Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decommissions

Gentlemen, I hate to step into a perfectly good argument but the T-80 replaced the T-64 while the T-72 replaced the T-62 and then was superseded by the T-90.

Here is one of the best documentary producers Wings of Russia where all strike and CAS aircrafts are mentioned of their time. The first approach was for striking targets high speeds and on that doctrine MiG-23 was used and changed the nose section, scrapping radar and installing TV and later FLIR Kyro, due the now very low range between striking aircraft and target they have installed armor plates left and right from the Pilot. The version was called MiG-23B (Bomber) and later MiG-27.

Which you can watch from 22:00 and the armor plates are mentioned and circled at 22:48.


The Su-24 is mentioned from 30:00 minute.

"
The basic doctrine for Su-24 unlike for MiG-23B/27 was not just higher speed, but high speeds with Mach 1 at very low altitudes to sprint fast big distances without being located by radars and then strike the targets. This had many problems and 10 birds have been lost during development, 13 pilots have lost their lifes while only 8 managed to parachute, due the highly complex job to develope an aircraft that can fly that fast at such low altitude, after a while it matured and had no rivals in this field. "


To much armor on Su-24 was counter productive for the needed speeds, it does not have different armor from the MiG-23, simple armor plates left and right of the pilots.

The problems they have seen during Vietnam is that they have gave up on Shturmovik (CAS) aircraft far to early and like the americans they have realized and started working on a new CAS aircraft the Su-25, which can sustain and operate under highly hostile and anti aircraft ground fire, since the MiG-23 and Su-24 had really bad time dealing or even seen masked AA guns on the ground. It is also mentioned that above 600 km/h in aviation for human eyes it is nearly impossible to recognize targets or threats. Therefore a highly armored CAS aircraft is needed to deal under such environments and enemy forces.

They later focus on the Su-25 armor at 39:00 and show even tests of the armor trails by exploding rocket warheads next to its engines, which keep running.

The Su-25 uses a titanium alloyed capsule for the pilots, two armor plates seperating engines, armor plates near fuel tanks, fuel tanks have a filler for suppression and explosion prevention and the belly is greatly protected by armor. Had the Su-24 even comparable armor and such a distinct and precise doctrine for its use and during developement, there would be constant and easily available mention of its massive amount of armor. The entire existence of the Su-25 was due to the lack of capability of the Su-24 in such environments. The americans came to the same conclusion with the F-111 which the Su-24 was leaned upon, that they need a dedicated CAS aircraft that can sustain abusive punishment and fullfil its mission of striking and pownding enemy ground forces, which F-111 and Su-24 can not, they are designed for high speed strike missions, to evade enemy ground fire and time to react by its main attribute of offensive and defensive aswell, its Speed!

By the way the name of the Su-25 based on its appearance from the front with the weapon pylons is "scallop".

Also mentioned that during 9 years of its service in Afghanistan only 23 have been lost and that among 60.000 sorties which it has carried out. The docu also says the Su-25 is 5 times better in survivability than comparable aircrafts.

The titanium alloyed bathtub is shown exactly at 39:50 and not a single pilot has been killed through this titanium armor by projectiles. The armor of cockpit and fuel tanks are been shot with 23mm projectiles, the fuel tanks never suffered from explosion due its filler that surpresses fire and explosions, the cockpit stays unpenetraded.

The docu mentions the use of Su-24 during Afghanistan which were used only from high altitude for bombing targets with low precision, but due that never suffered a single loss.

Unfortunately I understand not the video of Werewolf, it would be very interesting, but to understand properly this comment:

Werewolf wrote:To much armor on Su-24 was counter productive for the needed speeds, it does not have different armor from the MiG-23, simple armor plates left and right of the pilots.

It is necessary to take into account somethings.

When we have two aircrafts designed with the same goals, the biggest of them has habitually stronger structure and stronger cover. Most of the loads suffered by the structure and the cover of the aircraft are loads by surface unit (N/m2, like the pressure). It means, for bigger surface bigger overall load, and bigger requirements for the cover and the structure.

