Russia's National Defense Strategy issues

Those Russian experts are probably foreign funded. Cause no person with self inch of respect and intelligence would fear Tatars in Crimea since they account for 10% of crimeas population.

Ukraine is broke, along with turkey.  If they decide to use drones in eastern Ukraine against DNR/LNR, expect Russian supplies is EW and anti drone tech.

Ukraine has no navy either. Turkey's is pathetic.

Man, people fear and or push fear over nothing.

Russia will use Turkey cause Ukraine has no leverage over Turkey and Turkey had no friends now with cash.

Ukraine won't be that nation.

Lol.

Turkey is trying (but failing) to use Ukraine as leverage over Russia.

It's like Israel and all the Arab nations around it. Israel had even less capabilities but destroyed their enemy. Russia has all the capabilities and manpower to destroy Turkey multiple times over.  Ukraine isn't even a threat.  Georgia was more of a threat.

Add Poland to the mix and it's hilarious. Country barely has its own armed forces.

People are stupid in general. They think that a nation can't fight multiple fronts at once but there is a reason why Russia has military districts.

Ukraine, Azerbaijan, the UK, Turkey and Poland

Coalition of the abandoned and the fucked up... I mean just the fact that the Ukraine leads the list and the UK is third is amusing... how the mighty have fallen... and the irony that the UK started WWII over Poland but now Poland is the only country of that group actually in the EU...

I would say rather than fear them they should be encouraging them to work together... I am sure they will be capable of great things... shouldn't be long before the Kiev regime is overrun by the forces from the Donbass... the way the UK has severed relations with its main trading block because it does not like to be dictated to by Brussels is amusing... the Ukraine has essentially done the same with Russia and isolated itself from its main trading partner and customer base, while Turkey survived an attempted coup supported by its HATO allies like the US which continues to protect the coup leader, and is in almost open conflict with France and Greece over a few regional issues... and then there is Poland and Azerbaijan... I don't think it should be ignored, but I also don't think it will be keeping Russian defence planners up at night.

Regarding Turkish drones over the Ukraine... they already deal with them over Syria.... if the Ukraine wants to kill its own citizens with drones, I am sure they will respond with drones over Kiev and elsewhere... practise against drone attacks is ultimately a useful thing because planning and tactics need to be developed to counter them.

Russia should further strenghten Black sea fleet

Central District Short Blanket

The military equipment of the Central Military District is not enough to repel likely threats
About the author: Alexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin - Deputy Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis.

The Central Military District (headquartered in Yekaterinburg) is the largest in the country in terms of area of ​​responsibility. It exceeds 7 million square km (more than Australia), stretching from the Volga to Lake Baikal.

CVO potential

The grouping of the ground forces of the district (including the Airborne Forces) includes one military base, one tank division, six motorized rifle (including one mountain), one airborne assault, two special forces, two missile, two artillery, one MLRS, three anti-aircraft missile, one engineering, one communications, one electronic warfare, three battle management, two MTO brigades, two RChBZ brigades plus two RChBZ and two engineering regiments.

The group is armed with 24 Iskander missile launchers, about 300 tanks (T-72 and possibly T-90), more than 700 BMP-2 and BMD-2M, more than 400 BTR-80/82A, up to 50 MTLB , at least 250 self-propelled guns, up to 150 towed guns and mortars, about 150 MLRS, up to 100 self-propelled anti-tank systems and anti-tank systems MT-12, two divisions of S-300V air defense systems and nine divisions of Buk air defense missile systems, more than 100 short-range air defense systems and Tunguska air defense systems ".

In addition, a significant amount of equipment is in storage, given the fact that there are three central tank reserve bases on the territory of the Central Military District. Each of them has thousands of armored vehicles, though not always in a combat-ready state.

As part of the aviation group of the 14th Air Army of the Central Military District, as well as the Long-Range Aviation and Military Transport Aviation Commands, there are seven air regiments, one air base, an army aviation brigade and a helicopter regiment in the Central Military District. It is armed with about 100 bombers, attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft, about 50 MiG-31B interceptors, up to 100 transport and passenger aircraft, 30 Mi-24P attack helicopters, at least 50 Mi-8 multi-purpose helicopters, 5 Mi-26 transport helicopters.

The ground air defense grouping includes seven anti-aircraft missile regiments. Although the Central Military District accounts for the vast coastline of the Arctic Ocean, it does not include the forces and means of the Navy and Arctic units.

Given the size of the district, the available amount of weapons and equipment is completely insufficient for its defense. The situation is aggravated by the fact that most of this technology is seriously outdated (the only exceptions are the BTR-82A, the Chrysanthemum-S ATGM, some ground-based air defense systems and, in part, the 2S19 ACS).

A mitigating factor is the size of the territory, which is almost uninhabited in the north. Enemy air attack weapons (except for American and Chinese ICBMs, MRBMs and SLBMs) ​​simply will not reach many of the district's targets. It is because of the "central" location of the region that most of the ground component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces is deployed here: more than half of the strategic aviation, two of the three missile armies (9 out of 12 missile divisions) of the Strategic Missile Forces.

