Russian Spetsnaz Forces Thread

Saker interview with “Ramzes” – a Spetsnaz GRU officer

http://thesaker.is/saker-interview-with-ramzes-a-spetsnaz-gru-officer/

The Saker: Please introduce yourself in a few words, tell us which Brigade you served in, what rank you achieved there and what your military speciality was?

Ramzes: My GRU Spetsnaz call sign was Ramzes. I was born in Russia. I began service in 1994 and finished service in 1999. I was an airborne cadet for four years and served as an officer with the rank of lieutenant for one year after that. I served in the 16th Brigade of the GRU Spetsnaz based out of Chuchkovo. I was the commander of 25 GRU Spetsnaz soldiers. As the commander of this group it was mandatory that I was proficient and educated as a sniper, explosives & ordnace specialist, radio communication as well as use of the English language. To be a Spetsnaz commander you must be trained in all aspects of warfare employed by your entire unit.

In Spetsnaz GRU there is no platoon structure per se as in regular army units, we operate as a group and although command line is respected, all members of the group are active in intelligence and planning as well as mission execution. In Spetsnaz everybody is aware of the full situation and they all have the responsibility and opportunity to think about what the mission is and to weigh in at any time and if needed to think and operate on their own if required. Every member of the group must be able to act independently without needing immediate orders, yet knowing what the full scope of the mission is. They can all address the situation and assess and contribute their opinion on operations. As a commander I listen to everybody and make the final decision. This makes Spetsnaz more effective.

The Saker: There are many elite units in the Russian military, including the SOBR and ODON units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Alpha and Vympel Spetsnaz of the FSB, the 4 divisions and 8 brigades of the VDV, the Navy’s Spetsnaz units, the “Zaslon” unit of the SVR, etc. How would you compare these forces to the 7 Spetsnaz GRU brigades? What makes the Spetsnaz GRU unique and different?

Ramzes: In the beginning Spetsnaz was only GRU. They are the original and some say true Special Forces. During the 1990’s the reputation of the Spetznas was renowned throughout Russia and deeply respected. At this time all the forces created there own Spetsnaz units to piggyback on the reputation and elite status of the original GRU Spetsnaz. The very identity of Spetsnaz became a catch word for the elite unit within all of the various military and security organisations.

Now if you say that you are Spetsnaz there is more responsibility to live up to a certain reputation as the situation in Russia is exceptionally more advanced and capable compared to the 90’s.

Originally the main operational concept of the Special Forces was to execute our missions on the territory of the enemy. Now there are domestic Spetsnaz and all sorts of various Spetsnaz delegations that were not trained for foreign incursions like the original GRU Spetsnaz.

When we were trained all GRU Spetsnaz were educated in one or more several key languages. Farsi, Mandarin, English, Arabic, French. Now they learn a greater variety of languages. For example during the Afghan War our Spetsnaz were fluent in various local dialects and after this experience this practice was expanded.

The Saker: It is often reported that there are Spetsnaz GRU units formed exclusively of officers and NCOs which are used in more complex and demanding operations. Is that so and, if yes, are these units part of the Spetsnaz Brigades or are they directly depending on the 5th (or 8th?) GRU Directorate in Moscow?

Ramzes: I can say only this. There are GRU Spetsnaz groups that consist of only officers. Every group will be working under the directorate of the GRU. Of course the most difficult and delicate missions are for groups composed of officers only officers and NCO’s.

The Saker: As far as I know, the original primary mission of the Spetsnaz GRU forces was the detection of NATO missile launchers and associated command posts, combined with deep reconnaissance and diversionary attacks. During the Eltsin years Spetnaz GRU forces were used in all sorts of manners which have very little to do with their original mission: they were used as infantry, as assault units, as anti-terrorist units, as protection units for generals, etc. Is that still the case today and how to you see the future of the Spetsnaz GRU and what kind of missions would you want them assigned to?

Ramzes: Detecting missile launch sites was only one (of many) mission designations of GRU Spetsnaz units. I think active serving Spetsnaz of GRU were never used for any security detail for Generals. They had other missions, again always on foreign soil.

Security is provided by other teams not GRU. Even during Yeltsin years GRU Spetsnaz were only assigned to foreign territory. Protection of generals, assault troops, anti-terrorist Spetsnaz of MVD (police) not GRU. Not exclusively however, there are several incidents when GRU Spetsnaz did assist when large scale assaults on domestic territory were active, like various scenarios in chechnia, but again very rare.

Of course retired GRU officers can enter into active duty with MVD or other units if they choose after they finish their service w/ the GRU.

As for what I would like to see them assigned to – that depends on the situation, but of course the main idea is to protect Russia.

The Saker: The 16th Spetsnaz Brigade saw combat in Afghanistan, Tadjikistan, Chechnia, the North Caucasus and Abkhazia and soliders from this Brigade also served in Kosovo. I also have very strong suspicions that the Brigade was sent into Moscow in 1993 in the days right after the end of the combats around the White House and the Ostankino Tower. Did these conflicts trigger changes inside the organization or training of the Brigade? Which of those wars were the most difficult ones for the Brigade?

Ramzes: Perhaps this question is not the right one to ask or it is phrased in a way that can not clearly be answered. For example regarding the wars, it depends on the specific mission, there could be one mission in Afghanistan that was a complete success and one in Chechnia that was a terrible failure but we can not assess based on region or war, but based on each individual mission. Considering this we can say that Afghanistan provided the most rich experience simply due to the duration and variety of the missions. While Chechnia had some intense and complex missions GRU Spetsnaz were not deployed in this conflict as much as the general public assumes, as again this was on domestic territory.

None of these conflicts resulted in any diametric changes within the GRU Spetsnaz, yet the training and tactics are constantly evolving. If you are an officer or soldier for Spetsnaz your mission is to serve the people of Russia exclusively and at all times. I can personally say that the 16th were very clever soldiers who understood their situation and that the commanders could never nor would ever order their units to take any aggressive action against citizens of the RF, nor act as crowd control against the people of Russia, especially as per the situation inside Moscow during 1993, no GRU Spetsnaz were involved in these incidents.

Of course the Spetsnaz GRU always modernizes and updates tactics and strategy from experience. When I was a cadet we learned things that the cadets today probably do not learn due to the rapidly evolving nature of missions, experiences, technology, tactics and geopolitics.

During WW2 we had one specific tactic and now we have various tactics and the differences are understandably very significant. For example better equipment, improved battlefield awareness, logistics… Of course the basic ideas and principles are the same but also much improved.

Today of course their is much more money to fund and supply our soldiers than in the 90’s and our technology is now highly advanced and is far greater today then when I served.

I am envious of what equipment they have to work with today. GRU Spetsnaz are in all likelihood far stronger and more capable today than they were when I was in service, however at the core we have the same ideals and work habits.

The Saker: How surprised were you when the Polite Men in green conducted an absolutely brilliant operation in Crimea which they managed to secure without a single person being shot even though the peninsula was full of elite Ukrainian units including many sent from the western Ukraine? Does this operation show that the modern Spetsnaz GRU forces are as good as the old Soviet ones or, possibly, that they have become even better than the used to be?

Ramzes: Was I surprised, well yes, but I understand that such success is possible, even 20 years ago it was possible. Taking the enemy whole without the loss of life is one of the greatest ways to achieve victory in any mission. This is a very significant example of mission success. This is a case when the art of martial tactics shines more brilliantly than the forces of war.

