Russian Army ATGM Thread

Mindstorm wrote:
I agree perfectly with you. We all remember what impact obtained 14.... fourteen.....launchers of Kornet-E in the hands of Hezbollah five years ago and the reaction of foreign minister of Israel with Russia about the possible penetration of those.... 14 launchers... from a batch provided to Syria in 1998 .

Any idea how did the kornet fare , I am aware they used many missile like Konkurs , Kornet , RPG-29 but I am more specifically trying to know how did the Kornet fare ?

What does that phrase mean ?

It means are you interested in naval things, and things related to the sea.

So it does not have top attack capability will not be hard to get a bill 2 like capability.

The easiest way to give it top attack capability is to position the guidance beam in the air on a UCAV... otherwise it is pretty tricky to get real diving top attack.

Very simply if the Russian Army is attacking a force and need a top attack weapon there are plenty of SALH guided artillery shells from 120mm right up to 240mm that could devastate pretty much any target.

The extra cost and complication of adding it to Kornet-EM makes it unlikely they will bother.

Very simply draw a circle around your current position that is 8km in radius, now think of all the potential firing positions there could be within that area... do you really think a tank commander can keep his front armour pointed towards all those positions at once.

In real combat no one is going to see a missile launch 8km away, so unless you see the incoming IR plume the first you will know of an attack will be an impact.
It is up to the Kornet operators to position their launchers in places where they will get chances of shooting at a tanks flank, whether it is a river or a bridge or a mine field there are plenty of natural and unnatural things on a battlefield that will channel and choke an armoured force in one direction or another.

Still it does not take away the fact that it has this capability what you are saying is describing a situation where it can or cannot be used.

The capability is pointless if you can't use it.

It is like spending 40,000 US dollars on a thermal imager to put in the nose of a Javelin ATGM and the finding it wont lock on anything except armoured vehicles with their engines running. This means it can't use its much vaunted fire and forget capability that everyone on the internet goes on about when it is used 90% of the time to hit buildings and trees and snipers and mg positions.
It works just like Metis, but costs several times more.
The vaunted top attack capability requires a lock on before launch so if it even makes it into real combat with a real enemy and that real enemy has something like Nakhidka the Javelin becomes useless in the fire and forget mode because it wont lock on to the target.

Both Spike and Javelin are expensive and very slow missiles, which would be acceptable penalties if they were both fire and forget. The expensive choices made give them limited F&F capability, and the lock on after launch capability is dependent on the operator being able to find and identify a target with the missile in flight... pop smoke and it will be fairly useless too.

More to the point Kornet is clearly a far superior weapon to either and vastly cheaper too, so it will likely be mass produced in enormous numbers and widely exported. Javelin will be widely produced because Americans believe they can afford such extravagance.

Iffact you can use this capability even if the target is at LOS because you might not want your self to be exposed so you just move out of LOS of target and use this capability to attack the target with little to no exposure to the target on your part.

Fibre optic cable is not cheap and neither is Spike... and it would be even more vulnerable to smoke than Kornet.

interesting pics... thanks for posting.

One thing many people forget... the doubling of the flight range of the Kornet is useful, but to do that they must have introduced fairly high quality thermal and digital video sights on the launcher to be able to detect and autotrack targets as small as UAVs up to 10km away.

Milan units in the British Army were issued with MIRA thermal sights and these sights were often "borrowed" or used by the Milan units themselves for night observation ops.

The sights fitted to these Tigrs above will also make the vehicle more than just a BRDM-2 with ATGMs fitted. It will be a combination of a BRDM-2, with an SA-13, and an observation version of a BMP or BMD with thermal sights... except all these vehicles are limited to 5-8km depending on the model, whereas this new Tigr will be able to see further and shoot to 8-10km depending on the target.

It will likely put them on an equal footing with a Cobra or Apache helo in a duel.

Nice pictures Kratos. It seems that one of those Tigers have small Kazakhstan flag on antenna.

Is it just me or are some of the later pictures showing longer missile tubes... perhaps with a different missile?

These might be Tigr images rather than Kornet EM images, so it might show different missile and weapon options.

The gun armed versions look interesting... 14.5mm calibre KPV?, or perhaps 23mm calibre KPB?

The muzzle brakes look different and doesn't look like standard ZU-23 like cannon, and the barrels are too long for 12.7mm and too short for 30mm.

