Russian Naval Construction Plans and Numbers

ALAMO wrote:Not that I feel a particular need to defend Russkies here bro, but ...

Re: France/Italy programs, we talk about two world-class marine powers, so there is nothing strange that they can construct&build relatively successful units.
France's and Italy's defense budgets combined are bigger than the Russian one.
Both nations are well established naval construction players for centuries, and none of them faced catastrophic events like the dissolution of the WarPac and the SU itself.
Russkie are being continuously deprived of the possibility of a stable fleet modernization program, and that is both obvious and notorious.
The 2014 coup was a giant blow to the Russian naval programs of all sorts, and I am impressed - frankly speaking - that they have managed to recover in a really short time.

Yet, FREMM is just an oversized equivalent of a Russian corvette.
It represents no bigger punch than 20380, objectively speaking.
From this perspective, Russians made no worse - 20380, 20385, 20386, 11356 ...
If we take let's say Horizon frigates, then again Russkie are not worse with 22350...

Just take a look at the submarine construction program - what the Russians do there is mindblowing. There is no equivalent in Europe for that, no matter that the European combined defense spending fourfold the Russian ones.

lancelot has a good point there.
Chinese are just steadily expanding their capabilities, and that reflects the general condition of China itself.
They became a global superpower in the last 2 decades and the biggest economy on the planet. They need a big, blue water navy because of the structure of the economy - big dependence on the sea route trade.
That includes both the things they export and the crucial resources that they need to import, including the supply from Africa.
It didn't take out of anywhere, you know. They needed time to master the situation, and a civilian construction peak was one of the reasons here. You need cadres to make a successful naval construction program, and you can't have those cadres with no big & effective marine construction sector. This is what Russkie have been building for more than a decade now, and belive me my friend, you will see the difference very soon.

It is a matter of priorities if you ask my opinion

Alamo, my friend, the small missile ships of project 22800 are a direct consequence of 2014 and the cessation of deliveries of gas turbines from Ukroshitstan and Zorya-Mashproekt. Therefore, project 11356R and 22350 frigates were left without power units. I'm just writing that a country that builds intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, tons of tanks and armored vehicles of all kinds - should not have allowed itself to get into this position.

Since it is clear that there is no respect between the USA and Russia and there is no more agreement regarding long-range missiles, and therefore cruise missiles, then it is better to place two missiles on two or 4 trucks (depending on whether they are two or 4 Kalibr missiles) on truck, but to build small missile ships without sufficient navigation range, without serious radar systems, only with a close air defense system and without anti-submarine weapons.

To standardize and improve the two existing classes of ships, that is, the corvette and the frigate, while it is necessary to work on the third "link" called the destroyer. The fourth is the landing ships of project 11711. This is the only correct solution;

* The Chinese are building corvettes of the Type-056A project, which are not even servants to the Russian corvettes of the basic 20380 project (the 20385 is not even worth talking about in comparison with Type-056A), so the ideal solution is the 20386 corvette with two UKSK (16 missiles in total) and two VLS for the Redut (also 16 missiles) + Paket-NK for anti-submarine warfare. Also, these corvettes would carry the new "Otvet" torpedo rockets in their UKSK. In short; after 20385 you need to perfect 20386 (in constructin from 2016 !!!) or simply don't waste time and increase the production of 20385 corvettes and the corvette problem is solved..


* Project 22350 frigates; finally finish the testing of the gas turbine and reducer and start the large-scale construction of the frigates of this project. Given the small displacement of these frigates but their impressive arsenal, these frigates do not have a long sailing range - according to Russian sources, about 4,500 nautical miles at a sailing speed of about 14 knots.


* destroyers; Ships that would have a range of over 6,000 miles with an economic cruising speed of about 18 knots are not yet under construction in Russia. Project 1164 cruisers have an economical cruising speed of around 18 knots and a range of 6000+ nautical miles. Apart from a much longer sailing range, these ships would have at least twice as many UKSKs as the upgraded project 22350 frigates, which should have 24 (3 UKSKs). It is certain that these ships would also have a naval variant of the Pantsir or Tor-M2 system. And the ship's electronic equipment would be at a slightly higher level, with the possible possibility of carrying two helicopters.

* landing craft; it is necessary to continue with the construction of the additional number of this project 11711, while the ships of project 23900 are still far from the end of construction and with the construction of a solid air wing made of attack drones and helicopters, their application makes sense.

