Russian Space Forces: News

START III AND DEVELOPMENT OF MISSILE AND SPACE DEFENCE

Author: Sergei Boev

Sergei Boev, Designer General of the RTI Sistemy Consortium, designer general the missile attack warning system commercial-off-the-shelf radar

The Russian president and his US counterpart, who signed the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III) in April 2010, have taken a crucial step towards improving mutual nuclear safety and decreasing the level of the nuclear threat across the globe. When implemented, the commitments undertaken will significantly reduce nuclear potentials of the two great powers. At the same time the global strategic security will not be affected, despite the fact that there still are certain disagreements over key problems between our countries.

The lack of understanding about missile defence constitutes one of such differences. The statement, issued by the Russian side after the Treaty had been signed, reads: “The Treaty can only be effective and viable, if there is no build-up of the capabilities and the strength of the missile defence system, which can ultimately result in posing a threat to Russian strategic forces.” “It is linked to the configuration of our potentials,” the Russian president said.

The term ‘configuration' is a key one for defence industry experts, since it is the defence industry that is responsible for the configuration of the national defence potential.

In terms of the line of work, pursued by the RTI Sistemy Consortium, to wit development of powerful super-radars for space surveillance, missile attack warning, and missile defence systems, this definition does not simply mobilise efforts. It has determined the necessity to revise the ongoing research and development of space and missile defence information systems, as well as to evaluate their current and future contribution to ensuring nuclear deterrence and maintaining strategic stability. We have to review time and again both ongoing and planned projects for compliance with the objective of maintaining strategic stability and the nuclear deterrence posture, sufficient to guarantee infliction of specified damage (as per the new Russian military doctrine) in the environment, to be established after the START III is ratified.

Even the initial assessment shows that new issues and requirements, which were not as critical earlier, will emerge. It is obvious that as far as the development of space and missile defence information systems is concerned, the RTI Sistemy Consortium now faces challenges, demanding a total focus of intellectual and production potentials of its flagship enterprises, including the Radio Engineering Institute named after A.L. Mints and the Scientific Research Institute for Long-Range Radio Communications. We are now seeing a transformation of the power balance, created over the past few decades, as far as threats to our national security are concerned. We believe that the major factors of this transformation are as follows:

1. Strategic conventional precision-guided munitions (PGM) (ballistic missiles with guided warheads, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), hypersonic cruise missiles, etc.) become comparable to nuclear weapons, insofar their predicted damage and impact on strategic stability are concerned.

2. The threat of PGM strikes against Russian strategic targets increases. There is a drastic growth in the risk of hostile cruise missiles suppressing the top chain of command, missile and space defence information systems, and command and control (C2) systems of the Russian Armed Forces.

3. The established balance of mutual strategic nuclear deterrence may be tipped through the weapon-isation of space and deployment of strategic missile defence elements across the globe (both in Eastern Europe and in the Far East) all around Russia.

4. The jamming and the target environment within the coverage of missile and space defence systems grows more complicated, which makes it difficult to generate timely and valid warning information in case of an attack.

The list of threats and challenges is in fact considerably longer. However, the issue here is not the number of threats and challenges, but the task to make the configuration of potentials, mentioned by the Russian president, flexible and adaptable to any transformation or nascent threat.

It would not be fair to say that Russia has not attempted to tackle the problem. Methods for solving this problem are based on time-proved efficient target-oriented planning programmes and proposals on missile and space defence information systems, introduced into the current State Arms Programme (SAP-2015). The SAP programme envisions elements of adaptation to the changing environment. Here are some examples to this end:

1. A gradual replacement of missile attack warning radars with commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) radars, capable of quickly boosting performance and boasting a high scientific intensity.

It was a complicated process. Development was conducted in the 1990s, given tremendous limitations of resources, including financial resources. It was necessary to solve an entire range of problems, starting with production of components, since back then manufacturing plants were in a deep crisis and suffered physically and morally obsolete production facilities, and a considerable attrition, and, therefore, shortages, of qualified experts. The Consortium managed to solve these problems despite dramatic hardships.

The Consortium developed the Voronezh and the Voronezh-DM COTS radar prototypes, operating in difference bandwidths. The Voronezh radar, deployed in Lekhtusi, has already undergone state tests, while the Voronezh-DM, deployed in Armavir, is currently undergoing factory tests. We expect the Voronezh-DM radar to complete the state tests this year and to be fielded with the Russian Space Forces.

2. The Radio Engineering Institute named after A.L. Mints and the Scientific Research Institute for Long-Range Radio Communications have worked out proposals on future development of space and missile defence radars. The proposals have been submitted for consideration to be included in the draft state arms programme through to 2020 (SAP-2020). They include the following:

First and foremost, establishment of a central radar system designed for acquisition and processing of data, fed by space-based components of the missile attack warning system, over-the-horizon radars, perimeter acquisition radars of the missile attack warning system, and central radar field surveillance radars (Don-2N general-purpose radar, the Dunai-3U surveillance radar, and COTS radars). It will:

• increase reliability of evaluation of possible targeted facilities, the scale of an attack, and targets, attacking crucial facilities;

• detect and track potential targets, including ballistic missiles with gliding warheads and hypersonic cruise missiles, throughout their flight trajectories;

• engage non-strategic ballistic missiles and provide information support to combat employment of air defence and missile defence systems;

• acquire accurate information on space-based targets;

• considerably increase survivability of the strategic deterrence forces information support.

Secondly, development and production of new-generation re-deployable COTS radars designed to:

• boost information support capabilities of space, missile, and air defence systems, operating in sectors posing increased threat;

• establish remote radar stations;

• monitor missile defence component tests at field ranges of foreign states.

Thirdly, new radar development technologies, actively researched by the Consortium:

• based on built-in dual-band automated phased arrays with an overall adaptive signal processing and control;

• multi-dimensional digital 3D-frequency-time and polarisation aggregate signal processing;

• flexible adaptive control over power, hardware, and software resources, multi-level troubleshooting and backup of general-purpose radars;

• mutual synchronisation, reception, and processing of signals, emitted by other radars, and multi-positioning within a group of space and missile defence information assets.