Russian Anti-Armour Weapons and Israeli Tanks in Lebanon

Mikhail Barabanov
http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2007/

The military conflict that unfolded from 12 July – 14 August, 2006 between Israel and the Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite Islamist Resistance group, marked the first time in several years that the Israeli army has confronted a well equipped opponent in a large-scale confrontation. Military observers paid particular attention to the use of Israeli armour and the outcome of battles between Israeli main battle tanks and Hezbollah’s anti-tank weaponry.

All in all, four division headquarters and 17 Israeli Army brigades (six armoured, seven infantry and four airborne) took part in battle, though not all were up to full combat strength. Over 30,000 Israeli servicemen and up to 400 main battle tanks were directly engaged in battle on Lebanese soil, and the tanks were all Merkava models made in Israel. Of the six armoured brigades, two brigades (7th and 847th) were equipped with the Merkava Mk 2 model, three brigades (188th, 434th and 673rd) with the Merkava Mk 3 model, and one brigade (401st) with the most advanced Merkava Mk 4 model. Of the seven infantry brigades, two (1st and 609th) were equipped with Achzarit heavy armoured personnel carriers, converted from Soviet T-55 tanks seized from Arab forces in the wars of 1967 and 1973.

Since 2000, Hezbollah has turned the expanse between the Israeli border and the Litani river into a heavily fortified line of defence, known as “Nasser.” Practically every settlement was equipped with temporary or permanent fortifications (including concrete bunkers, steel doors, etc), a large number of underground tunnels and heavy camouflage. However, although Hezbollah fighters made use of these fortifications, they did not engage in positional warfare, but mounted mobile military operations. Fighters were mobilized in groups of no more than 20 people (often just five or six), based, as a rule, on detachments of anti-tank missile systems. It appears their strategy was to expose the advancing Israeli units, and tank units in particular, to guided anti-tank missiles fired at a fairly long range, often changing their positions, using a network of tunnels and bunkers.

Hezbollah deployed up to 2500 fighters, of which a core of a thousand “regular” troops were well trained and equipped to the best western standards. These zealous, professional fighters were well supplied with arms, and strictly followed orders. One could not say that Israel was fighting with “partisan” formations in the conventional sense of the term, but in reality with a well equipped and organized regular army, even if it displayed some peculiar methods of warfare.

Hezbollah made a special effort to confront Israeli armour with a huge number of anti-tank weapons, including the Soviet Malyutka anti-tank guided—missile complex (NATO code AT-3) with 9M14 series guided—missiles (including licensed Yugoslav versions and the Iranian Raad and Raad—2T tandem warhead “clones,” the Fagot (AT-5), Konkurs (AT-5, including the licensed Iranian Towsan-1 version), the French MILAN, the American TOW (including its Iranian Toophan and tandem warhead Toophan-2 copy), recoilless guns and several versions of the Soviet RPG-7 hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher. Iran and Syria were the main suppliers of these weapons, with some western systems apparently reaching the Shiites from the arsenal of the Lebanese Army.

Aside from that, Hezbollah used a small number of modern 9K115—2 Metis-M (AT-13) and 9K129 Kornet-E (AT-14) portable anti-tank guided—missile systems, and RPG-29 Vampir anti-tank rocket launchers, delivered by Russia to Syria in 1998—1999. These three new systems penetrated armour exceptionally well thanks to their tandem High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) warheads. The close-range Metis-M system have a range of up to 1500 meters and are armed with 9M131 guided—missiles weighing 13.8 kg with wire-guidance. The heavier Kornet-E fires 9M133 laser-guided missiles weighing 29 kg up to 5500 meters. Both systems are made by the Tula Instrument Design Bureau and were equipped with 1PN86V1 Mulat thermal sights. The hand-held RPG‑29 Vampir anti-tank rocket launcher is one of the latest products of Moscow-based Basalt. Weighing 11.5 kg, it fires rocket-propelled grenades that weigh 6.2 kg up to 500 metres from a telescopic pipe.

Hezbollah’s defences were structured around these anti-tank weapons, which were used in great numbers. According to Israeli estimates, the fighters launched over 500 anti-tank guided—missiles in July alone, and about 1000 through the course of the conflict. Moreover, the anti-tank guided—missiles were used not only against armoured objects, but also against Israeli infantry. The fighters sought generally to employ the weapons from the maximum possible range.

