S-300V Army SAM System

Isos wrote:Nice how the radar is facing upwards. It makes a really bubble compared to other AD that create a "donut" and can't hit above them.

magnumcromagnon wrote:Advanced new-look tactical air defence armament system (illustrations), co authored by the chiefs of Almaz-Antey and Army Air Defence (circa 2019):

[ANALYSIS] How could Russia help the Armenian side and what are the real possibilities of the S-300V system?

SLO with Giant radar and missiles within the Abakan system on a wheeled platform / Photo: Vitalij Kuzmin

We have entered the fifth week of the war for Nagorno-Karabakh between the Azerbaijani army and the army of the so-called Republic of Artsakh supported by Armenia (hereinafter, the Armenian side). Tango Six has written about the use of aviation and air defense technology in this conflict on two occasions so far - the first text and the second text .

With the selfless help of Turkey (and Israel), Azerbaijan has shown a new type of air combat, which is based on reconnaissance and strike drones, kamikaze drones and An-2 drones. It also uses quasi-ballistic missiles made in Israel by Lora.

During this period, although we are aware that a propaganda war is being waged, there is no doubt that they were successful in hitting and destroying or at least temporarily disabling a large amount of equipment of the Armenian side, starting with artillery, ballistic missile launchers and multi-barrel rocket launchers type and purpose, tanks, up to the air defense system, which is what I write about the most.

In addition to propaganda, the use of models and spent equipment as a target, there is no doubt that Azerbaijanis using BPL Bajraktar TB2, kamikaze drones Harop and locally modified Orbiters 1 and 3 managed to neutralize, permanently or temporarily disable the double-digit number of firearms33 AKM system PVOK 9 AKM, one number of Arrows-10, several launchers of the PVO 2K12 Kub system (without missiles, probably serve as baits), at least one target radar of the PVO 2K11 Krug system (probably all Krug systems are used as targets, because they seem inactive), several observation-acquisition radars 36D6 Niva and P-18 Terek, but also at least one radar for guiding the S-300PS system. Probably as a result, a division of the S-125 Neva air defense system was deployed to the position, and we had the opportunity to see the alleged footage of the hit and its target radar by the kamikaze drone Harop.

I got the impression, analyzing the material on the internet portals that follow this war, that the Azerbaijanis, in addition to technical assistance from the Turks and Israelis, also have support in the satellite reconnaissance of the terrain of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Since Turkey does not have such a possibility, this type of help can come and probably comes from Israel. Satellite imagery is sent to real-time data processing and processing stations in Azerbaijan to then plan and execute missions. It is therefore a well-planned and coordinated action against the Armenian side. In addition, Turkey, according to many allegations, brings to the field part of the so-called. moderate rebels from Syria from the Idlib region and northern Syria.

The Armenian side will not be able to win this war or lose in order to "gain something" if it does not get help from the side (read: Russia).

Apparently, the goal of the war here is complete "liberation" or "occupation" (as who interprets and understands) the territory of the self-proclaimed Republic of Arzach, and if there is no "counter force" on the other side, I am afraid there will be no compromise. A good indicator can be the growing number of data that speak of large losses in the manpower of the Azerbaijani army, which are hidden in the "semi-censorship" that currently reigns there when it comes to this topic.

How can Russia help the Armenian side?

Given that all surrounding countries have closed borders and airspace for the delivery of military aid to Armenia, and it is very questionable whether Iran would make it possible due to its internal problems with a large Azerbaijani minority living in northern Iran along the border with Azerbaijan and Armenia, I will consider the possibility of Russia helping exclusively with the equipment at its disposal at its base in Gyumri.

At the Russian military base in Gyumri in eastern Armenia, there is the 3624th Air Base, which houses 18 MiG-29 fighters. It is a front-line fighter with certain possibilities of action on targets on the ground, it could help establish balance in the airspace of Nagorno-Karabakh, but also in the destruction of unmanned aerial vehicles, using a wide arsenal of VV missiles, IC-guided R-73 and R-27T, to the semi-active radar-guided R-27R. Of course, it would probably be confronted with Azerbaijani MiG-29s, but perhaps also with Turkish F-16Cs, as well as with Azerbaijani air defense systems, such as the S-300PMU-2 Favorit and others. Of course, both Azeri and Turkish planes would be endangered by the air defense systems of the Armenian side, which I have already written about.

