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    Russia's Foreign Policy

    GarryB
    GarryB


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    Post  GarryB Mon Oct 07, 2024 5:34 am

    The second comment is true, but I would say misguided... the way the US has been acting I would not be surprised if Harris took the election by getting extra votes at 3am like Biden did against Trump that part of the unrest might include accusations against Russia and perhaps even violations of embassy rules where the US authorities start seizing materials... better to just remove it all before hand... there isn't a lot to discuss with America when it is in this sort of mood.

    You either agree with me or you are Putins puppet... there are no alternatives, which makes discussions impossible.

    I don't think it suggests Russia is about to attack, but if the US allows Kiev to strike targets deep inside Russia with HATO weapons with HATO advisors and therefore HATO joins the war then the US becomes a legitimate target...

    franco
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    Post  franco Fri Oct 11, 2024 10:36 pm

    German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said that telephone talks between German Chancellor Scholz and Russian leader Vladimir Putin will not take place due to the Kremlin's refusal. The head of the foreign policy department reported this to local media.

    Information about Scholz's desire to call Vladimir Putin and discuss the situation in Ukraine was spread in some German publications in early October. Der Tagesspiegel even conducted a survey among Germans about the advisability of Russian-German negotiations at the highest level.

    The sociological survey data showed that 59% of Germans approved of Scholz's possible call to the Russian president. Only 26% of respondents were against such a step. However, Baerbock disappointed the German majority.

    These days he [Vladimir Putin] is not even ready to talk to the German Chancellor on the phone – the German media quotes the head of the Foreign Ministry.

    However, today the German Chancellor is more ready for dialogue with the illegitimate president of Ukraine than with the Russian leader. Scholz met Volodymyr Zelensky in Berlin today and positively described the close ties between Germany and Ukraine. To the delight of the head of the Kiev regime, the German Chancellor announced a new military aid package worth 600 million euros.

    Olaf Scholz assured the Ukrainian guest that by the end of the year, Germany, with the participation of Belgium, Denmark and Norway, will allocate another 1.4 billion dollars to help Kiev. As a token of gratitude, Volodymyr Zelensky promised to familiarize the Chancellor with the “victory plan,” which Western media have already dubbed a “losing adventure.”

    https://topcor-ru.translate.goog/52442-vladimir-putin-otkazalsja-obschatsja-po-telefonu-s-sholcem-berbok.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en

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    GarryB
    GarryB


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    Post  GarryB Sat Oct 12, 2024 11:15 am

    These days he [Vladimir Putin] is not even ready to talk to the German Chancellor on the phone – the German media quotes the head of the Foreign Ministry.

    They don't listen do they... Putin said no talks while Ukrainian forces are on Russian soil, and they are still there... yet the German media and German politicians don't understand what is happening.

    Makes you wonder why they care if they don't want to listen and just want to make demands and speeches about how evil Putin and the Russians are... why would Putin ever talk to such people?

    Of course Merkel and Holland were no better and essentially lied to his face, so why talk to them?

    The US president is the only one worth talking to and until they are elected any agreements or talks now are a waste of time.

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    Kiko
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    Post  Kiko Thu Oct 24, 2024 10:33 am

    China and India gave Russia the main gift in Kazan, by Pëtr Akopov for RiaNovosti. 10.24.2024.

    Today, the Kazan BRICS summit will end with a meeting in an expanded format, including 13 countries whose applications to join the organization are a priority. An even larger number of states have expressed a similar desire, so in the foreseeable future, BRICS will face several waves of expansion. Quite recently, the group was "five", now it is "nine", but everyone remembers and understands which countries were at the origins of the process - Russia, China and India. It was with the RIC format in 2003 that BRICS began, and the idea of ​​​​uniting the three great Eurasian powers was put forward by Yevgeny Primakov back in 1998.

    The Russian elite of that time did not yet have a correct understanding not only of our geopolitical interests, but even of Russia's place in the world, but strategically and nationally minded statesmen like Academician Primakov (who was then the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) realized that relying on the integration of post-Soviet Russia with the West or even on a strategic partnership with it was futile. Russia needed to focus on the East , based both on national interests and on the desire to build a new, post-Western world order. And it was China and India, along with Russia, that were to become the three forces that could both promote it and consolidate the non-Western world around themselves.

