Indian Army (IA): Equipment and News

Every one who knows about this trial also knows neither Arjun or T-90 came out outstanding in this trials. Both had their pluses and minus to its credit.

The main problem with Arjun is not that the tank is not good or it cant be made much better. The problem is Logistics which has to do with its weight and type of ammo ....Indian Army logistics revolve totally around 50 T tank which is of T-72 and T-90 and the entire transport logistics built around it over past 3 decades.

Put in Arjun and we have a totally western tank which has ZERO Logistics Commonality with Indian tank be it T-72 or T-90 , the only common thing if ever between the two tank could be the Indian crew using it.

India will have to spend multi billion dollar to just build logistics for Arjun and in some places like North East its not even possible due to poor over all logistics.

Army is right in ordering more of T-90MS for North East though I doubt Arjun Mk2 would match the T-90MS as the latter is clearly very advanced comparable to the best western tank out there.

The main problem with Arjun is not that the tank is not good or it cant be made much better. The problem is Logistics which has to do with its weight and type of ammo.

Anyone wanting to talk seriously of tank's warfare in a major conventional war against a peer/near peer enemy and of the best compromises to include in its design, will ALWAYS develop an argumentation gravitating around volumetric and weight factors.

One more time Gulf War, a conflict characterized by a ridiculous imbalance of forces and a embarassing ineptitude by part of Iraqi operatives, has been a sort of curse for quality and objectivity in military analysis science, because it has contributed to sell (with the great aid of guided media) as correct or even "winning" some system's design or concepts of operation totally disadvantageous under a strict technical or even physical point of view.

In the MBT department the engagements between NATO MBTs and Iraqi T-62 and monkey models of T-72s -employed moreover as entrenched ,redeployable artillery pieces or pillboxs - manned by some of the most incompetent crew ever and in an environment with total control by part of NATO have contributed to spread the idea that MBT's designs characterized by high internal volume and emormous weight is round or even advantageous
In reality any MBT's designer, US and european included, has obviously as its first requirement the reduction at minimum of internal volume and of the weight of its product, the seminal idea behind western basis concept of MBT design was developed only after MBT 70/Kpz 70 program failure in the attempt to lower requirements to reduce development's risks.



An high internal volume (resulting above others by the presence of a manual loader) in facts :

1) Greatly reduce armoured mass to surface index (lowering so overall armour density of the tank in question)
2) Render the MBT ,for the related increase of aspect target area and silhouette's projection, a much more easy target for enemy direct fire in the typical mobile engagements characterizing modern ground combined arms warfare (enemy MBTs included, independetly from theris FCS's sophistication -see my pasted post n. 555 of this thread on that- )
3) Enormously reduce ,togheter with weight increase (of which it represent an strong catalysing factor), rate of strategic transportability by land/ship/air assets.
4) Limit tactical mobility in costrained spaces, secondary mountain/hill roads, some off-road environments and peculiar morphological elements of battlefields .
5) Increase fatally the weight of the vehicle.
6) Increase drammatically acquisition and life cost of the MBT


The high weight, at its own time, generate:

1) Higher engine power demand ,to mantain constant disposable power/weigh ratio. That obviously also increase fuel requirement both at idle and in march with the related increases in costs, lenght and vulnerability of its logistic tail.
2) Increase of stess on suspensions and transmission ,theirs "wear and tear" rate and theirs related mantainment and reduce average off-road speed in terrains characterized by abrupt humps and holes (energy produced by 65-70 metric tons at gravity accelerations for some meters don't match well with integer suspensions...forget completely to procede at the speed you see in T-90's exibitions)
3) Enormous difficulties in recollecting damaged or entraped tanks, requiring much bigger support vehicles ,at theirs own times requiring more fuel and crew
4) Substantial reduction in strategic mobility and tactical mobility -see my previous post n. 708 and 719 on that- and freedom in movements off-road ....and sometimes also on roads !!!
The dire consequences of that in a major war is the loss of one of the most important element for victory : Force Concentration Overmatch on enemy.