Despite the favorable geographical position, the Central Military District, especially its Ural-Siberian part, requires a radical quantitative and qualitative strengthening. And not due to the weakening of other districts, but due to the formation of new units and formations, receiving not old equipment from warehouses, but the latest from factories.

Unfortunately, so far the trends are rather opposite. The Central Military District is the last to receive new equipment, and its grouping is gradually "drifting" westward. From Siberia, connections are relocated to the Urals and the Volga region. First of all, due to the formations of the Central Military District, the ZVO grouping is formed on the border with Ukraine. Its creation is necessary, but the Central Military District must receive compensation.

Due to its geographical location, the Central Military District should be a reserve for the rest of the districts and the closest rear for the military military district. New equipment should come here not last, but first of all, in order to be tested in polygon conditions. For example, it would be quite natural to transfer the first serial "Armata" to the 90th Panzer Division in Chebarkul, especially since it is very close to the manufacturing plant. Alas, so far everything is quite the opposite.

There can be two potential wars in the Central Military District's area of ​​responsibility. They talk about one for a long time and regularly, about the other they are deafeningly silent.

Islamic Caliphate

The Russian military campaign in Syria was launched primarily in order to stop the expansion of radical Islam as far as possible from the Russian borders. There is another geographic area where Moscow may have to fight a war with similar goals. In the short term, this is generally the most likely war for Russia.

It is already clear that the Afghan campaign of the United States and its allies has failed, the Afghan Armed Forces alone are not capable of defending the country. Apparently, the United States will surrender Afghanistan to the Taliban, considering them the lesser of evils in comparison with the "Islamic Caliphate" (banned in the Russian Federation - "NVO"). It is difficult to say whether the Taliban themselves will begin expansion to the north. The Taliban is a movement (banned in the Russian Federation - NVO), mainly Pashtun, they do not like to operate in ethnically alien areas. But Islamists from the countries of Central Asia are able to "take root" on the territory of Afghanistan. Having received combat training in Afghanistan, they will carry "knowledge and experience" home.

Despite the ideological similarity, the Taliban are at war with the Islamic Caliphate. For the latter, expansion is a way of being. Central Asia and Afghanistan for him are a single "vilayat Khorasan". The Taliban will most likely simply push the “caliphate” to the north, that is, the expansion of the latter into Central Asia will happen automatically. It will take place in the form of infiltration of small sabotage and terrorist groups designed to "wake up" the "sleeping cells" of like-minded people that exist in all Central Asian countries.

Members of the "sleeping cells" can be representatives of a wide variety of segments of the population, including businessmen, officials and security agencies. As a result, it is completely unclear where the "front line" will be. It is clear that the radicals will not observe the state borders. On the contrary, they will deliberately break them, creating in practice "wilayat Khorasan".

Russia will not be able to stay on the sidelines not even because of its obligations under the CSTO, but because of the same considerations for which it launched the Syrian campaign. It is better to lose 200 servicemen in the south of Central Asia than 20 thousand military and civilians in the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia, if radicals break through there. The main problem will be on whose side will be a tangible part of the civilian population and security forces of the Central Asian countries. For one part of the region's population, the Russian military will be the defenders, for another part - the occupiers.

On the part of the RF Armed Forces at the initial stage of the conflict, the Airborne Forces and front-line strike aviation will certainly be involved. It is impossible to answer now whether their potential will be enough to solve the problem or significantly reduce its severity. This answer depends primarily on the reaction of the local population, which will be different in different countries of Central Asia.

If it becomes necessary to transfer tank and infantry units and formations to Central Asia, this will mean the development of the conflict according to the most unfavorable scenario, reminiscent of “our” Afghan war (“Afghan Lesson for Russia”, “NVO”, 06.04.18). If the Russian troops begin to incur significant losses in people and equipment, the analogy will become quite obvious and completely unpleasant.

At the same time, Russia cannot simply admit defeat and leave. If only because in a few years at most we will have to wage the same war on our own territory. Therefore, there may be a variant of retreat from the southern countries of Central Asia, which do not have borders with us, with the simultaneous deployment of a military grouping on the southern border of Kazakhstan, which will have to be defended as our own.

However, this "obvious" war seems like "flowers" in comparison with the one about which it is customary to keep silent.

Strategic partners?

The Chinese are moving to Central Asia very actively ("Beijing goes on the offensive", "NVO", 11/16/18). The invasion is being conducted in economic and demographic ways. Military expansion is likely to be overkill. Or it will look peaceful too: in Tajikistan, military facilities of the PLA, apparently, already exist now - with the consent of official Dushanbe.

But no options can be ruled out. At least Kazakhstan may be ready to resist. Or Beijing, for some internal reason, wants to speed up the process. And then the likelihood of an openly military scenario will arise.

In the event of an invasion of Central Asia by Chinese troops, Moscow will find itself in a difficult situation. All countries of the region bordering on the PRC are members of the CSTO, that is, Russia is legally obliged to protect them in the event of external aggression. In addition, the seizure of Central Asia by China and the PLA's access to the Russian-Kazakh border from Astrakhan to Barnaul will become a complete geopolitical disaster for Russia. On the other hand, you don't want to fight China at all, especially if it did not attack you.