Of course GRU Spetsnaz is now better than 20 years ago. With better equipment, radio, satellite, weapons, GPS etc… It all provides huge advantages. The reduction in weight alone is a massive operational advantage as well as the reduced size of technology used and what it can achieve. We had a compass and map, today they have smart phones and gadgets that provide truly amazing intelligence and tactical capabilities to out groups.

The Saker: The Urkonazi junta is constantly claiming that Spetsnaz GRU units are operating in the Donbass. Purely in theory, would you say that that this is possible or do you completely exclude such a possiblity. Please explain the reasons for your reply. What do you make of this video:

Ramzes: As for there being Spetznas in Donbass – you can have it both ways. It is extremely unlikely, but however, well anything is possible.

Just as it is possible that GRU Spetsnaz can be in the USA, Canada, Germany, Israel, Saudi Arabia at this moment. They might even be in China, Venezuela or Iran etc…

But GRU will not be operating inside Russia.

American readers need not to worry, no GRU Spetsnaz will be popping up in front of the White House or on Wall Street anytime soon, wearing telnyashkas and sporting prison tattoos with big beards etc… These Hollywood stereotypes do not reflect a true active GRU Spetsnaz soldier, so don’t believe the scripts. You will never know we are there.

Reconnaissance is one of our main missions. Our tactics are to never engage in direct battle, we will only engage once we are shot upon. If we are discovered, several people might stay behind to fight while the rest of the group will disappear.

Maybe there are retired ex-military Spetsnaz personnel who are acting independently trying to help the people of Donbass, if the Ukranians catch retired personnel and discover the previous identities than they may make such claims, but it is NO active GRU unit would be involved in such manners. That is not our function. Also if someone is tortured they will say anything. Intelligence obtained under duress and bodily harm is never accurate. It is only used for public consumption. So if a personal is captured they can be forced to say anything, it means very little.

If I left to Donbass by the command of my heart to help the people and was captured, they would claim they caught a Spetsnaz officer, but I would be acting on my own. As a Spetsnaz officer we would never wear any distinguishing badges or marks, nor reveal our identities.

If you think about it – no GRU Spetsnaz unit of 12-25 men would stay and engage in a fire fight against 200 Azov or Right Sector soldiers. That would be stupid. Spetsnaz do not engage in stupidity. This whole video wreaks of disinformation and I do not think it holds much validity. It is for public consumption like Hollywood movies it does not reflect real warfare tactics.

The Saker: There are constant rumors about US and Polish special forces operating on the Urkonazi side. Again, in theory, do you think that this is possible? What would the foreign special forces offer which the Ukrainian special forces would not be capable of?

Ramzes: I think it is very possible. I think they are helping behind the line of contact, providing expert advisors who tell the private armies and the Ukrainian soldiers what to do, how to do it, when to do it and so on… They will be coaching and encouraging these people how to fight. Providing intelligence, equipment and strategy but most likely not engaged in the fighting. You may have individuals among the Right Sector or Azov Battalions across the line of contacts, but most likely no American or Polish units or groups operating as they would typically.

It is now very much like it was in Georgia during the 90’s and now again today. Americans and other nationals provide most of the training, provide the equipment and intelligence but do not engage in battle themselves.

As far as Maidan, nobody knows whether it was Polish snipers or Right Sector snipers there on the roofs. This is very difficult to assess and most likely has many complexities that provide cover for the actual shooters who pulled the trigger. What is clear is that is was a provocation and that there was a significant amount of preparation and situational awareness involved. So is the Ukrainian president the one ordering a provocation to unseat himself? This is how shallow the logic and propaganda is, not very difficult to debunk.

Imagine that if the Ukrainian president was reluctant to use his Berkut Riot police to quell the situation on the ground at the line of contact then it makes zero sense that he had the will or stomach to give orders to unleash snipers on an open crowd. Plus the shells and exit wounds clearly show the same weapons were used to hit and kill both the Ukrainian Berkut Riot police and the rioters themselves.

Perhaps it was a mistake for the Ukrainian President to not order the Berkut to properly control the situation, they had the means to do so. The USA understood that at this moment there was weakness in the command structure (it is entirely possible that they manufactured this weakness as well, political and private leverage is also a weapon and tactic used as well) at this critical moment and exploited that event to maximize chaos on the ground and degeneration of social order. Once the Fog of War is as thick as the smoke from the burning tires it becomes difficult to explain and events begin to unfold too fast to keep the public attuned to what matters. By the time the smoke clears it is too late, chaos has sewn its seeds.

This was an extremely difficult position to be put into. Maybe the Ukrainian president is just a regular human not a military man. I myself may not know what order I would give in I was in his shoes if I had to order my Berkut soldiers to kill civilians my own civilians even if they are wild Maidan protestors encouraged by inserted terrorists, they are still people.

Americans might see him as being a weak leader with not the stomach to shed blood to maintain power, but as a Russian I understand that these people have families and loved ones too. Ask yourself if you could order your Berkut soldiers to kill and subdue a massive mob like that. It is not an easy question to resolve. In hindsight we can say that giving this order would have saved thousands of lives and likely helped their economy greatly, but in the moment things are not clear and nobody can predict the future. This is an area where civilian leadership may lead to more bloodshed than military leadership.

The Saker: What is your take on the murder of Alexei Mozgovoi. Do you believe that it is possible for a Ukrainian or NATO diversionary unit to have acted so deep behind the front lines and, if yes, could they have succeeded without an accomplice inside the LRN giving them the information about the schedule and route taken by Mozgovoi?

Ramzes: I think that it is possible. In no way is this good for DNR and LNR headquarters. Mozgovoi was a clever and very strong commander. Many people did not like him within the LNR and DNR but they all knew they needed him as he prooved his battle expertise. His value was well understood and this along with his passionate views made him unpopular to some, but nobody within the LNR or DNR would dare execute this murder, it would be treason.

Mozgovoi was more of a problem for the Ukrainian and American interests as his battlefield awareness and command was responsible for many successes.

Many Ukrainian Spetsnaz were trained by Russian GRU back in the day, they were trained well and are familiar with our methods. Many people from the Ukraine can penetrate deep into DNR and LNR structures without being detected. It is an extremely complicated scenario due to our long common history. Now we have external agents acting on these people and anything is possible.

I know people personally who are actual brothers who are currently fighting on opposite sides of this war. They understand that this war is not needed by the people. They have no choice in the matter though, as they must act to save their families.

If you are a Ukrainian man and wish to stay at home and avoid this war you will likely be killed by Right Sector or Azov Battalion agents. Also if they choose to escape to Russia their homes and possessions will be taken. But however, if you go to fight against DNR & LNR then OK go ahead and fight. Many people in the Ukrainian Army see the only way to save their family and possessions is to join the Ukrainian Army because there is no choice. For this reason you see many people who fight when clearly their heart is not into it, they do not want to kill their brothers and cousins but are being forced to do so by fascist thugs who are running across the country acting with crazy brutality and with full impunity. You see this wherever certain geopolitical actors are involved. Rule by terror and chaos.

