Russian Navy: Status & News #3

JohninMK wrote:with the Ashot-7 vessel… ]

JohninMK wrote:One suspects that they really really don't want this ship to fall into foreign hands by way of salvage!

MOSCOW (Sputnik) — A Russian Black Sea Fleet research vessel, the Liman, received a hull breach in the sea 40 kilometers from the Bosphorus, the crew were not injured, the Russian Defense Ministry said in a statement Thursday.

"On April 27 at 11.53 Moscow time, in the southwestern part of the Black Sea, 40 kilometers northwest of the Bosphorus Strait, the research vessel of the Black Sea Fleet, the Liman, as a result of a collision with the Ashot-7 vessel… received a starboard hole below the waterline. No one was injured among the crew. The crew… are fighting for the survivability of the vessel," the statement said.

Black Sea Fleet vessels and an An-26 plane with rescuers were sent to assist the sailors.

9132 tons Dvinitsa-50 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/54458/
7250 tons Vologda-50 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/54485/
4509 tons Kyzyl-60 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/55363/
2099 tons Kazan-60 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/16128/

14165 tons Yauza Project 550 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/20520/ (Used in Syria now for the same role, with a number of amphibious landing ships)

7230 tons Yamal Project 596P http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17555/
6300 tons Akademik Kovalev Project 20180/20181 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42639/
4473 tons Daugaba Project 1791 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/33930/
3947 tons Pechora Project 740 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/14386/
1985 tons VTR-79 Project 20360 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/3205/
1985 tons Viktor Cherokov Project 20360 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/60772/
1915 tons Yrghiz Project 572 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42760/
1915 tons Bira Project 572 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/716/
1243 tons VTR-139 Project 1807 modified to armament transport ship http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/35262/
1192 tons VTR-140 Project 773 modified to dry-cargo ship http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/26719/

6300 tons Akademik Makeev Project 20180/20181 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/59962/ (Under construction, expected by 2018)
2500 tons ?????? Project 20360 http://russianships.info/eng/support/project_20360.htm (Under construction expected by 2019)
2500 tons ?????? Project 20360 http://russianships.info/eng/support/project_20360.htm (Under construction expected by 2020)

6000 tons Ivan Gren Project 11711 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/25277/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Under construction, expected by 2017)
6000 tons Pyotr Morgunov Project 11711 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/59957/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Under construction, expected by 2018)
4012 tons Konstantin Olshanskiy Project 775 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/4752/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Captured to Ukaine, potential introduction)
4012 tons Oslyabya Project 775 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17125/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Reparation contracted)

JohninMK wrote:

eehnie wrote:From previous posts it is possible to recover the data about the alternatives to the four ships purchased for the operation in Syria present today in the Russian Navy.


Russia addopted this solution of the purchase of ships (in my view wrongly because it opens the door to doubts about the capacity of the fleet), but never had, and will not have in the future, a problem of sea transport capacity for an operation like this of Syria.

I understand what you are saying but it is clear to me that the MoD did the correct thing. There is little known surplus of ships of this type in the RuN and the Syrian Express was a particular and well defined task. I doubt anyone with any knowledge of shipping would have questioned the move, let alone making it a reason to doubt the RuN's capacity. In a way, it shows quite the reverse, flexible and pragmatic thinking.

Why pull in ships from the other Fleets and wear them out ahead of time, when for very few $ they could buy in a few near end of life correct specification ships, already in the area, and run them into the ground? They haven't even rushed the Ivan Gren into service.

eehnie wrote:

JohninMK wrote:

eehnie wrote:From previous posts it is possible to recover the data about the alternatives to the four ships purchased for the operation in Syria present today in the Russian Navy.


Russia addopted this solution of the purchase of ships (in my view wrongly because it opens the door to doubts about the capacity of the fleet), but never had, and will not have in the future, a problem of sea transport capacity for an operation like this of Syria.

I understand what you are saying but it is clear to me that the MoD did the correct thing. There is little known surplus of ships of this type in the RuN and the Syrian Express was a particular and well defined task. I doubt anyone with any knowledge of shipping would have questioned the move, let alone making it a reason to doubt the RuN's capacity. In a way, it shows quite the reverse, flexible and pragmatic thinking.