By the way i want to clarify ,about the subject of tactical mobility, an important fact for remove one time for all a widely spread platitude : Ground Pressure DON'T equate and even less define capability of a MBT to move in difficult, soft or "brittle" terrains , in facts ground pressure's dilution obtained through track widening (reducing obviously power transference and lateral grip) manage to increase mobility only on homogeneous/uniform terrains and only when planar axis of the MBT is perpendicular to gravity's vector.
Majority of soft or brittle pervious terrains ,in facts, have big patchs of surface areas standing on few denser and more solid deeper elements working effectively as theirs weight-bearing structures and so is for several man-made construtions (from a bridge to under-road crossbeams).
To better clarify this concept i can recurr to this comparison : if your arm is strong enough to sustain at maximum 50 kg ,attempt to put 70 kg on a tray of 50x50 cm will not aid you in any way in sustaining the excessive weight ; in the same way a pylon sustaining a section of a bridge or a rocky formation sustaining a section of a mountainous passsage is capable to sustain at maximum 52 tons will collapse under 62 tons of weight in the same, exact way indipendently if this charge will be put on a single m2 or spread over the entire section laying upon it.

Another element is obviously the degree of inclination of the plane, at the growing of which diminish exponentially the benefit of widened tracks (rather,at equal disposable power/weight ratio, them become even a big disadvantage for big tanks attempting to negotiate with high edges or abrupt slopes , here tangential gravity's component and position of barycenter become prevalents with effects almost always not plaesant for over 60 tons behemoths.





From what said up to this time anyone can realize that Arjun's overall layout ,mutuated by western design, and foreseeing an high internal volume and less stringent weight constarints has been purposely selected to reduce development's risks for the first Indian domestic MBT development program (exactly in the same way this selection was useful at reduce engineerign risks in the West afetr the ambitious MBT-70's project's failure) ; it show a good FCS and a good vectronic department, but that has not relation with the value nd efficiency of tank's conceptual basis.

The real technological leap will be attempted by India with its FMBT where most stringent volumetric and weight constraint (to achieve FAR SUPERIOR performances and efficiency in major wars ) will be added in the technical requirements.

Excellent Post Mindstorm as always expected

IA is no fool not to understand tank warfare and the advantage of Medium/Heavy tank in their environment where they fight and the advantage of logistics which will play a critical role in sustaining tank warfare for longer time.

Key reason why IA thinks upgrading T-72 and inducting T-90MS is a good idea over buying many more Arjun ...its a logistic game coupled with disadvantage of heavy tank as you have pointed out in ur post.

Well Ajaishukla thinks IA will go ahead with Arjun variant as FMBT which i doubt seriously

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2012/11/army-proposes-to-scrap-future-main.html

Funny he puts a fan boy picture of Armata there

Any reason why Armata will end up being a 60 T tank and how will it affect Russian logistics built around T-90 types of tanks ?

Well Ajaishukla thinks IA will go ahead with Arjun variant as FMBT which i doubt seriously

If that would be the case, it would mean that DRDO consider original requirements for FMBT too high and risky for its today capabilities and has, therefore, opted for an evolutionary path starting from a basis platform with less stringent volume and weight limits.
Naturally ,in this instance, India would also accept a final product way inferior to what was planned in the initial FMBT program.

Mine opinion is that India will never accept an Arjun's derivative as its FMBT ,at maximum DRDO will wait that some of the most critical technologies and expertises linked to a similar realization will be mastered before commit itself to the task of develop a true future domestic MBT design.

Funny he puts a fan boy picture of Armata there

Actually Object 640

Evolutionary is better than Revolutionary considering Indian Industry n R&D does not have maturity and capability to deliver any thing radical.

Even mature defence industry like that of Russia have many many decades of experience have chosen evolutionary path and even Armata has some of its basis on the cancelled T-95 program.

Garry I agree 55 T is something we should all look at +/- 2 Tons

NEW DELHI: The Army is getting ready to dump its indigenous INSAS rifles, which have suffered from glitches since their induction in 1994-95, in favour of new-generation assault rifles with interchangeable barrels for conventional warfare and counter-insurgency operations.

The humble foot-soldiers, often forgotten in the race to buy tanks, submarines and fighters, are also slated to get new close-quarter battle (CBQ) carbines, light machine guns (LMGs), specialized sniper rifles and anti-material "bunker-bursting" rifles.

However, Army chief General Bikram Singh has identified the acquisition of the new assault rifles for the 356 infantry battalions and some other "fighting and support arms" in the 1.13-million force as a "Priority-I" project, say sources.

Defence minister AK Antony told Rajya the Sabha on Wednesday that the project to replace the 5.56mm INSAS rifles was underway since "technological development has created more superior rifles over the years".

Sources say five foreign firms — Colt, Beretta, Sig Sauer, Ceska and Israel Weapon Industries (IWI) — are in the running to partner the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) in bagging the huge project that would eventually cost over Rs 10,000 crore.