On the whole, both the scale of Hezbollah’s use of anti-tank systems, as well as their possession of modern systems with superior armour penetration capability, came as a surprise to the Israeli command. Nevertheless, measures to reduce losses of armour were taken from the very beginning. It is indicative that on Lebanese territory the Israelis used only their heavily protected APCs on main battle tank chassis: the Achazarit (on the T‑55 chassis), the Nagmahon, a few of Nemerah prototypes(on the Merkava chassis), the Puma combat engineering vehicle and the Nakpadon, all based on the old British Centurion tank chassis, while the standard M113 APCs, even those modernized with a great deal of extra protection, where hardly used at all, and then only as engineering, support and convoy vehicles.

According to various Israeli and Western sources, during the course of battle in Lebanon, between 46 and 50 Merkava main battle tanks (of the 400 deployed) and 14 APCs were hit by anti-tank weapons, including 22 incidents where tank armour and 5 cases where APC armour was penetrated. Another six tanks and at least one APC were blown up by mines and IDEs.

Of those tanks hit by anti-tank weapons, 18 were the newest Merkava Mk 4 version (from the 401st armoured brigade), and six of these had their armour penetrated. Twenty-three tank and five APC crew members were killed. A large number of anti-tank guide-missiles and RPG grenades hit the tanks, but in most cases these did little damage. It was reported that one of the Merkava Mk 4 tanks survived 23 hits from anti-tank guided—missiles before it was finally disabled and its armour penetrated. All penetrations of Merkava armour, according to Israeli statements, were achieved by the Konkurs, Metis-M and Kornet-E anti-tank guided—missiles, and the RPG-29 rocket-propelled grenades. If one considers that 22 of 50 tanks had their armour penetrated, that gives a penetration rate of 44% (and only 33% for the Merkava Mk 4). According to Israeli Army statistics, the penetration rate for tanks during the 1982 Lebanon War was 47%, and 60% during the 1973 War. The crew casualties rate was also much higher in 2006 at 0.5 crew member for each damaged tank, while the rate per disabled tank in 1973 War is one full crew member.

The number of irrecoverable tank losses among those damaged, according to recent Israeli publications, was five altogether, of which two (a Merkava Mk 2 and Mk 4) were destroyed by IDEs and three tanks were completely burned out after hits by guided anti-tank guided—missiles. This attests to the high degree of protection afforded by the most modern Merkava Mk 4 tanks, which could be damaged only by the most modern anti-tank weapons with powerful tandem HEAT warheads hitting, it would seem, weakened armoured zones.

The extremely low percentage of missile hits and the low percentage of armour penetration clearly shows that the vast majority of anti-tank guided—missiles were of the old type, most likely the completely obsolete Malyutka (and its many copies), with clumsy guidance systems (manual, on the oldest models), with no modern sights and a relatively small warhead, by modern standards.

It appears that non-modernized second generation anti-tank guided—missiles produced in the 1970s (Fagot, Konkurs, MILAN, TOW) were used in battle. The Kornet-E and Metis-M systems, with their much higher level of effectiveness, were clearly present in very small numbers, but accounted for the majority of Israeli losses. This allows one to conclude that Israel made an issue of the possession of these new systems by Hezbollah mostly for political, rather than strictly military, reasons. On the other hand, if Hezbollah had a large number of Kornet-E and Metis-M systems, the Israeli tank attack in Lebanon could have been completely repelled. Modern Russian weapons proved to be quite effective against the newest Western equipment.

The old types of anti-tank guided—missile systems have shown themselves to be extremely ineffective. And since the majority of anti-tank forces in the world are equipped with precisely this old generation of missile systems, the results of recent warfare in Lebanon should sound an alarm, and provoke considered reflection regarding the purchase of modern anti-tank weapons, such as the Kornet-E.

Nevertheless, from their experience in Lebanon the Israelis themselves concluded that armour itself cannot in principle provide full protection from anti-tank guided—missile systems, and that all of their tanks would be equipped with active protection systems such as the Rafael Trophy and the IMI Iron Fist systems.

They decided in early 2007 to equip the entire fleet of Merkava tanks and the Nemerah APCs yet to be built with Trophy active protection systems by the end of 2008. Passive electronic countermeasures are also now held in high regard. Apparently, none of the four tanks equipped with experimental electronic countermeasures system was hit by even a single anti-tank guided—missile.

