Biden's Approach to Sanctions Will Benefit Russia, 07.07.2021
The American administration, according to a number of leaks, is changing its attitude towards the sanctions policy. What was the peculiarity of the sanctions policy during the Trump era, how and why will this change under Biden, and how will the new sanctions approach be much more useful for Russia than the old one?
US President Joseph Biden's team is undertaking a complete overhaul of sanctions policy. This was recently reported by the influential American Wall Street Journal.
According to the newspaper, the revision itself will end as soon as possible (probably during the summer). And, on the one hand, these terms look somehow optimistic - given the inertia and sluggishness of the American bureaucratic machine, a whole host of various agreements between departments and even government bodies (for example, with Congress). However, on the other hand, the timing is quite realistic - after all, the revision of the US sanctions policy has been asking for a long time. The directions of this revision are not only predictable, but in principle are not contested by the American establishment itself.
Sublimation experiment failed
In fact, we are not even talking so much about revisions as about returning sanctions to their classic functions. Punitive - when sanctions are predictably introduced for sins understandable to everyone (including the violator). Deterrent - when the main purpose of sanctions is not so much their imposition as the threat of imposition to prevent these sins. And also mobilization - when one of the tasks of the sanctions is to consolidate allies for collective pressure on the violator.
Under Trump, the States took a different approach. For the previous US president, sanctions were not a means of diplomacy, but a tool for pursuing a forceful foreign policy to pressure and crush competitors. This means, in particular, that they did not envisage any collective actions together with external partners. “In the previous four years, the United States has acted largely unilaterally and applied sanctions without much grace, disregarding the damage to allies, and sometimes to American business itself,” writes Ivan Timofeev, program director of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).
In addition, there was a complete out-of-sync in the sanctions policy among the branches of the American government - the Congress, as part of the fight against "Russian influence", stamped its own sanctions against Moscow, and the administration wrote its own. There was also no predictability in terms of conditions of administration and non-administration. Sanctions were taken against the same Russia literally from the end, on any occasion that appeared.
As a result, their seriousness and usefulness for the United States was emasculated. The Kremlin and the Russian people began to perceive the American sanctions not as something dangerous or undesirable, but as part of everyday life, from which there is nowhere to escape and whose existence does not depend in any way on the actions of Russia itself. Sanctions have lost their deterrent function and turned into a kind of sublimation mechanism, a means of America's escape from reality.
The fact is that American policy towards Russia has reached a dead end. It was not possible to change the regime in the Kremlin, and it was not possible to force Moscow to dance to the American tune (in the Washington understanding - “to change behavior on the foreign arena”). At the same time, the American authorities at that time, for various reasons, did not want and could not change course in Russian-American relations and start a normal dialogue with Putin. As a result, the sanctions became a kind of political fig leaf, demonstrating the willingness of the United States to continue the policy of "containing Russia."
A policy dominated, in fact, by the sporting principle - “participation is more important than results”. Yes, it was a pointless waste of resources, the exhaust was minimal - but it allowed the United States to somehow keep its face in the Russian direction and demonstrate to its satellites and allies its readiness to continue to resist the "evil actions of Moscow."
Do we need it?
Under Biden, however, the attitudes have changed somewhat. For a number of reasons (the regime of foreign policy economy, effective relations with the American establishment, the secondary nature of tasks in the Russian direction), the current American president has taken a course to renounce the senseless escalation of relations with Russia. This means that Trump's sublimation, demonstrative-power and masculine sanctions policy is no longer needed. Instead, Biden returns to the classic rules of the sanctions game.
How profitable is this refund for Russia? Domestic politicians treat the launched revision with caution, without undue optimism. “In the end, everything will most likely boil down to a more restrained application of new sanctions, and not to the abolition of those already introduced (with possible rare exceptions),” says Russian Senator Alexei Pushkov.
Indeed, one should not expect some kind of mass lifting of restrictions. But let's be honest - there can be no such thing in the current conditions of Russian-American relations. But what can be expected is, for example, a change in the focus of sanctions. What does it mean?
Today, the most dangerous restrictions for Russia are, of course, economic ones. Sanctions against Russian business, projects, financial institutions. However, these sanctions to one degree or another affect the interests of American allies - for example, Germany, which is now trying to launch the most important infrastructure project Nord Stream 2 together with Russia. Or it concerns Europe as a whole, if we are talking about any restrictions on Russian export-import operations, as well as investment activities. Meanwhile, one of Biden's new principles is a collective approach to sanctions - they will be developed together with key American allies and taking into account their own interests.
And since under the Biden administration, the United States in European affairs will rely not on destructive anti-European and anti-Russian forces like Poland, but still on Old Europe (primarily Germany), there can be no doubt that Berlin's objections to the unreasonable unleashing of an economic war against Russia will be heard in Washington and taken into account. “The administration is unlikely to use carpet bombing, similar to the sanctions on April 6, 2018, against major Russian businessmen, without a good reason,” Ivan Timofeev is sure.
Instead, it is likely that the United States will focus on those types of restrictions where its approach is similar to the European one - on human rights. “Targeted sanctions on human rights beloved by Democrats can be applied more aggressively. The "Navalny case" here may become the main attraction point for sanctions. The blow will more likely be against government agencies and officials than against business, ”said Ivan Timofeev.
But again, let's be honest. Firstly, this is still a lesser evil, and secondly, the Russian Federation is already accustomed to criticism on human rights issues. And I am ready to endure her.
In fact, the main disadvantage for Russia from the Biden revision lies not in the sanctions policy as such, but in the partial overcoming of a serious transatlantic split between the United States and Europe. Some mending of US-European relations and a temporary resurgence of the specter of Western unity. A unity within which the United States and the EU will again together contain the Russian Federation, preventing it from playing on the contradictions between them.
Fortunately, the key word here is “temporary”. The divergence of interests between the US and the EU is too deep and concerns too many aspects. So, on the whole, the revision initiated by Biden is still beneficial for the Russian Federation.
Text: Gevorg Mirzayan
https://m.vz.ru/world/2021/7/7/1107772.html