Much has been done, but even more remains to be done. There is no time for idling. Unfortunately, we have yet to capitalise on advantages, offered by such large-scale integrated enterprises as the RTI Sistemy Consortium, incorporated a decade ago, to the full extent.

The consortium management, which realises tougher requirements to space and missile defence information systems in light of the START III Treaty, understands short- and long-term priorities, facing the company.

Our major scientific and engineering efforts are focused on ensuring the required high intellectual level of information systems, which, being the ‘eyes and ears' of the Russian president, who is also Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Force, will have to discharge every task assigned.

Much theoretical, engineering, and methodological progress has been done in this sphere.

Engineering and design solutions are tested by developing mathematical models on a specially designed multi-purpose stand. This approach will increase the efficiency of testing algorithms and monitoring operation of strategic space and missile defence information systems and reduce their commissioning time without significantly expanding the number of experts involved.

When space and missile defence systems are fielded and operated, it is necessary to address such problems as current assessment and prediction of basic specifications and capabilities of items produced, analysis of performance of tracking systems, control systems, etc. In order to solve such problems experts simulate space target environments to carry out necessary experiments. Traditional gauges, available at strategic defensive systems' deployment sites, are sometimes as accurate as the hardware they are supposed to monitor, which is clearly not sufficient. This fact results in the necessity of finding new ways to solve the afore-mentioned problems.

Mathematical and in-line simulations become major methods of testing defence algorithms and techniques, as well as basic specifications of existing and advanced radars.

New technologies, developed by the RTI Sistemy Consortium, will streamline financial, material, and human resources in the course of the development of efficient and science-intensive information

assets for missile attack warning systems and space and missile defence systems, and ultimately solve the problems specified.

Thus, the analysis of the environment, space surveillance, missile attack warning, and missile defence systems will have to operate in, as well as tasks, which will face their designers and manufacturers after the START III comes into force, allows the following conclusions to be drawn:

1. Given the reduction in nuclear arms, the focus is shifted towards conventional offensive weapons. According to experts, in the next five to seven years the effect of a massive PGM strike will be comparable to that of a nuclear attack.

2. The new START III Treaty will be able to increase the stability of the strategic nuclear deterrence only given a corresponding level of information assets for space surveillance, missile attack warning, and space and missile defence systems, since timely and reliable information, provided by such assets, prevents an aggressor from delivering a surprise missile or nuclear strike. Given appearance of new types of targets and a growing role of conventional PGMs, a natural way of developing space and missile defence information systems consists in their integration into a single missile and PGM attack warning system.

3. The new draft State Arms Programme for 2011-2020 should envision research and development of efficient target detection systems and integration of space and missile defence information systems into a single missile and PGM attack warning system.

Editorial note

The article by S.F. Boev raises issues that determine the efficiency of future space surveillance, missile attack warning, and space and missile defence systems, which are crucial components of the national security. Military Parade invites everyone, working on the configuration of defence potentials, including military commanders, scientists, and defence industry designers, to share their views, which will be published in our magazine.

Russian Air and Space Defense Troops: Gaping Holes
Moscow Defence Brief May 2012

Alexander Stukalin, Kommersant Publishing House

The Russian Armed Forces have recently completed a major reorganization with resulted in the formation of the Air and Space Defense Troops (Voyskavozdyshno-kosmicheskoyoborony) as an independent armed service. The decision was unveiled by the government with great fanfare, after much squabbling behind the curtains and heated debates among the military. Nevertheless, the ASD Troops began their service as scheduled, on December 1, 2011. Several months on we have enough information about them to draw some preliminary conclusions.

Background

Soviet air and space defense research began back into the 1970s at the Air Defense Command Academy and at the MoD’s 2nd Central Research Institute. Air Defense Troops were an extremely important and powerful component of the Soviet Armed Forces, and an independent armed service. They included anti-aircraft missile and radar troops augmented with fighter aviation, as well as missile defense and space defense troops. The latter component operated the Soviet Missile Attack Early Warning System (SPRN) and the Space Monitoring System (SKKP). In essence, the Soviet air defense system already had all the components of the future ASD Troops in terms of technology, organization and equipment — but those components were not integrated into a single whole. The Soviet military had not yet formed the concept of the various ASD forces and weaponry working in concert in a variety of combat situations against a whole range of the adversary’s weapons and their combinations, from low-altitude and low-speed cruise missiles to strategic warheads and military satellites.

Soviet research in that area was stepped up after the United States announced its Strategic Defense Initiative program in 1983. In 1986 the HQs of the Soviet Air Defense Troops and the Soviet Air Force ordered the military research institutions to develop “means of defending against air and space attacks using space weapons and new air defense (missile defense) systems”. As part of the Perspektiva R&D project conducted in 1986-1988 the military researchers proposed the organizational structure for the future ASD troops. In the 1980s and 1990s the Air Defense Troops conducted a number of technical experiments during which they used the SPRN stations to detect air targets and provide target designation to the Air Force. They also experimented with using air defense and missile defense weaponry against aeroballistic missiles and assessed the possibility of using the MiG-31 fighter to intercept cruise missiles. During the same period the MoD conducted a series of at least three command staff exercises codenamed “Deflection” (Otrazheniye) which involved air defense and missile defense troops, as well as the SPRN and SKKP systems. Territorially the exercises covered the Central Zone of the Soviet/Russian air defense system.1

