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I have been the first critic, but where there is some reason to be critic, I will not agree with unfair critics about the lack of capacity or the bad state of the fleet of auxiliary ships of the Russian Navy, and less from people with a proved wrong trajectory here, like this Militarov.
If it was not clear enough, the best to prove what I'm saying and rule out some habitual negative mantras, is to expand the list posted before with more ships available for the Russian Navy. And also to include the ships under construction today looking at the future capability of the Russian Navy fleet.
As said, surely the weakest part of the entire Russian operation in Syria has been the purchase of 4 cargo ships:
As said, I think it was not necessary for a relatively small operation like this of Syria. With 523 auxilary ships today for many roles, without count these 4 cargo ships, the need of the purchase seems not a real need. These 523 cover multiple roles, but I think Russia would have enough dry cargo and armament transport ships to this operation without a purchase:
Ships marked with the same color, different of black, are of almost the same size.
Some questions used by previous commenters to justify the purchase that in fact mean bigger critizism to Russian Navy than mine:
1.- How many classic cargo ships Ru navy have in that 523 au ships? And how many of them could be taken from their daily missions and be sent to Syria for years? Who will do their job during this Syrian campain? How many of them are big enought to be usefull in supplying Syria mission?
The previous list and some detail about ships in bad state explained later answer this question in the refered to the ships over 1000 tons. Also it would be possible to include in the list one of the ships captured to Ukraine, but I did not. This one:
There are 34 ships more under 1000 tons in the Russian Navy, including both the combat fleet (310 ships) and auxiliary fleet (523 ships), but without include the Coast Guard fleet and other non military gubernmental ships.
In the 525 there are
2.- Are you aware that Russia have to supply not only its forces in Syria, but SAA as well?
Obviously yes. Russia is doing it, not? Is doing it with the group of ships deployed to Syria (60 ships deployed, 23 of them auxiliary, plus some temporary participations) that includes a good amount of amphibious landing ships and these 4 cargo ships purchased for the campaign.
The supplying proces of the Russian forces and Syria would not be damaged just replacing these 4 purchased ships by other ships not deployed in Syria until now that are cited in the previous lists.
3.- It has been an inappropriate use of amphibious landing ships in Syria?
No. Amphibious landing ships as military concept are sea transport ships with some additional armament and with the capability of amphibious landing, to use when there are not proper infrastructure for landing. But of course these ships are not to be used only on amphibious landing operations. These ships are combat transport ships that can be used in every operation of military sea transport in contested areas. This is a fairly proper use.
While I included not the landing amphibious ships deployed to Syria, I included the amphibious landing ships under construction to show properly the future sea transport capabilty of the Russian Navy.
4.- It has been here a problem of lack of capacity in the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy to justify the purchase of these 4 ships?
No. Obviously looking at the list the available capability was superior to the purchased capability. The Russian Navy has today, and also had in 2015 the necessary to afford a campaign like this of Syria.
If the UK was in need of purchasing external ships for the campaign in the Falkland Island, it proves not that this was good or bad, it only proves that the UK Navy is less capable than the Russian Navy. And more taking into account the difference of size of both campaigns.
5.- It has been here a problem of bad state of the ships of the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy?
No. In the previous list have been ruled out the ships looking in bad state. The ships included seem active at this point, despite to be veteran in some cases. But do not think I ruled out many ships looking in bad state. I only ruled out one, that is not an auxiliary ship:
The situation is not like the people say. There are old ships, there are auxiliary ships waiting to be scrapped, but it affects not to the capability of the Russian Navy to develop an operation like this of Syria.
6.- It makes sense the purchase of ships to keep and reserve the oldest ships of the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy for future operations and to wait until new ships be built?
No. It not makes sense because of two reasons.
First, because the oldest ships are to be used. If necessary, the same purchase would be possible in the future, when some of the current ships are totally exhausted, if new ships are not then available. Also in some years the ships that would be purchased would be more modern than the ships purchased now.