    This concept has always been criticized by both our Westerners and Western geopoliticians, and not only because it absolutely did not meet their interests. Many believed that the contradictions between the three powers were so deep and diverse that their rapprochement could only be temporary and situational: well, yes, they want to limit the West's influence in regions of the world that are important to them or even reduce its shareholding in globalization, but sooner or later they will collide with each other (including in the struggle for spheres of influence), so that in general the Anglo-Saxons need not fear the emergence of a united front of non-Western powers under the leadership of Moscow , Beijing and Delhi.

    The West's hope that a Russian-Chinese strategic alliance was impossible lasted almost until the start of our operation in Ukraine - now it is not even customary to remember that this was the dominant concept among the Anglo-Saxons. Although China has not become an open military ally of Russia, everyone understands who is on which side of the barricades. The expectation that Beijing would sacrifice strategic relations with Russia for the sake of a tactical win in the growing confrontation with the United States has clearly failed.

    The West, of course, has not given up on trying to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing, but now it is doing so in the hope of a long-term perspective. In the meantime, the main bet is on playing out the contradictions between Beijing and Delhi - fortunately, there is something to work on there.

    Moreover, the territorial dispute, which is the main stumbling block on the path of Chinese-Indian rapprochement, is a legacy of colonial times, English rule over India and London's attempts to subjugate Chinese Tibet. That is, first they laid mines, and now they are trying to play on the contradictions.

    In 1962, they even went to war, which happened at a time when the closest allied relations between Moscow and Beijing had already developed a huge crack (and then completely slid into confrontation), and between Moscow and Delhi, sympathies and ties were only growing stronger. For the next two decades, the Moscow-Delhi-Beijing triangle essentially had two sides: China against the USSR and India. Beijing began to establish ties with Moscow and Delhi only in the mid-1980s, but even then there was no talk of a trilateral format: the USSR soon collapsed, power in Moscow ended up in the hands of the pro-Western elite, and Delhi continued to be wary of Chinese initiatives. Therefore, a real triangle began to take shape only at the beginning of this century, when the leadership of all three countries came to understand its importance.

    At the same time, Beijing and Delhi have failed to resolve territorial disputes, although after Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 , and Modi in 2014, strong leaders capable of strategic thinking took the helm of both countries. That is, they understand that border disputes and conflicts only play into the hands of the opponents of both countries, allowing the West to scare Delhi with "Chinese expansion" and put a spoke in the wheel of BRICS. Xi and Modi held several meetings, even in a special, unofficial format, visiting each other. But the last such meeting took place in the fall of 2019 in southern India, and then the pandemic hit.

    And soon after it began, in May-June 2020, there were bloody clashes between the two countries' militaries on the border in the Himalayas - after that, there were no more exchanges of visits. Moreover, Xi and Modi have not held a single meeting since then - they met a couple of times at international forums, communicated, but did not hold official negotiations.

    That is why it is so important that on Wednesday, on the sidelines of the summit in Kazan, the first meeting in five years between the Chinese President and the Indian Prime Minister took place. And the day before, it was announced that in recent weeks, diplomats and military personnel from both countries had held talks and reached agreements on border patrol mechanisms (or rather, the line of actual control), meaning that the situation had returned to the state before the clashes four years ago. It is clear that this was done specifically to make it possible to hold official talks between Xi and Modi, and such an agreement in itself is an extremely important achievement.

    Strengthening Indian-Chinese trust is of great importance for Russia and the entire non-Western world, which is why the meeting between Xi and Modi in Kazan is so important. Ultimately, the US should be deprived of the ability to influence relations in the RIC triangle - and this will be a significant contribution to strengthening BRICS.

    https://ria.ru/20241024/briks-1979677687.html

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    higurashihougi
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    Post  higurashihougi Tue Oct 29, 2024 5:44 pm

    Formal diplomatic talks between Vietnam and Russia at the end of BRICS.

    "The prestige of Comrade Putin and Russia nation is more and more increasing. We have the faith of victory in Comrade Putin, that Comrade will never be defeated by any enemies."