Work on the project proceeded apace even after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Russia’s first comprehensive ASD program involved the country’ largest radio-electronic, missile and aircraft design bureaux. Decisions to that effect were made by Defense Minister PavelGrachev and the MoD Council. The specifications for the project were approved in 1993 by the commander of Air Defense Troops, Col. Gen. Viktor Prudnikov. Informed military sources claim that all the main principles of the program were outlined in President Boris Yeltsin’s Decree No 1032 of July 13, 1993 “On the Organization of the Air Defense System of the Russian Federation”. Immediately after the decree was issued the MoD held a special command staff exercise codenamed Zenith-93. Following the exercise Gen. P. Grachev announced that forming the new branch of the Russian Armed Forces, the Air and Space Defense Troops, was one of the central objectives of the MoD. The first comprehensive ASD program was given the green light. In 1994-1996 the MoD drew up details of the organization of the Main ASD District (covering Central Russia and Moscow) and other territorial districts. It also produced a concept of ASD development up to 2005.2

However, shortly afterwards, on July 13, 1997, President Yeltsin issued Decree No 725c “On optimizing the structure of the Russian Armed Forces”, which abolished the ASD troops as a separate armed service. The ASD tasks and functions were distributed between the Air Force, the Strategic Missile Troops (which initially took over the Missile Defense Service, the SPRN and the SKKP systems) and the Navy. The Space Defense System was taken off combat duty, and for the next decade the whole ASD program remained suspended.

The new stage

The Russian government and the MoD ordered work on the program to be resumed in the mid-2000s, under President Vladimir Putin. Before that, in 2001, the MoD set up an independent Space Troops service, which took over all the divisions that controlled space launches and satellites from the Strategic Missile Troops, as well as the Missile Defense Service, the SPRN and the SKKP services. The latter three services were merged into the 3rd Independent Missile and Space Defense Army. A year later the Moscow District of the Air Force and Air Defense service was transformed into the Special Purpose Command. Both the 3rd Army and the Special Purpose Command were tasked with defending Moscow; the MoD once again began to think about closer integration between the two structures.

In 2006 President Putin approved a new Air and Space Defense Concept for the period of 2016 and beyond. The document had taken three years to develop. But neither the Concept nor the 2005 Russian Security Council Resolution “On the prospects of developing the Russian military organization up to 2015” contained any plans for making air and space defense a separate armed service. In fact, the Security Council resolution stipulated that Space Troops should become part of the Air Force3 — but the decision was not announced publicly. Discussions at the time focused on the most suitable name the existing structures. For example, the chief of the Special Purpose Command, Col. Gen. YuriySolovyev, said that at some point in the future the Command could be renamed the Moscow Air and Space Defense Zone, arguing that "the name more accurately reflects the purpose and the status of these forces".4

Interestingly, the first official to predict the merger of the Moscow Air Defense System with the capital’s A-135 Missile Defense System into a kind of “superstructure” was the then commander of the Russian Air Force, Gen. Vladimir Mikhaylov. He also correctly predicted the time frame for such merger. “The S-400 SAM system can form the core of the space defense service. In addition we have the A-135 system. All of this should be merged into a single whole. I believe that such a model will become operational after 2011,” the general said in August 2006.5 From then on, all the discussions among the top brass focused on the question of how to integrate the two separate systems and who should be in charge once the reorganization was completed. In 2008 Mikhaylov’s successor, Col. Gen AleksandrZelin, insisted that “as part of our efforts to create the Air and Space Defense service it is absolutely necessary to merge the Air Force and the missile and space defense forces under a single command within the Air Force; this must be done as soon as possible.” Zelin’s proposal was that the remit of the Space Troops should be reduced to launching satellites and “anti-satellite measures”. He later added that “if the need arises”, the Space Troops could be tasked with “waging warfare in space”6 — which, given the current situation, sounded more like a cruel joke by the Air Force commander.

But Zelin’s advice was not heeded by the government and the MoD. All he managed to achieve was to rename on July 1, 2010 the Special Purpose Command the Operational-Strategic Command of the Space Defense Forces. Apart from that small victory, the Air Force lost the bureaucratic tussle for control of ASD. One of the reasons for that was the radical military reform launched in 2008 by Defense Minister AnatoliySerdyukov and the chief of the General Staff, Gen. Nikolay Makarov. One of the goals of that reform was to reduce the number and size of various command structures, and to abolish unnecessary tiers of command. The Air Force and the Army saw some of the most drastic transformations.

The Air Force lost many units and airfields; its armies, divisions and regiments were abolished. The service moved to an entirely new organizational structure. It now includes Air Force and Air Defense commands, Air and Space Defense brigades subordinated to military districts, air bases and air groups. The intensity of combat training has been ramped up. The usual practice of combat duty has been restored across the Air Force; all the units now permanently remain in a combat-ready state. The number of exercises and inspections has been increased. Finally, the bloated officer training system has been overhauled.

In other words, the Air Force Command has had its hands full ever since the second half of 2008. Its energies have been completely monopolized by trying to “fight off the reform”. Even if we admit for the sake of argument that Zelin and his subordinates have been doing their best to implement the MoD’s reform plans precisely and on schedule, it is clear that they have had no time or energy left for squabbles over who should control the ASD forces. To make matters worse, all three of the Main Commands (of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy) have also undergone serious transformations, and lost all but five of their previous 30 functions in the process. They are now in charge of such relatively menial tasks as training, ordering new hardware and overseeing peacekeeping missions. In essence, the Main Commands are no longer in control of their respective armed services. The size of each Main Command has been slashed from 1,500 to 150-170 officers. In such a situation it would clearly be pointless for Zelin to keep fighting for control of the Air and Space Defense service. It would be equally pointless for the MoD to task the Air Force with creating and running that service.

Meanwhile, the relatively small and compact Space Troops service has been in the MoD’s and the Russian government’s good books ever since its creation. There have been very few complaints about its performance. The service has also escaped the military reform relatively unscathed and preserved a lot of bureaucratic clout, which put it in a very good position to take control of the ASD Troops. Still, nothing was certain.