Nevertheless, refusing to defend at least Kazakhstan will become a delayed geopolitical suicide for Russia, and a very short delay. If Moscow has at least the instinct for self-preservation, it will have to fight. To try to avoid an escalation of the conflict, it will be possible to officially declare that the RF Armed Forces will conduct hostilities only in the territories of the Central Asian countries and will not be the first to strike at the territory of the PRC.

It is quite obvious that the PLA grouping only of the Western Command and the Xinjiang Military District is much stronger than the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan and the Central Military District and the Airborne Forces of Russia combined (the Kyrgyz and Tajik armies can be neglected). On the side of the latter - only the terrain. Terrain conditions allow organizing a sufficiently strong defense and inflicting tangible losses on the aggressor. And if the Kazakh army is only able to detain the enemy on its eastern border, then with Russian help it is possible to grasp the mountain passes on this border seriously. Further, the main role will be played by logistics, the ability of the parties to build up forces in the theater of operations through the transfer of reinforcements. For both Russia and China, this problem will be difficult due to the large distances.

Even if Moscow and Beijing initially agree to fight only in Central Asia, without touching the territories of the PRC and the Russian Federation, Russia will not be able to transfer military-military units to Kazakhstan. This is inconvenient in terms of transport and unacceptable from a safety point of view. If Moscow removes its troops from the Far East, Beijing will immediately "forget" about the original agreement, and this will be a disaster for us. Therefore, the grouping in Kazakhstan can be strengthened by the troops of the Western Military District and, to a lesser extent, the Southern Military District.

There is no need to be afraid of being stabbed in the back by NATO. Not because NATO members are noble, and even more so not because they will be on our side, but because they are weak and cowardly. But it is better not to touch the grouping on the border with Ukraine until the last opportunity.

The human resources of China are endless, but the number of military equipment is finite. Therefore, it is very difficult to contain the PLA offensive in the border regions of Kazakhstan, but it is possible. If this succeeds, Beijing will have to admit defeat. And if the PLA breaks into the operational space of the Kazakh steppes, Moscow will have to admit defeat, since it will have nothing more to cling to on the territory of Kazakhstan (except for the borders of the Irtysh rivers in the northeast and the Ural in the northwest). The first option will be painful for Beijing, but not disastrous. The second option will be a disaster for Moscow.

However, the losing side may not want to admit defeat. And it will escalate by striking enemy territory. This almost automatically means a full-scale war, at the end of which an exchange of nuclear strikes is seen.

Of course, neither Moscow nor Beijing needs this. But most wars in history have not been needed by either side. Nevertheless, they began. And then they ended very sadly. At least for one of the parties, and more often for all.

They are probably upgrading the other districts who require the new equipment most, first.

Central is important but it wouldn't be hard to quickly provide assets and men to it from the other districts.  While I agree they newer equipment and more men, they also need to prioritize.

Over time, it will get its upgrades and probably increase in men and equipment.

Does anyone have a good breakdown of Central military districts current equipment and total manpower?

miketheterrible wrote:They are probably upgrading the other districts who require the new equipment most, first.

Central is important but it wouldn't be hard to quickly provide assets and men to it from the other districts.  While I agree they newer equipment and more men, they also need to prioritize.

Over time, it will get its upgrades and probably increase in men and equipment.

Does anyone have a good breakdown of Central military districts current equipment and total manpower?

The only T-90 tanks would be at the Tank Command Institute at Kazan. As for manpower my guesstimate is 162,000 which would include all services and military cadets. I show 15-16 battalions of tanks which makes it 450-500. For Motor Rifle battalions, 13 with BMP-2/2M and 10 with BTR-82A's. There is also 1 light battalion with SUV's and 2 Mountain battalions with Tigr's and Typhoons. The Airborne brigade has 2 battalions with BMD-4M's and 1 with BMD-2. There are 8 Spetsnaz battalions in addition. They are getting new equipment but not the priority of the West and South. Sorry but all the time I have presently.

Thanks franco

The author of this garbage is a moron.

The loudest chirping bird gets the worm breakfast from the mother... this is just a baby bird chirping for attention...

Filling the place with Armata tanks barely makes sense because any conflict with the Taleban or Chinese really wont benefit from having Armata types in service there.

Speeding up procurement and deliver of new gear across the range of land sea and air equipment would be the best solution all round.

"Apart from the army and navy": Finnish media announced the emergence of a third ally for Russia

The demonstration of military power is extremely important for Moscow. Russian politicians want to achieve great power status for their country, recognized by other states. But Russia's share in the world economy is only about 3%, according to the Finnish TV and radio company Yle.

In this regard, the great-power aspirations of Russians rest mainly on how militarily strong Russia is seen in the world. And we must pay tribute, over the past decade, it has been seriously rearmed.

According to the Finnish Defense Ministry's Power of Russia report, Moscow has made significant progress on this issue, despite the world's economic woes. The percentage of modern weapons systems has grown significantly.