    Comment from some netizens: "Vietnam literally sh*ts on the face of Kiev government."

    https://www.facebook.com/K01Archive/videos/498720416500669

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    GarryB
    GarryB


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    Post  GarryB Wed Oct 30, 2024 7:07 am


    Comment from some netizens: "Vietnam literally sh*ts on the face of Kiev government."


    Based on the choices Kiev has made over the last decade and the friends it has chosen, I am guessing that is the sort of gay crap that would turn them on and make them loyal poodles... They probably opened their mouths when they saw those arse cheeks pucker.

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    Kiko
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    Post  Kiko Wed Nov 27, 2024 10:51 pm

    Russia Tests New Type of Policy in the East, by Timofey Bordachev, programme director of the Valdai Club. 11.27.2024.

    At a time when the contours of the international order in Europe are being determined on the battlefields, stability in the south-east requires initiative and patience from Moscow.

    The international policy of a great power is distinguished by the fact that even despite significant tension of forces in one of the geographical directions, it maintains a presence and activity in others. This is how the USA behaves, which from its island is always, including moments of crisis within, active in other regions of the world. And this is especially true for Russia, whose very geopolitical position opens up opportunities to participate in the affairs of Europe, the Middle East and Asia: it does not force one to do this, but rather creates the conditions to be omnipresent in Eurasia.

    Now, when the military-political crisis around Ukraine has reached another dramatic stage, the current week is also marked by politics in the East. Not in Asia, where our affairs are stabilized by a stable partnership with the People's Republic of China and friendly relations with other powers, except Japan, but closer - in the space of Central Asia and Afghanistan. There, the Russian presence has been preserved for several centuries - and no one is going to leave.

    The culmination of these events will be the state visit of the Russian President to Kazakhstan, which will also include a summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

    The day before, a large Russian delegation headed by Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk visited Afghanistan. Their contacts and negotiations with the ruling Taliban* movement (banned in Russia) in Kabul showed that Moscow takes a pragmatic view of the Taliban's achievements and views them as a resource rather than a problem for its regional policy. Moreover, few doubt the desire of Western countries to more vigorously "muddy the waters" in Central Asia as Russia achieves success in the Ukrainian direction. Here, our diplomacy and military development will take into account the likelihood of very alarming scenarios.

    The combination of attention to Afghanistan and Central Asia within one time period is not accidental: maintaining comparative stability in this area requires a comprehensive view of the entire region. In other words, we cannot fence ourselves off from Afghanistan because our allies are neighbors. And new destabilization on Afghan soil could lead to terrorists penetrating Central Asia. But the issue should not only be about protection from potential threats from Afghanistan: gradual stabilization of relations between Russia and the Taliban government is needed in order not to be locked within the former USSR. Policy in the East should be proactive.

    In modern conditions, given the need to solve our internal development problems, Russia cannot consider traditional approaches of the past – establishing direct control over these vast territories. Russia reached the borders of Central Asia in the middle of the 18th century and hesitated for more than 100 years. In the end, perhaps the only decision in those conditions was made – to include Central Asia in the Russian Empire. This saved its peoples from the penetration of British colonialism and the fate that befell India or the countries of Africa. However, already in the 20th century, Russia faced the problem that the security of Central Asia cannot be guaranteed without control over Afghanistan. The consequence was the tragic war of 1979-1989, which we do not have the best memories of. Now Russia approaches the region differently: through the involvement of its states in complex political and economic ties and assistance in their development.

    It is no coincidence that during the negotiations in Kabul, the Russian side pointed out the prospects of the trans-Afghan railway project. This idea has long been advocated by Russia's partners in Uzbekistan, for whom the Termez-Hairatan railway bridge could be a new "window" to world trade. And for the Afghan side, this is an opportunity to export to the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union, connecting to the markets of Eurasia. The political side of any "North-South" transport projects is also of great importance . Unfortunately, the main way our opponents in the United States exercise power over others is to maintain most countries in a state of poverty and political weakness. Therefore, Russian countermeasures are aimed at making neighbors stronger, strengthening their statehood and increasing self-confidence.

    As Deputy Prime Minister Overchuk noted following the talks in Kabul, Russia views the railway project through Afghanistan as "key to improving connectivity in the Central Asian region and Eurasia as a whole, one of the elements of our large project of the international transport corridor "North-South", which should connect the countries of Northern Eurasia with the Global South." Moreover, a unique situation has now developed for Afghanistan over the past 45 years, in which the government controls the entire territory of the country. Russia has experience in developing large-scale transport and logistics systems, it has much to offer our partners in the region. And to receive significant economic benefits from this through new access to the markets of the Global South.