The problem was that many of the top brass favored a third option under which neither the Air Force nor the Space Troops would be put in charge of creating and running the Air and Space Defense Troops. For example, the president of the Academy of Military Sciences, Gen. MakhmutGareyev, whose opinions have been held in high regard since Soviet times, has insisted up until very recently that there was no need to create a separate new armed service or to subordinate it to the Air Force. He argued that it would be enough to set up a separate Strategic Command within the General Staff itself, modeled on the United States Strategic Command. Under Gareyev’s proposal the new Strategic Command would be tasked only with combat command-and-control, as well as organizing combat duty operations. The actual Air and Space Defense forces, their day-to-day running, training and logistics would be distributed between the already existing services. Gen. Gareyev argued that "such an option is the least costly in terms of money and resources; it requires 50 per cent fewer officers and can be implemented much more swiftly“.7

But the chief of General Staff, Gen. Makarov, already had his hands full with the reform of the armed forces. Besides, he had repeatedly expressed his annoyance over the disjointed nature of all the forces that constitute the Russian air and space defense capability, and over the absence of a single body in control of that capability.8 It was therefore quite naïve to hope that Gen. Makarov and the General Staff would accept the Gareyev plan and busy themselves with creating the Air and Space Defense service on top of all their other commitments.

Be that as it may, during his address to the Federal Assembly on November 30, 2010 President Medvedev said that the government was determined to merge all the Russian air and space defense components “under a single strategic command” before the end of 2011. By that time the MoD and the General Staff had already decided that it would not be merely a “command” but a separate armed service, and that the service would be created on the basis of the Space Troops. In January 2011 the commander of the Space Troops, Lt. Gen. Oleg Ostapenko, held a press conference to announce that “all the main documents outlining the future Air and Space Defense system” were already being drafted, and that he would soon be ready "to submit one of the versions of the concept for the development of that system to the MoD and the General Staff“.9 In April 2011 the general looked visibly pleased as he told journalists that the concept had been approved and that work on forming the new Air and Space Defense system had already begun.

The current state

It is known that in 2011 President Medvedev issued the decree “On changes to the composition of the Russian Armed Forces until January 1, 2016”, which ordered the creation of the Air and Space Defense Troops. But next to nothing is known about the actual contents of that decree. The government has not made public the remit of the new armed service, its numerical strength, organizational structure or the schedule of its creation. Even the number of the decree and the exact date of its signing remain unknown. The date is actually a very interesting detail, because in late July 2011 the commander of the United Strategic Command of Air and Space Defense (which was still part of the Air Force at the time), Lt. Gen. ValeriyIvanov, told journalists without a hint of doubt that “the Air and Space Defense system is already in place”. He immediately added, however, that it had yet to be decided whether Air and Space Defense would be an independent armed service. “We are not clear on that for now... The final decision will be made by the political leadership of our country,” the general said.10 He also insisted during the interview that the air force units which constituted part of the air defense system would remain directly subordinated to the Air and Space Defense command. As we now know, the general was wrong. In other words, only three months before he was put in charge of the Air and Space Defense Troops as first deputy commander, Gen Ivanov (who was the commander of the Moscow air defense system at the time) was almost completely in the dark about the shape of the future system. Meanwhile, as expected, in November 2011 the commander of the Space Troops, Gen. Ostapenko, was appointed as commander of the Air and Space Defense Troops.11 And on December 1, 2011 these troops were put on combat duty.

The main outlines of the new organizational structure emerged shortly afterwards. The Air Defense and Missile Defense Command and the Space Command have become part of the Air and Space Defense Troops. The Air Defense and Missile Defense Command is headed by the former deputy commander of the Air Force in charge of Air Defense, Maj. Gen. Sergey Popov. The Command includes the 9th Missile Defense Division (the A-135 system, with an HQ in Sofrino) and three missile defense brigades stationed in Moscow region; all three — the 4th (Dolgoprudnyy), the 5th (Vidnoye) and the 6th (Rzhev) — were previously part of the Air Force’s ASD Operational Strategic Command.

The Space Command includes the 820th Main Missile Attack Early Warning Center (Solnechnogorsk), the 821st Main Space Intelligence Center (the former Space Monitoring Center), and the 153rdTitov Main Space Testing Center (Krasnoznamensk), in addition to 14 separate measuring stations spread from Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the east to Kaliningrad in the west. The former chief of the 153rd Main Space Testing Center, Maj. Gen. Oleg Maydanovich, has been appointed as chief of the Space Command.12

The Air and Space Defense Troops also include the 1st State Experimental Cosmodrome (Plesetsk) and several centrally-subordinated units.13, 14

The decision to designate the space launch center in Plesetsk as an operational-strategic unit of combat troops has drawn immediate criticism. By its very nature the facility in Plesetsk has no air or space defense capability. It is merely a support facility; in addition, it is heavily involved in civilian programs. When asked after the reform what the space launches in Plesetsk had to do with air and space defense, the commander of the facility, Maj. Gen. Aleksey Golovko decided not to invent any plausible explanations. His answer was simple: "No comment“.15

Worse, Russian military experts have immediately noticed that whereas all the former Space Troops units have been taken over by the Air and Space Defense Troops with very few changes, the air defense component of the new service looks extremely weak. In fact, the “air” and “defense” parts of the Air and Space Defense Troops name are more of an aspiration than a statement of fact.

