry Sujoy, but i are uncapable to understand what you mean here.

None of the EW systems you mentioned employ any revolutionary measure or solution, rather some are even badly outdated
Those systems are in no way different or better than those mounted on surface ships of the most advanced nations worldwide; literally even the most conventional of ASCM at world (leaving out high supersonic monsters capable of "swarm cooperative attacks" such as P-500,P-700 and p-1000) is designed to resist to similar "classic" kind of countermeasures : decoys, jamming and chaff/flares.

I truly don't understand, Sujoy.

Someone could rightly ask what are the measures implemented in an attacking system to overcome defensive systems employing new solutions: at example someone could question what measures should be involved in next generations torpedos - in the past designed only to resist to "soft-kill" defensive systems - to avoid interception by part of an innovative Paket-E/NK hard-kill anti-torpedo systems because it introduce a completely new level of defensive solutions to overcome in order to achieve its intended goal; AN/SLQ-32 or AN/SLQ-49 to the contrary don't represent anything worth of special attention.

AN SLQ 32 in sufficient numbers ( which we have ) can jam any incoming hostile missile .

Oh yes ,SPS-171/L005S/Sorbtsiya-S in suffiecient numbers ( which we have ) can jam any incoming hostile missile. Radar based AAM are doomed


Chances to jam sea skimming missiles (enjoying therefore a very low sidelobe's susceptibility), capable to create a swarm-like integrated picture of the targets composed by the multi-incidence active/passive radar data coming from each missile of the salvo (a capability unique still today among missiles in any category and in any nation worldwide) and with high supersonic speed[/b], therefore offering [b]enormously reduced times not only to overcome ECCM screening of the active half part of the seeker but also to eventually put a similar missile in a vector (compatible with the atacking missile's inertial guidance data) outside ship's projection ....all of that starting from AN SLQ 32's line of sight horizont !!) are ,for those reasons, technically very, very slim.


We are attempting to conduct a serious ,informed debate on the subject and you are more than agreeably invited to expose your position on the subject, it can be a resource for all of us.

Naturally this statement :

AN SLQ 32 in sufficient numbers ( which we have ) can jam any incoming hostile missile.

or this one

SPS-171/L005S/Sorbtsiya-S in suffiecient numbers ( which we have ) can jam any incoming hostile missile.

would never represent serious assertions on the related subjects

Is that video actually accurate?

For example, the fake signal creation by the Granit? How does it even detected an incoming missile? Is the false signal accurate?

Maybe I have been a slacker on my reading, but I have never even hear of this before.