However, the importance of heavy “conventional” armour (including explosive reactive armour suites) was also proven on the battlefield, and the Israelis decided to continue the production of Merkava Mk 4 main battle tanks, and to launch the serial production of heavily armoured Nemerah APCs on the chassis of these tanks. Two hundred such vehicles have been ordered.

Thus, the war in Lebanon has proven the Soviet and Russian approach to the development of protection for main battle tanks, as established in the 1970s, to be very well. In the 1980s the USSR created the first comprehensive passive (Shtora) and active (Drozd, Arena) protection systems, which are still being developed today. Israel and the West are only now catching up to Russia. Meanwhile, we can see that the newest Western tanks (included the well-protected Merkava) burn up when hit by modern anti-tank weapons in just the same way as the old Soviet T-72 tanks deployed in Chechnya and Iraq.

Russia avoided the Western fashion of dismissing heavy armour and explosive reactive armour as “unnecessary” and continued to develop a balanced configuration of armour, including detachable and built-in protection, and in this turned out to be justified. The Lebanese conflict of 2006 and the war in Iraq have once again proven allegations of the obsolescence of the main battle tank to be absurd. The modern MBT with its powerful heavy armour and large combat weight will continue for some time as the core of the land forces.

As for the tactical application of armour troops, it is clear that the Israelis used their tanks in small groups almost exclusively for immediate support of line infantry. It was precisely this well equipped and trained infantry that played the decisive role in battle. Attempts to use armour troops to achieve a breakthrough without infantry support and reconnaissance inevitably led to senseless losses, as befell the forces of the 401st Israeli armoured brigade at Vadi Saluki on 9 August.

The tank battalion of this brigade, pushing forward with no infantry, fell into a fire trap of anti-tank guided—missile systems (mostly Kornet-E, according to Israeli sources), losing eleven Mk 4 Merkava tanks damaged and eight crew killed, including the battalion commander. The Israeli armour troops were clearly not well prepared for action against modern anti-tank weapons.

On the Israeli side, it is also clear that the armoured reserve units were insufficiently prepared, especially in the use of countermeasures (smoke screens, advancing fire to disturb aiming, reverse gear withdrawal, etc). As such, the quality of the training of the armour troops and the ability of the commanders to effectively combine tanks and other forces remain the key elements for the successful use of main battle tanks on the field.

http://rutube.ru/tracks/5133579.html

Nice video, Kornet testing @ Kapustin Yar.

Nice vid.

Couldn't find a better place to post this video about the Khrizantema anti-tank complex in production:

http://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201204190945-c0ld.htm

Nice.

Krisantema is a heavier missile than the Kornet-EM and will likely be the standard Helicopter and light aircraft and UCAV anti armour/anti point target weapon.

The lighter Kornet-EM will likely be used on Boomerang and Kurganets chassis as a replacement for the AT4/5 launcher on the troop carriers and also on any BMPT type fire support vehicle as an anti helo and long range anti point target weapon.

The krisantema might even replace the Shturm on light patrol vessels with its higher speed and presumably longer range... eventually.

I don't understand Russian language... did the video mention any new model missile with perhaps longer range?

The Krisantema combines laser beam riding guidance with SARH in MMW radar frequencies so there is huge potential for flight profile shaping as the system obviously combines lasers with radar so the precise range to the target should be known. The guidance options mean that a target that has no distinct MMW radar signature like a log bunker can be engaged with the optical autotracker directing a laser beam for the missile to guide. For a target like a moving tank that would be easy to get a MMW radar lock on then the radar can detect and track the target and direct a radar beam at the target which the missile homes in on.

I would suspect therefore that MMW radar guidance should also be possible against a target detected in the optics of the system if there is sensor fusion and the Thermal sight is slaved to the radar and vice versa, so as well as directing the laser with the autotracker locked on to a target, it could also direct a MMW radar beam on a target locked by the optical auto tracker.

With precise ranging the missile could be lofted to increase engagement range and to effect a steeper attack angle for better penetration on impact.

Of course a little further development of an active radar seeker in the MMW frequency would allow the choice of SARH and ARH as well as laser beam riding. Of course the development of low cost IIR seekers using QWIP technology would offer another fire and forget guidance option too.

I don't understand Russian language... did the video mention any new model missile with perhaps longer range?

Unfortunately not. Commander of artillery units just made a visit in factory and see Krizanthema production line and they talk about repairs and modernization of artillery equipment.