* FOREVER GOODBYE to ;Small missile ships of projects 21631 and 22800, as well as patrol ships of project 22160; insufficient sailing range, there are only extremely close range systems (at 21631 with Gibka system) and only Pantsir (22800 project and from the third ship), while 22160 has nothing. There are no anti-submarine weapons on those ships, while there are no missile weapons on the 22160, but it does have a helicopter.

lancelot wrote:

Podlodka77 wrote:And where are the gas turbines you write about because "Golovko" was launched on May 22, 2020 and both turbines were installed inside the ship by December 2020. The ship still hasn't started sea trials. And what is the guarantee that even when it finally starts sea trials, there will be no malfunctions ?
What is the justification that Russia, as a country with a largest nuclear arsenal (a fact), did not start designing and then building gas turbines immediately after the disintegration of the USSR ?
...
I have already written about the fact that only American and Chinese warships have universal VLS, while European and Russian ships use separate VLS for air defense systems.

It is like I said it took them roughly 5 years to put those marine gas turbines into production from when the project started in 2014. Which is pretty impressive. Yes it might have malfunctions like the UK has had issues with its propulsion units in the Type 45. So what? I am pretty sure if there are any issues they will be fixed.

Remember that trade with Ukraine was pretty lopsided to begin with and with so many things needing funding after the breakup of the Soviet Union the naval combustion engines were like the last item on the list. It is not like they didn't have enough credits given that Ukraine always seemed to never pay for the natural gas they used. The only reason Russia went with things like the MTU diesel engines in the first place was because of the lack of on time delivery on the part of Ukraine of any military components they ordered. The only sector in Russia which had consistent funding in the 1990s was strategic weapons like the ICBM program.

With regards to the VLS like others here told you, a universal VLS takes more space, and since Russia is still restrained to building smaller ship hulls they maximize their space with separate VLS for the land attack and air defense missiles. It is as simple as that.

Have you already forgotten that Ukroshitstan cut into pieces 10 Tu-160s back in the nineties under US pressure and that due to the Russian threat regarding Ukraine's debt for gas payments, Ukroshitstans had to deliver to Russia 8 Tu-160s and 3 Tu-95MS, as well as over 570 H-55 missiles ?
Wasn't that enough of an indicator for Russia to start developing its own turbines back in the nineties ?
There is no justification for gas turbines, and I stand by my statement because Russia had to have strategic planning and even in the 1990s it was clear in what direction Ukroshitstan was going.
The bottom line is that corvettes 20380 and frigates 22350 are universal ships and have anti-submarine, anti-ship and anti-aircraft weapons, as well as a cannon and a helicopter. Project 20385 corvettes have significantly raised the "ladder" and these corvettes have a 33,3% increased number of missiles from the Redut system compared to 20380 and because those corvettes have one UKSK they have the ability to launch the P-800 Onyx, 3M-14 Kalibr or 3M54 Kalibr, and therefore the "Otvet" missile-torpedo. This most likely also means the possibility of new 3M22 hypersonic missiles could be launched from 20385 corvettes.

OK ALAMO, this picture is for you; on the left the project 22800 Karakurt and on the right 21631 Buyan-M.

Wasn't that enough of an indicator for Russia to start developing its own turbines back in the nineties ?

Nobody else was buying their ship gas turbine propulsion systems and Russia was also the main user of Motor Sichs' helicopter engines for Hinds and Hips and Havocs and Hokums and Helix and also the bigger engines for Halos.

The Orcs were arseholes but who knew they would commit suicide and cut off their biggest customer?

In the 1990s you could probably predict they would be total dicks but there were thousands of other technologies that also needed to be developed in Russia that were a higher priority at the time... helicopter engines were more important than engines for new ships considering how few new ships they were building anyway.

It is very good that Klimov managed to get helicopter engines into production in an improved design and into production, and they are still working on bigger engines for bigger aircraft (helicopters and transport planes).

They will build solutions for their other gas turbine powered corvettes and frigates but if destroyers and larger ships are going to be nuclear powered then they won't be needing an enormous number of ship propulsion systems anyway.

Next gen stuff seem to be going to electric motors anyway in ships and subs and aircraft and ground vehicles (tanks, IFVs, APCs, prime movers, buses, trucks, cars, bikes, trains, etc etc etc).

They can't invest in everything at once and have to make choices.

They are likely going to need a civilian fleet of ships as well to sell goods around the world without fear of western sanctions.

They are going to have to expand and upgrade all of their existing shipyards... military and civilian.

The UEC Saturn M90FR gas turbine is powerful enough to make destroyers. Just use four engines instead of two.

Once the PD-35 engine is available then that engine core might be repurposed for naval engines. Similarly to what the Brits did with the Rolls Royce MT30. That engine should have 35 MW power instead of 20 MW and would enable a new generation of ship designs.

As for cruisers they can simply use nuclear power. Russia has the RITM-200 nuclear reactor.