Why pull in ships from the other Fleets and wear them out ahead of time, when for very few $ they could buy in a few near end of life correct specification ships, already in the area, and run them into the ground? They haven't even rushed the Ivan Gren into service.

The ships of the Russian Navy for sea transport of dry cargo, not used in the Syrian operation, are listed in the second box of my previous comment. This is something public, and as consequence it is easy to see that Russia had always enough sea transport capacity for this operation in Syria. In reality, who has a real knowledge of the data comes to this conclusion, which is obvious. Even in this case, this means not approval or disapproval of the purchase of four ships, because having enough capacity for it, the purchase was also in the mix of the valid options.

The problem here is that there is people that take profit of the purchase to put in doubt the capability of the Russian Navy to afford completely the operation in Syria. This people plays with the lack of knowledge, saying that there are not ships, but even with the data that I posted in front they continue with the doubt. Against it, my opinion is that it would have been better to avoid the purchase. I see the purchase as a mistake, likely the worst in the Russian operation, but being the worst is small, very small.

Here, after the capacity of the Russian Navy was questioned, we have the data in front. Time to see who can aknowledge now that Russia has the capacity and who keeps saying that Russia purchased the ships by lack of capacity.

SeigSoloyvov wrote:

eehnie wrote:

JohninMK wrote:

eehnie wrote:From previous posts it is possible to recover the data about the alternatives to the four ships purchased for the operation in Syria present today in the Russian Navy.


Russia addopted this solution of the purchase of ships (in my view wrongly because it opens the door to doubts about the capacity of the fleet), but never had, and will not have in the future, a problem of sea transport capacity for an operation like this of Syria.

I understand what you are saying but it is clear to me that the MoD did the correct thing. There is little known surplus of ships of this type in the RuN and the Syrian Express was a particular and well defined task. I doubt anyone with any knowledge of shipping would have questioned the move, let alone making it a reason to doubt the RuN's capacity. In a way, it shows quite the reverse, flexible and pragmatic thinking.

Why pull in ships from the other Fleets and wear them out ahead of time, when for very few $ they could buy in a few near end of life correct specification ships, already in the area, and run them into the ground? They haven't even rushed the Ivan Gren into service.

The ships of the Russian Navy for sea transport of dry cargo, not used in the Syrian operation, are listed in the second box of my previous comment. This is something public, and as consequence it is easy to see that Russia had always enough sea transport capacity for this operation in Syria. In reality, who has a real knowledge of the data comes to this conclusion, which is obvious. Even in this case, this means not approval or disapproval of the purchase of four ships, because having enough capacity for it, the purchase was also in the mix of the valid options.

The problem here is that there is people that take profit of the purchase to put in doubt the capability of the Russian Navy to afford completely the operation in Syria. This people plays with the lack of knowledge, saying that there are not ships, but even with the data that I posted in front they continue with the doubt. Against it, my opinion is that it would have been better to avoid the purchase. I see the purchase as a mistake, likely the worst in the Russian operation, but being the worst is small, very small.

Here, after the capacity of the Russian Navy was questioned, we have the data in front. Time to see who can aknowledge now that Russia has the capacity and who keeps saying that Russia purchased the ships by lack of capacity.

Your list depends on two factors.

1. The sea condition of most of those vessels, not all of them is up to the standard for this.

2. What type of cargo they can load and safely transport.

So unless you have access the Russian navy in ways no one else here does.

Have you ever worked on large scale cargo transportation?. You can't just stick every dam thing in a ship hull there is rules and procedures one must follow.

so people having their doubts here is reasonable, what is unreasonable is you saying they are wrong when the only thing you have to base this off is some internet articles.

Personally, go and inspect every one of these ships, get some experience in the type of job that is being done here and then your words can be accepted has fact.

eehnie wrote:

SeigSoloyvov wrote:

eehnie wrote:

JohninMK wrote:

eehnie wrote:From previous posts it is possible to recover the data about the alternatives to the four ships purchased for the operation in Syria present today in the Russian Navy.


Russia addopted this solution of the purchase of ships (in my view wrongly because it opens the door to doubts about the capacity of the fleet), but never had, and will not have in the future, a problem of sea transport capacity for an operation like this of Syria.