The Krisantema combines laser beam riding guidance with SARH in MMW radar frequencies so there is huge potential for flight profile shaping as the system obviously combines lasers with radar so the precise range to the target should be known. The guidance options mean that a target that has no distinct MMW radar signature like a log bunker can be engaged with the optical autotracker directing a laser beam for the missile to guide. For a target like a moving tank that would be easy to get a MMW radar lock on then the radar can detect and track the target and direct a radar beam at the target which the missile homes in on.

I would suspect therefore that MMW radar guidance should also be possible against a target detected in the optics of the system if there is sensor fusion and the Thermal sight is slaved to the radar and vice versa, so as well as directing the laser with the autotracker locked on to a target, it could also direct a MMW radar beam on a target locked by the optical auto tracker.

Ka-52 helicopter and Krizanthema-S are actually first ATGM complexes, which could use ATGMs in radar and optical laser guiding mode day and night, what only means tanks could not be invisible for them. They could put RAM on it and tank will be visible in Thermal imager, if they put thermal stealth cover, it will be visible on radar. Potential is huge and giving here Hermes ATGMs, it will only extend its very long range and improve penetration capabilities.

About sensor fusion, it is hard to say anything, because all known datas are for older prototype with old day time only optical sight with missile guiding channel and this one could not be fused with radar guiding and that was reason,why it have to launch two missiles, one to be guided by radar and one by optical sight. The new day/night sight with TV and thermal imager is more easy to connect with computer, so sensor fusion could be reality and changing guidance modes in time of missile flight could be possible. But I don't know if they actually make this kind of fusion inside krizanthema.

The thing about sensor fusion is getting round camouflage.

For instance right now with a MMW radar and a thermal sighting system equipped with current Krisantema missiles a helo has the basic choices for detection and engagement as the current Krisantema vehicle which is SARH with radar or laser beam riding, but with night and all weather capability using thermal sights for optics.

In other words to find a target you can scan with a radar or you can find it with a thermal imager sight and then fire a missile at that target.

The problem is of course that radar can be defeated with radar stealth and thermal imagers can be defeated with IR screens/camouflage. Something like Nakidka would reduce the detection range of the system making it rather less effective.

The point is that with sensor fusion you can add other data sources like LLLTV and LIDAR that will enable a radar stealthy low thermal emission target to be revealed at extended ranges. As I mentioned they are working on image intensification equipment that can detect the difference between natural colours and artificial colours so a simple camouflage net will glow in the LLLTV channel even if it matches the background in radar and IR so a laser beam riding missile can still be directed at the target, or a pencil radar beam can be directed at the centre of the target for the missile to home in on.

Obviously ideally you will want fire and forget weapons and with the development of lock on after launch IIR seeking missiles like Morfei I think QWIP sensors and MMW radar ARH sensors are the way forward there.

Most threats in the NATO tank park have fire on the move capability and by firing on the move they are safer from unguided weapons like RPGs, but moving around the place will expend an enormous amount of fuel and make them vulnerable to helicopter threats...

The problem is of course that radar can be defeated with radar stealth and thermal imagers can be defeated with IR screens/camouflage. Something like Nakidka would reduce the detection range of the system making it rather less effective.

The point is that with sensor fusion you can add other data sources like LLLTV and LIDAR that will enable a radar stealthy low thermal emission target to be revealed at extended ranges. As I mentioned they are working on image intensification equipment that can detect the difference between natural colours and artificial colours so a simple camouflage net will glow in the LLLTV channel even if it matches the background in radar and IR so a laser beam riding missile can still be directed at the target, or a pencil radar beam can be directed at the centre of the target for the missile to home in on.

Radar stealth covers and IR stealth covers could work against planes, which operate behind lines, but on the battlefield you could just fire few illuminating rounds and you will see with naked eyes those tanks. Also army units have enough II night sights to see them.

For instance right now with a MMW radar and a thermal sighting system equipped with current Krisantema missiles a helo has the basic choices for detection and engagement as the current Krisantema vehicle which is SARH with radar or laser beam riding, but with night and all weather capability using thermal sights for optics.

In other words to find a target you can scan with a radar or you can find it with a thermal imager sight and then fire a missile at that target.

I think both Ka-52 and Krizanthema could search targets with both radar and EO sensors and engage two targets simultaneously one with radar and one with optical mode.