ALAMO wrote:

Podlodka77 wrote:
* FOREVER GOODBYE to ;Small missile ships of projects 21631 and 22800, as well as patrol ships of project 22160; insufficient sailing range, there are only extremely close range systems (at 21631 with Gibka system) and only Pantsir (22800 project and from the third ship), while 22160 has nothing. There are no anti-submarine weapons on those ships, while there are no missile weapons on the 22160, but it does have a helicopter.

I seriously disagree.
Those ships play an extremely important role in the whole Russian Navy concept, and de facto closing a niche of impotence Russkie always had with their fleet. No matter how big it was, it was separated into different theatres of operation, unable to relocate quickly and achieve local dominance. This is how it was defeated by an inferior enemy.
Now with that mosquito fleet they finally achieved the flexibility and potential to make a secret, safe and effective dominance at demanded front.
Sure you can kill the locks, block the river routes, but you can do perfectly nothing to defeat a 2500km range cruise missiles carrier that sits hidden in the grassy shore of Ladoga lake and covers the whole of Europe with its missiles.
I like those small ugly motherf*ukers.
Like them a lot bro

Yes those small missile and other patrol boats are actually essential, but I do agree with Podlodka in that they need to pay serious attention to small ASW boats - replacing the ancient Grisha and Pauk boats. These ASW orientated boats should also be very useful against the type of drone attacks we've seen recently.

ALAMO wrote:They have much more ASW assets than the whole of NATO combined.
Poland's ancient trawlers are a valuable asset of a NATO ASW fleet due to lack of competition.
Russkie invest heavily in this class of vessels, 12700 type is being steadily built in numbers - 10 constructed and in various construction stage. Talking about 30-40 pcs of it, they mean it...

Yes you are talking about minesweepers here which are equally important no doubt. The class of boats I am talking about should be much more ASW orientated armed with 91R-1/2 ASW missiles and perhaps even small helicopter drones with Sonobuoy/charges.

Rodion_Romanovic wrote:
In soviet time, in addition to the ASW destroyers of the udaloy class (project 1155), they also had the small Grisha class (Project 1124) ASW corvettes, which are only marginally larger than the project 20800 karakurt class corvette (but they were too small to host a Ka-27 ASW helicopter)

The project 20380 Steregushchiy class are large multi-purpose corvettes which main task is ASW warfare, but they are also much bigger than the Grisha class (they have almost 3 times the displacement of the Project 1124).

If they want a smaller ASW corvette they could maybe think at a ASW modification of the Project 22160 patrol ship, or possibly even a ASW modification of the 800 tons displacement 20800 class corvette with maybe a helipad and a small hangar for a Ka226 helicopter.

Note: the Baynunah-class corvettes, which have about 900 tons displacement and are only 4 metres longer than the karakurt , have a hangar for a helicopter.

A modification of the Israeli Navy Sa'ar 4.5-class missile boat (Aliya subclass) currently in service with the Mexican mavy , 500 tons and 62 metres long (5 metres shorter than the karakurt) also has an helicopter hsngar

Apart from the Grishas they also had equally impressive ASW corvettes of the Parchim II pr.1331M class and the even smaller Pauk pr.12412 boats - all of these classes still serving today. As you mentioned they all lack helicopters, but I think UAV's can be a good substitute/alternative on these small boats like the Karakurt you've mentioned. The Pr.22160 would naturally be an excellent candidate as it already has the capacity for a Ka-27 size helicopter.

Soviet era Pr.10230 Bizon ASW corvette based on the smaller Pr.1239 Bora missile boat would have been interesting.



A much larger version also made it into model form that had some serious weapons on board incl 2 Ka-27 helicopters and S-300 missiles.

They don't just have the Ovtet for the UKSK launch tubes, they also have the Medvedev launcher... smaller, lighter and shorter ranged and only carries anti sub rockets carrying anti sub torpedoes but smaller and more compact and easy to fit on smaller vessels if required.

People here are talking about ASW or anti ship or other type small ships but their current corvettes are all multirole and would work in teams to hunt subs or ships or defend from aircraft or drones.

Not every corvette needs a helicopter and not all helicopters need to be 12 ton Helix sized aircraft... the Ka-226T is smaller and lighter and of course drone based helicopters could be used as well.

Some corrections and a bit more detail on the two SES type projects.