Second, because in the future, the lack of ships for the role is not guaranted, looking at the ships under construction now. Some big ships are expected to come in the short term, and even some delay would not be critic. Plus, some additional ship can be ordered. As consequence, the need of a purchase like this in the future is not guaranted.
7.- Why are not used and built ships like the Yauza of the Project 550?
Basically because it is a giant ship, that must be used near its full capability to be economically competitive. It means giant loses in case of sinking.
8.- Can Russia resale the ships recovering the money?
Yes. Russia did not purchase these ships paying overprice.
9.- Why this has been the weakest part of the whole campaign in Syria?
Because it opens the door to all these boring negative mantras habitually used in relation with the Russian Navy. The Russian navy can make shut-up all them easily eliminationg these 4 purchased cargo ships from the campaign and replacing them with other own ships available. The people should be recognizing the hability of the Russian Navy of affording a whole operation like this by its own means instead of having to support all this critizism about their overall capabilities. This has been a little unnecessary mistake that helps to hidde the real merit of the Russian Navy.
If it was not clear enough, the best to prove what I'm saying and rule out some habitual negative mantras, is to expand the list posted before with more ships available for the Russian Navy. And also to include the ships under construction today looking at the future capability of the Russian Navy fleet.
As said, surely the weakest part of the entire Russian operation in Syria has been the purchase of 4 cargo ships:
9132 tons Dvinitsa-50 http://www.kchf.ru/ship/vspomog/dvinitsa50.htm
7250 tons Vologda-50 http://www.kchf.ru/ship/vspomog/vologda50.htm
4509 tons Kyzyl-60 http://www.kchf.ru/ship/vspomog/kyzyl60.htm
2099 tons Kazan-60 http://www.kchf.ru/ship/vspomog/kazan60.htm
As said, I think it was not necessary for a relatively small operation like this of Syria. With 523 auxilary ships today for many roles, without count these 4 cargo ships, the need of the purchase seems not a real need. These 523 cover multiple roles, but I think Russia would have enough dry cargo and armament transport ships to this operation without a purchase:
14165 tons Yauza Project 550 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/20520/ (Also in Syria now)
7230 tons Yamal Project 596P http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17555/
6300 tons Akademik Kovalev Project 20180/20181 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42639/
4473 tons Daugaba Project 1791 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/33930/
3947 tons Pechora Project 740 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/14386/
1985 tons VTR-79 Project 20360 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/3205/
1985 tons Viktor Cherokov Project 20360 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/60772/
1915 tons Yrghiz Project 572 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/42760/
1915 tons Bira Project 572 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/716/
1243 tons VTR-139 Project 1807 modified to armament transport ship http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/35262/
1192 tons VTR-140 Project 773 modified to dry-cargo ship http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/26719/
6300 tons Akademik Makeev Project 20180/20181 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/59962/ (Under construction, expected by 2018)
2500 tons ?????? Project 20360 http://russianships.info/eng/support/project_20360.htm (Under construction expected by 2019)
2500 tons ?????? Project 20360 http://russianships.info/eng/support/project_20360.htm (Under construction expected by 2020)
6000 tons Ivan Gren Project 11711 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/25277/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Under construction, expected by 2017)
6000 tons Pyotr Morgunov Project 11711 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/59957/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Under construction, expected by 2018)
4012 tons Konstantin Olshanskiy Project 775 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/4752/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Captured to Ukaine, potential introduction)
4012 tons Oslyabya Project 775 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17125/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (To be repaired)
Ships marked with the same color, different of black, are of almost the same size.
Some questions used by previous commenters to justify the purchase that in fact mean bigger critizism to Russian Navy than mine:
1.- How many classic cargo ships Ru navy have in that 523 au ships? And how many of them could be taken from their daily missions and be sent to Syria for years? Who will do their job during this Syrian campain? How many of them are big enought to be usefull in supplying Syria mission?