The three air defense brigades are each the size of regiments, but they are spread too thin over their large area of responsibility. They are clearly not strong enough for the tasks laid upon them; that is especially true of the outer-ring 6th Brigade in Rzhev. In 2008 the area of responsibility of the Special Purpose Command, the predecessor of the Air Defense and Missile Defense Command, covered Moscow and 26 administrative regions around the capital. That territory is home to 30 per cent of Russia’s population and has 140 separate protected facilities. It was said that the fighting ability of the Special Purpose Command was sufficient to hit up to 500 high and medium-altitude targets and up to 400 low-altitude targets in a “single volley” of surface-to-air missiles and air-launched weaponry.16 But even back then it was not very clear how such a feat can be accomplished for a protected area of 1.3 million sq.km. Since then the Central District of the Russian air defense system has not received any new weaponry; neither has it been augmented by any mobile reserves. In fact, the new Air and Space Defense Troops have taken over the SAM systems but not the aircraft. Those aircraft are still assigned to the Military Districts (Operational Strategic Commands) and to the Air Force. They were an important component of the air defense system — and its only mobile component. For example, the MiG-31 fighters which were assigned to the Special Purpose Command (the Command also had Su-27 and MiG-29 regiments) were supposed to be able to take out as many as 144 air targets.17

Neither has the merger of Air Defense and Missile Defense strengthened the whole system. The commanders of the Air and Space Defense Troops say they want Air Force, Missile Defense, the SPRN and the SKKP systems to work hand in hand to achieve synergies. The Air Defense and Missile Defense branch now even has a common catalogue of targets with single designations.18But in practice such integration will be difficult to pull off. The specifics of the combat tasks performed by the various weapons systems now in service are so different that merging them into a single operational system would be very premature. Back in the 1990s the MoD attempted to integrate the S-50 system (Moscow air defense) and the A-135 (missile defense) system. The resulting performance was adequate only for SRAM-type targets which are no longer representative of the kind of adversary the integrated system may have to face.19

Grand plans for the next decade

The commanders of the ASD Troops seem to be well aware of these problems. Gen. Ostapenko has politely described the current fighting ability of the force as “somewhat limited”. But there are grand plans to ramp up that ability, and most of them have already been unveiled. They are part of the State Armament Program 2020, which will cost an estimated 3 trillion — 4 trillion roubles.20 According to a presentation held by the ASD Troops commander, the plans for his force are as follows21:

* Deploy a United Space Detection and Combat System (consisting at the initial stage of four new satellites which will monitor all the potential missile launch areas in the Northern Hemisphere around the clock)

* Augment the SPRN system with three new prefabricated radars (RLS VZG type) near Armavir and Kaliningrad (77Ya5-DM Voronezh-DM, decimeter range) and near Irkutsk (high-potential meter-range 77Ya6-VP Voronezh-VP)

* Build and launch new RLS VZG radars in Pechora, Barnaul, Yeniseysk, Murmansk and Omsk

* complete the development of an over-the-horizon (OTH) radar to detect space objects

* equip combat units with the latest S-400 SAM systems; complete the development and begin the rollout of the next-generation S-500 system

* improve the Moscow air defense system by further augmenting its fighting ability

Looking at these objectives it becomes obvious that the focus is on strengthening the capability of the ASD Space Command. Plans to build new missile attack early warning radars along the perimeter of the country in order to cover the existing blind spots make perfect sense and deserve praise — especially since the list above appears incomplete.

In at least two of his interviews Gen. Ostapenko mentioned that the MoD intends to build another radar in Orenburg Region.22,23 The completion of one more Voronezh-DM radar in Gabala, Azerbaijan is scheduled for 2019 (provided that an agreement can be reached with the Azeri government).24 This means that a total of seven new RLS VZG-type radars will be built. Their manufacturer, the Saransk Television Plant, has already been promised orders which will keep it in business well after 2030. Meanwhile, the developer of these radars, the RTI holding, has designed specially for the ASD Troops "new mobile stations which can be deployed where necessary as and when new threats emerge from new directions".25

During his presentation Ostapenko did not say anything about any new space reconnaissance systems, but we have reliable information that there are ambitious plans in that area as well. For example, at the 7th Independent Measuring Station near Barnaul (Savvushka village) the MoD is building the second stage of an optics and laser center equipped with Eurasia’s largest laser telescope. The instrument has a diameter of 312 cm and weighs 85 tonnes. It was designed by the Precision Instruments Systems corporation to track satellites. The completion of the project is scheduled for 2014.26

In addition, the Main Communications Directorate of the Armed Forces has announced that the ASD Troops will be the first armed service to be equipped with the latest digital communication technology. Meanwhile, the MoD is aiming to complete the upgrade of the ASD command center and put it on combat duty later this year (in essence this will be a new facility rather than a mere upgrade).

Investment into upgrading the intelligence and space segment of the ASD troops is of course very important. We especially welcome the plan to launch a new generation of missile attack warning satellites, given that the current system is in a woeful state and that the program of launching the old 71X6 Oko-1 satellites has already ended.27 But we believe that the government is not moving fast enough to modernize and increase the firepower component of Air and Space Defense, i.e. the very component which actually underpins the “Defense” bit of the title.

As of this moment the ASD Troops have only two SAM regiments equipped with the S-400 system: the 606th Regiment of the 5th Brigade near Elektrostal and the 210th Regiment of the 4th Brigade near Dmitrov. Under the SAP‑2020 program the armed forces have been promised enough of the new systems to equip 28 regiments (or 56 divisions, under the current system). That would enable the armed forces significantly to strengthen the air defenses of the Central District, which was seen as a priority not so long ago. But as soon as the brigades and regiments stationed near Moscow became part of the Space Troops system rather than the Air Force, strange things started to happen. More precisely, there have been serious changes in the list of the destinations of the new S-400 systems to be supplied to the armed forces.

For example, the last regiment-sized batch of the S-400 systems delivered in 2011 (three such batches were delivered last year) was sent to Kaliningrad Region. Shortly afterwards the Air Force commander, Gen. Zelin, hinted that that the ASD troops would not be receiving any of those new missiles any time soon. “Several S-400 batches will be delivered in 2012 — but unlike in previous years, they will be supplied to units stationed along the Russian land and maritime borders rather than around Moscow,” the general said.28Zelin’s subordinates later added that the next regiment-sized batch of the S-400 will be deployed in the Far East. When asked who exactly determines the allocation of the S-300, S-400 and S-500 systems, Gen. Zelin said that "for now, these matters are decided by the Air Force... After that, we’ll see. For now let me just emphasize once again that the ASD troops’ area or responsibility is limited to the Central Industrial District".29 If that is really the case, it appears that the Air Force has very little interest in the Central Industrial District and seems bent on stationing all the new S-400 batteries as far away from Moscow as possible.