One example that helps to see easier the effect of the difference of weight in the structure is the following. As example, we have the aircraft A and B, both designed to support 6g. But the aircraft A (20 tons) has double weight than the aircraft B (10 tons). Many people have heard  some time about aircrafts going to 3g, 4g, 6g... This means the aircraft doing some maneuver where the loads over the structure of the aircraft being 3 times the own weight, 4 times the own weight, or 6 times the own weight. We can imagine both aircrafts designed for the same requirement (to support, 6g, 7g or something else). For the aircraft A to go at 6g means to support loads of 120 tons, while for the aircraft B 6g would mean loads of 60 tons, this big difference comes from the fact of the own weight of every aircraft being different. The structure and the cover of the aircraft A must be significantly stronger than the structure and the cover of the aircraft B (and it helps improving the armour).

Also there is a significant increase of the loads because of the movement at higher speed inside a fluid like the air. We easily see it when we out the hand by the window of our car running at 120 Km/h or at 50 Km/h. The effect is significantly stronger going at 1500 Km/h (as example one hurricane is about 300 Km/h, and the structure and the cover need to resist it, even avoiding most of the deformations to lose not aerodynamically.

In overall terms, being designed under the flying requierements, according to structure and cover strenght we would have:

Su-24 > MiG-23/27 (smaller) > Su-25 (smaller and no-supersonnic)

From this basis is where the aditional reinforcement of the Su-25 begins, while the others seem to have not it. It seems that the zone of the pilot and the zone of the engine are significantly reinforced, but other zones, like the wings seems to be not reinforced from the design to support the flying loads and efforts, that are lower than in the Su-24 and the MiG-23/27.

i dont understand nothing :shock: :shock: :shock: :dunno: :dunno: :dunno: :dunno: :dunno:

It seems that is being in the US a discussion about the CAS style of fight.

http://www.janes.com/article/53745/new-usaf-strategy-suggests-a-10-replacement

The article talks about the different views on the issue. The entire article is interesting but I would like to quote this part:

...the USAF has also argued that the A-10 is not suitable for use against adversaries capable of deploying sophisticated air defenses. With the proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities the strategy document argues for modernisation of legacy fleets where possible, as well as for buying new fifth-generation aircraft.

A multiservice CAS summit earlier this year confirmed the USAF plans to retire the aircraft, but did not yield plans for a new CAS aircraft.

The bolded part means that the USAF considers at this point the A-10 not able to do its main function vs adversaries capable of deploying sophisticated air defense. In other words, it is considered obsolete (today, in 2015) vs these adversaries. It comes even before of what I expected.

Technically it is very difficult to see how a new aircraft keeping this fighting style can avoid the new air-defenses.

eehnie wrote:It seems that is being in the US a discussion about the CAS style of fight.

http://www.janes.com/article/53745/new-usaf-strategy-suggests-a-10-replacement

The article talks about the different views on the issue. The entire article is interesting but I would like to quote this part:

...the USAF has also argued that the A-10 is not suitable for use against adversaries capable of deploying sophisticated air defenses. With the proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities the strategy document argues for modernisation of legacy fleets where possible, as well as for buying new fifth-generation aircraft.

A multiservice CAS summit earlier this year confirmed the USAF plans to retire the aircraft, but did not yield plans for a new CAS aircraft.

The bolded part means that the USAF considers at this point the A-10 not able to do its main function vs adversaries capable of deploying sophisticated air defense. In other words, it is considered obsolete (today, in 2015) vs these adversaries. It comes even before of what I expected.

Technically it is very difficult to see how a new aircraft keeping this fighting style can avoid the new air-defenses.

Nothing mere than the lobbyism for the F-35, it will end up exactly like GarryB has predicted, they will talk about decommission A-10 in next 20 years without doing it while duds like F-35 will continue to be incapable of integration into USAF untill it by accident meets the maturity and requirements.