May people from LNR & DNR speak directly with Ukrainian military who understand that this is a political situation and actively coordinate fire positions so as to not kill one another. For example brothers who previously served in Afghanistan together will do what they can to avoid killing one another now that they find themselves on opposite sides of the battle. But this only applies to the Ukrainian Army and the DNR & LNR. The Pravy Sektor and Azov Battalions as well as private mercenaries are the main units causing all the damage, chaos, terror and violence while the others are trying to avoid the politics and ride out the violence.

As for Mozgovoi’s death. Of course their could be deep intelligence penetration inside the LNR, their could also be high tech reconnaissance from USA intercepting communications w/out a physical spy inside actively betraying Mozgovoi’s route.

The Saker: Recently there have been speculations in the Russian media about MH17 being shot down by a BUK missile after all. In that hypothesis the Ukrainians managed to drive a BUK missile launcher into the the territory of the DNR undetected and then fired at MH17. Do you believe that it is possible for a Ukrainian crew drive a MH17 missile launcher undetected into the DNR-controlled territory and fire it in order to blame the Novorussians for the shot?

Ramzes: I have a special attitude regarding this. I was in the sky on July 17th at the exact time MH17 was shot down. I saw a military military plane in the sky. There is only one military plane that can be in the sky at this time. Only a Ukrainian military jet could be in the airspace at that time. I was not the only person who saw this military plane. Many of us saw it. I saw it with my own eyes.

The state that media then reported that Ukrainians denied having a plane in the air at that time. So ask yourself why are they lying?

I checked an American run flight path tracking website and I saw my commercial flight, I saw MH17, I saw that at that exact time (20 minutes after MH17) my commercial plane’s flight path was logged on this website. The next day discussing this with fellow officers and friends we looked at the website again and in less than 24 hours my commercial flight was not on this web site . Why would they delete the flight record of a commercial flight? This is a daily scheduled flight from Greece to Russia. This flight appears on the July 16 and on July 18, and it was there on July 17 as per its regular schedule yet it was removed from the record on July 17th.

If a BUK was also involved it makes sense, as military redundancy is always a practice employed when striking a target. It makes sense to have it hit by military jets, then by a BUK then by a bomb inside the aircraft and so on… This all points to a high level of preparation for this attack. However I do not think this was executed by high level professional operatives, it was most likely done by someone who could order ground units and planes to attack (read Oligarch) but not someone slick enough to have a bomb on board or make this look like an accident (read CIA or Special Ops). It could be CIA if they wanted to make it look like an Oligarch to trigger anger and a response. Again anything is possible but we know 100% it was not local fighters from the DNR or LNR. Especially not with Russia in any way supporting such craziness.

The event was made to be the most important news, which implies it was a diversionary tactic for public consumption while on the ground troops were amassing and preparing for and initiating battles. Again, it was a cover for engagement. Clearly the LNR and DNR are suing for peace as is Moscow.

So this tragedy was a clear and important pivot to make the world to pay attention and while the world paid attention to MH17 other orders were being executed on the ground to create the pretext for a full war.

Thank you for providing the blog service for your readers world wide. Dear Saker readers please do help by making a donation as we understand in Russia that the information warfare in Western countries is relentless, this campaign is being conducted against us and that we deeply appreciate the time, energy and effort it takes to stand tall and speak truthfully. Together we can act as an effective Spetsnaz group. To know the whole situation and to individually do what needs to be done.

Mozgovoi was a man driven by his consciousness he was a man of principals and actions. Let his soul observe us all continuing to support what he dies for – the truth and lasting peace.

Thank you and God Bless.

Special forces’ unit commander killed in clashes with rebels in Tajikistan — source

The commander of the special forces’ Alpha Group was one of the four servicemen killed in the clashes that continue in Tajikistan’s Ramit mountain gorge

DUSHANBE, September 16. /TASS/. Four servicemen, including special forces’ Alpha Group commander Colonel Rustan Amakiyev, have been killed in clashed with militants from the armed grouping of former deputy defense minister Abdukhalim Nazarzoda in the Ramit mountain gorge in Tajikistan, a source close to the headquarters of the anti-terrorist operation told TASS on Wednesday.

Clashes broke out last night 60 kilometers to the east of Dushanbe in Tajikistan’s Ramit mountain gorge and still continue. The details of the incident have been officially reported yet.

On September 4, the rebellious general together with his supporters staged two terrorist attacks in Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe and Vahdat, in the country’s west. Nazarzoda seized a large amount of weapons and hid in the Ramit Gorge. Nine police officers were killed as a result of the criminals' attacks and 12 others were wounded. More than 100 terrorists have been detained in an anti-terrorist operation that followed the attacks. Twelve of them surrendered arms voluntarily. Twenty-two were killed in clashes with law enforcers. The anti-terrorist operation is still underway.

Tajik prosecutor general’s office initiated a criminal case against Nazarzoda, the former defense minister, on charges of high treason, terrorism, organizing an extremist group and sabotage. Similar charges were brought against Nazarzoda’s "closest supporter" Colonel Dzhunaidullo Umarov, who took active part in setting up a criminal group and attacking policemen in Dushanbe and Vakhdat. The prosecutor general’s office also said Nazarzods possessed a "big business" and dozens of illegally privatized assets."

Over the years of the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992-1995, Nazarzoda, dubbed Khalim, was a field commander of the Tajik armed opposition. After a peace deal was signed in June 1997, Nazarzoda was commissioned to the Tajik army under the programme of reintegration of former opposition gunmen. In 2014, he was promoted to the rank of Major General and appointed deputy defense minister. He was dismissed from the post by President Emomali Rakhmov on Friday, September 5, for "committing a crime."

Military innovation in an authoritarian state - Russian special forces.

Organization and principles of application of Russian special operations forces since 2008 have undergone significant changes. Reduce the number of special forces (Spetsnaz), is managed by the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff (GS) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Russian Armed Forces), have changed their subordination and objectives. To top it all, in March 2013 was formed fundamentally new structure - the command of special operations forces (KSSO).

Immediately after the end of August (2008), the war with Georgia, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov has initiated a comprehensive radical reform of the Russian Armed Forces. The reform has had a major impact on the Russian special operations forces. Transformation started at Anatoly Serdyukov, apparently, were continued under his successor, Sergei Shoigu. Meanwhile, the use of these forces in the ongoing conflict in 2014 in the south-east of Ukraine demonstrates the relevance of this kind of research.

The Russian view on the use of special operations forces

For obvious reasons, the principles of the use of Russian military components of their special operations forces in the public domain to date does not spell out in detail. Despite this, it is possible to get some ideas about the basic installation position on the issue of open source. Some of these sources describe the combat and numerical strength, armaments and equipment, as well as the organizational structure of the special operations forces, while others analyze their use in hostilities in the post-Soviet period. In addition, some of these sources present some theoretical positions from the scope of special operations forces.

Military historian Simon Engle identified three based tasks to be undertaken by the majority of special forces around the world, reconnaissance and surveillance (surveillance and reconnaissance), attacks on important targets (offensive action against important targets), and support for anti-government forces and through it to influence the internal political stability (support and influence). This classification task is almost identical to that contained in the official doctrine of NATO Special Operations. Last distinguishes special intelligence (special reconnaissance), subversive action (direct action) and organization of the rebel movement (military assistance). In this case, NATO classification will help to structure the discourse of the Russian approach to the special operations, as Western countries can now be considered a world leader in the construction of these forces.