Meanwhile, the future S-500 system is very far from being ready for prime time. Under the SAP-2020 program about 10 S-500 batteries should be supplied to the troops. But it has recently been announced that the beginning of tests of the new system has been pushed back by another two years.30 Representatives of the ASD Troops say all the old S-300PM systems have now been upgraded to the Favorit-S specification. The second stage of the upgrade, to the S-300PM2 spec, will improve the SAM system’s kill ratio for ballistic targets, replace the obsolete control stations and IT elements, and add autonomous target detection and designation components, upgraded communications systems and modern geo-positioning capability.31 But all these upgrades cannot change the fact that the underlying S-300 hardware is very aged. The life of the S-300 missiles in service with the ASD regiments has already been extended to 30 years, and now the time is approaching for yet another extension if they are to remain in service.32

Meanwhile, the Moscow missile defense system is being upgraded as part of the Samolet-M (Aircraft-M) program (for details see an article in Issue 4, 2011 of MDB). The purpose of the program is “to augment the system’s fighting ability”. But in actual fact the program holds no promise of any radical improvement in the performance of the A-135(M) system. Gen Ostapenko has said that “at some point in the future” the system may be equipped with long-range missile interceptors, though it is not clear what time frame he had in mind. But such an upgrade would merely restore the system’s functionality to the level last seen in Soviet times, i.e. before the old long-range interceptors were decommissioned. Even back then the system’s capability was so limited as to be unsuitable for defending against any serious strikes. At the very best it could cope with a few single ballistic missiles, making it effective only against accidental missile launches or “terrorist” attacks by some hypothetical adversary.

Doctrinal vacuum

It appears, however, that inadequate equipment and insufficient anti-aircraft/anti-missile firepower is not the main problem facing the new ASD Troops. More worryingly, it turns out that, as Gen. Ostapenko put it during a presentation held in January 2012 at the Academy of Military Sciences, Russia “lacks a clear understanding in its military doctrines and strategies of what the ASD Troops are for”.

The general then went on to describe his own understanding of the situation. “In our own opinion, the ASD system consists of the forces and hardware deployed on the ground, in the sea, in the air and in the outer space, and functionally united into a single system designed to protect the territory of Russia and its allies from attacks from the air, from outer space and via outer space”. Based on that interpretation the general formulated the tasks set before the current and future ASD system. These tasks are as follows33:

* provide early warning about missile and space attacks, conduct reconnaissance of the situation in outer space, and alert the rest of the armed forces to any threats

* intercept the warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, destroy or functionally suppress the adversary’s military satellites

* provide early warning about air raids; conduct reconnaissance of the situation in the airspace and monitor the use of the air space by the air defense and missile defense systems; defend the key command-and-control, military and economic infrastructure, as well as large concentrations of troops and key military facilities

* monitor the radio-electronic situation and provide radio-electronic defense of ASD elements

The ASD commander must recognize, however, that his understanding of the nature of the ASD system is not entirely compatible with the tasks he believes that system must perform. The “forces and equipment” which the general says make up the system are enough to protect the “key facilities and infrastructure”. But they are clearly not up to the task of “protecting the territory of Russia”, let alone Russia’s allies.

It has become quite clear that the Russian ASD system suffers from a “doctrinal vacuum”. Such a situation raises some legitimate questions. For example, can it be that the ASD Concept for the period up to 2016 is so vague on the main principles and objectives of the system? And if it is, then who wrote that concept? What for? And why did it take three years to write it? Are we to understand that the main principles outlined in the document signed by President Putin in 2006 have been abandoned only six years later?

In his pre-election article on defense issues published three months ago, Putin continues to insist that ASD is a national security priority. To be more precise, in the list of these national security priorities he ranks it second after the Russian nuclear deterrent. Based on his view of the global military-political developments (i.e. the deployment of the American missile defense system) and on the need to maintain the current global balance of power, Putin sets only two main strategic tasks before the armed forces. These tasks are “to be able to penetrate any missile defense system, and to protect the Russian retaliatory strike capability”. He goes on to say that "these tasks are to be fulfilled by the Strategic Nuclear Forces and the Air and Space Defense system“.34

Despite these proclamations it has to be recognized that neither the ASD Troops in their current shape, nor the future ASD force the Russian military planners hope to build by 2020 are up to the task of “protecting the Russian retaliatory strike capability”. That capability is not concentrated in the Central Industrial District. It is spread all over the country, from Kamchatka in the east to Kaliningrad in the west (the Iskander missiles Moscow wants to station in Kaliningrad can well be considered as part of that capability if Washington deploys its missile defense elements in Poland). Protecting all that capability from possible missile attacks or air raids by means of anti-aircraft systems and fighter aviation is completely unrealistic. The ASD system Russia is building clearly appears to prioritize the reconnaissance and space-based capability. In theory, there is only one way such a “Reconnaissance and Space” model can protect the Russian retaliatory capability: it needs to put in place an effective and reliable system of detecting missile launches (including cruise missiles launched at various altitudes) and providing early warning about such launches. The system must be efficient and reliable enough to guarantee that in the event of an attack the Russian leadership will have enough time to give launch-under-attack orders, and that the Russian strategic nuclear forces will have enough time fully to execute those orders before being hit. But is that the kind of defense scenario Putin actually has in mind?

The doctrinal vacuum, or rather the doctrinal uncertainty, can undermine the new ASD Troops service and eventually spell its untimely demise due to the lack of any concrete purpose. That uncertainty should be the main target of criticism. In fact, the military have plenty of various alternative options, models and proposals for how the ASD service should be built, complete with all the necessary projections and calculations. All that is really necessary is to make the right choice, and for someone (the Kremlin, the MoD, or some individual general or government official) to take the responsibility for making that choice.