Under it, initially 65,000 rifles will be bought directly from the selected foreign vendor, for an estimated Rs 4,850 crore, to equip the 120 infantry battalions deployed on the western and eastern fronts.

The OFB will subsequently produce over 113,000 rifles after getting transfer of technology (ToT) from the vendor. The project could become even bigger if the eight-lakh-strong paramilitary forces also induct these rifles.

"Technical evaluation of bids submitted by the five firms is over. The field evaluation trials will begin in early-2013. The plan is to begin inducting the new rifles by mid-2014," said a source.

The new rifles, weighing around 3.5-kg, will come with two barrels, apart from night-vision devices, laser designators, detachable under-barrel grenade launchers and the like.

The primary 5.56x45mm barrel will be for conventional warfare. The secondary 7.62x39mm one will be used for counter-insurgency operations due to "their higher rate of fire".

INSAS (Indian small arms system) rifles, weighing over 4.25-kg and with an effective range of just 450-metre, had replaced the earlier cumbersome 7.62mm self-loading rifles but they too have now become virtually obsolete. The Army had also been forced to import one lakh AK-47s, apart from using the ones seized in encounters, for counter-insurgency operations in J&K and the north-east.

The other procurement project already underway involves an initial purchase of 44,000 CQB carbines for around Rs 3,200 crore, with subsequent production of another 1,20,000 by OFB under ToT. "User trials of Beretta, Colt, Sig Sauer and IWI carbines are over now. The induction should begin by early-2014," said the source.

The process for LMGs and bipod sniper rifles will also kick off soon. The Army wants over 16,000 7.62x51mm LMGs and 3,500 sniper rifles, both with an effective 1-km range, for its infantry battalions to begin with. "The aim is to get light-weight weapons with more lethality and range," added the source.

Russia has offered to transfer BMP-3 combat vehicle technology to India if India cancels its project, an Indian Defense Ministry source said. This has more sense for India, as its homemade Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) can be commissioned no earlier than in ten years’ time.

The FICV project was approved four years ago and has seen practically no progress since that. It envisages the production of 2,600 vehicles to replace the older BMP-2 combat vehicles. The project costs about ten billion dollars, while the government will fund 80 percent of development costs.

At the present moment, India has in arsenal about 1,500 BMP-2 combat vehicles.

1.) That is a pic of BMD-4, not BMP-3.
2.) Why not invite India to wait a few years and check out the new Russian APCs, instead of BMP-3 now.

TR1 wrote:Why not invite India to wait a few years and check out the new Russian APCs, instead of BMP-3 now.

The Indian Army is in dier straits .

Going by operational reqmts, there’s an urgent reqmt for 900 new-build tracked ICVs for ferrying fully-equipped infantry soldiers to the tactical battle area. Such ICVs are reqd for accompanying the existing T-90S & Arjun Mk1 MBT regiments. However, there is also a parallel reqmt for some 300 tank-destroyer-cum-armoured recce tracked vehicles.

Originally, the NAMICA was supposed to fulfil this reqmt, but due to persistent R & D delays involving NAMICA, the Indian Army is giving serious thought to procuring the BMPT ‘Terminator’ off-the-shelf from Russia.

Therefore, what Russia is proposing are two solutions to plug the IA’s urgent capability gaps: BMP-3 ICV for use as battle taxis, & BMPTs as substitutes for NAMICA.

In my opinion India , at reason , will never accept to give up its FICV -Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle- project for production of BMP-3/3M IFV, the technical requirements in play are too different in level and sophistication to allow a similar compromise to happen.

What instaed i believe possible is a limited purchase of BMP-3M vehicles with limited ToT related to some materials and design solutions aimed at achieve operative buoyancy ( retaining capability to engage enemy targets at long range ) to be eventually integrated in the domestic project.

That feature, in facts, represent one of the most critical capabilities for vehicles in this class in conflicts between evenly advanced opponents , dozen of times more important and critical ,under a strategical and tactical point of view than some mm of RHA armor or some mrad of fire dispersion ; it allow to dilute enormously enemy force concentration ,both in offensive and defensive operations, to avoid completely majority of enemy's choke points and channeling defensive lines or conduct combined or even insulated landing operations practically anywhere ,quickly establishing defensive or ambush position with the disembarked infantry (naturally greatly aided by the unique fire solution, for vehicles in this class, offered by the 100 mm gun capable to fire 3UOF-19/E3UOF-19 rounds with 3OF70 HE-Frag projectile and "Arkhan" GLGM at typical enemy anti-tanks squad from outside theirs range of engagement ).