The previous list and some detail about ships in bad state explained later answer this question in the refered to the ships over 1000 tons. Also it would be possible to include in the list one of the ships captured to Ukraine, but I did not. This one:
4012 tons Konstantin Olshanskiy Project 775 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/4752/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (Captured to Ukraine, potential introduction)
There are 34 ships more under 1000 tons in the Russian Navy, including both the combat fleet (310 ships) and auxiliary fleet (523 ships), but without include the Coast Guard fleet and other non military gubernmental ships.
In the 525 there are
2.- Are you aware that Russia have to supply not only its forces in Syria, but SAA as well?
Obviously yes. Russia is doing it, not? Is doing it with the group of ships deployed to Syria (60 ships deployed, 23 of them auxiliary, plus some temporary participations) that includes a good amount of amphibious landing ships and these 4 cargo ships purchased for the campaign.
The supplying proces of the Russian forces and Syria would not be damaged just replacing these 4 purchased ships by other ships not deployed in Syria until now that are cited in the previous lists.
3.- It has been an inappropriate use of amphibious landing ships in Syria?
No. Amphibious landing ships as military concept are sea transport ships with some additional armament and with the capability of amphibious landing, to use when there are not proper infrastructure for landing. But of course these ships are not to be used only on amphibious landing operations. These ships are combat transport ships that can be used in every operation of military sea transport in contested areas. This is a fairly proper use.
While I included not the landing amphibious ships deployed to Syria, I included the amphibious landing ships under construction to show properly the future sea transport capabilty of the Russian Navy.
4.- It has been here a problem of lack of capacity in the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy to justify the purchase of these 4 ships?
No. Obviously looking at the list the available capability was superior to the purchased capability. The Russian Navy has today, and also had in 2015 the necessary to afford a campaign like this of Syria.
If the UK was in need of purchasing external ships for the campaign in the Falkland Island, it proves not that this was good or bad, it only proves that the UK Navy is less capable than the Russian Navy. And more taking into account the difference of size of both campaigns.
5.- It has been here a problem of bad state of the ships of the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy?
No. In the previous list have been ruled out the ships looking in bad state. The ships included seem active at this point, despite to be veteran in some cases. But do not think I ruled out many ships looking in bad state. I only ruled out one, that is not an auxiliary ship:
4012 tons Oslyabya Project 775 http://fleetphoto.ru/ship/17125/ Landing ship, combat ship, not auxiliary (To be repaired)
The situation is not like the people say. There are old ships, there are auxiliary ships waiting to be scrapped, but it affects not to the capability of the Russian Navy to develop an operation like this of Syria.
6.- It makes sense the purchase of ships to keep and reserve the oldest ships of the auxiliary fleet of the Russian Navy for future operations and to wait until new ships be built?
No. It not makes sense because of two reasons.
First, because the oldest ships are to be used. If necessary, the same purchase would be possible in the future, when some of the current ships are totally exhausted, if new ships are not then available. Also in some years the ships that would be purchased would be more modern than the ships purchased now.
Second, because in the future, the lack of ships for the role is not guaranted, looking at the ships under construction now. Some big ships are expected to come in the short term, and even some delay would not be critic. Plus, some additional ship can be ordered. As consequence, the need of a purchase like this in the future is not guaranted.
7.- Why are not used and built ships like the Yauza of the Project 550?
Basically because it is a giant ship, that must be used near its full capability to be economically competitive. It means giant loses in case of sinking.
8.- Can Russia resale the ships recovering the money?
Yes. Russia did not purchase these ships paying overprice.
9.- Why this has been the weakest part of the whole campaign in Syria?
Because it opens the door to all these boring negative mantras habitually used in relation with the Russian Navy. The Russian navy can make shut-up all them easily eliminationg these 4 purchased cargo ships from the campaign and replacing them with other own ships available. The people should be recognizing the hability of the Russian Navy of affording a whole operation like this by its own means instead of having to support all this critizism about their overall capabilities. This has been a little unnecessary mistake that helps to hidde the real merit of the Russian Navy.
Last edited by eehnie on Mon Apr 10, 2017 3:08 am; edited 5 times in total
JohninMK