Russian discourse theory and special operations

Simon Engle writes, that special operations "do not have a guru or great theorist". The same conclusion come from Russian experts in the field. According to a former officer of GRU Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov, the development of the theory of special operations in Russia - it is something that remains to be done. One of the reasons for this state of affairs calls another veteran of the Special Forces, Major-General Sergei Kanchukov. According to him, in the Soviet military tradition always present a certain bias to the special operations forces, like the typical tool of Western imperialism. Since the Soviet Union condemned this very imperialism discourse on the use of special operations forces tend to limit their contribution to the territorial defense of the country, but not beyond.[2]

Vladimir Kvachkov - one of the few Russian officers who took part in the development of the official theory of the use of special operations forces in Russia. From 2004 to 2008 Kvachkov was developing a policy document on the future of Russian SOFs. Development of the document came to nothing, but later, in a thematic collection of a group of authors, in the chapter "Use of special operations forces in the modern world", he presented a list of what, in his view, beyond the scope of the task of forming a special purpose:

• sabotage special actions (raids and sabotage);

• sabotage and reconnaissance special activities (special reconnaissance);

• Special anti-sabotage activities (combating enemy SOF);

• information-psychological special actions (psychological operations);

• specific actions to ensure the safety of allied states (military assistance);

• support special actions to secure their own general-purpose forces (support for one's own non-SOF forces);

• Special search and rescue activities (search and rescue operations);

• special actions to secure peace-keeping operations (peace support operations)

This list of challenges is not much different from what is in front of the Western SOF. One of the few important differences - this resistance SOF opponent. Normally, such challenges to Western SOF not put. Western view is that SOF lose their advantages when used against forces similar in structure and preparation. General purpose forces often have a significant advantage in firepower, and so they are more suited for countering enemy SOF than forming its own special purpose.

Another important difference is the western theory of special operations by the Russian is that the first is much more attention to operations at a considerable distance from their own territory. Modern Western theory of special operations, seems to be more focused on the contribution of special forces to secure action peacekeeping force to stabilize the situation in conflict zones. On the other hand, the Russian theory of special operations, the focus is the protection of its own territory. Russia also has considerable experience in combating irregular units from Afghanistan to the North Caucasus, but this experience has never prevailed in the Russian military theory of the paradigm of the Second World War. Countering threats to symmetric always dominated and continues to dominate the Russian military theory.

Kvachkov claims that 5-7% of the armed forces are to act in special ways, behind enemy lines, enough to radically change the situation in its backyard. Output in the enemy's rear a similar amount of its forces to act in special ways to attract the enemy force to deal with them half of their forces and equipment. For Kvachkov, special forces is a tool that is able to "deprive the enemy of the concept of the boundary between the front and rear" .

The share of the Special Forces in the 5-7% of the size of the armed forces - a higher rate than in most countries today. Stoll Loterud argues that the SOF, usually on the order of 1-3% of the total strength of the armed forces. According to rough estimates, Russian special forces now number about 14 thousand people (12 thousand - In the Spetsnaz GRU brigades of the General Staff, 1.5 thousand. - In structures KSSO, 700 - in the 45th Airborne Brigade Spetsnaz). This represents 1.9% of the current size of the Armed Forces of 766 thousand people.

In terms of acquisition and deployment of special forces, Russia is also different from many countries. First of all, because of the large proportion of conscripts. For example, in 2011 in Tambov 16th Spetsnaz brigade had only 30% contractors. This means that 70% of the military brigade in the event of deployment of its mission to the region will be behind him only a year or even, less combat and special training. The General Staff has optimistically declared that at the end of 2014 all of the special purpose will be staffed by contract, but it remains unclear whether this goal is achieved. Despite the desire to equip special forces with contractors, said the commander of the Tambov unit, Colonel Konstantin Bushuyev did not believe that conscripts are not suitable to serve in the special forces. He argues from experience that "over the last 15 years, we have seen that recruits cope with the tasks worse than do most contractors".

Special Intelligence

SOF carry out intelligence gathering that can not get otherwise. There are, however, other parts and units responsible for intelligence gathering. One of the key differentiating features, which allows to distinguish between SOF and other institutions under the Ministry of Defense and involved the collection of intelligence, is the category of "customer". In the role of the last acts or other military formations or military-political leadership of the state. Parts of the division of military intelligence, as a rule, provide other military formations, SOF usually work directly in the interests of the military-political leadership of the state. Requirements intelligence of these two "customers" often differ. Veteran Special Forces Colonel Sergei Breslavskiy believes that any structure only if the structure has a right to be called "special purpose" if its "customer" serves the military and political leadership of the state. Therefore, he believes that Russia's military doctrine should more clearly articulate that the army units themselves are responsible for most of the intelligence in the interest of ensuring the performance of tasks. SOF also need to collect information for the benefit of the military-political leadership of the state. And to add to this issue final clarity Breslavskiy SOF proposes to allocate a separate unit of the Armed Forces.

Breslavskiy, apparently based on the experience of actual use of the Russian special forces for intelligence gathering. For example, the GRU in the first Chechen campaign is often used to perform reconnaissance tasks due to the low level of training of staff intelligence units of army units. This decision, of course, improved intelligence to the military echelon, but also became scarce in the intelligence unit of the strategic because GRU could not simultaneously conduct intelligence in the interest of both rings. A similar pattern was observed in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in August 2008.

Sabotage

As noted above, the actions of sabotage were originally one of the tasks of the Soviet Special Forces.
Given that the main task of the Soviet special forces was the destruction of tactical nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, the Soviet doctrine of right and pointed to a number of other tasks of special forces - the impact on communications and communications facilities of the enemy, as well as the elimination of the individual members of its military political leadership. Because of this, the GRU special forces eliminated a large number of Soviet defectors in Europe immediately after World War II. However, over time these tasks was assigned to the KGB, and the task of eliminating the enemy representatives of the leadership has been excluded from the doctrine of the GRU.

During the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989 years) diversionary actions were the main task of the Special Forces. Russian sources called the war in Afghanistan "finest hour special forces." The operations in Afghanistan was not only the GRU, but also two other special units of law enforcement agencies - the Interior Ministry and the KGB. However, it GRU performed mainly solved the problems associated with doing acts of sabotage, such as raids on convoys Mujahideen.

Common to all SOF dilemma is the question of the distribution of forces and means, as well as a temporary resource in combat situations to perform tasks of special reconnaissance and sabotage actions. This is a problem for the Russian discourse. Colonel Kvachkov believes that modern Russian doctrine attaches too much importance to the detriment of intelligence 'tasks related to inflict direct damage to the increase in the efficiency of troops (forces) weapons'. According to him, priority to the tasks of exploration turns into a kind of Russian MTR usual reconnaissance. Retired Major GRU Sergei Kozlov, based on practical experience, offers a special service members pay 80% of the time solving problems of special intelligence and 20% - the implementation of the tasks of sabotage, and the newly formed KSSO - mirror (20/80) priority.

Organization of insurgency

As in the case of sabotage, the organization of the rebel movement was originally a Soviet special forces tasks. In the 50s of the last century, this work was known as the "organization and management of the national liberation movement". While communist ideology had a significant number of followers in many parts of the world, and the Soviet leadership expected to be able to help ideologically close political groups in foreign countries in the establishment of communist regimes. In addition, these groups can become allies, and even military allies in the event of a conflict between the West and the Soviet Union.