I understand what you are saying but it is clear to me that the MoD did the correct thing. There is little known surplus of ships of this type in the RuN and the Syrian Express was a particular and well defined task. I doubt anyone with any knowledge of shipping would have questioned the move, let alone making it a reason to doubt the RuN's capacity. In a way, it shows quite the reverse, flexible and pragmatic thinking.

Why pull in ships from the other Fleets and wear them out ahead of time, when for very few $ they could buy in a few near end of life correct specification ships, already in the area, and run them into the ground? They haven't even rushed the Ivan Gren into service.

The ships of the Russian Navy for sea transport of dry cargo, not used in the Syrian operation, are listed in the second box of my previous comment. This is something public, and as consequence it is easy to see that Russia had always enough sea transport capacity for this operation in Syria. In reality, who has a real knowledge of the data comes to this conclusion, which is obvious. Even in this case, this means not approval or disapproval of the purchase of four ships, because having enough capacity for it, the purchase was also in the mix of the valid options.

The problem here is that there is people that take profit of the purchase to put in doubt the capability of the Russian Navy to afford completely the operation in Syria. This people plays with the lack of knowledge, saying that there are not ships, but even with the data that I posted in front they continue with the doubt. Against it, my opinion is that it would have been better to avoid the purchase. I see the purchase as a mistake, likely the worst in the Russian operation, but being the worst is small, very small.

Here, after the capacity of the Russian Navy was questioned, we have the data in front. Time to see who can aknowledge now that Russia has the capacity and who keeps saying that Russia purchased the ships by lack of capacity.

Your list depends on two factors.

1. The sea condition of most of those vessels, not all of them is up to the standard for this.

2. What type of cargo they can load and safely transport.

So unless you have access the Russian navy in ways no one else here does.

Have you ever worked on large scale cargo transportation?. You can't just stick every dam thing in a ship hull there is rules and procedures one must follow.

so people having their doubts here is reasonable, what is unreasonable is you saying they are wrong when the only thing you have to base this off is some internet articles.

Personally, go and inspect every one of these ships, get some experience in the type of job that is being done here and then your words can be accepted has fact.

Do you have something in support of your doubts? say it here... link it here... Do you have something else that we can add to the list?

In the other side, we have:

- All these ships are in active service in the Russian Navy.
- Ships publicly known, with many public pictures of them, including pictures of them working recently (some of them in the links that I posted in the list).
- Ships publicly known, with a good number of available data for them. Some of the ships even are new.
- Ships under 1000 tons have not been included in the list.
- The word capability has been used under its technical definition in my comments.

This was not exactly the purpose, but has been one of the conclusions. Before to say that Russia had the capability to afford completely the operation in Syria without need of purchases, I did an extensive research between the entire Russian combat fleet and the Russian auxiliary fleet (854 ships and submarines, without include those that go as equipment of bigger ships), I did the contrast about the state of these ships, and the result has been also included in the list (you can see the reference to the contract for the restoration of an amphibious landing ship of the Project 775).

This is open to arguments, but until now I only see doubts based on nothing or based only in the purchase (which reinforces my opinion about the purchase as a small mistake, in my opinion the worst in relative terms in the entire Russian operation in Syria, that reached high standards).

eehnie wrote:From previous posts it is possible to recover the data about the alternatives to the four ships purchased for the operation in Syria present today in the Russian Navy.

These are the data about the four ships purchased for the opeartion in Syria:

9132 tons Dvinitsa-50 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/54458/2099 tons Kazan-60 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/16128/

These are the potential alternatives present in the Russian Navy today and in the short term:

14165 tons Yauza Project 550 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/20520/ (Used in Syria now for the same role, with a number of amphibious landing ships)

7230 tons Yamal Project 596P http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17555/
6300 tons Akademik Kovalev Project 20180/20181 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42639/
4473 tons Daugaba Project 1791 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/33930/
3947 tons Pechora Project 740 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/14386/
1985 tons VTR-79 Project 20360 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/3205/
1985 tons Viktor Cherokov Project 20360 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/60772/
1915 tons Yrghiz Project 572 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42760/
1915 tons Bira Project 572 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/716/
1243 tons VTR-139 Project 1807 modified to armament transport ship http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/35262/
1192 tons VTR-140 Project 773 modified to dry-cargo ship http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/26719/