Now Russia's arms spending is being cut due to the COVID-19 pandemic. But they are still among the largest in the world, even though they make up less than 10% of the money the US spends on defense. At the same time, it is important for Moscow not only to develop new weapons, but also to create images - the image and perception of Russia's military power by others.

In 2018, Russian leader Vladimir Putin shocked the world by threatening an "invincible superweapon" - the Avangard hypersonic unit for ICBMs and other weapons systems. Since then, Russia has kept the planet in suspense, regularly recalling its military potential. This was last done on Putin's birthday, when the Russian military announced that they had successfully tested the Zircon anti-ship hypersonic missiles.

According to Professor Hiski Haukkala, reflected in the new book "The Big Game Returns", the Russian military doctrine pays great attention to information impact, since it can be used to influence the situation and make decisions. Even with a simple declaration of its military superiority, Moscow frees its hands. Therefore, the Russians in every possible way emphasize their military power, since this is important in solving foreign policy problems.

Every year in Russia, Victory Day is celebrated more and more solemnly and more monuments appear. The St. George ribbon became a symbol of Russian pride, and patriotic symbols began to be used everywhere. The state does everything it can to ensure that citizens admire the military power of their country. This is reflected in opinion polls, according to which Russians trust the army, Putin and the special services the most.

Russia has only two allies - its army and navy  - Emperor Alexander III once said.

As the Finnish media write, these words for Russians have not lost their relevance now. But given technical progress, the Russians now trust, in addition to the Ground Forces and the Navy, also the Aerospace Forces and the hypersonic missile component, calling them a third ally.

franco wrote:[b]

Russia has only two allies - its army and navy  - Emperor Alexander III once said.

As the Finnish media write, these words for Russians have not lost their relevance now. But given technical progress, the Russians now trust, in addition to the Ground Forces and the Navy, also the Aerospace Forces and the hypersonic missile component, calling them a third ally.

Logic since there were no air forces during Emperor Alexander III times

No question of trusting neighbours... because of the neighbours Russia has...

Of course Russia projects an image of strength... who wants to be a wimp in this pool of sharks... a wimp is just an easy meal in a shark tank... it is normal to not want to be a meal.

Better to look at Finland... they are sucking up to HATO to make themselves not look delicious, but the huge irony is that it is HATO that is the most voracious shark in the tank...

Russia is one of the few autarkies that exist. They aren't 100% self reliant but I don't think there will ever be a time they will be. But instead, critical aspects are being built inside while non critical can be obtained. Even their semiconductor industry is self reliant for major security situations while less important can be made outside of the country. Even then they see the benefits doing it in house.

Point of the matter is, you can't compare Russia's economy to most others. You can only compare it to other Autarkies.

Do you want a cookie for your great insight?

Sorry cookies are reserved for the Ukrainians only, no cookies for the Finns. Maybe the Soup Nazis will allow them some soup...

EDIT:

Thanks

franco wrote:Do you want a cookie for your great insight?

Sorry cookies are reserved for the Ukrainians only, no cookies for the Finns. Maybe the Soap Nazis will allow them some soap...

Soap or Soup?

lol

If he stinks as bad as his writing then perhaps some soap would help as well....

My point exactly

Ignore the anti-Russian verbal onslaught. But there is now open acceptance (as this piece in The Economist suggest) in the West that the Russian military has made decent technological advancement

Whereas 99% of Russian armour in 2007 was classified as “legacy”—ie, introduced into service more than three decades ago—today fully 27% is modern, according to IISS_org. Russian warplanes have gone from being 97% legacy to being 71% modern in that time

Russian military forces dazzle after a decade of reform

AFTER THE Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s once-mighty armed forces were laid low. Moscow bus drivers out-earned fighter pilots. Hungry soldiers were sent to forage for berries and mushrooms. Corruption was rife—one general was charged with renting out a MiG-29 for illicit drag racing between cars and jets on a German airfield. “No army in the world is in as wretched a state as ours,” lamented a defence minister in 1994. Yet few armies have bounced back as dramatically. In 2008 Russian forces bungled a war with Georgia. In response, they were transformed from top to bottom.

That began with large sums of money. Russian military expenditure approximately doubled between 2005 and 2018, when measured in exchange rates adjusted for purchasing power. Though much of the budget is secret, Russia’s annual military spending probably stands somewhere between $150bn and $180bn, says Michael Kofman of the Centre for Naval Analyses, a think-tank. That is around three times as much as Britain and close to 4% of GDP.

Much of that money has been spent on kit. In the past decade, Russia added around 600 new planes, 840 helicopters and 2,300 drones, estimates Julian Cooper of the University of Birmingham. Whereas 99% of Russian armour in 2007 was classified as “legacy”—ie, introduced into service more than three decades ago—today fully 27% is modern, according to a study published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a think-tank in London, on September 29th. Russia’s warplanes have gone from being 97% legacy to being 71% modern in that time.