Werewolf wrote:Nothing mere than the lobbyism for the F-35, it will end up exactly like GarryB has predicted, they will talk about decommission A-10 in next 20 years without doing it while duds like F-35 will continue to be incapable of integration into USAF untill it by accident meets the maturity and requirements.

In fact the USAF is saying that the A-10 is done vs these adversaries, no matter the replacement. It is not something that we heard every day.

I'm not sure of this being to lobby for the F-35, since the USAF is open to explore for a replacement of the A-10 with a new aircraft designed under a development of the same combat style (that I personally see difficult to become successful in terms of avoiding the modern air defense while working at low speed in close air support).

the discussion has gone off-topic

When I opened this topic, I wanted to have some opinions about the older warfare performance taking into account the overall picture. There are multiple topics to talk about every case, and it was not the purpose of this topic to monopolize the entire discussions about the performance of every case. The point was to allow some discussion in relative terms (as example to see what type of warfare is getting outdated before, priorities for renovation of warfare, what replacements to afford before, to see if there is some urgent replacement or not, and things like these).

In my case the alone interest to include this article about US warfare was to see how the same discussions are being done at the highest level in other countries. I understand the comment of George.

As in the twin topic for land warfare, the performance and loses of every type of combat aircrafts and helicopters of Ukraine since the begin of the war can be an inportant information in order to decide about future decommissions in Russia.

To see the loses of Ukraine, the best source seems to be aviation-safety.net.

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/dblist.php?Country=UR

They have very complete reports about aircrafts and helicopters damaged and lost in accidents or in armed actions. According to their data, plus according to other reports of captured air warfare in Crimea before the begin of the war, and comparing the data with the total number of units of every type before the begin of the war, these would be the loses of combat aircraft and helicopters of Ukraine since the begin of the war:

9.84% 50 pieces of air combat warfare

9.52% 12 MiG-29 (including the 9 MiG-29 captured in Crimea that were not returned to Ukraine after the begin of the combats in Donbass)
5.08% 3 Su-24
2.77% 1 Su-27/30/33/35

27.77% 10 Su-25 (including the Su-25 captured in Donbass)
9,72% 24 Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177

0.00% 0 Be-12


For the air warfare the reports of loses in Crimea and Donbass before the begin of the war are more complete. Note that the loses of non-combat air warfare has not been included because would not be the subject of this topic. Also to note that some of the types surely has not been used in the war.

But again in this case, a big part of the remaining air warfare of Ukraine is not combat ready and even can not fly by low maintenance.

From the list in the poll only MiG-25 and Be-12 will be decommissioned until the end of decade And probably Mi-14, although there were reports for possible restart of its production

It is interesting to see the results of the two twin topics (for land warfare and for air warfare) combined. It can be a good exercice to take an overall view of the situation. It is possible to do it because the vote for every piece of warfare is independent thanks to have the multiple vote allowed.

This is the link to the topic for land warfare:

https://www.russiadefence.net/t4072-older-warfare-performance-and-short-mid-term-decomissions

Every vote to every piece of warfare is a vote of a person that thinks that the piece is performing well enough to avoid a total decommission (including of the reserve) before the end of the decade.

At the time of the begin of the topic, the Mi-14 and Mi-24/25/35 were included. The last two would variants developed from a single basis, the Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177. For this platform, likely the most modern options would mark the highest number of votes, and the Mi-35 is one of them. It would be difficult to see other variant of this type with more votes, then we can take the option with more votes as the option representative for the entire type of warfare.

Almost all the models have some vote of people that thinks that will not be retired, but some have more than others. According to the people that voted, the most likely models to be retired from active service and from the reserve would be (in this order):

BMD-1
BTR-70
BMP-1
BRDM-2
BTR-D
Be-12
2S9
BMD-2

Il-38
MT-LB
BMP-2
BTR-80
Tu-95/142
Ka-27/28/29/31/32/35
Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177
Mi-28
Ka-50/52
Su-25/39

To note that when two models have the same number of votes I put first the model with earlier data of end of production, and if the production is not still officially finnished, I put first the model with earlier data of begin of production.