6300 tons Akademik Makeev Project 20180/20181 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/59962/ (Under construction, expected by 2018)
2500 tons ?????? Project 20360 http://russianships.info/eng/support/project_20360.htm (Under construction expected by 2019)
2500 tons ?????? Project 20360 http://russianships.info/eng/support/project_20360.htm (Under construction expected by 2020)

6000 tons Ivan Gren Project 11711 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/25277/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Under construction, expected by 2017)
6000 tons Pyotr Morgunov Project 11711 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/59957/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Under construction, expected by 2018)
7250 tons Vologda-50 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/54485/
4509 tons Kyzyl-60 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/55363/

4012 tons Konstantin Olshanskiy Project 775 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/4752/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Captured to Ukaine, potential introduction)
4012 tons Oslyabya Project 775 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17125/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Reparation contracted)

Ships marked with the same color, different of black, are of almost the same size.

Russia addopted this solution of the purchase of ships (in my view wrongly because it opens the door to doubts about the capacity of the fleet), but never had, and will not have in the future, a problem of sea transport capacity for an operation like this of Syria.

Militarov wrote:To start with, active status does not mean its available for use. You have active ships that havent sailed in years due to various reasons, that is same everywhere. You cant leave two fleets without transport capabilities to support one operation.

Also i am not sure, again, if you understand how badly transport of this frequency affects lifespan of the ships. Ships that RuNav would normally use 5-6-7 more years would be ruined in a year and half, and then what? Ship is not Folkswagen Golf 2, you cant drive it around till your registration expires no matter in how bad shape it is.

Okay, nice 854 ships, and how many of them have actually sailed in past 2 years? 250? 300? How many of them are even an actual ships and not floating cranes, harbour tugs, landing boats etc, etc?

Stop flooding forum with crap seriously. I already gave you a link if you think you have something to object onto Russian naval doctrine, because apparently they are all imbeciles and dont know how many ships and of what type they have on their disposal.

eehnie wrote:These are the data about the four ships purchased for the opeartion in Syria:

9132 tons Dvinitsa-50 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/54458/
7250 tons Vologda-50 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/54485/
4509 tons Kyzyl-60 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/55363/
2099 tons Kazan-60 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/16128/

These are the potential alternatives present in the Russian Navy today and in the short term:

14165 tons Yauza Project 550 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/20520/ (Used in Syria now for the same role, with a number of amphibious landing ships)

7230 tons Yamal Project 596P http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17555/
6300 tons Akademik Kovalev Project 20180/20181 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42639/
4473 tons Daugaba Project 1791 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/33930/
3947 tons Pechora Project 740 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/14386/
1985 tons VTR-79 Project 20360 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/3205/
1985 tons Viktor Cherokov Project 20360 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/60772/
1915 tons Yrghiz Project 572 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42760/
1915 tons Bira Project 572 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/716/
1243 tons VTR-139 Project 1807 modified to armament transport ship http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/35262/
1192 tons VTR-140 Project 773 modified to dry-cargo ship http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/26719/

6300 tons Akademik Makeev Project 20180/20181 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/59962/ (Under construction, expected by 2018)
2500 tons ?????? Project 20360 http://russianships.info/eng/support/project_20360.htm (Under construction expected by 2019)
2500 tons ?????? Project 20360 http://russianships.info/eng/support/project_20360.htm (Under construction expected by 2020)

6000 tons Ivan Gren Project 11711 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/25277/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Under construction, expected by 2017)
6000 tons Pyotr Morgunov Project 11711 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/59957/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Under construction, expected by 2018)
4012 tons Konstantin Olshanskiy Project 775 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/4752/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Captured to Ukaine, potential introduction)
4012 tons Oslyabya Project 775 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17125/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Reparation contracted)

marat wrote:Some of the ships that you have inserted on that list are not finished jet, or do not even belong tu RuNavy, some are even 70 years old (project 572) !!!

You seriously want to use this ship ???