The Pr.10230 Tur (not Bizon) ASW corvette was an early 1980's project.
The Tur had a displacement of around 1600 tons with a speed of around 55 knots.
Armament included Kinzhal and Vodapod missiles, 1x AK-176 and 2x AK-630 guns and hanger for 1x Ka-27 helicopter



The much larger SES type boat Pr. 10210 Bizon was a much earlier project dating back to the 70's but the project was terminated in 1981.
The Bizon had a displacement of around 5000 tons with a speed of 50 knots.
Armament included the S-300F Fort, Kinzhal and Vodapod and Ura missiles. It also packed Kortik/Kashtan CIWS and a AK-176 gun plus 2x Ka-27 helicopters.

ALAMO wrote:

Mir wrote:
Yes you are talking about minesweepers here which are equally important no doubt. The class of boats I am talking about should be much more ASW orientated armed with 91R-1/2 ASW missiles and perhaps even small helicopter drones with Sonobuoy/charges.

One of the main reasons the Soviets used a waste fleet of small ASW corvettes was a fact, that they had a problem with constructing more universal platforms.
Parchim you have mentioned was a downgraded German build chaser with a very specified role - it was constructed to hunt down small subs in the shore zone. That was Baltic first of all. The Baltic is a really shitty sea for ASW warfare, as it combines lots of thermoclines with different zones of salt and even oxygen content in the water. That is why a dipping sonar is a must, and that was the smallest ship that had one.
Now all Russian ships that use USKS can carry ASW weaponry, and all of them do have a serious sonar suite. So a niche closed seriously for a need of having narrowly specialized ASW corvettes. A few years ago they have trained a new tactics, with 22160 corvette being a group lider responsible for getting targeting data and distribute them among the older ships lacking modern sonar suite.

These type of corvettes and patrol boats were all really designed for coastal and harbour protection against submarines and saboteurs. I think it is an important niche.

The Buyan, Grachonok and probably the Karakurt class boats have some towed anti-saboteur sonar but they don't rally have any weapons to use against submarines though. They will have to call a friend.

The more serious Krivak/Burevestnik frigates (corvettes in reality)were really good sea keeping ships. They were supposed to hunt for submarines with the Moskva helicopter carrying cruisers and the Kiev class carriers which had plenty of helicopters on board.

You can design a coastal ASW defense system in the same format - but all of them should have the capacity to kill a sub.

Plus you should not look at them individually because they will work together as a team in a group to perform multiple roles.

Lots of their corvettes just carried anti ship missiles and were to stop any attempt at landing anywhere they could get to.

Corvettes without sonar can still operate helicopter and drones and towed dipping sonars of a range of types.

An important use for Corvettes is to help protect other vessels looking for enemy subs too.

Saying one type of corvette is useless because it does not have extensive anti sub equipment, is like saying a sniper is useless because he doesn't have an anti tank missile.

lancelot wrote:There is no comparison really. You are comparing a navy which is in full swing in terms of production to one which is still trying to come up with the proper ship types to manufacture. Why don't you look at the Chinese ships from 1990-2010 then? It was a succession of pathetically obsolete ships, mishmashed designs, and poor designs in general made in homeopathic amounts until they came up with the ship types they have in service at the moment. I think the major mistake Russia made was believing they could import weapon components. After the Chinese were hit with sanctions following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 they have had severe restrictions on weapons imports. Given that experience and their previous experience with the Soviets withdrawing technical support after the Sino-Soviet split they basically demand the capability to license manufacture anything they use in their own military to any large degree. That is where I think Russia failed with its imports of MTU engines and Ukrainian gas turbines. They should have never put those in the critical production path without demanding tech transfer first.

I think the Russian industry responded quite quickly to the gas turbine shortage. 5 years is the typical minimum for a project like that to enter production. Ramping up to mass production will take longer. The main issue is the goddamned diesels.

Interesting. What do you think was the reason Russia didn't want to license produce german marine diesels? In the 2000s russia license produced catherine thermals so the germans theoretically should have allowed it. The better question is why the Russian army insisted on license production and tech transfer of western components, but the russian navy didn't care. Was it just financial stinginess?

Was it just financial stinginess?

At the time they were buying these engines they were not buying thousands, only a couple per year if that and so it really didn't make sense to licence produce them.

The Thermal Imagers were different... thermals can be installed in almost every vehicle and every weapon to turn that platform or weapon into a day night all weather system so you could be making millions of them... and the primary reason they started licence producing them was so they could put them in vehicles they were selling to India... export equipment and vehicles got those thermals before the Russian military started using them for themselves.

Thales could also get the Russian companies to make thermals cheaper than they could make them in France so they could sell them to third parties and being cheaper to make in Russia meant an even bigger profit margin for Thales in those sales.

Obviously Russia would not be making engines for German companies to sell to third parties because Germany wanted to make that money to support their own economy.

It is also not stinginess when there is no money to spend.

The Russian Navy never had money to waste.