The most important investments were in precision missiles like the land-based Iskander, sea-launched Kalibr and air-launched Kh-101, putting in range targets across Europe (see map). A decade ago the idea that the Russian navy could accurately strike targets in Syria from warships in the Caspian Sea would have been science fiction, notes Dmitry Stefanovich of IMEMO, a research institute in Moscow. “Now it’s a reality.” In a European war, the idea would be to use such missiles to threaten civilian and military infrastructure deep behind the front lines on the ground, ensuring that a conflict over, say, Tallinn would stretch far to the west of the Rhine.

Russia’s ultimate aim is to create a “reconnaissance-strike complex”—originally a Soviet idea—in which data from vehicles on the ground, drones in the air, satellites in space and radio signals emitted by enemy units are collected, processed and fed to the weapons in real time. Any “sensor” (for instance, a drone) can feed a target to any “shooter” (like a faraway ship), with targets prioritised centrally and struck, ideally, within minutes. Though Russia is behind America and probably China in this ambitious endeavour, it has made “huge leaps”, says Dima Adamsky of IDC Herzliya, a university in Israel.

Russian forces are not just better armed, but also more fleet-footed. Thanks to improvements in readiness, Russia could probably get 100,000 troops, complete with heavy armour, to a European hotspot within 30 days. NATO might struggle to muster half the number, of lighter forces, in that time. Around 5,000 of Russia’s airborne troops are said to be on two hours’ notice. Soldiers are kept on their toes with huge exercises. The latest, Kavkaz (Caucacus) 2020, involved 80,000 personnel and concluded on September 26th. “Russia has traded mass for tempo,” concludes Lt-General Jim Hockenhull, Britain’s chief of defence intelligence.

Russia’s armed forces enjoy the additional advantage of being blooded in battle. Though Russia and China may have comparable weapons, the quality of the forces, in training and combat experience, is “night and day”, says Mr Kofman. In Ukraine, for instance, Russia has practised armoured warfare and artillery duels, experimenting with the use of cyber-attacks and drones to feed targeting information to its guns. Syria, where over 63,000 Russian personnel have served, has been a testbed for precision strikes, air defence against rebel drone swarms and the use of unmanned vehicles.

Russian officers in Syria have even shown signs of shedding the Soviet legacy of rigid, top-down command and acting with more autonomy and creativity, a practice known as “mission command”, observes Mr Adamsky. That, he says, would be “a major departure from the Russian military tradition”. And in both countries, Russia has honed its skills in electronic warfare by jamming radios, radars and drones. Russia’s fake GPS signals in Syria were even strong enough to bamboozle civilian airliners in Israel.

Not everything has been fixed, of course. Viktor Murakhovsky, a former officer who now edits a military journal, is positive about the reforms. But he says that shipbuilding is painfully slow and that the country lags behind its rivals in long-range drones. The new T-14 Armata tank, the next-generation Su-57 warplane and new submarines have all been delayed. Though Russia is adept at blowing things up in space, its ageing fleet of reconnaissance satellites has shrunk over the years, with modernisation complicated by Western sanctions. Until five years ago, their film had to be physically sent back to Earth in capsules, notes Bart Hendrickx, an analyst of Russia’s space programme. The biggest problem of all, says Mr Kofman, is the limited capacity of Russia’s defence industry, including shortages of skilled personnel, machine tools and components.

The trade-off between hardware and humans is also apparent. Though troops no longer go hungry, their pay is not great. Mr Murakhovsky points out that a skilled tank commander in his 20s can expect little more than 43,000 rubles ($532) a month in peacetime, lower than the national average. “In my opinion, it’s not enough.” Morale among conscripts, who still make up 55% of the force, remains low, and the short duration of their service limits their usefulness in combat. And though the days of renting out warplanes may be over, last year Russian military prosecutors announced that 2,800 military officials had been charged with corruption, with the amount stolen totalling around $90m.

Nor has military renaissance bought peace of mind. In a war with NATO, Russia “would have conventional superiority for a limited period”, concludes the IISS, but would be outgunned if the conflict dragged on. In recent years, Mr Putin has therefore worked to ensure that a conflict would not drag on. To that end, he has invested heavily in nuclear forces, unveiling a host of lurid weapons such as hypersonic gliders, radioactive torpedos designed to pollute coastal areas and nuclear-powered cruise missiles capable of circling the Earth indefinitely. Missiles like the Iskander, Kalibr and Kh-101 can also carry both conventional and nuclear warheads (NATO officials point out that they would have no way of knowing which until they landed). For Russian generals, the hope is that their revived strength means that the nukes are never needed.

For its part, NATO has largely focused on Russian threats to the Baltic states, and the challenges of reinforcing Europe over weeks and months. It has underestimated how Russia’s new firepower might be used in a shorter, sharper and more expansive war that would stretch far beyond the Baltics. Its planners, and the national politicians that set military budgets and priorities, need to adjust their strategies and spending in the light of these new threats.

https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/11/02/russian-military-forces-dazzle-after-a-decade-of-reform

For its part, NATO has largely focused on Russian threats to the Baltic states

FFS...  saying that Russia threatens the balts is like saying the US threatens Mexico.  Is this scaremongering BS the best these corrupt establishment scribblers have to offer?

