Russia's National Defense Strategy issues

There is no point in Russia planning or preparing to fight HATO in a conventional conflict... such a financial cost would cripple them economically and force them to remain behind, despite their clever use of resources and military spending... no other country spends less and gets as much bang for buck... and in fact many countries who spend more don't get as much value for money as Russia does.

The point is that any conventional war would quickly spiral into a nuclear conflict and in that regard they are much better off than any other country on the planet.

It is this nuclear supremacy that will prevent any conventional conflict from spiralling out of control.

The introduction of hypersonic missiles will actually be ground breaking because conventional warheads can be used for what previously required nuclear weapons to achieve so in terms of conventional potency they will step up above everyone else.

More fundamentally there is no reason for Russia to have conventional military power except for self defence in situations that don't warrant nukes... Russia does not need to take more land or occupy any countries... Russia already has plenty of land.

The main uses it would have for military power would be self defence, which essentially would equate to destroying threats. Nukes destroy threats much more quickly and efficiently than any conventional force available currently, though striking countries seats of government, HQs, comms centres, and major military installations with hypersonic missiles would be a very useful thing for them.

He is right... it is amusing that the Europeans and Americans only just noticed and have just started mentioning the fact that China is a communist country...

So what... the last three decades it hasn't mattered that Russia is not a communist country, why would it matter that China is... especially when it didn't seem to matter before.

Overview of the what and why of the "surprise" military alert.

https://www.rt.com/op-ed/495646-russia-sudden-military-exercise/

For the top brass such an exercise may not be a surprise but for the small foot soldier it is and that matters.

Kaliningrad—A Key Factor in the Kremlin’s Calculations on Belarus
That region is as important as Crimea, Kamchatka & the Kurils.

If Belarus turns western and collapses into a pile of shit like the Ukraine has done... so what.

Access to Kaliningrad has only be reliable via the sea, and that wont change.

If the countries between Russia and Kaliningrad become a problem when war starts they can be quickly eliminated... all they need are radiation proof transport vehicles...

Access through baltic states with tanks is reliable too .

Russia won't give up Belarus to EU & NATO to be used against her- she had enough trouble with Ukraine & the Baltics, so it's a moot point IMO.

Russia didn't want to give up the Baltic states or Ukraine or eastern europe, but didn't really get much of a choice in the matter then either.

GarryB wrote:Russia didn't want to give up the Baltic states or Ukraine or eastern europe, but didn't really get much of a choice in the matter then either.

SOVIET UNION didn't wanted to give up and it didn't gave them up, really, just dissolved itself.

What is now Belarus was/is the weak link in the border chain of the Russian Empire, USSR & the RF- all 3 major invasions from the West came across it. Controlling it gives Russia strategic depth, that's why in the last war every 4th resident there died in the guerilla war. 
If Poland & therefore NATO gets to control it, that depth will shrink & cost many more lives in any future conventional war there. 
[url=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buck_passing#:~:text="The buck stops here" is,ultimate responsibility for those decisions.]The buck stops here.[/url]

The Southern Military District, headquartered in Rostov-on-Don, is the smallest controlled territory of the new Russian military districts. Moreover, its geopolitical position is very specific. The Southern Military District is connected with the territory of Russia by a not very wide corridor between the Black and Caspian Seas. In the north-west, the district borders on absolutely hostile Ukraine, in the south-west - on the equally hostile Georgia. Azerbaijan is located in the southeast - not that it is directly hostile, but you cannot call it an ally either.

The Southern Military District is responsible for the defense of the partially isolated Crimea ("Problems in Building the Defense of the Crimea", "NVO", 08/30/19), partially recognized by Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Armenia not bordering on Russia ("External Shield of the Caucasus", "NVO", 08/31/18), and their own North Caucasian republics are considered not very calm (and until recently they were a very hot spot). It turns out a situation of "defense in all azimuths" ("North Caucasus: when the rear becomes a front", "NVO", 02/08/19), while reinforcements from the rest of Russia must come through this narrowest corridor. Fortunately, the Ukrainian army is unable to cut this corridor, and Kazakhstan is still our ally.