In the end, all we need is clear answers to a clear set of questions:

* Does Russia need Air and Space Defense, and why? Does it actually have to be a defense service, or would an early warning system be sufficient?

* Does the ASD service have to cover the entire Russian territory, or only the most important sites?

* Should the launch sites of the Strategic Nuclear Forces be among the protected facilities? Should they actually be on top of the list of such facilities?

* Can such an ASD service be built, and how much will it cost?

* Finally, if the whole country cannot be protected, would it make sense to limit the protected area to Moscow and central Russia?

A perfectly protected Moscow would stop being an attractive military target if the adversary has sufficient resources and is free to attack the rest of the Russian territory unimpeded. Conversely, a haphazardly built Moscow defense system would be of very little value for Russia itself. Many of the Russian generals understand that very well.

Naturally, it would have been preferable to answer these questions before creating the ASD Troops — but it is not yet too late. If all these questions are left unanswered, sooner or later people will start asking one final question: why have such an inadequate ASD system at all?

1 Volkov S.A. The foundations of ASD.Air and Space Defense, No 6, 2010.

2 Volkov S.A. The foundations of ASD.Air and Space Defense, No 1, 2011.

3 Mikhaylov A. ASD: the right decision is needed. Air and Space Defense. No 6, 2010.

4 Interfax-AVN, April 7, 2005.

5 ITAR-TASS, August 9, 2006.

6 ITAR-TASS, January 19, 2008.

7 Gareev M.A. Creating the ASD service is a priority national task. Air and Space Defense, No 3, 2011.

8 Interfax-AVN, December 14, 2010.

9 ITAR-TASS, January 27, 2011.

10 RIA Novosti, July 22, 2011.

11 Kommersant, November 7, 2011.

12 RossiyskayaGazeta, December 9, 2011.

13 Voenno-promyshlenyyKuryer, No 5 (422), February 15, 2012.

14 Panorama Mirnogo, No 12 (64), March 29, 2012.

15 Vesti TV news, March 8, 2012.

16 KrasnayaZvezda, May 16, 2008.

17 KrasnayaZvezda, February 14, 2007.

18 KrasnayaZvezda, February 22, 2012.

19 Krinitskiy Y. Russia’s ASD: signs of the future system. Air and Space Defense, No 2, 2012.

20 Interfax-AVN, February 14, 2012.

21 Voenno-promyshlennyyKuryer, No 5 (422), February 15, 2012.

22 Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 13, 2012.

23 MoskovskiyKomsomolets, February 28, 2012.

24 RIA Novosti, December 12, 2011.

25 KrasnayaZvezda, April 4, 2012.

26 KrasnayaZvezda, March 28, 2012.

27 Kommersant, March 31, 2012.

28 RIA Novosti, February 13, 2012.

29 NezavisimoyeVoennoeObozreniye, No 8, March 16, 2012.

30 MoskovskiyKomsomolets, February 7, 2012.

31 KrasnayaZvezda, January 27, 2012.

32 NezavisimoyeVoennoeObozreniye, No 3, January 28, 2011.

33 Voenno-promyshlennyyKuryer, No 5 (422), February 15, 2012.

34 RossiyskayaGazeta, February 20, 2012.

I think Moscow must keep their eyes on Azerbaijan,

Viktor point taken. Nice Long Interesting interview with Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov

http://echo.msk.ru/programs/voensovet/1104718-echo/

A. QUESTION: I remind Yuri Borisov, Deputy Minister of Defense, and the last question in this part, you just have not responded to it. Here, repeat for Smoudena incident. So the possibility of the American system, it is clear that they are used in the military - is tracking, intelligence, personal intelligence. Do we have such a system, or the Americans here, it came to light that (inaudible), far ahead? This is the same intelligence, roughly speaking.

Yuri Borisov: In order to use means of combat, of course you're right, it is necessary to have information support. Moreover, as regards the fight from a strategic weapon system, or strategic weapons system, it is usually a multi-tiered system of information, including a space echelon, ground echelon of intelligence and resources, and working at different distances, with different accuracy characteristics.

A. QUESTION: You specifically said the word train? How the program echelon of American Tracking?

Yuri Borisov: No, I have not specifically said. Just in our terminology, this is a slang, common, multi-tiered system. Americans today are already in use space-based systems that monitor virtually the ability to run from the territory of Russia or from other areas of the threats of various kinds of missiles, strategic or not strategic, and are able to pinpoint them on the torch. Our system is in this we had it in the mid 80's, we have it created. It's more of the satellites that are on the (inaudible) orbits, and look at the background of the land opportunity ... rather not watch an opportunity, and the fact of watching the start of the torch ballistic missiles, and give a signal that something of such and such a district has taken off. Something slipped, but still can not draw conclusions is something to arrive, and how much time will fly. But only for the simple reason that the strategic missile today tend to be moving along a ballistic trajectory, according to Kepler's laws. And in order to predict the fall of this point, you need some time. But such a system, I stress, the Americans have. They are with us. And now we're just at the stage of the modernization of the system and are in the process of creating a new generation of the system.

A. QUESTION: This tracking system?

Yuri Borisov: This tracking system, space tracking system.

A. QUESTION: And that's how it is accurate? I mean, not only to record the start there and fix the conversations they have in the General Staff?

Yuri Borisov: No, this system is designed for a different brand. This is not a system of signals intelligence, it is not a system of space-tier information system to detect the launch of ballistic and (inaudible) missiles.

A. QUESTION: There is parity?

Yuri Borisov: In this plan ... Parity is, I say, that's where. We are a little behind in the cosmic system, but we seriously now built up the pace to rebuild ground-tier warning system. You may have heard ... But did not hear, and know perfectly well that we have quite recently been put into operation a new plant of high operational readiness in Armavir, which we closed this region, it is a unique station.