Of course do not expect all to be retired in less than 4 years from now, but, I think the results are interesting and accurate. The warfare with lower number of votes seems fairly to be the warfare with higher probability of a total decommission before the end of the decade. And with more votes in both topics, the results only will improve.

There is an interesting sequence of news that is interesting to read together. I readed time ago the first, and I was finding the second but unsuccessfully until now, despite it is from a little before to begin this topic. Reading all them together it is easier to have a better understanding of what is being done for the replacement of the Be-12, the Il-38 and (maybe) the Tu-142.

The first new, the declaration of June 2015 about a decission to be made in the short term (then) about a platform to be elected to replace the current fleet of Anti-Submarine Aircrafts:

https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fria.ru%2Fdefense_safety%2F20150630%2F1103958839.html

aircraft IL-38 and IL-20 will be put up to 2020

11:06 30/06/2015 (updated 11:08 30.06.2015)

Противолодочный самолет Ил-38. Архивное фото
© RIA Novosti. Vitaly Ankov Go to the photo bank
Unified platform, created to replace the IL-38, as well as other anti-aircraft type will be completely new and will replace all existing naval aviation park patrol cars, said the head of the Naval Aviation Russian Major-General Igor Kozhin.
Zhukovsky (Moscow region)., June 30 - RIA Novosti The new unified platform to replace the aircraft IL-38 and IL-20 in the interest of the Russian Navy Naval Aviation will be introduced until 2020, told reporters on Tuesday the head of the Naval Aviation Russian Major-General Igor. Kozhin.

"The platform is now selected by 2020 it will be introduced, will be the general structure." - Kozhin said, answering journalists' questions about the timing of input of the new platform.

According to the chief of naval aviation, unified platform, created to replace the IL-38, as well as other anti-aircraft type will be completely new and will replace all existing naval aviation park patrol cars.

"This is a new, modern car that many issues will surpass foreign analogues Now we evaluate the possibility of building on it." - Kozhin said, answering journalists' questions about the main characteristics of the new platform, which should enter into operation in 2020.

The second new, the new of July 2015 announcing which platform has been selected:

https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fria.ru%2Fdefense_safety%2F20150717%2F1134034092.html&sandbox=1

Source: Russian Navy intends to 2020 to buy the planes on the basis of the Be-200

14:47 17/07/2015 (updated 14:49 07.17.2015)

Самолет Бе-200. Архивное фото
© RIA Novosti. Sergey Levanenkov
Fleet Command made a decision to purchase up to 2020 on the basis of hydroplanes Be-200 to search, detect and destroy submarines, said a senior official of the Russian Navy.

MOSCOW, July 17 -. RIA Novosti Command of the Navy until 2020, it intends to order the game industry such as hydroplanes Be-200 to detect and destroy submarines, told RIA Novosti on Friday, a senior official of the Russian Navy.

In Russia on July 17 is the day of naval aviation of the Navy.

"Command of the Navy decided to purchase necessary to 2020 on the basis of hydroplanes Be-200 to search, detect and destroy submarines," - a spokesman said.

He recalled that at the present time as part of the Navy Naval Aviation are hydroplanes Be-12, which service life is coming to an end. The new aircraft Be-12 is no longer produced.

The structure of Naval Aviation of the Russian Navy includes deck, anti-submarine, military transport and assault aircraft.

Day Sea Russian Navy aviation's celebrated on the day when the Russian pilots were victorious in a dogfight over the Baltic Sea during the First World War - 17 July 1916 four hydroplane M-9 aircraft carrier vessel "eagle" of the Baltic fleet rose into the air and clashed with four German planes.