The Economist has always been shitty Atlantacist propaganda.  It must be awful having to turn up at work each morning knowing you have to sell a bill of shitty goods, but you need to work the mill regardless to pay your mortgage and keep yer kids in their fancy school.  Oh, the horrors of media pressitution!

Russia's new defense plan will ensure a guaranteed deterrence of NATO aggression

Safety first

The state defense plan for 2021-2025 will help the Russian Federation to effectively build up its military potential in the face of the NATO threat, a military political scientist, associate professor of the Department of Political Science and Sociology at the Russian University of Economics , told FBA "Economy Today" GV Plekhanova, member of the Expert Council of the public organization "Officers of Russia" Alexander Perendzhiev .

The President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, signed a decree that put into effect the national defense plan for the period from 2021 to 2025.
“Such a document began to appear in Russia not so long ago. It is signed for a certain period and was recently adopted - in 2016 until 2020.
When a new cell in the form of the National Center for Defense Management appeared in the military structure, the urgency of the presidential plan increased, ”commented Alexander Perendzhiev.

In a corresponding document published on the official Internet portal of legal information, the Russian leader ordered "to put into effect a plan from January 1, 2021," the development of which he had previously entrusted to the Russian Ministry of Defense.
The department was ordered to analyze and take into account the changes in the military-political situation in the world, thereby paying attention to potential military threats.
The order was given by the head of state against the background of growing concern over the annual NATO exercises and the system of control over nuclear missile weapons hanging in the balance.
“First, we really need to devote time to analyzing the situation in the world and around the Russian Federation. Next, you need to take care of strengthening the existing military structures and organizing their material and technical support.

The new plan should include such mandatory tasks as improving the country's defense management system, improving weapons and equipment, increasing the mobilization and organizational readiness of the Russian troops, "the agency's interlocutor suggested.

The North Atlantic Alliance has increased the frequency of annual military preparatory events in European countries to 40. In addition, intelligence activity has increased near the Russian borders. Compared to 2018 and 2019, the increase amounted to several tens of percentage points: the intensity of aviation flights increased by 33%, and foreign warships began to sail 24% more often.

The NATO command, said earlier Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, operates according to the "four by 30" principle. That is, in order to implement anti-Russian initiatives, the organization seeks to achieve a 30-day readiness for the use of 30 aviation squadrons, 30 warships, as well as 30 mechanized battalions.

Recall that the Russian side, expressing concern about the actions of the North Atlantic Alliance, provided the transfer of new weapons and equipment to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation this year.

Improving efficiency

According to the Ministry of Defense of Russia, the troops will receive 106 aircraft, 565 armored vehicles and 436 models of missile and artillery weapons. Also, regimental kits of anti-aircraft missile system, two divisional complexes "Buk-M3", as well as six divisional complexes of the "Pantsir" system will be sent to the army.

At present, the share of modern weapons in the army is 68.2%. In order to increase it to 70% in the near future, the navy will receive 18 boats and support vessels, submarines, 14 ships and combat boats, and one Bal coastal missile system.

Six modernized strategic bombers Tu-95MS will go to the strategic nuclear forces. Together with them will arrive 22 launchers with ballistic missiles "Yars", complexes "Avangard", the first serial nuclear-powered submarine of project 955A "Borey-A" "Prince Oleg".

“The defense plan should be aimed at solving the issues that the General Staff deals with. They usually relate to theaters of military operations in different parts of the world, as well as the alleged steps of the Russian Federation in the development of negative scenarios or the emergence of various real threats.

To work out the scenarios qualitatively, the Russian side must attend to increasing the effectiveness of military education, the military sphere and infrastructure in general. We are talking about educational institutions, roads, bases, warehouses, strategic forces, airfields, lines of communication and communications and much more, ”said Perendzhiev.

The military political scientist stressed that the defense plan is not about preparing for hostilities, but about working out the actions of the state, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and the Minister of Defense, capable of preventing armed conflicts and the participation of the Russian Federation in them.

Author: Alexandra Melnik

NOTE: Information vague as usual, however part of the new process similar to that of Equipment purchases in which there is a review and revision of the present plan every 5 years. This is an update of the 2016 plan for Strategic goals and development plans.

The role of new strategic weapons systems in ensuring strategic deterrence

The official military-theoretical journal of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation "Voennaya Mysl" (No. 12 for 2020 - issue ) published an interesting article by well-known Russian military theorists Colonel A.V. Evsyukov and retired lieutenant colonel A.L. Khryapin "The Role of New Strategic Arms Systems in Ensuring Strategic Deterrence" , which examines the peculiarities of using the Kinzhal air missile system with a hypersonic missile and the Peresvet laser combat complex in the interests of strategic deterrence, and primarily in the context of the concept of strategic non-nuclear deterrence.

CONTAINING aggression is an integral element of the national policy of any state throughout the centuries-old stage of the existence of the system of interstate relations. As a consequence, the threat of war, overt or implied, became a diplomatic tool with which one state held back the other from unwanted military-political moves. At the same time, the policy of strategic deterrence as the most important component of the national policy of the state received official recognition only with the advent of nuclear weapons (NW), which became the main deterrent tool for many decades. Until recently, strategic deterrence was perceived as nuclear deterrence. Moreover, as the troops (forces) are equipped with strategic non-nuclear weapons (SNNW) systems,capable of ensuring the implementation of a number of strategic tasks in military conflicts
of various scales and intensity, the role of non-nuclear deterrence is increasing in strategic deterrence. On this basis, strategic deterrence should be considered two of its components: nuclear and non-nuclear.