    Kazakhstan, in turn, forms the northern part of a vast region not separated from Russia by any topographic boundaries. The position of this state in the context of the conflict between Russia and the West is dual.

    On the one hand, Astana is committed to allied relations with Moscow and adequately assesses Russia's potential. It is no coincidence that President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev outraged the West with his recent statement that "it is impossible to defeat Russia." Therefore, there is little doubt that the visit of the head of the Russian state to Astana will now take place at the highest level, and the decisions taken will further strengthen our trade and economic relations. Moreover, they are already on the rise - in 2023, trade turnover reached a record 27 billion dollars, Russia accounts for 18% of foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan. The latter is especially important given that we are talking about a country where the main sector is energy, where Western companies have had a strong presence since the 1990s. In addition, in the context of friendly competition with Uzbekistan, the Kazakh authorities are interested in Astana appearing as the center of international life in Eurasia.

    On the other hand, it was Kazakhstan that experienced a crisis in recent times , which called into question the very internal stability, if not the survival of the state. In January 2022, the head of the republic even asked for help from the CSTO peacekeepers to restore order on the streets and stop mass outrages. Now it is Kazakhstan that attracts special attention from Western powers, which is expressed in the active financing of anti-Russian sentiments among part of the elite and intelligentsia. In this regard, observers are somewhat concerned about cooperation between the governments of Central Asian countries and the United States, even in purely technical matters, such as software for foreign trade activities.

    It is no secret that Americans seek to spy on the entire world. Any interaction with them by developing countries inevitably entails the creation of new opportunities for US special services, whose intentions are never good. Russia understands this very well. But they also know what difficult conditions our friends and allies find themselves in in relations with the West. Much was done in the 1990s that leads to vulnerability to blackmail and pressure from the West. And the process of nationalization of the elite, especially the economic one, took a significant amount of time even in Russia.

    Now, when the contours of the international order in Europe are being determined on the fields of armed confrontation, stability in the south-east direction requires Moscow to combine initiative and patience.

    https://vz.ru/opinions/2024/11/27/1300130.html

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    Kiko
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    Post  Kiko Sun Jan 12, 2025 10:03 am

    Russia Returns Afghanistan to Greater Eurasia, by Gevorg Mirzayan for VZGLYAD. 01.12.2025.

    "Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban in its current form is much better for Russia than Afghanistan before their return to power." These are the words used by experts to comment on one of the main expected foreign policy news of 2025 – the probable exclusion of the Taliban* movement from the list of terrorists. How does Russia benefit from cooperation with the Taliban regime today?

    One of the most important events of 2025 in the Central Asian direction will most likely be the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and the new Afghan authorities – that is, the Taliban. Moscow has already made a fundamental decision to exclude the Taliban* from the Russian list of terrorist organizations.

    In addition, a law was signed in late December 2024 that introduces a mechanism for this process. Such a decision can be made on the basis of a statement from the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, provided that the organization has ceased its activities aimed at supporting, justifying and promoting terrorism.

    And the Taliban stopped this propaganda long ago. "The current Taliban do not claim expansion and the creation of a global caliphate. They are not allies of other extremist terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda* or the Islamic State*, but, on the contrary, they even fight with them," Dmitry Suslov, deputy director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, explains to the Vzglyad newspaper.

    The normalization of relations between the Russian Federation and the Taliban is necessary for Russia for several reasons. First of all, it corresponds to the Russian principle of working with the authorities of the country that rule it (unless these authorities are pursuing a policy hostile to the Russian Federation). And the Taliban are in power there now.

    "There is no other authority in Afghanistan. And if we want to solve some problems there and guarantee our security in this area, then there is simply no one else to negotiate with," Nikita Mendkovich, head of the Eurasian Analytical Club, explains to the Vzglyad newspaper.

    Over the several years of being in power (i.e. since the summer of 2021), the Taliban has been able to demonstrate its resilience and, most importantly, its ability to negotiate. “The new government has stabilized, overcome the period of upheaval and, most importantly, demonstrated a non-hostile attitude towards us and a desire to negotiate and cooperate,” continues Nikita Mendkovich.