And finally, a related new of March 2016 showing what is after the word platform in the news about the replacement of the current fleet of maritime patrol aircrafts:

https://translate.google.com/translate?depth=3&hl=en&rurl=translate.google.com&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20160303/1383612879.html

ASW seaplanes A-40 will replace the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the legacy BE-12

12:29 03/03/2016 (updated: 03.03.2016 12:39)

Самолет-амфибия А-40 (Альбатрос). Архивное фото
© RIA Novosti. Roman Denisov Go to the photo bank
Full update Naval Aviation Russian Black Sea Fleet of the park will be completed by 2020, said BSF MA Colonel Gennady Zagonov.
SEVASTOPOL, March 3 -. RIA News New anti seaplanes A-40 "Albatros" will replace the amphibious aircraft Be-12 in the framework of the Black Sea Fleet of complete renewal of the Naval Aviation (MA BSF) Russia in 2020, told reporters on Thursday the chief MA BSF Colonel Gennady Zagonov.

"Amphibious aircraft Be-12 will be replaced by modern anti-aircraft A-40 by 2020", - he said.

Multipurpose amphibian A-40 "Albatross" (Be-42, a product "B", according to NATO codification: Mermaid) - Soviet multipurpose amphibious aircraft was planned to replace the Be-12. The project was halted after the Soviet Union collapsed, then repeatedly declared to resume production.

Taking into account that the Be-200 (of 37900Kg of Takeoff Weight and 2100Km of range), is based on the Be A-40 (of 86000Kg of Takeoff Weight and 4100Km of Range), we begin to see the true sense of the word platform here.

Also taking into account that 6 Be-200 were ordered in 2013 and seems to be for combat roles, this is what I can understand from all this:

1.- The family formed by the Be A-40 and the Be-200 has been selected to replace the Be-12 and the Il-38. The Tu-204/214 and the Il-114 will not be used for the maritime patrol role. Both seems rejected.

2.- While is not well reflected in the news, the Be-200 has the size of the Be-12 and the Be A-40 is a little bigger than the Il-38/20/22. These would be the logical replacements if there are new orders for both.

3.- The work on this is far more advanced than expected. The replacement of both aircrafts will begin before the end of the decade, and the replacement of the Be-12 can be finished by the end of the decade.

4.- The effort on design will be low. The Be-200 is an aircraft in production and the Be A-40 would be in production before 2020.

5.- With the unmanned technologies coming, there is some risk for these aircrafts to become obsolete early in their life cycle. To take a traditional manned aircraft as solution for the future maritime patrol requires to have the new aircrafts as fast as possible, and to keep low the costs of design and development. This solution seems to do it.

6.- Thinking about it, a seaplane can have advange on range over other types of aircrafts if it is possible to refuel them from ships. It can make another way of "shipborne" maritime patrol, where the range begins to count from the ship.

In overall terms this solution seems to maximize the features for manned aircrafts done according to the old mold,

According to reliable sources, these would be the combat aircrafts in the reserve of the Russian Aerospace Force:

Supersonic Aircrafts (from newer to older, variants not specified):
86: Su-27/30/33/35
159: MiG-29/35 (including 9 captured in Crimea but returned not to Ukraine before the begin of the war)
100+: MiG-25/31
100: Tu-22
120: Su-24
226-: Su-17/20/22
160+: MiG-27
200+: MiG-23

Subsonic Aircrafts and Helicopters:
8: Ka-50/52
382+: Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177
12: Tu-95/142
17: Il-38
34: Be-12

Subsonic non-combat Aircrafts and Helicopters (is not in the subject of this threat, but can be useful for the following comment):
19: An-72/74
16: An-124
54: Mi-26/27
74: Ka-27/28/29/31/32/35
240: Yak-52
71: Il-76/78/A50
3: Tu-154
2: Il-62
5: Mi-2
102: Tu-134
159: An-24/26/30/32
7: Il-18/20/22
3: An-22
59: An-10/12
38: An-2
70: Let L-410

The data include aircrafts and helicopters from all the branches of the Russian Armed Forces.

Taking all it into account, it seems understandable to see how the serviceability rate in the Russian Aerospace Forces seems to be lower than in other types of warfare. Also surely the level of serviceability of the aircrafts and helicopters of the Russian Naval Aviation can be affecting to the serviceability data of the Russian Navy which has very low number of ships in the reserve. From other threat:

franco wrote:Serviceability

On August 1, Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu conducted a teleconference during which he addressed the serviceability (исправность) of Russia’s weapons and military equipment. Serviceability is pretty synonymous with “in service,” “good condition,” “operability,” or “equipment operational readiness.”