At present and for the foreseeable future, Russia is forced to deter the world's leading states from unleashing aggression against it and its allies by intimidation, which is based on a military threat, openly declared and communicated to a potential aggressor. In relation to other states, in addition to intimidation,
be applied deterrent actions associated with restrictions and coercion. Intimidation, restriction and coercion actions are carried out within the framework of the strategic deterrence mechanism.

Strategic deterrence is based on the combat capabilities of the RF Armed Forces (AF) to inflict damage on any aggressor incommensurate with the military-political and economic goals of the war - the so-called “deterrent” damage. Its upper limit is "unacceptable" damage, that is, damage that is absolutely unacceptable for the aggressor, when the aggressor state (aggressor states) ceases to function as a socio-political system.

In general, strategic deterrence measures are carried out continuously both in peacetime, including the period of an imminent threat of aggression, and in wartime up to the stage of massive use of nuclear weapons.

Strategic deterrence is ensured if the following conditions are met:

• the presence in the RF Armed Forces of combat-ready strategic deterrent forces, including nuclear and strategic non-nuclear forces with combat capabilities that ensure the infliction of unacceptable damage to any aggressor, including the coalition composition, in any development of the military-political and strategic furnishings;

• the determination and readiness of the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation to use these forces, if necessary, in accordance with Russian legislation.

The military policy pursued by the United States and its allies is aimed at reducing the combat capabilities of the RF Armed Forces, including the creation of a global missile defense system (ABM) and means of "instant global strike". In data
Under the conditions, the creation of modern domestic highly effective systems of strategic (nuclear and non-nuclear) weapons with equipping troops (forces) with them, as well as determining their role in ensuring strategic deterrence, are of paramount importance.

In his annual messages to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in 2018, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin stated and in 2019 confirmed the armament of the Russian Armed Forces with new types of strategic weapons:

• the Sarmat missile system with a heavy intercontinental ballistic missile;

• missile system "Avangard" with a gliding cruise warhead;

• combat laser complex (BLK) "Peresvet";

• Aviation missile system (ARC) "Dagger" with a hypersonic cruise missile;

• strategic complex "Burevestnik";

• unmanned underwater vehicle "Poseidon".

The adoption of these models into service will increase the flexibility and multivariance of the functioning of the strategic deterrent mechanism, as well as expand the possibilities of using weapons in existing and future strategic actions of the RF Armed Forces.

If the Sarmat and Avangard missile systems are assigned a role similar to the existing missile systems of the Strategic Missile Forces, then the role of directed energy weapons (ONE) and hypersonic weapons (GZO) is determined based on their unique characteristics and capabilities to influence various targets.

In modern conditions, the most important are the tasks of ensuring the combat stability of domestic strategic nuclear forces and reducing the effectiveness of the US missile defense system to a level that allows the Russian Federation to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. The successful fulfillment of these tasks can largely be achieved on the basis of the introduction of promising technologies and the proactive implementation of asymmetric countermeasures related to the comprehensive implementation of aerospace defense tasks, including anti-satellite warfare.

Combat laser complex "Peresvet"can be used to perform a wide range of tasks, including to combat the enemy's optical-electronic reconnaissance space assets by means of their functional defeat (suppression) by laser radiation. At present and in the medium term, it will be used to cover the positional areas of missile divisions with mobile missile systems.

The role of the strategic ONE in general and BLK "Peresvet" in particular in the system of strategic deterrence is determined by:

• an increase in the share of tasks to reduce the stability and efficiency of information, reconnaissance, combat and control systems of the enemy (primarily aerospace-based), which can be performed with the use of ONE;

• the need for highly effective selective destruction (suppression) of objects (their elements) with minimization of negative consequences for the population and the environment in the areas of strikes;

• the possibility of using the ONE both independently and together with traditional types of weapons, while ensuring an increase in their combat effectiveness;

• the possibility of using the ONE as a universal means of engaging the enemy in military conflicts of any scale and intensity;

• the ability to selectively, accurately and timely hit targets (primarily aerospace attack weapons) of the enemy;

• the ability to effectively perform cover missions against destruction of the most important groupings of troops (forces) and objects of state and military control;

• the possibility of hitting targets at a significant distance, contributing to the creation of an echeloned system of heterogeneous destruction of the enemy.

Aviation missile system "Dagger" is a GZO complex designed to perform strategic tasks in the pre-nuclear phase of a military conflict. The ARC's impact on the enemy's critical objects (CEP), including objects of the state and military command system, military-economic and combat potentials, as well as infrastructure, can decisively change the course of a military conflict and provide a significant increase in the effectiveness of the use of nuclear forces.

The possibilities of the multi-variant application of the ARC "Dagger" make it possible to exert influence on the adversary state (both the military-political leadership and the population) in order to deter it from unleashing military aggression or escalating hostilities during a military conflict.