    Some may not like the specifics of the Taliban's domestic policy. But Moscow does not interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states and does not teach them how to live. For Russia, the main thing was that the country did not pose a threat to Russian security and other interests. And Taliban Afghanistan does not – unlike pre-Taliban Afghanistan.


    "Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban in its current form is much better for Russia than Afghanistan was before their return to power. After all, one of the main irritants and threats for Moscow emanating from this country was the presence of the United States in the country. A presence that, from the Russian point of view, undermined its security and influence in the Central Asian region, and also brought instability in all senses," says Dmitry Suslov.

    Now, according to the expert, the return of the US to Afghanistan under the Taliban is excluded. Moreover, their absence in Afghanistan minimizes or, at least, reduces the influence of the Americans in Central Asia.

    And, of course, it reduces the flow of drugs into Russia. From the end of 2022 to the end of 2023, the Taliban managed to reduce the area of ​​poppy fields in the country by almost 95%. “This is what happens when the one who was really interested in exporting heroin to Russia and other countries leaves the region,” says Deputy Head of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev.

    "The previous pro-American government of Afghanistan and the American army stationed there were in no way able to improve the situation related to Afghan heroin and drug trafficking and extremism. They also could do nothing about the presence of the Central Asian branch of the Islamic State in Afghanistan," explains Dmitry Suslov.

    Restoring relations with the Taliban allows us to solve not only security issues, but also implement economic projects. First of all, transit ones. "Within the framework of the Russian project of the Greater Eurasian Space and the Chinese project "Belt and Road", many things pass through Afghanistan. Various corridors north-south and west-east," says Dmitry Suslov.

    For Russia, of course, the most important direction is "North-South". In the conditions of the blockade from the West, attempts to lock Russian ships in the Baltic and Black Seas, Moscow needs access to southern ports and partners from the Global South.

    "Our interests in the region include transit through Central Asia and Afghanistan to the countries of South Asia. First of all, to Pakistan, then to India. This is also an outlet to a large market for a wide variety of raw materials. For example, gas, the demand for which in Pakistan, for example, is growing at a very fast pace. In addition, this is an outlet to the coast of the Indian Ocean, from where we can freely move our goods to almost any point in the world," says Nikita Mendkovich.

    And to implement these projects – expensive and slow – a set of investment and other agreements with Afghanistan is, of course, necessary.

    Finally, the Afghan subsoil is of interest to Russian investors. "Afghanistan has large undeveloped mineral deposits - from lithium to rich iron ore deposits. Both we and China are interested in them," says Nikita Mendkovich. However, unlike the Chinese, the Russians have the experience of Soviet engineers, who once conducted exploration of Afghan deposits.

    All this requires an official dialogue with the new Afghan authorities. However, establishing this dialogue here and now will not be easy. And it is not just a matter of bureaucratic procedures – in restoring diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, Moscow must take into account the interests of its allies. Interests – and fears.

    "The United States is putting pressure on countries like India and Tajikistan - that is, states that were more afraid than others of the Taliban coming to power and therefore took the most confrontational and uncompromising approach to the Taliban. The Americans are trying in every way to sow discord both in the process of integrating Afghanistan into the regional international community and between local states on the Afghan issue," says Dmitry Suslov.

    In particular, they convince India and Tajikistan that Moscow and Beijing, building relations with the Taliban, are going against the interests of New Delhi and Dushanbe. Accordingly, Russia is now making every effort to ensure that India and Tajikistan at least understand that their interests are not threatened. And at most, they get involved in integrating the new, post-American Afghanistan into projects of the greater Eurasian space.

    * The organization (organizations) have been liquidated or their activities are prohibited in the Russian Federation.

    https://m.vz.ru/world/2025/1/12/1307940.html
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    mnztr


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    Post  mnztr Wed Jan 15, 2025 7:35 am

    With so much focus on East Eurasia, has there been any talk about selecting an Eastern Capital for Russia? With such a massive nation a major pivot east it would make sense for Russia to designate a city in the east to act as a hub. Would Vladivostok make the most sense or Khabarovsk
    ?

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