A full range of activities of the special forces of the Russian military authorities in the post-Soviet era for the organization of the rebel movement beyond the borders of the country, most likely will never be known because of the secrecy of most of these problems. Nevertheless, a number of examples are described in the public domain. Three of the most important examples: (1) assistance to the Russian and Uzbek special forces to the rebels who overthrew the quasi-Islamist regime in Tajikistan in 1994; (2) Russia's assistance in the creation of the SOF in Ethiopia in 2002-2003; (3) the use of special forces of the GRU and KSSO in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

According to Adam Grissom, the change in the military organization and doctrine was considered innovative, it must: (1) characterized by a change in the modus operandi of the military formations on the battlefield; (2) have extensive and serious consequences; (3) implicitly accompanied by an increase combat effectiveness in solving the problems.

Decline of GRU

During his stay Anatoly Serdyukov as defense minister, he had taken three fateful GRU decisions that led to their demise. Firstly, the GRU in 2009 was forced to agree to a significant reduction in the organizational structure. The number of teams was reduced from nine to seven, were cut about a thousand officers' posts in the army. According to anonymous sources in the GRU, the organization was ordered as a whole to reduce the expenditure side of the budget by 30% . GRU also felt humiliated because of the decision to equalize its nominally-job categories with those that exist in the armed forces. For the majority of the officers of the GRU, this meant that they would be demoted. Nevertheless, several sources claim that the reduced brigade were never fully completed, and that many have fallen under the knife cuts found "were employed" in other structural units of the GRU or other formations of special purpose. Therefore, it is possible retrenchment was not such a disaster as some special forces, at least in relation to the strength of the Special Forces. This last point may slightly reduce the significance of the reform on the criterion of the scale and effects, but not to the point to make it already quite low.

Along with the reduction in staff numbers, the second serious blow to the GRU special forces was their subordination of the General Staff of the newly formed joint strategic command. As mentioned above, the structure of any special purpose to maintain its status and preserve the freedom of action it is important to act directly on behalf of the military-political leadership of the state and not on the orders of any authority of military control in the structure of the military. As a result of reforms GRU was in a position where they would have to act - at least in the case of full-scale war - on the orders of a purely military control of the military.

The former chief of the direction of special intelligence GRU of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Dmitry Gerasimov in an interview with the Russian weekly New Times in February 2011 stated its belief that "the GRU disorganized absolutely consciously.

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1525523.html

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1525947.html

Russian Spetsnaz forces training in the Western Military Region;

https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Ftopwar.ru%2F&sandbox=1

George1 wrote:Special forces’ unit commander killed in clashes with rebels in Tajikistan — source

The commander of the special forces’ Alpha Group was one of the four servicemen killed in the clashes that continue in Tajikistan’s Ramit mountain gorge

DUSHANBE, September 16. /TASS/. Four servicemen, including special forces’ Alpha Group commander Colonel Rustan Amakiyev, have been killed in clashed with militants from the armed grouping of former deputy defense minister Abdukhalim Nazarzoda in the Ramit mountain gorge in Tajikistan, a source close to the headquarters of the anti-terrorist operation told TASS on Wednesday.

Clashes broke out last night 60 kilometers to the east of Dushanbe in Tajikistan’s Ramit mountain gorge and still continue. The details of the incident have been officially reported yet.

On September 4, the rebellious general together with his supporters staged two terrorist attacks in Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe and Vahdat, in the country’s west. Nazarzoda seized a large amount of weapons and hid in the Ramit Gorge. Nine police officers were killed as a result of the criminals' attacks and 12 others were wounded. More than 100 terrorists have been detained in an anti-terrorist operation that followed the attacks. Twelve of them surrendered arms voluntarily. Twenty-two were killed in clashes with law enforcers. The anti-terrorist operation is still underway.

Tajik prosecutor general’s office initiated a criminal case against Nazarzoda, the former defense minister, on charges of high treason, terrorism, organizing an extremist group and sabotage. Similar charges were brought against Nazarzoda’s "closest supporter" Colonel Dzhunaidullo Umarov, who took active part in setting up a criminal group and attacking policemen in Dushanbe and Vakhdat. The prosecutor general’s office also said Nazarzods possessed a "big business" and dozens of illegally privatized assets."

Over the years of the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992-1995, Nazarzoda, dubbed Khalim, was a field commander of the Tajik armed opposition. After a peace deal was signed in June 1997, Nazarzoda was commissioned to the Tajik army under the programme of reintegration of former opposition gunmen. In 2014, he was promoted to the rank of Major General and appointed deputy defense minister. He was dismissed from the post by President Emomali Rakhmov on Friday, September 5, for "committing a crime."

We're talking Tajik Alpha here?

KoTeMoRe wrote:

George1 wrote:Special forces’ unit commander killed in clashes with rebels in Tajikistan — source

The commander of the special forces’ Alpha Group was one of the four servicemen killed in the clashes that continue in Tajikistan’s Ramit mountain gorge

DUSHANBE, September 16. /TASS/. Four servicemen, including special forces’ Alpha Group commander Colonel Rustan Amakiyev, have been killed in clashed with militants from the armed grouping of former deputy defense minister Abdukhalim Nazarzoda in the Ramit mountain gorge in Tajikistan, a source close to the headquarters of the anti-terrorist operation told TASS on Wednesday.

Clashes broke out last night 60 kilometers to the east of Dushanbe in Tajikistan’s Ramit mountain gorge and still continue. The details of the incident have been officially reported yet.

On September 4, the rebellious general together with his supporters staged two terrorist attacks in Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe and Vahdat, in the country’s west. Nazarzoda seized a large amount of weapons and hid in the Ramit Gorge. Nine police officers were killed as a result of the criminals' attacks and 12 others were wounded. More than 100 terrorists have been detained in an anti-terrorist operation that followed the attacks. Twelve of them surrendered arms voluntarily. Twenty-two were killed in clashes with law enforcers. The anti-terrorist operation is still underway.

Tajik prosecutor general’s office initiated a criminal case against Nazarzoda, the former defense minister, on charges of high treason, terrorism, organizing an extremist group and sabotage. Similar charges were brought against Nazarzoda’s "closest supporter" Colonel Dzhunaidullo Umarov, who took active part in setting up a criminal group and attacking policemen in Dushanbe and Vakhdat. The prosecutor general’s office also said Nazarzods possessed a "big business" and dozens of illegally privatized assets."

Over the years of the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992-1995, Nazarzoda, dubbed Khalim, was a field commander of the Tajik armed opposition. After a peace deal was signed in June 1997, Nazarzoda was commissioned to the Tajik army under the programme of reintegration of former opposition gunmen. In 2014, he was promoted to the rank of Major General and appointed deputy defense minister. He was dismissed from the post by President Emomali Rakhmov on Friday, September 5, for "committing a crime."

We're talking Tajik Alpha here?

With a name like that (dead commander), I would say yes.

RIP to the brave men fighting those terror scumbags.

That said, why is that news here?

Afghanistan:
Agent from FSKN's (Federal Drug Control Service) "Thunder/ Гром" Unit


https://twitter.com/2Rook14/

FSB special forces will target ISIS leadership

http://russia-insider.com/en/military/watch-out-isis-russias-special-forces-are-coming-you/ri11237

Russian army special forces participate in operations in Syria — commander

Russia's special operations forces conduct reconnaissance checks prior to the Russian air strikes

MOSCOW, March 23 /TASS/. The task of the Russian special operations forces in Syria is to direct planes to targets, Colonel General Alexander Dvornikov, commander of the Russian group of troops in Syria, has said.