Military potential of the Southern Military District

The ground forces of the Southern Military District and the Airborne Forces on its territory include 3 military bases (approximately equivalent to reinforced motorized rifle brigades), 3 motorized rifle and 1 airborne assault (mountain) division, 5 motorized rifle (including one coastal defense), 3 missile, 2 missile coastal defense , 2 artillery, 1 MLRS, 3 anti-aircraft missiles, 2 reconnaissance, 3 special forces, 1 airborne assault, 1 marines, 1 radio technical OSNAZ, 1 communications, 1 electronic warfare, 1 engineering, 1 RChBZ, 3 directorates, 3 MTO brigades, 1 artillery, 1 special forces, 1 radio-technical OSNAZ, 3 engineer-sappers, 3 RHBZ, 1 marines, 1 coastal defense regiment.
This group is armed with 36 Iskander missile launchers, over 500 tanks (at least 80 T-90A, over 400 T-72B / B3), over 800 BMP-2/3 and up to 250 BMD-2 / 4M, over 600 BTR-80 / 82A, more than 600 MTLB and BTR-D, more than 500 self-propelled guns, about 150 towed guns, more than 200 large-caliber mortars, more than 200 MLRS, about 150 self-propelled ATGM systems and up to 80 MT-12 anti-tank systems, 12 large and medium air defense missile systems divisions range (2 S-300V air defense missile systems, 10 Buk missile defense systems of various modifications), up to 250 short-range air defense systems and Tunguska air defense missile systems. This number does not include equipment in warehouses and storage bases.

As part of the VKS YuVO (including the naval aviation of the Black Sea Fleet) and central subordination on its territory there are 12 aviation and 2 helicopter regiments, 1 brigade of army aviation, 5 training air bases. They are armed with over 80 front-line bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, over 50 attack aircraft, over 150 fighters and fighter-bombers, 2 RTR Il-20M aircraft, over 40 transport aircraft, up to 80 training aircraft, over 120 combat and anti-submarine helicopters, up to 60 multipurpose helicopters Mi-8, 8 transport helicopters Mi-26. It does not include the aircraft in service with the 929th GLITs in Akhtubinsk. There are two air defense divisions in the Southern Military District. They include 7 anti-aircraft missile regiments.

As part of the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla, which can exchange ships and boats (along the Volga-Don), there are 7 submarines (1 project 877, 6 project 06363), 1 missile cruiser, project 1164, 6 patrol ships (1 pr. 01090, 1 pr. 1135, 1 pr. 1135M, 3 pr. 11356), 2 missile ships pr. 11661, 6 MPK (1 pr. 1124, 5 pr. 1124M), 2 patrol ships pr. 22160, 3 small artillery ship pr. 21630, 10 MRK (2 pr. 12341, 2 pr. 1239, 6 pr. 21631), 6 missile boats (2 pr. 1241T, 4 pr. 12411), 1 artillery boat pr. 1241T (missile boat without PKR), 4 armored boats of project 1204, 7 sea minesweepers (1 project 12660, 1 project 12700, 4 project 266M, 1 project 02668), 4 base minesweepers of project 12650, 4 road minesweepers (1 project 1258, 1 Project 12592, 2 Project 10750), 7 BDK (3 Project 1171, 4 Project 775), 9 landing boats (1 Project 21820, 2 Project 1176, 6 Project 11770).

In the troops of the Southern Military District there is a very large (higher than in other military districts) the share of the most modern equipment, which after the 2008 war ("War 08.08.08 - afterword", "NVO", 03.08.18) came here on a priority basis. These are T-90A, BMP-3, BTR-82A, 2S19 self-propelled guns, Tornado MLRS, Buk and Tor air defense systems of various modifications, S-300V air defense systems, Su-34 bombers, Su-30 fighter-bombers, combat helicopters Mi-35M, Mi-28N, Ka-52, submarine pr. 06363, patrol ships (frigates) pr. 11356, missile ships, pr. 11661, IAC pr. 21630 and MRK pr. 21631, SCRC "Bal" and " Bastion".

The potential of the Southern Military District, even without taking into account the Armed Forces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, significantly exceeds the potential of the Armed Forces of Georgia. After the defeat of 2008, this country cannot be considered a military enemy, and no real strengthening of the Georgian army to a scale that is dangerous for us can be expected in any foreseeable future. Together with the Armed Forces of Armenia (and NKR), the Southern Military District is significantly stronger than the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan, however, the war in this configuration does not seem real. The Armed Forces of Bulgaria and Romania are virtual opponents in every sense (political, geographic, military); there are no real forces of other NATO members on their territories. Thus, the Southern Military District has two real opponents - Ukraine and Turkey.