A. QUESTION: It replaced Gabalenskuyu.

Yuri Borisov: Yes, it replaced Gabalenskuyu station. This is a unique station that has its characteristics superior to the previous ones. Range of its actions around 6,000 kilometers, it can detect objects.

A. QUESTION: Where to? Return to the south. I just thought, 6000 to the south - this is where we? That we have India, Pakistan?

Yuri Borisov: Mediterranean Sea.

A. QUESTION: It's Mediterranean ...

Yuri Borisov: Yes.

A. QUESTION: And there's a side of Pakistan.

Yuri Borisov: Yes. One rocket dangerous area, because the start and can be done from submarines. And almost like the station - they are placed on the perimeter of our borders, and will cover all missile-direction, which is the guarantee of early detection, and signal to the response. The space echelon adds quite simply the probability of making the right decision. Well, I would say it's the first bell. He does not know where all of this will fly, but it says something slipped. A land train, it just simply is accurately calculates according to the information received from these nodes, that the stations of high operational readiness, gaining information for ... Reliable information to respond to the measures already taken. But you know, it's too important decision, and the price of that decision - it is actually whether the world continue to exist at all, or not. So ...

A. QUESTION: Generally, there is the human factor is taken into account, or is it automatic ... Decisions are made automatically? Here are some there came together the numbers on the machine?

Yuri Borisov: Alex, a very good question.

A. QUESTION: But it's prime, actually.

Yuri Borisov: The main issue. So in practice, the system is automatic. Because there's no time for reflection. A washed-up on the stage, she say, automated. Because in the process of decision-making by far, the man has interfered.

A. QUESTION: So, this obligation or the ability to persist?

Yuri Borisov: Yes, it is saved. But the number of people in this situation is sharply reduced, this 2 person.

A. QUESTION: And, well, that is, it is conditional nuclear suitcase.

Yuri Borisov: Yes, this is conditional nuclear briefcase.

Austin wrote:The kind of capability that American have today the Russians would get similar capability by 2020 since this is part of SAP program as mentioned by Russian General.

Austin wrote:
I think the Space based capability of American today is almost second to none , the Russians and Europe are like distant second most of American capability are so classified that nobody even knows what it can do , thats the fearsome fact.

Recall that since the Soviet era in Sevastopol is radar (radar) system of missile warning "Dnepr" and item spacecraft control. A near Evpatoria based range space communication center. Ukraine inherited a legacy of the Soviet Union, these objects are not exploited. Radar for a long time to lease Russian Defense Ministry. But when in Kiev for the use of the station began to demand exorbitant fees, lease in Moscow decided not to roll over. Especially because by the time the southern strategic direction, which covered the Ukrainian radar, stood on alert radar high prefabrication "Voronezh", built near Armavir.

As for Evpatorian center, then he found a replacement in the territory of the Russian Federation. Now, after returning to the Crimea to Russia, both objects take on a second life. General Golovko said that from December 1 complex in Yalta get the status of the Main Center for testing and control of space vehicles and will be a part is located in the suburban Krasnoznamensk Main Test Space Center named after Titov. Commander SAI said that Evpatoria center "will take up the tasks of managing spacecraft Russian orbital group, as well as in the interests of the Russian space surveillance systems." But before this place will be properly retrofitted.

Its unique radio astronomy telescope RT-70, which is a complex of parameters, the combination of huge size with all-weather and severity "of" and the ability to work in different ranges of radio waves, still has no equal in the world. However, in the post-rarity equipment hardly used. So now his condition is poor.

- We have already begun to equip this new object command-measuring systems of space vehicles and complexes of space surveillance systems - said Golovko. - Complete program of refurbishment of the Centre with modern equipment is scheduled for 2016. During this time there will be commissioned in about 20 systems and complexes of new generation.

A year later, with a small station "Dnepr" in Sevastopol should again connect to alert duty in the national system of missile warning. But before waiting for a major update of the radar. At the facility will assemble the new equipment, conduct upgrades computer complex, engineering, technical and technological systems. And on December 1, this year will be commissioned Sevastopol control point constellation.

Advanced radar capable of monitoring missile launches in various parts of the world, in Russia every year it becomes more and more. Alternate sites for their construction are incorporated in the Orenburg region and the Arctic. There will soon be highly compatible radar "Voronezh". Already state tests of similar plants in Kaliningrad and Irkutsk regions. According to the head, until the end of this year, their calculations will start control radar missile-western and eastern areas. In the next three months on experimental combat duty has two radar "Voronezh" - in the Altai Territory (Barnaul) and Yenisei.

To understand what an important mission to fulfill these objects, we present brief statistics. This year alone, with the help of the stations of the missile warning our military tracked and escorted more than two dozen launches. If the rocket went to Russia, this information would help command EKR time to repel an attack.

Commander of the orbital forces confirmed sounded earlier information that the first launch of a heavy version of the missile, "Angara" is tentatively scheduled between 20 and 30 December (the so-called start-up window). About a month before that date she was transported to the launch pad, in the words of Golovko, for the "development work with the product." General stressed that all the stages of preparation "Sheds A-5" to start are under his personal control. To do this, at the Baikonur launched a special video control system. It allows the team right out of his office at the Headquarters of real-time tracking of the entire course of the test of a new missile.

More Golovko said that Ashuluk range near Astrakhan now prepared to step up combat duty for the protection of the central zone defense next regiment of anti-aircraft missile systems S-400.

Austin wrote:Most interesting part is where the Ocean Survellence Satellite was about to track NATO Submarine......

Mindstorm wrote:

Interview with the legendary Анатолий Иванович Савин , conceiver and creator of the first working ASAT program at world, of first world's space based global surveillance and tracking system (with a little hint to a very special quality of the revolutionary system in question , unmatched abroad still today) and of literally dozen and dozen other breakthrough discoveries and weapon system in several different fields since '40 years.

A true living legend ; worth of attentive reading for any word.



http://www.rg.ru/2015/04/07/savin.html