S-300V Russian base in Armenia

In that base, there is also the 988th Air Defense Missile Regiment, armed with the S-300V air defense missile system. According to available data, there are two missile divisions in the base. It is not known exactly how many batteries each division has, but according to the available images and pictures, there are at least two rocket batteries per division. The regiment also includes units for direct protection, such as Strela-10M, light portable missile systems, but also systems for electronic protection and counteraction.

How and could the S-300V missile regiment do something more in this conflict, faced with unmanned aerial vehicles and kamikaze drones? In my opinion, it could do a good job, due to its purpose, technical characteristics and tactics of use.

The S-300V self-propelled missile system is an anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense system at medium and long distances. The basic tactical unit is the Missile Division, which usually consists of 2-3 Missile Batteries. Missile divisions are imported through the automatic control system of Field D4 into Missile Brigades or regiments. The missile division has the power of 2 rocket batteries, it is able to theoretically act on 12 targets at the same time, and the rocket battery on 6. Ranges range from modification to modification, from 100 to 250 km, and in the latest versions V4 up to 400 km.

The formation of one S-300V missile division with 2 missile batteries, which is probably located at the Gyumri base, consists of a Command Battery which includes a circular surveillance radar and acquisition of 9S15 Obzor targets (hereinafter: circular OAR), a sectoral surveillance-acquisition radar 9S19 Ginger (hereinafter: sectoral OAR) which is also an anti-ballistic radar, as well as Command Station 9S457 with automatic radar information management system Pori P2M.

Circular OAR 9S15 Overview

Sectoral OAR 9S19 Ginger

Command Station 9S457

Each of the 2 rocket batteries contains 1 radar for tracking targets and 9S32 Grill Pan missiles (hereinafter: missile guidance radar), 2 self-propelled launch vehicles with radar for illuminating targets 9A82 (hereinafter: SLO with radar) and one self-propelled launch vehicle 9A84, as well as 4 self-propelled launch vehicles with radar for illuminating targets 9A83 (hereinafter: SLO with radar) and 2 self-propelled loading vehicles 9A85.

9S32 Grill Pan missile guidance radar

SLO with lighting radars for Gladiator and Giant missiles

In this full formation, as part of each division with 2 missile batteries, there are 12 9M82 missiles (hereinafter: Giant - Div), with the predominant purpose of protection against ballistic missiles and 48 9M83 missiles (hereinafter: Gladiator), with the predominant purpose of protection against aerodynamic targets. Such a missile regiment with 2 divisions (4 missile batteries) S-300V is theoretically able to simultaneously act on 24 aerodynamic and ballistic targets.

Giant and Gladiator rockets

What is important to mention is the content of the Regiment or Brigade Command Post. Since it is a Missile Regiment in Armenia, the Command Post most likely has the means of an automated control system 9S52 Field D4, one long-range OAR 1L13 Sky, as well as another circular OAR 9S15 Obzor and another sector OAR 9S19 Ginger. So, as we can see, the Puka Command Post itself is well equipped with radar and automation means, which further increases the possibilities of timely detection, detection and tracking of aerodynamic and ballistic targets and their automatic delivery to missile divisions for capture and action.

Box Spring 1L13-3

The S-300V system, most likely deployed in Armenia (one of the first versions), is capable of destroying aerodynamic targets in the airspace at distances of up to 200 km, and ballistic missiles at distances of about 40 km. The height of action on aerodynamic targets is up to 30 km, and the height of destruction of ballistic missiles is up to 25 km, while the minimum height of action is 25 meters for an aerodynamic target and 1000 meters for a ballistic missile.

I wrote about the problems related to low flight speeds of unmanned aerial vehicles, drone drones below 180 km / h, which are a big problem for air defense systems from the S-300P family, but also for systems from the Buk family and older systems Kub, Neva, Krug and Wasp.

With the S-300V system, these problems are almost non-existent. Namely, the radars of the S-300V system, starting from circular OAR, sector (anti-ballistic) OAR, all the way to battery radars for guiding missiles, are able to track targets that fly at "zero" speed (rest, float) and they are guided by rockets! So, this problem practically does not exist.