Opponents of the Southern Military District

The Southern Military District, especially its newly formed 8th Army, is the closest rear for the DPR / LPR forces, which, in turn, provide the Southern Military District with the “foreground” and “airbag”. At the same time, however, the Southern Military District should also provide the defense of the Crimea. On the other hand, the ZVO grouping "hangs" over the Ukrainian border in its northeast ("Imaginary and Real Opponents", "NVO", 04/17/2020), behind which the second echelon is the group of the same ZVO around Moscow ("Guarding the Heart Russia "," NVO ", 01/11/19). In addition, the forces of the Western Military District and the Southern Military District, opposing the Armed Forces of Ukraine, have another echelon - the Volga group of the Central Military District (Striking Force of the Volga Region, NVO, 04/05/19). All these forces are more than enough for a successful confrontation of the Ukrainian army, and the introduction of NATO troops into Ukraine is possible only in the imagination of the paranoid.

Turkey is already a member of NATO, but the alliance will not help it to fight against Russia either. Because he is not ready to fight with Russia, and also because Ankara's current membership in the “aggressive imperialist bloc” is mostly virtual.

Apparently, Russia has not fought as much with anyone in history as with Turkey. This was determined by the intersection of the geopolitical interests of the parties in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East. The last war between Russia and Turkey was the First World War. Thus, in the fall of 2018, the second century began without wars between the two countries. Now between Moscow and Ankara there is a downright "great friendship". True, geopolitical contradictions have not disappeared from this. In some ways, they may even have worsened.

In fact, the "great friendship" between the two countries is being built for almost the entire twenty-first century. However, its real strength was demonstrated in the fall of 2015, when a Turkish F-16C fighter deliberately shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber over Syria, one of whose pilots was killed. The parties instantly found themselves on the brink of open war. The situation changed as a result of an attempted military coup in Turkey in July 2016 (“there would be no happiness, but misfortune helped”). Turkish President Erdogan blamed Washington for organizing this attempt (it is still unclear how justified this is) and went for a sharp rapprochement with Moscow. At the same time, however, the interests of Russia and Turkey, both in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East and Caucasus, continue to diverge enormously. Moreover, Moscow and Tehran, in fact,forced Ankara to play in Syria according to their rules, which the Turks cannot like in any way. Thanks to the "special relationship" between Moscow and Ankara, Syrian troops with Russian-Iranian support have successfully liquidated all the enclaves controlled by the Syrian groups under Turkish command, leaving only Idlib. Speaking in rough modern language, it turned out that Erdogan was "bred like a sucker." At the same time, Idlib (part of the province not controlled by Damascus) was cut by the Syrians with Russian support by more than half. Realizing that almost everything was lost, Erdogan flew into a rage when a new Syrian offensive began at the end of 2019. Again Russia and Turkey found themselves on the verge of a direct military clash, but again "friendship" prevailed, Moscow successfully "legalized" all the new Syrian acquisitions.The situation is once again frozen at a new level, with the strongest impression that in the very foreseeable future another similar cycle will happen: the militants sponsored by Ankara will stage another provocation, in response to which the Syrian troops, with Russian-Iranian support, will go to recapture the rest of Idlib.

In this regard, the "great friendship" can very easily develop into a much more natural enmity with centuries of tradition. Moreover, not only Syria, but also Nagorno-Karabakh can become the reason for the renewal of hostility. At some point, Baku may decide that the Azerbaijani Armed Forces have achieved a decisive superiority over the Armenian Armed Forces, so it is possible to start a war, automatically creating a threat of war between the “older brothers” - Turkey and Russia. Syria also has not only Idlib: one can imagine a scenario in which the Kurds agree with Assad to return under the Syrian flag, but the Turkish Armed Forces still begin a military operation against the Kurds on Syrian territory. Some other scenarios may also arise. Especially if the government changes in Ankara and Turkey again begins to move closer to the US and NATO.

As you know, there are no land borders between Turkey and Russia, which in a certain way complicates the conduct of hostilities for both sides. However, Russia's 102nd base in Armenia and Russian military facilities in Syria are located near the Turkish borders of the respective countries. Despite the fact that neither Armenia nor Syria border on Russia either.