Shoygu reported that the Russian military has achieved the following serviceability rates:

   63 percent for Aerospace Forces (VKS) aircraft;
   96 percent for air and missile defense systems;
   98 percent for space systems;
   76 percent for the Navy;
   94 percent for armored units;
   93 percent for artillery units.

Shoygu claimed that the military has devoted attention to obtaining higher quality weapons systems and to supporting their serviceability in the future.  He attributed high equipment availability to the shift to “full life cycle” maintenance contracts.  He said the MOD has worked with producers and developers to find problems that occur during use and work out measures to prevent them in the future.

In 2014, Shoygu reported that the overall serviceability of Russian arms and equipment improved from 80 to 85 percent.

In late 2013, Kommersant reported that the serviceability rate of aircraft in the air forces (VVS) was below 50 percent.  “Permanent readiness” requires 80 percent operational availability.

The MOD Action Plan (2013) specifies that equipment in-service rates for the ground troops and navy should be 85 percent and 80 percent for aircraft by 2020.

The U.S. military goal is 90 percent for all equipment except aircraft, which is 75 percent. But actual serviceability varies widely depending on a unit’s training and operational tempo.  Recovery time might actually be more critical.

The Canadian Army recently assessed its major vehicle and equipment fleet serviceability at 60 percent, which apparently didn’t make it too happy.

In what is refered to the oldest supersonic combat aircrafts in the reserve, I do not think the Su-17/20/22, the MiG-27, the MiG-25 and the MiG-23 are obsolete aircrafts in concept. Of course they are not as good as the new, but in my view they can have still some life in the reserve, and it would be interesting. In overall terms while attending the procurement of new aircrafts the serviceability of the aircrafts in the reserve need to be improved, at least something.

In what is refered to the subsonic combat aircrafts and helicopters, except for the Ka-50/52 and the Mi-24/25/35, almost all of them are of the Russian Naval Aviation. The report about serviceability talks about units, and it is likely that it includes the aerial units of the Russian Navy. It means the serviceability of the Russian Navy can be affected by lower serviceability of the subsonic aircrafts and helicopters of the Russian Naval Aviation, because Russia has very low number of ships and submarines in the reserve.

And about the non-combat aircrafts and helicopters I do not think that to keep not-serviceable units in the reserve makes sense, but well better in we get not distracted with them in this threat. They are only included to have the whole picture.

Where did you get those figures?

franco wrote:Where did you get those figures?

Basically from russianplanes.net and warfare.be, excluding units used as museums and with some information else.

There are a few aircraft stored on most bases but the 3 main aircraft storage bases are at Rzhev, Lipetsk and Chebenki (Zhilgorodok). There is no way they total anywhere near those figures.

franco wrote:There are a few aircraft stored on most bases but the 3 main aircraft storage bases are at Rzhev, Lipetsk and Chebenki (Zhilgorodok). There is no way they total anywhere near those figures.

From what I see in russianplanes.net, which has pictures of every aircraft, in most of the cases, they are out of storage bases, but are not decommissioned according to the info. For many cases, surely they are not serviceable.

If not, I would not understand the low serviceabilty rate.

eehnie wrote:

franco wrote:There are a few aircraft stored on most bases but the 3 main aircraft storage bases are at Rzhev, Lipetsk and Chebenki (Zhilgorodok). There is no way they total anywhere near those figures.

From what I see in russianplanes.net, which has pictures of every aircraft, in most of the cases, they are out of storage bases, but are not decommissioned according to the info. For many cases, surely they are not serviceable.

If not, I would not understand the low serviceabilty rate.

Those aircraft in storage would not count against the serviceability rate and those low rates for the aircraft are due to the high maintenance required to keep combat aircraft flying period. Same applies for NATO forces also and 63% is a major improvement over 47% back in 2009. The older the aircraft, the more service required so as the VKS aircraft fleet gets more modern this rate will go up.

franco wrote:

eehnie wrote:

franco wrote:There are a few aircraft stored on most bases but the 3 main aircraft storage bases are at Rzhev, Lipetsk and Chebenki (Zhilgorodok). There is no way they total anywhere near those figures.