Obviously ideally you will want fire and forget weapons and with the development of lock on after launch IIR seeking missiles like Morfei I think QWIP sensors and MMW radar ARH sensors are the way forward there.

True, this would be ideal, but I think this sensors are too expensive for ATGMs, also as in many discussions, there are two philosophies of ATGMs, one is fire and forget with IIR seeker, which fly high and slow and could be shot down by modern air defense and the other is with guided missile, which fly low and fast to reduce time of flight and to prevent shotting down the missile. What is better depend on your needs.

Radar stealth covers and IR stealth covers could work against planes, which operate behind lines, but on the battlefield you could just fire few illuminating rounds and you will see with naked eyes those tanks. Also army units have enough II night sights to see them.

But seeing them is just part of the problem and it means that at a stroke you Ka-52 shifts from 16km detection and engagement, night and all weather, to optical range even on bright clear sunny days.

The purpose of sensor fusion is to combine the attributes of the sensors and maximise performance... the Pilot and crew don't care what sensor detected the target, the focus is detecting targets and especially threats at max possible ranges so they can be identified and dealt with or avoided.

I think both Ka-52 and Krizanthema could search targets with both radar and EO sensors and engage two targets simultaneously one with radar and one with optical mode.

It certainly can, but AFAIK if it is a snowstorm then optics wont be effective and neither will the laser... and what if the target is a log bunker that doesn't stand out from the trees around it on radar?

Even if it is a clear sunny day and you can detect the log bunker from 12km or more, if you can't get a radar lock then you can only fire a laser beam riding missile.

True, this would be ideal, but I think this sensors are too expensive for ATGMs, also as in many discussions, there are two philosophies of ATGMs, one is fire and forget with IIR seeker, which fly high and slow and could be shot down by modern air defense and the other is with guided missile, which fly low and fast to reduce time of flight and to prevent shotting down the missile. What is better depend on your needs.

QWIP sensors... once mature, should become as cheap to make as CCD sensor chips... a 640 x 480 sensor might cost a dollar or two... cheap enough to use in a missile.

BTW there is no reason why IIR guided missiles need to fly high and slow... the IR versions of Kh-25 and Kh-29 are both highly supersonic with flight speeds of 500m/s plus.

I think there is an overriding principle that ATGMs must be cheap... as they are the expendible component of the system and to be useful they must be able to be used in large numbers to be effective... both in training and combat.

Having said that a combination of manually guided and fire and forget makes your force much more flexible, and in terms of an expensive helicopter spending a little extra cash to enable it to fire at standoff distances and then leave the area rapidly make that expensive helo much safer.

A range of engagement options would be ideal... active radar homing sensors for ground targets are apparantly fairly cheap to mass produce and combined with cheap IIR and laser beam riding missiles I think would result in the best final result of a balance of low cost with fire and forget capability and lethality.

BTW laser guided Kh-25ML has a top flight speed of 870m/s and an average speed to 10km of 670m/s.
The radar homing versions with 40km range have average flight speeds of 450m/s with the higher peak speed of 920m/s.

BTW there is no reason why IIR guided missiles need to fly high and slow... the IR versions of Kh-25 and Kh-29 are both highly supersonic with flight speeds of 500m/s plus.

I apologize, discussions were about Javelin/Spike against Kornet and both Javelin and Spike fly high and slow comparing to Kornet, which fly low and fast. TV/IR versions of Kh-25 and Kh-29 fly a little faster than 1 Mach, laser versions are faster ones.

But seeing them is just part of the problem and it means that at a stroke you Ka-52 shifts from 16km detection and engagement, night and all weather, to optical range even on bright clear sunny days.

The purpose of sensor fusion is to combine the attributes of the sensors and maximise performance... the Pilot and crew don't care what sensor detected the target, the focus is detecting targets and especially threats at max possible ranges so they can be identified and dealt with or avoided.

Absolutely, all data are for ideal conditions, any weather obstacles (fog, smoke, heavy rain, snow, etc) reduce detecting capabilities and engagement range. Combining different sensors, which work in different specters is proper way to overcome those obstacles.

It certainly can, but AFAIK if it is a snowstorm then optics wont be effective and neither will the laser... and what if the target is a log bunker that doesn't stand out from the trees around it on radar?

Weather conditions are equal for both sides. If you can't see them, than they also can't see you. I think in such bad weather you won't use helicopters, but artillery.