Of course, the ground forces of Russia in all respects are significantly superior to the Turkish army, but in the absence of a land border, this does not really matter. Where the sides do touch (in the south of Armenia and in the north-west of Syria), on the contrary, the Turkish army on land has an overwhelming superiority over the corresponding Russian groups, and strengthening the latter becomes a most difficult task for Moscow. It remains to hope for the help of the allies (Armenia, Syria and, possibly, Iran), as well as for the very difficult mountainous terrain, which will certainly be against the advancing (Turks) for the defenders (Russia, Armenia, Syria). However, if the Russian army goes through Georgia to save its troops in Armenia (and maybe in Syria), large-scale ground battles could unfold on the territory of this country.First, between the forces of the Southern Military District of the RF Armed Forces and the Turkish 3rd Field Army, and then between the troops coming to their aid from the depths of each country. With such a development of events, in the end, Russia must "transfer" the enemy at the expense of the quantity and quality of people and equipment, but it will not work out either easily or quickly.

At sea, the situation for Russia is also not at all favorable. As in the case of the ground forces, the Russian Navy as a whole is much stronger than the Turkish Navy, but locally the situation is more likely the opposite. The matter is aggravated by the fact that supplies to our group in Syria go mainly through the Turkish straits. Russian merchant ships and auxiliary unarmed ships of the Navy, which ended up in the straits zone at the beginning of the war, will simply be captured by the Turks, and the warships will inevitably be sunk by them (and, quite likely, without losses for the Turkish side). Colossal problems for the Russian military and merchant shipping in the Black and Mediterranean Seas will be created by the Turkish submarines of project 209 (at least 12 units). Fighting them for the Russian fleet will be extremely difficult. Objectively speaking, the easiest way to destroy Turkish submarines will not be at sea, but in their bases.

In this regard, the struggle for air supremacy will be of decisive importance. Turkey has a powerful air force that is quite capable of striking directly against Russian territory. True, both in the Crimea and in the North Caucasus, which the Turkish F-16s are capable of reaching, powerful groups of fighter aircraft and ground air defense are deployed, so for the Turks air raids on these areas can be prohibitively expensive. It will be much easier to attack Russian targets in Armenia and Syria, but even here it will not do without losses. On the other hand, Russia can, thanks to the presence of a developed airfield network, quickly build up an aviation grouping in the Crimea and the Caucasus at the expense of the Air Force of the Western Military District, the Central Military District, and not, if necessary, even the Air Defense Force. In addition, in the Saratov region (by the standards of strategists,it is very close), the main group of Long-Range Aviation ("Air Strategists", "NVO", 07.12.18) is deployed. It will be difficult to confront all this with the Turkish Air Force, to put it mildly. Turkey's ground air defense is large enough, but very archaic. The situation is radically changed by Ankara's acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system, but the question of whether this air defense system will be able to shoot at Russian aircraft remains open. Russian aviation is capable of reaching any point and to any object (in particular, to military-industrial complex enterprises) in Turkey, while practically the entire territory of Russia (except for the Crimea and part of the North Caucasus) is out of reach of Turkish aviation.The situation is radically changed by Ankara's acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system, but the question of whether this air defense system will be able to shoot at Russian aircraft remains open. Russian aviation is capable of reaching any point and to any object (in particular, to military-industrial complex enterprises) in Turkey, while practically the entire territory of Russia (except for the Crimea and part of the North Caucasus) is out of reach of Turkish aviation.The situation is radically changed by Ankara's acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system, but the question of whether this air defense system will be able to shoot at Russian aircraft remains open. Russian aviation is capable of reaching any point and to any object (in particular, to military-industrial complex enterprises) in Turkey, while practically the entire territory of Russia (except for the Crimea and part of the North Caucasus) is out of reach of Turkish aviation.

Now another additional theater of operations has emerged - Libya, where Ankara and Moscow again found themselves on different sides of the local civil war. And here our allies were Egypt and the Arabian monarchies. However, Russia's involvement in the Libyan conflict is much lower than in Syria, so one can only wish Turkey to get involved in the Libyan war as deeply and deeply as possible.

In any case, a Russian-Turkish war would have cost both sides enormously, regardless of the outcome (which will almost certainly be in Russia's favor). This is a strong deterrent, but not a 100% guarantee that there will be no war.

More about exercises.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnoN8_iO4Jg

Tsavo Lion wrote:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnoN8_iO4Jg

Can you summarize what they are saying?

Since the Chinese BRI goes via Kazakhstan, with branches in Azerbaijan & Ukraine, & RF, destabilizing C. Asia & all of those is the way to derail it. Nazarbayev conducted power transfer to prevent turmoil like in Kirgizia, Armenia, Ukraine & Belarus.