The role of the ARC "Dagger" in the system of strategic deterrence is determined by:

• the growing importance of the factor of power in interstate relations, the aggravation of the competition between the world economic and military-political centers of power for expanding their spheres of influence, as well as the possibility of achieving the goals of political and armed confrontation by means of influence (threats impact) on various critical enemy targets using modern conventional (non-nuclear) weapons;

• improving the strategic containment mechanism and expanding the range of tasks assigned to the ARC "Dagger";

• an increase in the spatial and reduction of the temporal indicators of military operations in combination with the widespread use of "non-contact" forms of employment of troops (forces);

• increasing the combat capabilities of the ARC "Dagger" in terms of selective destructive effect on air defense systems, including the enemy's air defense-missile defense system in conditions of its opposition.

The use of this complex in military conflicts can suspend or prevent hostile actions of the enemy, limit the escalation of the conflict and will allow taking forceful actions in conditions when the use of other types of weapons is unacceptable for political, ethical or other reasons.

The advantage of a hypersonic missile in comparison with subsonic low-altitude cruise missiles is a significantly lower vulnerability when overcoming air defense and missile defense systems due to high speeds and flight altitudes. The high degree of vulnerability of subsonic low-altitude cruise missiles was confirmed by the results of the US military operations in the war against Yugoslavia, when a significant part of the American Tomahawk-class cruise missiles in that war were shot down by portable anti-aircraft missile systems.

Based on the characteristics of the ARC "Dagger" and BLK "Peresvet", it is possible to concretize the procedure for using these complexes in the general system of strategic deterrence in different periods of the origin and unleashing of a military conflict.

In peacetime- carrying out combat duty by forces equipped with the ARC "Dagger" and BLK "Peresvet", with the implementation of the following measures:

• operational training with the conduct of training and combat launches of hypersonic missiles;

• improving the structure and composition of forces, as well as the planning and control system;

• comprehensive preparation for use, etc.

During the period of immediate threat of aggression - by demonstration actions with the use of ARC "Dagger" and BLK "Peresvet" in order to prevent the development of the military phase of the conflict and force the enemy to renounce aggression. These actions may include:

transferring forces to the highest levels of combat readiness;

building up ready-to-use products;

carrying out measures to preserve their survivability;

conducting demonstration launches with hypersonic missiles, etc.

In wartime - the limited use of forces equipped with ARC and BKL (including the application of single strikes for demonstration purposes), their massive use (all or most of them with combat-ready complexes).

The effectiveness of the use of ARC and BKL depends on their combat capabilities, which are determined by the military-strategic requirements, including:

• the possibility of operational (in time) multivariate use of the complexes in strategic operations in the entire range of launch ranges;

• high accuracy of shooting;

• guaranteed performance of combat missions;

• functioning in a difficult jamming environment, including with organized counteraction by a potential enemy;

• the ability to quickly retarget;

• ensuring noise immunity of equipment and imitation resistance of control, communication and weapon guidance systems;

• reliability of detection, reliability of recognition and classification of targets in difficult weather conditions and jamming conditions;

• secrecy of the use of complexes;

• agreements in the field of strategic arms.

Thus, the adoption of the ARC "Dagger" and the BLK "Peresvet" (in the future, the "Burevestnik" complex and the unmanned underwater vehicle "Poseidon") and putting them on experimental combat, and then on combat duty, expands the capabilities of the military-political leadership The Russian Federation to implement strategic deterrence measures based on SNNW through its flexible and multivariate use in the pre-nuclear phase of a military conflict without switching to the use of nuclear weapons.

In 2008 Russian forces bungled a war with Georgia.

Really?

I can understand a western source claiming they bungled the war only if they take the Georgian take on what happened... the Georgians claim that during the opening ceremony of the Olympics the Russians sent an enormous force of soldiers to invade Georgia and the Georgian forces managed to push them back to the gates of the capital city of South Ossetia and shell said capital as well as the VDV peacekeepers base in the region and only then were the Russian forces able to push them back into Georgian territory.

The reality was that Georgian forces invaded South Ossetia n the hopes of taking the small territory before Russia or anyone could respond, they shelled the VDV peacekeepers base and the capital city in the hopes of rapidly defeating them with their new HATO training... they generally chose to use ex Soviet weapons and equipment for the actual fighting though.

For the Russians it was a shock... at how badly their soldiers were equipped, but they didn't outnumber the Georgians at any time and managed to crush them in a period of about a week despite lacking drones which the Georgians had plenty and used them too, and their C4IR was poor as well... communication was by cell phone.

Despite all this they managed to shock the west because they reacted very quickly and mobilised a force to push the georgian forces out of south ossetia and back into georgian territory.

It was a wakeup call for Russia that its military force has been neglected, and the transformation has been dramatic but there was no bungling in Georgia by the Russians... it was a relatively quick and efficient response that revealed problems within the military which the government set about and have succeeded in dealing with as shown in the Crimea and Syria... they are a totally new force able to perform missions they were not equipped or trained to do before.