About this last point i believe that would be very useful ,for Indian national security itself, to execute contexually and urgently also a test trial simulating capabilities of infantry anti-tank squads equiped with the latest western-style anti-tanks missiles to repel an attack conducted with BMP-3 class IFVs.

I firmly believe that the image of infantry squads sitting ,completely powerless, while 20-30 BMP-3/3M IFVs stationed several km outside theirs maximum engagement range (even from open sea or distant river surface !!) procede to saturate with indirect fire of 3OF70 HE-Frag after 3OF70 HE-Frag round a defensive position after the other and with Arkhan missile bunkers ,engineering vehicles, field radars and even enemy IFV -always outside theirs enagagement range- all of that while disembarked infantry ,likely at theris own time armed with Kornet-E or ,worse Kornet-EM and Shmel-M, take position to engage any surviving enemy's element adn to take control of stargical point of interests, will lead Indian authorities at rethink instantly to the real operational value of the acquisition of systems with 2000 m class maximum engegement range such as FGM-148 "Javelin" or Rafael's Spike ATGMs.


Do you know India has not the luxury to having the chance to select its enemies among third world opponents completely uncapable to defend themselves and armed , in the ssector, at best with downgraded export versions of early models of BMP-1/2 .

I think the new of BMP-3 sales is likely a red hearing.

Most comments i heard on BR and DFI seems to suggest that BMP-3 is a bad design when it comes to crew comfort , safety and protection but good in firepower

BR and DFI seems to suggest that BMP-3 is a bad design when it comes to crew comfort , safety and protection

BR and DFI suggest ?
Very interesting...i image that theirs contribution is highly documented ,like theirs highly technical analysis of T-90S...sorry i want to say "tin can" its correct denomination....naturally all authenticated by the "legendary" comparative trial's results invent....cough....cough.....cited by A.Shukla.


Without any pretense to contradict theirs high technical and supremely documented expertise, let me add only some...naturally completely baseless and absolutely personal point of view.....on safety and protection of BMP-3 adn BMP-3M IFV.


Let start with a declassified CIA document on the subject (at pag 11 you can find some conservative eximations)

http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000498688/DOC_0000498688.pdf


Let continue with implications....naturally equally baseless....of similar defensive factors on very recent development of offensive solutions for LAV's rounds .

A pag 7 of the fist and pag 13 of the second anyone can find a very explicative graph and image projection ( ostensibly wrote by someone that has no get the luck to study at BR or DFI University) of BMP-3/3M level of protection


http://www.kalasnyikov.hu/dokumentumok/cta.pdf


http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2009gunmissile/7961leslie.pdf


Moreover firepower (in particular 100 mm 3OF70 HE-Frag projectile capable to engage ANY western ATGM squad from WELL outside theirs maximum engagement range...Javelin/Spike anyone ?....and Arkhan guided missile capable to engage enemy LAVs and bunkers from outside their area of return fire for not say enemy surveillance UAVs and helicopters) is not its most defining feature , strategical and tactical mobility is likely even more.


From 6:48 on of this video someone can get a....naturally totally baseless....idea of what said.

Mindstorm wrote:In my opinion India , at reason , will never accept to give up its FICV -Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle- project for production of BMP-3/3M IFV, the technical requirements in play are too different in level and sophistication to allow a similar compromise to happen.

The FICV as of now is completely stalled . TATA had teamed up with Rheinmetall but the later got banned from doing business in India , TATA is now searching for a new partner . That leaves out two JV teams BAE + M&M and Rosoboronexport + OFB .

It would be good if Rosoboronexport can now sell a limited number of BMP 3 with a few modifications as per Indian requirements and make a proposal to upgrade them to FICV standards in the near future . The BMP 3s can then be sold to another interested party in Asia , Africa or Latin America.

Mindstorm wrote:will lead Indian authorities at rethink instantly to the real operational value of the acquisition of systems with 2000 m class maximum engegement range such as FGM-148 "Javelin" or Rafael's Spike ATGMs.

The proposal to buy Javelin has now been shelved as the US was unwilling to transfer full ToT. Also it does NOT make sense to buy a $125K system when you can get two other such systems for the price of one . As far as SPIKE is concerned the staff evaluation is still going on and there are no plans to purchase it yet.

As on this date the Indian Army has 1400 Kornet E and very soon 10,000 Konkur M and 25,000 Invar missiles are arriving from Russia . Under the ToT agreement another 15,000 Invar missiles will be produced in India .

Given the current threat scenario this should suffice in the short run.

