miketheterrible Fri Apr 06, 2018 4:31 pm
Its really no different than S-300PMU operations in NATO countries.
Essentially, some real basic stuff to the radar are different from export variant to domestic. IFF transponders would be different as example. Some other basic components like the software and the encryption would be different. In the end, all aspects are the same - Radar and guidance systems with their frequency and amount of power being used. In this regard, jamming and the like can be done by any system so long as it has much greater energy output than the guidance/tracking radar itself. If they had access to the necessary information like the IFF transponders (being able to then effectively spoof it if they had that info) is where the secrecy is. There really isn't much secrecy behind how radar works, how all that information is transferred, so on so forth. Only thing is, they let off signals. And in these cases, the signals can be encrypted making it hard to spoof it if you cant crack the encryption fast enough. That encryption works for both the IFF transponder and the guidance system for the missiles. In this regard, I believe both can be easily changed - in this case, Turkey will get an IFF transponders based upon their own design thus they wont know what Russia's variant or China's variant is so they cant spoof it. Same with the encryption from datalink between missile and guidance radar - it more than likely would be changed to fit the need of said nation.
That is why Russia said it could even be sold to the United States. No different if US sold Patriot SAM's to Russia. They can copy it, what not. But so long as they don't have that information, the encryption and what not, there really isn't much to work on.
How Israel was able to defeat Arab AD systems in the past, was that someone in the soviet union provided info to Israel on such informations, making it easy for them to spoof or jam the systems.
This is my understanding of it. I could be wrong entirely. But this is what I read/heard.