"I am not going to conceal the fact that our special operations forces are working in the territory of Syria. They are doing reconnaissance checks prior to the Russian air strikes; heading the planes to targets in remote regions as well as fulfilling other special tasks," Dvornikov said in an interview with the Rossiyskaya Gazeta daily.

He added that similar units of the US Armed Forces and the armies of other coalition states were also operating in Syria.

In addition to that, Russian military advisers are helping the Syrian authorities. "These officers are helping their Syrian colleagues to plan and conduct the warfare against terrorists and learn to handle the Russian military hardware," General Dvornikov said.


More:
http://tass.ru/en/defense/864616

Russian major was killed in Syria last month: former subordinates
BALASHIKHA, RUSSIA | BY MARIA TSVETKOVA

A major with an elite unit from Russia's interior ministry was killed in Syria last month, several of his former comrades told Reuters on Wednesday, though Russian officials have not acknowledged his death.

The death would bring to six the number of Russian servicemen known to have been killed in Syria during the Kremlin's five-month military campaign, which it said last week it was winding down.

The death of Sergei Chupov, 51, was first reported by the Conflict Intelligence Team, a group of Russian bloggers who use social media to track Russian military engagements abroad.

Reuters spoke independently to several former colleagues of Chupov, who confirmed that he was killed in fighting in Syria. Reuters also visited the cemetery outside Moscow where Chupov is buried.

Funeral wreaths and a modest iron cross with a wooden crucifix adorn the fresh grave, with a picture of Chupov wearing uniform and medals. The date of his death marked on the grave, Feb. 8, matches the date in other accounts of his death.

"I know Chupov was a negotiator in Syria and was killed by a direct hit from a mortar shell," Radik Belov, who said he served under Chupov's command in a reconnaissance platoon in the 1990s, told Reuters.

The Russian defense ministry, which oversees the Russian operation in Syria, and the interior ministry, did not respond to Reuters questions about Chupov. A Kremlin spokesman said he had not heard about the case.

There were no details about what Chupov was doing in Syria. His former comrades said he was a long-standing officer with experience of combat. He served with the Interior Ministry troops, an elite force who have in the past been involved in fighting in Russia's restive Chechnya region.

SPECIAL FORCES

Russia has for months said its role in Syria is restricted to air strikes, advising and training Syrian government forces, search and rescue missions for downed aircrew, and protecting Russia's bases.

However, Russia's Interfax news agency on Wednesday quoted the commander of Russia's contingent in Syria, Alexander Dvornikov, as saying that Russia had special forces in Syria who were involved in reconnaissance of targets for air strikes and "other special tasks".

At the cemetery in the town of Balashikha, four men in their thirties and forties, who said they had served under his command, left a glass of brandy and a slice of bread at his grave, a Russian tradition.

They said they were all ex-servicemen but declined to give their names. They referred to Chupov as their commander and mentor. He was "a true Russian officer" said one of the men. Another described him as someone "who deserved to be a hero".

They said they did not want to go into details because Russia has many enemies and the death of a Russian soldier in Syria could be used against Moscow.

Asked about the bloggers' report, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told a teleconference with journalists: "I have heard nothing about it. I don't know ... on what sort of information it's based."

President Vladimir Putin last week ordered the withdrawal of the bulk of Russian forces in Syria, saying they had achieved most of their objectives.

At a Kremlin ceremony a few days later to decorate officers for the Syria mission, Putin broke four months of official silence about the death of a Russian soldier, Fyodor Zhuravlyov, bringing the official death toll Syria to five.

The Conflict Intelligence Team, citing social media posts and accounts of people who knew him, said Chupov graduated from a prestigious military school in then Soviet Kazakhstan, and served in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

(Writing by Dmitry Solovyov and Christian Lowe; Editing by Andrew Osborn and Giles Elgood)

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-toll-idUSKCN0WP2AW

A view shows the grave of Russian serviceman Sergei Chupov at a cemetery in the Balashikha district of the Moscow region, Russia, March 23, 2016.
- REUTERS/MARIA TSVETKOVA

Book. wrote:Russian major was killed in Syria last month: former subordinates
BALASHIKHA, RUSSIA | BY MARIA TSVETKOVA

A major with an elite unit from Russia's interior ministry was killed in Syria last month, several of his former comrades told Reuters on Wednesday, though Russian officials have not acknowledged his death.

The death would bring to six the number of Russian servicemen known to have been killed in Syria during the Kremlin's five-month military campaign, which it said last week it was winding down.

The death of Sergei Chupov, 51, was first reported by the Conflict Intelligence Team, a group of Russian bloggers who use social media to track Russian military engagements abroad.

Reuters spoke independently to several former colleagues of Chupov, who confirmed that he was killed in fighting in Syria. Reuters also visited the cemetery outside Moscow where Chupov is buried.

Funeral wreaths and a modest iron cross with a wooden crucifix adorn the fresh grave, with a picture of Chupov wearing uniform and medals. The date of his death marked on the grave, Feb. 8, matches the date in other accounts of his death.

"I know Chupov was a negotiator in Syria and was killed by a direct hit from a mortar shell," Radik Belov, who said he served under Chupov's command in a reconnaissance platoon in the 1990s, told Reuters.

The Russian defense ministry, which oversees the Russian operation in Syria, and the interior ministry, did not respond to Reuters questions about Chupov. A Kremlin spokesman said he had not heard about the case.

There were no details about what Chupov was doing in Syria. His former comrades said he was a long-standing officer with experience of combat. He served with the Interior Ministry troops, an elite force who have in the past been involved in fighting in Russia's restive Chechnya region.

SPECIAL FORCES

Russia has for months said its role in Syria is restricted to air strikes, advising and training Syrian government forces, search and rescue missions for downed aircrew, and protecting Russia's bases.

However, Russia's Interfax news agency on Wednesday quoted the commander of Russia's contingent in Syria, Alexander Dvornikov, as saying that Russia had special forces in Syria who were involved in reconnaissance of targets for air strikes and "other special tasks".

At the cemetery in the town of Balashikha, four men in their thirties and forties, who said they had served under his command, left a glass of brandy and a slice of bread at his grave, a Russian tradition.

They said they were all ex-servicemen but declined to give their names. They referred to Chupov as their commander and mentor. He was "a true Russian officer" said one of the men. Another described him as someone "who deserved to be a hero".

They said they did not want to go into details because Russia has many enemies and the death of a Russian soldier in Syria could be used against Moscow.

Asked about the bloggers' report, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told a teleconference with journalists: "I have heard nothing about it. I don't know ... on what sort of information it's based."

President Vladimir Putin last week ordered the withdrawal of the bulk of Russian forces in Syria, saying they had achieved most of their objectives.

At a Kremlin ceremony a few days later to decorate officers for the Syria mission, Putin broke four months of official silence about the death of a Russian soldier, Fyodor Zhuravlyov, bringing the official death toll Syria to five.

The Conflict Intelligence Team, citing social media posts and accounts of people who knew him, said Chupov graduated from a prestigious military school in then Soviet Kazakhstan, and served in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

(Writing by Dmitry Solovyov and Christian Lowe; Editing by Andrew Osborn and Giles Elgood)

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-toll-idUSKCN0WP2AW

A view shows the grave of Russian serviceman Sergei Chupov at a cemetery in the Balashikha district of the Moscow region, Russia, March 23, 2016.
- REUTERS/MARIA TSVETKOVA

RIP.