Mindstorm wrote:From 6:48 on of this video someone can get a....naturally totally baseless....idea of what said.

Sorry ...didn't get your point .

Nice post Mindstorm , Thanks for clarifying the whole issue , My vote for it.

I think right now India will be upgrading its BMP-2 fleet to BMP-2M standard with Kornet and EO systems.

A modified BMP-3 offering logistics commonality with BMP-2 will be only good the way i think

Modified BMP-2 will serve a long time to come in the IA.

Indeed there are many good up-armor packages for BMP-2 that put armor on levels no worse than say Stryker or IFVs in similar weight class.

BMP-3 is an excellent redo/cavalry vehicle, but the troop compartment is definatly not ideal for role as main IFV.

Mindstorm wrote:
From 6:48 on of this video someone can get a....naturally totally baseless....idea of what said.


Sorry ...didn't get your point .

Ok i will try to be more explicit :


See with attention the last part of the video i have pointed out (in particular from 6:57 on). Memorized ? Well.

Now image for some second to be the enemy. Ok ?
You must plan and prepare the position of your : mine fields, bunkers, ambushing anti-tank squads, air defense assets, MBTs, IFV, APCs, C4 vehicles and theirs entire...and very frail...logistical tail (maintenance vehicles, fuel vehicles , ammunition charts , engineering support etc..etc..) ,ok ?

Now if your opponent is equipped with a classical IFV (let put a Striker or a Puma IFV ) you can plan easily the best position and pathway for your LAVs, MBTs, APCs ,both on the offense and in defense, the times for redeployment or counterattack enemy forces in a particular sector and the most efficient placement for any of your defensive assets knowing that vectors of attacks are self-channeled by bridges - for any sector including a river - solid terrain - for any sectors with lakes, marass or swamps- or by the same coast - for any sector with sea coast-.

In substance the mere absence of a real amphibious capabilities among IFVs of your opponent mean that you can gain easily local force concentration , organize very easily choke points and ambush ,both in offensive and in defensive operations, with your MBTs, IFVs, CAS aircraft ,anti-tanks squads etc.... or force them in minefields or pre-planned "kill-box" area of your Artillery/Air Force.

Now if you add amphibious capability to all the vehicles of your enemy you will quickly realize that ,both in the offense and in the defense, your forces became effectively diluted over a territorial surface several orders of magnitude greater -your local force concentration effectively collapse- that several offensive/defensive tactics and solutions become totally impracticable and that the possible gaps opened on your frail rear assets and your entire logistical assets become suddenly not coverable


Clear the concept now Sujoy ?

Impact of this mobility feature on the same outcome of a conflcit against a very strong opponent is simply critical.

Mindstorm wrote:Clear the concept now Sujoy ?

Impact of this mobility feature on the same outcome of a conflcit against a very strong opponent is simply critical

Appreciate your explanation . Thank You Mindstorm.

GarryB wrote:The BMP-3 has a serious design compromise because it was demanded it have heavy front armour and heavy weapons in a turret and it had to be amphibious. This meant the engine had to be at the rear to balance the frontal armour.

If India doesn't care about the amphibious capability the engine could be moved to the front and a ramp rear door fitted.

So summarise it

Positive

1 ) BMP-3 is good frontal protection but side and rear protection is just as good as any of its peers of its generation

2 ) Has far superior fire power compared to its peers or even current generation ICV

3 ) Has good Amphibious Capability and Cross Country Mobility

4 ) The issue of Fuel being dangerous as in BMP-2 has been taken care in BMP-3 by moving fuel to the front and engine to rear.


Problems

Crew Comfort is bad as was described by V Popovkin

http://www.tanknutdave.com/component/content/article/248

Public Condemnation by Russian General

In 2010 Russian Gen. Popowkin made a public statement where he criticized the BMP-3 stating that the troops used to ride on the top of the vehicle as the inside was seen as a coffin and that a replacement for the BMP-3 should be developed.

So how is the crew comfort and safety compromised in BMP-3 ?

The only thing compromised is the exit of the troops over the engine deck.
Russian troops ride on top of virtually every vehicle outside of combat, even with traditional doors, so it is not due to them being coffins.
Ofc like most of its peers, the BMP-3 is not designed to protect against large mines or explosives.

Well Kurganets will dispense of the awkward setup, so it was definitely not a step foreword.
The setup had more to do with amphibious qualities + rear engine than particularly heavy front armor AFK.
IMO BMP-3 is an excellent reco and general purpose vehicle, not so much APC