Can't see them halting combat because the weather is bad.

I would think because of their radars helicopters would be more useful to send up than most types of UAV.

Optical and IR guided weapons will be less effective as will small arms fire, and radar guided weapons would not be able to use optical alternatives to scanning the skies so the use of radar to find the helos will betray targets for the helos to engage I suppose.

Regarding missile speed you actually gave me an idea... the longest range Hermes has a booster rocket motor that propels the missile to about 1,300m/s... if they could change the 30kgs warhead from a dual purpose HEAT/Frag warhead into a long 25kg rod of DU maybe 3 metres long and 30-40mm wide, mounted terminal guidance in the nose with control surfaces with the rest of the missile body solid rocket fuel to accelerate the missile to something like 2km/s out to about 12km or so you would have the ultimate anti armour weapon with the very high flight speed delivering excellent terminal effects and short launch to impact times... of course a 30kg HEAT warhead on its own should be effective enough but the problem with HEAT charges is that their penetration is directly proportional to their diameter but large diameter means slower heavier missile...

http://vpk.name/news/71450_Tulskoe_KBP_rasschityivaet_chto_Minoboronyi_primet_na_vooruzhenie_kompleksyi_KornetEM.html

KBP claim, that Russian military will buy Kornet-EM to protect S-400 regiments together with Pantsir-S1, where it also use Pantsir commands to easier engage flying targets, but mostly it will protect them against ground targets.

Perhaps it is a short term measure?

I would expect that the ground based Hermes would be a better solution to defending a site from ground attack as its range performance is double (20km vs 10km) and also the unification of missiles with Pantsir-S1 means against some targets the Hermes could be used against aerial targets... from what we know the SALH, MMW radar homing, and IIR homing models of Hermes might also potentially be used against aerial targets as easily as against ground targets with the Pantsir-S1 vehicles tracking the aerial targets and using its command guidance link to direct the missiles to close enough to get their own lock on the targets.

Normally they guide the Pantsir-S1 missile right in for the kill but using Hermes missiles which also use radio command to the target area you could deal with a much larger number of attackers as the missiles will handle the terminal phase of the engagement themselves. Plus the ground based model of Hermes has been depicted in mockups as showing up to 40 launch tubes, so even if you fill them with Pantsir-S1 missiles that means they could drive around a large base where needed and launch their missiles controlled by Pantsir-S1 vehicles so the problems of reloading the Pantsir-S1 after an attack is reduced... even after hundreds of cruise missiles are used to attack the Hermes vehicles will be quicker to reload and the Pantsir-S1 vehicles will be ready to fire too.
The range of the Hermes means that it can engage targets at extended ranges... depending on the model, 20, 40 or even 100km.

I suspect the main issue with Kornet-EM will be speed, with a flight speed of just over supersonic levels it will take about 3s per km so a 10km range engagement will take half a minute, whereas a Pantsir-S1 missile travelling at 1.3km/s will take rather less. Another factor will be the difference between the warhead weights which will also be significant.

On the whole I think the Kornet-EM will be an excellent place holder till Hermes is ready.

http://vitalykuzmin.net/?q=node/461

I don't wanna post all of them, but Vitaly has a bunch of these phenom photo reports from the recent display, check em all out.

http://77rus.smugmug.com/Military/Engineering-Technologies-2012/i-2JPRXkj/0/O/TVM2012ch2p3photo019.jpg

Tigr with Kornet-E is pretty sexy.

http://77rus.smugmug.com/Military/Engineering-Technologies-2012/i-rPk48Jv/0/O/TVM2012ch2p3photo022.jpg

The targeting and launch complex.

He has skill with a camera does he not?

I occasionally get the light right, but usually by accident...

George1 wrote:More than 10 sets of new anti-tank missiles (ATGM) "khrizantema-s" the crawler, which replaced the complexes "Shturm" entered the artillery connecting southern military district (ÛVO), located in Ingushetia.

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=486109058116747&set=a.289548557772799.66899.145866335474356&type=1&relevant_count=1

Excellent. It seems they will combine both Kornet and Krizanthema ATGMs. Good improvement in all weather and night capabilities. I wonder if there is capability to indirect cooperation through data link between Krizanthema and Ka-52.

Why have Kornet and Krizanthema both why not build just one ATGM and then develop it further to make it F&F