The situation with kamikaze drones "Harop" and similar hovering or cruising missiles, which when they find a target, follow the configuration of the terrain flying very low and then jump abruptly at high angles, which can lead to loss of radar tracking due to obstruction of the aircraft / missile behind a hill, this can hardly happen if the rules of tactical use are followed, but the technical capabilities of the guidance system are also different. Namely, S-300V batteries are usually deployed at least 40 km from the front line, taking into account the terrain, as much as possible. Therefore, it would be quite difficult to draw a projectile like this so close to a rocket battery that it would endanger it. On the other hand, if Harop is passively aimed at the target (radar), it must be constantly irradiated with radar from the ground, which excludes the possibility of "evading" the radar to guide the missiles. Too,The missile guidance system of the S-300V is such that for these targets most of the flight trajectories of the missile would be inertial, according to the initial data in the rocket computer before launch, because these targets do not maneuver much. Only occasionally would radio correction and illumination of the target be required 3 seconds before the calculated encounter of the rocket and the target.

As for the possible effect on the S-300V missile division / battery with a quasi-ballistic missile from the Lora system, I wrote about the problem of tracking that projectile in its final trajectory when it hits the target at an angle of almost 90 degrees. With the S-300PS system, I wrote that it is not too realistic for such a case to happen because the systems are still mobile, but there was at least a theoretical possibility, and the problems in tracking targets are limited by detection angles at an elevation of 64 degrees. This is solved tactically, with the correct layout of the S-300PS division at an appropriate distance of 7 km to defend each other from missile strikes through "dead piles" of radar.

With the S-300V system, mobility is at an even higher level, so this possibility is even lower, but if we still assume it, then we should know that the 9S19 Imbir sector radar can track ballistic missiles at angles of 75-80 degrees, so the danger would be reduced if that radar were a target. If the target were a battery radar for guiding 9S32 Grill Pan missiles, which is the heart of the battery or a circular OAR 9S15 Obzor, then this sector radar 9S19 Ginger, and under certain conditions circular OAR, could easily process the target and hand it over to that missile battery. whose target tracking and missile guidance radar can capture and track the target. For that reason, the rocket batteries are separated from the command batteries by 6-10 km, and they can be separated by up to 30 km. Also, circular and sectoral OARs from the Missile Regiment Command,they can also detect the target in time and forward it with an automatic control system to the missile division that is in the most favorable position for action. Thus, there is always a very good chance that one of the sectoral or circular OARs will detect and forward the parameters of the target in time to act on it.

As for the tactical deployment and relief of the terrain, the so-called Republic of Arcach, I believe that the S-300V systems, due to their configuration, technical capabilities and range and unfavorable mountainous terrain of Nagorno-Karabakh, should not be deployed at all in the area affected by direct combat and thus expose it to unnecessary risk. Given the depth of the territory of the so-called. Republic of Arcah, it would be best for the S-300V systems to be deployed at least 40 km in the depth of the territory of Armenia, taking into account the relief as much as possible. S-300V systems could cover the airspace over the capital Stepanakert, operating even from positions near Yerevan. Of course, for the immediate protection of the S-300V units, it is necessary to install whatever is available from the short-range air defense system, from light portable missile systems Igla through Strela-10M, to 9K33 Osa.There are also C-UAV means, but we can only assume what kind of electronic protection and anti-drone system the Russian army has in its base.

Deployment of a rocket division with 3 batteries

When firing drones, cruise missiles and quasi-ballistic missiles, the inertial guidance method would probably be used, which means that the 9S32 Grill Pan battery guidance radar would transmit data on the target, coordinates, and extrapolation to the computer before launch. current values. If there is a change in the movement of the target, the radar tracking targets and missile guidance sees it and sends a radio correction (via a radar antenna on a self-propelled launcher), and these corrections are included in the extrapolation algorithm in the rocket computer. The coordinates of the rocket are determined by the inertial system in the rocket, and having these two, the mutual distance of the target-rocket and the speed of approach are calculated. Since there is no electronic interference, only in the last 3 seconds, we would switch to semi-active radar homing of the rocket,when the illumination radar on a self-propelled launcher is aimed, guided by a battery radar to guide missiles.

Ballistic missile detection, acquisition, intervention and action system

The obvious failures of the S-300PT / PS system and others to oppose the new tactics of conducting air warfare, with a certain number of people, created the impression that these systems were not adequate. The fact that air attacks take place with BPL, and not with planes, speaks volumes about how good they are. We can agree that the only Su-25 attacker that Azerbaijan has will inflict far greater damage on the opponent on the ground, than the entire squadron of drones in one crash.

But the fear of the action of the air defense system of the Armenian side, in a way, forced the Azeris to use this tactic.

On the other hand, the S-300PT-1 and S-300PS systems are systems that also belong to the past. The fact that our army does not have that system either, probably created a rumor that it doesn't matter which generation of S-300 systems someone uses and that they are all of equal quality, which is by no means true.