From what I see in russianplanes.net, which has pictures of every aircraft, in most of the cases, they are out of storage bases, but are not decommissioned according to the info. For many cases, surely they are not serviceable.

If not, I would not understand the low serviceabilty rate.

Those aircraft in storage would not count against the serviceability rate and those low rates for the aircraft are due to the high maintenance required to keep combat aircraft flying period. Same applies for NATO forces also and 63% is a major improvement over 47% back in 2009. The older the aircraft, the more service required so as the VKS aircraft fleet gets more modern this rate will go up.

High maintenance is a fact, but at same time many operations of maintenance are done without affect to the serviceability of the aircraft. Revisions are continuous, replacement of some componets are continuous, but in many cases are done fast and without touch the serviceability of the aircraft.

To have a 60% of serviceability only, in a fleet of active aircrafts, would mean that every aircraft would be 5 months of 12 in maintenance operations that require a formal change in the serviceability of the aircraft. It seems too much to me. Even a serviceability of a 75% would mean 3 of 12 months in non serviceable status for every aircraft.

In the other side, if there is an aircraft, of which even recent pictures are provided, and that is reported as in the reserve (it means owned by the Russian Armed Forces, and in status of reserve, that can return still to active service after the necessary effort), I do not see why this aircraft would or should be formally excluded of the statistics of serviceability.

In my view these high rates of non-serviceable units only can be sustained with a decent numbers of not serviceable aircrafts in the reserve, that are not being repared. (And the NATO also has old aircrafts).

As example numerically, the numbers that I write in the previous comment for units in the reserve would mean Russia having a 61.70% of its aircrafts and helicopters in active service and a 38.30% of its aircrafts in the reserve.

We can do an approximation. Roughly:

To have the aircrafts in good state 4 mounths by year (every aircraft in average) in maintenance operations that require a change to non-serviceability status would mean to have a 6% of the entire fleet in permanent non-serviceability status, to be only at a 63% of overall serviceability rate. And this would mean a 15.7% of the units in the reserve being in permanent non-serviceability status.

To have the aircrafts in good state 3 mounths by year (every aircraft in average) in maintenance operations that require a change to non-serviceability status would mean to have a 16% of the entire fleet in permanent non-serviceability status, to be only at a 63% of overall serviceability rate. And this would mean a 41.8% of the units in the reserve being in permanent non-servicability status.

To have the aircrafts in good state 2 mounths by year (every aircraft in average)in maintenance operations that require a change to non-serviceability status would mean to have a 24.5% of the entire fleet in permanent non-serviceability status, to be only at a 63% of overall serviceability rate. And this would mean a 63.9% of the units in the reserve being in permanent non-serviceability status.

Surely the reality can be around these numbers.

As commented in the twin topic for the land warfare, one of the most interesting sources about decommissioned material comes from the Departament of Property Relations, and their sales and auctions.

http://economy.mil.ru/economy/disposal_of_assets/movables/lots.htm

For the year 2016, the sales and auctions related with air warfare and material have been very small, compared with the activity for land warfare and material.

The sales and auctions affected to the following models of air warfare:

In very low amounts:

Tu-22: Sale and auction of scrap material.
Su-24: Sale and auction of scrap material.
Su-17/20/22: Sale and auction of scrap material.
MiG-23: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Be-12: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Il-28: Sale and auction of scrap material.

Not easy to obtain conclussions in this case, but interesting to see. In overall terms I would say that there is not many material for scrapping from recent decommissions basically because it has been only few decommissions in recent years, and some models retired from active service like the Su-17/20/22, MiG-27, MiG-25 and MiG-23 remain in the reserve thanks to be still actual as military concept.

Looking at the reports I tend to think that:
- The scrapping process of the Il-28 can be totally finnished.