Another soldier who seen action since Afghanistan like the legendary Anatoliy Lebed who died nearly 3 years ago. Wonder how many of them are out there...

Soldiers of the fourth dimension

Russian special operations forces selected adaptive approach

Command special operations forces remains one of the most secretive institutions in the Armed Forces. It is known that in the last six months, two soldiers were killed in Syria MTR: Fedor Zhuravlev and became a posthumous Hero of Russia Alexander Prokhorenko.

The military special operations forces perform an important task. Suggests and corrected air strikes, including cruise missiles, on the positions of the "Islamic state" banned in Russia, saved the flight recorders of the Air Force shot down Turkish Russian Sukhoi Su-24M. This is a small part of the list.

Charges in Solnechnogorsk

History of Special Operations forces began in 1999 when the Training Center was established in Solnechnogorsk, but in fact the military unit of special purpose, reports directly to the chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate. Later the center was named "Senezh" and soldiers came to be called "Sunflowers". One of the founding fathers was the then Chief of the General Staff General of the Army Anatoly Kvashnin.

Sometimes this is called the training center, but according to several interlocutors "Military-Industrial Courier", "Senezh" never wore a "prefix", and the phrase "training" rather served as a cover, as well as the special status of the emphasized.

Initially the four areas of special operations were formed. Soldiers Airborne practiced difficult jumps - a protracted, and with the opening of the parachute immediately after separation from the side. Possession of such methods allows special forces invisible to the enemy to fly dozens of kilometers. Specialists jumping day and night, using night-vision equipment, in bad weather, with strong winds and fog.

Soldiers mountain areas began fighting climbers learned to storm the alpine peaks, to capture and hold the passes and glaciers. Training took place in particular on the base located in the foothills of Mount Elbrus training center «Terskol». Soldiers made climbing difficult, even climbed to the top of Mount Elbrus.

Special Forces assault directions learn not only to take the house and other buildings. Tasks were set much wider - the seizure of enemy targets in different conditions, on any terrain.

Soldiers sea direction mastered all kinds of waters, practiced activities in the diving equipment using special towing boats and light. Studied to capture ships and offshore facilities.

Even the experience of fighting in Chechnya, appeared in the center of the fifth area - protection of high-ranking military. Minister of Defence to protect employees FSO. But in fighting such officials as the chief of the General Staff, Commander-in-Chief, earlier accompanied at best spies or commandos. Preparation of these "guards", to put it mildly, leaves much to be desired. Therefore, the establishment of a specialized unit dealing with the protection of high-ranking representatives of the Defense Ministry, until the fifth direction was dire.

Soldiers of the fourth dimension At the same time, according to the interlocutors "Military-Industrial Courier", in the center never existed tough fighters binding to a specific direction. All the "sunflowers" learn to skydive, go to the mountains, swim with scuba diving, storm the house. But depending on the individual preparation of task items for the soldiers were more in-depth.

Moreover, the command tried to specialists for the service worked in several directions. To share experiences, knowledge and skills between departments. For example, a fighter who came from the Airborne directions to the sea, not only studied the peculiarities of the work on the water, but also shared with fellow skills skydiving.

Since its formation direction staffed exclusively by officers and ensigns. Conscripts had served only economic units or drivers.

Future "Sunflowers" were selected not only in the parts and units of Airborne and Special Forces, but also among the tankers, gunners, infantry officers, even defense and NBC. Several times a year, "buyers" from GRU visited military units, studied personal affairs soldiers and choose the right candidates.

But this was just beginning. Officers and non-commissioned officers arrived in Solnechnogorsk, where they carried out the so-called collections, and in fact the entrance test, which tested and physical training of future fighters MTR, and personality, and most importantly - the ability to work in a team.

Sources of "Military-Industrial Courier" emphasize that the basic principle of the center - does not prepare an individual fighter with great skills and abilities, and to build a team, acting as a single organism. This principle is strictly observed during all the years of its existence "SENEZH" always led "sunflowers" to victory.

His way and the cars for him

If we compare the organizational structure of training centers with performing the same tasks the US "Delta" and DEVGRU, British 22nd Regiment SAS and German the KSK, evident that the Western "squads" (analogue lines in our center) does not have the orientation under the a specific task - they are, so to speak, universal. In particular, in the 22nd regiment of four squadrons, each divided into four companies: airborne, marine, mountain and road.

But as shown by the experience of the Russian special forces combat use, versatile system in most cases is not optimal. For example, if the unit of special operations forces has been fighting in the mountains, it is better to have in its structure more than "climbers" and attack aircraft, but less Marines and sailors. Therefore, our experts, in contrast to Western troops are consolidated, where depending on the task group are transmitted from different directions. According to the "MIC" interlocutors, it is not universal and adaptive approach.

The forces of special operations of NATO countries consider it necessary to create a separate unit, trained to penetrate behind enemy lines, to make raids and ambushes on specialized automotive applications, such as "Land Rover - The Pink Panther" in the 22nd Regiment SAS, "Pinzgauer High-Mobility All-Terrain Vehicle" in the US "Delta ".

Experience Russian MTR showed that the type of armored vehicles of Russian "Tiger" in most cases not suitable for the tasks facing the Special Operations Forces. Therefore, the choice fell on the high permeability buggy in "SENEZH" praised the Israeli SUVs "Zebari."

Leaders of the Russian center from the very beginning to pay close attention not just a sniper training and the training of specialists capable of carrying out high-precision shooting and at the same time to solve a wide range of tasks. Initially, these needs were purchased Finnish high-precision systems TRG-42 firm "Sako", later appeared the AWP UK, designed by the legendary marksman Malcolm Cooper. Separately studied large-caliber sniper rifles of various companies, in particular the South African "Truvel".

In Chechnya and cordon

Immediately after the training centers by constructing his men were on the front line. In 1999, militants invaded Dagestan Wahhabis, but were defeated, and several months later, Russian troops launched a counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya.

Soldiers of the fourth dimension It is noteworthy that the name "Sunflower" was assigned to the center of the fighters after their first trip to the Caucasus. In that trip servicemen wearing panama, which did not exist in other parts and units for special purposes. According to one version, hats were just appeared from summer field set of SPN-2. According to another - Panama, which the soldiers saw in one of the American fighters, have been bought in the store, which sells western form of clothing and equipment. Whatever it was, for the unusual appearance, as well as the center is located near the station of suburban trains Sunflower, his men, and received the nickname of "Sunflowers". Later pattern sun flower on a background of crossed swords and arrows hit the center of the chevron.

Despite the fact that its activities in Chechnya is still classified as "Top Secret", according to reports, "Sunflowers" eliminated and captured high-ranking militants were found and destroyed bases and caches bandits, address other important tasks. How to recall the interlocutors "MIC" on the center of the fighters demanded not 100 percent guarantee that the task will be completed, and all 300. They simply did not have room for error.

One event in the center do not like to remember. In the fall of 1999, captured by the Chechen fighters were Lieutenant Alexei Galkin Vladimir Pakhomov. As experienced fighters were in such a difficult situation is still unclear. But later the two officers, despite severe injuries, escaped from captivity and came to his own. Alex Galkin became the Hero of Russia.