The S-300PT-1 system was produced in 1978, and improved in the early 1980s, with the introduction of a missile with a range of up to 75 km. The S-300PS system was introduced in 1984 - it is the first mobile system from the S-300P family and it was "slightly" modernized in Armenia, with the introduction of a 90 km missile, which again brings it to the level of the S-300PM system, a product of the early 90's. -the years of the last century.

So these are systems that are between 30-40 years old.

Russia, meanwhile, has discharged all S-300PT-1 systems that are somewhere in the strategic reserve, and is rapidly modernizing or also withdrawing the S-300PS (PMU export code) systems to the reserve. Of the systems from the S-300P family, practically only the newer systems S-300PM (export designation PMU-1) and S-300PM1 (export designation PMU-2) remain, and of course the S-400, which essentially originated from this family and which is currently the peak in this direction of development.

Systems from the S-300V family belong to a completely separate family of missile systems. In addition to a different purpose (corps air defense), the system is fundamentally different. It is both anti-aircraft and anti-missile (anti-ballistic), and it has nothing in common with the systems from the S-300P family. No single component of the system is interchangeable or compatible. Although they are marked S-300, they are two separate directions of development. In my humble opinion, S-300V systems are far more potent systems than systems from the S-300P family. They have greater mobility and mobility, better passability (caterpillar platform), air defense and AB purpose and real and realistic 6-channel missile battery per target, because they have 6 separate radars for sending commands to control missiles and illuminate targets. In addition, the formations are arranged differently, so one division has 2-3 rocket batteries,a larger number of OARs and radars for guidance and the possibility of simultaneous action on 12-18 targets. They have faster missiles (from 3200-4500 m / s), they can act on targets with zero speeds, with very small reflecting surfaces, which fly at altitudes of only 25 meters.

Recently, the components of the S-300V system are networked with the components of the Buk-M3 Viking system by introducing one self-propelled radar launcher and 4 missiles into the Buk-M3 division, increasing the spatial capabilities of the Buk-M3 system remotely, up to as much as 100 km (restrictions are on guidance radars for the Buk-M3 system) and enabling anti-ballistic purposes. A newer anti-missile (but also anti-aircraft) system Abakan was produced, whose fire unit consists of 2 SLOs with radar and missiles for AB protection Giant (can also be used against aerodynamic targets) based on the S-300V system and a modernized radar for detection, acquisition targets and guidance "96L6", and the whole system is located on a point platform and is intended, inter alia,as an anti-ballistic addition to the S-300PM1 Favorit divisions (export mark PMU-2) and the S-400 Triumph systems.

Finally, the S-300 Antej 2500 system and the S-300V4 system are produced, which introduced a new, modified missile with a range of 400 km.

SLO with Gladiator radar and missiles as part of the Buk-M3 division

So, every time it is looking for its own systems, new technical solutions and tactics of use. Any delay and hesitation in the procurement or production of new, modern air defense equipment can negatively affect the combat readiness and the ability of the air defense system to effectively protect the airspace of their country.

Original: https://tangosix.rs/2020/27/10/analiza-kako-bi-rusija-mogla-pomoci-jermenskoj-strani-i-kakve-su-zaista-mogucnosti-sistema-s-300v/?fbclid=IwAR2GXDhdhQAO9ICAl3TQsdBuhLIjYPW-17LXDvPZurL6tHVeRyFS-4f0h0A

Machine Translation: https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=sr&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Ftangosix.rs%2F2020%2F27%2F10%2Fanaliza-kako-bi-rusija-mogla-pomoci-jermenskoj-strani-i-kakve-su-zaista-mogucnosti-sistema-s-300v%2F%3Ffbclid%3DIwAR2GXDhdhQAO9ICAl3TQsdBuhLIjYPW-17LXDvPZurL6tHVeRyFS-4f0h0A

eridan wrote:While S-400 deliveries have been tracked in detail and there doesn't seem to be that much to argue over when it comes how many S-400 are in service...

The situation with S-300V family is much more murky. Does anyone have a source which tries to track the numbers of in service S-300Vs? Both the old generation and the new V4 variant?

Nice how the radar is facing upwards. It makes a really bubble compared to other AD that create a "donut" and can't hit above them.

Isos wrote:Everytime Ukrainians succeed in a big attack they write an article like this to praise their own forces. Yesterday and today ukrainian bombed Belgorod successfully and now the write their AD is the best in belgorod with made up numbers.

Pathetic and obvious propaganda.