According to some reports, the soldiers of training centers not only fought in Chechnya, but also solved the problem abroad. In particular, it participated in operations against pirates in the Horn of Africa.

The experience of fighting in Chechnya, and foreign operations showed that the chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the center of subordination is not the best solution. The head of military intelligence, for example, can not give orders to Air Force Commander to "Sunflowers" identified the aircraft or helicopters requires a fairly long procedure of preparation of the request, and then harmonize it. Meanwhile, in some cases, the operation time measured in hours and minutes.

Two centers in a new guise

Activities of Anatoly Serdyukov as defense minister Russia still subjected to serious criticism, but it was when it was created by the command of special operations forces. Just when you go to a new look, "Sunflowers", received the official name of the center of the Defense Ministry special "Senezh" operations, began to report directly to the Chief of the General Staff.

Base in Solnechnogorsk Serdyukov visited more than once. several research projects have been allocated funds for the purchase of weapons and equipment, are open. In the operational control "SENEZH" helicopter squadron moved from the center of the combat use of army aviation in Torzhok. And in Tver on duty round the clock there were military transport Il-76, ready, if necessary, at any time deliver MTR fighters in the designated point.

It is believed that during the transition to the new look "Senezh" as the Special Forces Brigade, subjected to reduction, and many of his soldiers either dismissed or withdrawn from the staff. But this is not the case. According to the "Military-Industrial Courier", the command center, taking advantage of this opportunity, conducted the certification of their fighters, to select the best.

Soldiers of the fourth dimension At the end of the 2000s in the Russian Ministry of Defense had a second Special Operations Center, subordinate to the chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate, and the dislocation in Moscow Kubinka. His appearance new SPC, nicknamed "Zazabore" obliged who came with Anatoly Serdyukov for the post of Deputy Defense Minister, Lieutenant-General Alexander Miroshnichenko, previously headed the "A" Special Purpose Center of the FSB, to put it simply - unit "Alpha".

Between Miroshnichenko and leadership "SENEZH" immediately formed, to put it mildly, strained relations. Former commander of the "Alpha" believed that the Ministry of Defence to create a command of special operations forces should be based only on the experience of its former management. Command "sunflowers" reasonably stated that they have their own, no less serious developments and training school, and the problem of "Alpha" and the forces of the military department of special operations differ.

In this situation, Serdyukov has adopted a compromise solution - to create a second Special Operations Center, which is the formation and instructed Alexander Miroshnichenko, which attracted to this work of former subordinates TSSN FSB.

Employees of "Alpha", creating "Zazabore" primarily focused on their own experience. The cornerstone of the individual training soldiers was set, great attention was paid to physical training - at the level of the sport of high achievements. A collective work, the key principle of "SENEZH" was not in the priority of the creators of the new center.

Interlocutor "MIC" says: "The" Alpha "it's different. They were taken in a car to the site of the operation, they ran 50 meters and became heroes. No one wants to smell the foot rags and weeks to crawl on the mountains - seek militants ".

In 2013, the SPC and the Ministry of Defence was subordinated to the command of special operations forces. Post Commander KSSO took Major General Alexey Dyumin, which, according to knowledgeable people, in many ways became a compromise figure in the background of confrontation "SENEZH" leadership and Alexander Miroshnichenko, actively continues to introduce the experience of SPC FSB.

It is noteworthy that "Zazabore" and kept a close relationship with the "Alpha". Her former employees, as noted by many, who met with the "Military-Industrial Courier" planted soldiers of the newly established Centre desire at any price to be the best in everything.

Note importantly - both centers fighters continued the traditions established by the founding fathers, performing the most complex tasks: to protect the Olympic Games in Sochi, conducted a brilliant operation in the Crimea, and are now working in Syria.

I don't suppose a foreigner would have any chance at joining Spetsnaz? I'm from India, but I live in the U.S.
I'm willing to be a fool and redeem the smallest chance.

Chucklenuts wrote:I don't suppose a foreigner would have any chance at joining Spetsnaz? I'm from India, but I live in the U.S.
I'm willing to be a fool and redeem the smallest chance.

I am looking so far to know this also, I know all I need for russian foreign legion or however its called which I am going to join asap.

Special Operations Service existed within OrbSpN long before certain GRU units ( mainly Kubnika and Senezh centers) were absorbed into the MOD gerneral staff's SSO. During the Soviet Union, SSO's current role in soviet times was also redundantly carried out by Department V of the KGB in addition to the special operation service.

During the reforms of 2008-2012 which affect the GRU, Kubnkia's training regime was heavily influenced by FSB Alpha veterans being placed in top echelon positions at that center. However Senzeh continuted with the GRU's training regime. Since the creation of the SSO, has these two units adopted a standard training regime?Is the training separate and influenced by the top echelon concerning the respective centers where Kubnika is influenced by Alphas regime, Center" T "and Senezh influenced by GRU's regime?

Article on the Russian SOF or MTR;

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2652506.html

TsSN FSB (Alpha Group) officer armed with modernised SV-98 rifle, memorial tournament in Tula dedicated to Vympel officer R.P.Stashenko

SSO at DeZ






----

Said to be Vympel in Syria

Spetsnaz "Zaslon" ('Barrier'/'Shield') of Foreign Intelligence Service of Russian Federation (SVR RF).

Zaslon means “Shield,” or “Barrier,” and their mission is covert, operating under deep cover. All of the operatives are Spetsnaz qualified, having served in the two former units prior to their service in Zaslon. The unit is used to provide protection for Russian ambassadors, conduct deep-cover intelligence and contact development, top-level assassinations, and the most delicate of all such terminations: the ones the autopsies rule to be “a death by natural causes,” leaving not a shred of evidence to the contrary. These highly trained, experienced operators have decades of experience in the former two Spetsnaz units. Handpicked for their intelligence and physical prowess, the Zaslon operatives are all fluent in several languages with extensive foreign service under their belts.

In Syria

Para-spetsnaz(45th OGvBrSpN VDV) at the memorial tournament for Vympel officer R.P.Stashenko.

Promo shot for MVS gear. Note a heavily customized AK-105 with 1P87 sight and what looks like the latest iteration of a 5.45x39 60-round mag. Also note RMB-93 shotgun in the background.

George1 wrote:Promo shot for MVS gear. Note a heavily customized AK-105 with 1P87 sight and what looks like the latest iteration of a 5.45x39 60-round mag. Also note RMB-93 shotgun in the background.

I would love to see a modernized version of AN-94 in service with russian special forces, it's a waste of such a good design.

it's bad to see russian SOF'S relying too much on customized versions of AK74M, AK103 and some western rifles like HK417.

SVR's spetsnaz - OSN Zaslon (in their signature olive green fatigues) w/SSO officers on the rooftops of both adjacent buildings within the #Russian Embassy compound in #Damascus, #Syria.
Also note TPN(thermal observation device)-1TOD w/ SSO

Most probably SVR's OSN Zaslon officers in Syria. Note: blurred EMBASSY OF RUSSIA chest patch
(https://twitter.com/Russian_Defence/status/968965716652298242); their signature olive green & tan fatigues & AK-104/109; LShZ 1+ helmet. Image via Sitkh at http://lostarmour.com



https://twitter.com/Russian_Defence/status/989977936840331264